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
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ART. I. — *God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.

WE called the attention of our readers to this volume by Dr. Bushnell, in our Review for October, 1849. In what we then said of it, we confined ourselves chiefly to the author's theory of language, and to some general remarks on the character and tendency of his doctrines; we propose in the present article, and those which may follow it, to enter into a more particular and thorough examination of his views and statements as a theologian, — not, indeed, because it is of much consequence to the community what are or are not the peculiar beliefs and opinions of Dr. Bushnell as an individual, but because the questions he raises are highly interesting in themselves, and of great importance in the present state of theology among those outside of the Catholic Church.

The topics on which Dr. Bushnell discourses in this volume are the Divinity of Christ, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and what he calls "Dogma and Spirit in general." His work is far from being methodical, or approaching the character of a systematic treatise on all or any one of the matters upon which it touches. In consequence, we shall be unable to throw our review of it into that methodical and systematic shape which we always prefer when it is possible. The most philosophical and logical method of considering the work would be to com-

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mence, after what we have said of the Preliminary Dissertation, which contains in some measure the principles of the author's theory, with his last Discourse, entitled "Dogma and Spirit," and then proceed to the consideration of what is said on each of the particular mysteries discussed. But this would compel us to recast the author's whole work, and reduce it to its logical order, — a labor which we are unwilling to bestow upon it, and which would oblige us to begin with the discussion of some knotty metaphysical questions, not at all to the taste of the majority of our readers, and which we would spare them, after the very unreasonable amount of metaphysics inflicted upon them during the last year. We shall follow, therefore, the method of the author himself, and take up the topics on which we propose to comment, as far as practicable, in the order he presents them.

Dr. Bushnell, as our readers are aware, is a Congregationalist minister, the pastor of a congregation in Hartford, Connecticut, which calls itself Orthodox, that is, orthodox in the sense of the New England Puritans, which means, that they hold Calvinistic doctrines against Arminius, and nominally Catholic doctrines against Unitarians. His Discourses have found several opponents among the ministers of his own sect, and one or two attempts have been, directly or indirectly, made to convict him officially of teaching heresy. But thus far these attempts have failed, and he appears to stand at this moment, if not acquitted, at least unconvicted, of the charge of teaching doctrines really incompatible with those generally held by the Puritan churches of New England. This is a significant fact, and indicates either a greater departure from sound doctrine, or less respectable theological attainments, on their part, than most people have supposed.

Dr. Bushnell does not avowedly reject the sacred mysteries we have named as the subjects of his Discourses; he even professes to hold them, and assumes the air of defending them against Unitarians. The reality revealed or declared in them he makes the profession of believing; but he opposes the verbal and dogmatic statements of them hitherto received by Christian theologians. These statements are not the reality itself, and tend to conceal rather than to exhibit it; and he seems to think that, if the truth or the revealed reality could be divested of these state-

ments, and insisted on irrespective of them, all, whether Trinitarians or Unitarians, orthodox or heterodox, would be found to be of one mind, and to embrace substantially one and the same truth, or fundamental reality. This fundamental reality, the truth that underlies the orthodox statements of the mysteries, it is his aim to set forth, and he appears to hope by so doing to bring about a true Christian union between the various Protestant sects, and even between Protestants and Catholics. His method is to show the inadequacy, and the contradictory and absurd character, of the approved dogmatic statements of the several mysteries, and then to set forth the truth which those statements were intended to express, or the reality that underlies them. We have, then, two things to do,—to consider, 1. His representations and criticisms of the approved statements; and, 2. The mysteries as set forth in his own statements. We begin with the mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity.

“I speak of the more commonly accepted doctrine. What that doctrine is, I am well aware it would be exceedingly difficult to state. Let us pause here a moment, and see if we can find our way to any proximate conception of it.

“It seems to be agreed by the orthodox, that there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the Divine nature. These three persons, too, are generally regarded as belonging, not to the *machina Dei*, by which God is revealed, but to the very *esse*, the substantial being of God, or the interior contents of his being. They are declared to be equal; all to be infinite; all to be the same in substance; all to be one. But, as soon as the question is raised, what are we to intend by the word *person*, the appearance of agreement, and often of self-understanding, vanishes.

“A very large portion of the Christian teachers, together with the general mass of disciples, undoubtedly hold three real living persons in the interior nature of God; that is, three consciousnesses, wills, hearts, understandings. Certain passages of Scripture, supposed to represent the three persons as covenanting, coöperating, and co-presiding, are taken, accordingly, so to affirm, in the most literal and dogmatic sense. And some very distinguished living teachers are frank enough to acknowledge, that any intermediate doctrine, between the absolute unity of God and a social unity, is impossible and incredible; therefore, that they take the latter. Accordingly, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are, in their view, socially united only, and preside in that way, as a kind of celestial tritheocracy over the world. They are one God simply in the sense that the three will always act together, with a perfect consent, or

coincidence. This view has the merit that it takes consequences fairly, states them frankly, and boldly renounces orthodoxy, at the point opposite to Unitarianism, to escape the same difficulties. It denies that the three persons are 'the *same* in substance,' and asserts instead, three substances; and yet, because of its clear opposition to Unitarianism, it is counted safe, and never treated as a heresy. However, when it is applied to Christ and his work, then it breaks down into the same confusion as the more common view, reducing the Son to a really subordinate and subject position, in which the proper attributes of deity are no longer visible or supposable.

"But our properly orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the verbal profession of one person. They suppose themselves really to hold that God is one person. And yet they most certainly do not; they only confuse their understanding, and call their confusion faith. This I affirm, not as speaking reproachfully, but, as I suppose, on the ground of sufficient evidence, — partly because it cannot be otherwise, and partly because it visibly is not.

"No man can assert three persons, meaning three consciousnesses, wills, and understandings, and still have any intelligent meaning in his mind, when he asserts that they are yet one person. For, as he now uses the term, the very idea of a person is that of an essential, incommunicable monad, bounded by consciousness, and vitalized by self-active will, which being true, he might as well profess to hold that three units are yet one unit. When he does it, his words will, of necessity, be only substitutes for sense." — pp. 130–132.

How far the author here reproduces the statement of this sacred mystery approved by his own brethren, we shall not undertake to say; but we can assure him that he by no means states the doctrine as held by orthodox theologians. "No man," he says, "can assert three persons, meaning three consciousnesses, wills, and understandings, and still have any intelligent meaning in his mind, when he asserts that they are yet one person." Who, we would ask him, maintains the contrary? No Christian theologian ever asserts that there are in God three wills and three understandings, or three consciousnesses. Will and understanding are Divine attributes and follow the Divine nature, essence, or substance, which is indistinguishably one as opposed to plurality, and simple as opposed to complexity or composition. The distinction of persons asserted by Christian theology is not a distinction of the substance, essence, or

nature of God, for that is identically one and the same in each of the three Divine persons. So there are not three wills and understandings in God, but only one will and one understanding. Hence to allege, because we say there are three persons in God, that we hold there are three wills and three understandings in God, is to misrepresent us, and to reason very sophistically.

No doubt there is no will or understanding where there is no person; but this creates no difficulty, for God is not impersonal, and nobody pretends that we hold him to be so; indeed, so far from this, the charge against us is that we make him too personal, assigning him three persons instead of only one person. No doubt, again, that, where there are no will and understanding, that is to say, no rational nature or substance, there is no person conceivable. But this is no objection, for God is rational nature or substance, terminating as its last complement in the three Divine persons. The three persons do not stand disjoined from the Divine substance; they do not terminate each a portion or division of the Divine substance, but each has, so to speak, under it the whole undivided, indivisible, and indistinguishable substance, nature, or essence of God, so that we can say, as we are taught in the Athanasian creed, and in all the rigor of the terms too, "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God." The word *person* in itself, and taken distinctively, is not equivalent to the word *God*, for the term *God* expresses the three distinct persons in the unity of the Divine essence. Yet each person is God; and when we name either the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Ghost, without intending to mark the personal distinction, we name all that we do when we name explicitly the three persons, because the distinction of persons is *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, because the persons, though really distinguishable, are inseparable, and because the whole Divine nature, essence, or substance, as we have just said, is indivisibly under each person. Personality is properly the terminus or last complement of rational nature, and the Divine nature, which is rational nature, instead of terminating in a single personality, as is the case with us, terminates in three personalities, or persons.

The author says, again, "Our properly orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the

verbal profession of one person." With his permission, this is false ; for their precise *verbal* profession is, that God is three distinct persons in one Divine substance, or essence, and none of them ever say, or allow any one to say, that he is but one person. The author need not labor to prove that three are not one in the sense they are three, or that one is not three in the sense it is one, for nobody does or can believe it. Orthodox theologians are not so stupid as to contend that God is three persons, and yet but one person ; for they hold that of contraries one must always be false. What they teach is, that there is one God and one only God ; but that in this one God there is the distinction *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, of three real persons, and that these three real persons subsist without prejudice to the strict and absolute unity and simplicity of the Divine being, or essence. Distinctions *ad extra* undoubtedly destroy the absolute unity of the subject of which they are predicated, but distinctions *ad intra* do not, for we distinguish in the cube, for instance, length, breadth, and depth, and yet without prejudice to its unity. We bring not this to illustrate the distinction of persons in God, but to show that distinctions *ad intra* are not incompatible with unity of substance. This being so, we can assert, after having asserted the distinction of persons in God, the strict unity of the Divine essence, without denying the reality of that distinction. It is false, then, to say that, while professing three persons, we retain the verbal profession, or even the virtual profession, of one person only.

We do not prove, nor undertake to prove, by natural reason, that God is three real persons in one essence, or to explain how he can be so, nor are required to do it, for we profess it, not as a revelation of the intelligible, but as a declaration of the superintelligible, and we believe it not on the authority of natural reason, but on the authority of God declaring it. We know from revelation that God is distinctively three persons in one indistinguishable nature, and we therefore know that he can be, for we may always safely reason *ab esse ad posse*. All we undertake to do by reason, and all we are required to do, is to show, not that the dogma is true, nor that it is possible even, but that reason is utterly unable to show that it is impossible, or that it involves, as our author, in common with Unitarians, contends, a contradiction. As he accuses us of stating the

dogma, it is contradictory and absurd; as we ourselves really do state it, and as it is held by all Christian theologians, it is neither one nor the other. The author falsifies the orthodox statement, and his objections have force against it only as he falsifies it. If he falsifies it ignorantly, he is incompetent to speak on the subject, and should return to the seminary and recommence his theology; if he does it knowingly, and therefore wilfully, we leave it to himself to characterize his grave moral delinquency.

But let us hear our author still further.

“Methods are also resorted to, in the way of explaining God’s oneness in consistency with *his existence in three persons*, which show that his real oneness, as a spirit, is virtually lost. Thus it will sometimes be represented, that the three persons are three sets of attributes inhering in a common substance; in which method, the three intelligences come to their unity in a virtually inorganic ground; for if the substance supposed be itself of a vital quality, a life, then we have only more difficulties on hand, and not fewer; viz., to conceive a Living Person having in himself, first, the attributes of a person, and secondly, three more persons who are attributes in the second degree, — that is, attributes of attributes. It can hardly be supposed that any such monster is intended, in the way of bringing the three persons into unity; therefore, taking the ‘substance’ as inorganic, we have three vital personal Gods, and back of them, or under them, as their ground of unity, an Inorganic Deity. I make no objection here to the supposition, that the persons are mere attributes of a substance not themselves; I ask not how attributes can be real enough to make persons, and not real enough to make substances; I urge it not as an objection, that our very idea of person, as the word is here used, is that of a living substance manifested through attributes, — itself the most real and substantial thing to thought in the universe of God, — I only call attention to the fact that this theory of Divine unity, making it essentially inorganic, indicates such a holding of the three persons as virtually leaves no unity at all, which is more distinct than a profession of mental confusion on the subject.

“But, while the unity is thus confused and lost in the threeness, perhaps I should also admit that the threeness sometimes appears to be clouded or obscured by the unity. Thus, it is sometimes protested that, in the word *person*, nothing is meant beyond a ‘three-fold distinction’; though it will always be observed that nothing is really meant by the protestation, — that the protester goes on to speak and reason of the three, not as being only somewhats, or distinctions, but as metaphysical and real persons. Or, the three are sometimes compared, in their union, to the soul, the life principle,

and the body, united in one person, called a man, — an illustration which, if it has any point or appositeness at all, shows how God may be one and not three; for the life and the body are not persons. Or, if the soul be itself the life, and the body its external development, which is possible, then, in a yet stricter sense, there is but one person in them all.” — pp. 132, 133.

The several methods here enumerated are new to us, and we cannot forbear asking the author what *Tractatus de Trinitate* he has studied, and if in fact he is not somewhat accustomed, like his friend Theodore Parker, to substitute his own gloss for the text he studies, — what he fancies his author ought to say, for what he does say? It is a little remarkable that no neologist seems able to see *straight* or single, and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find an instance in which one faithfully reproduces the orthodox doctrine he proposes to controvert. No orthodox theologian ever confounds the distinction of persons with the distinction of attributes; for the distinction of persons is a real distinction *ad intra* in God, whereas the distinction of attributes is not a real distinction in God, but simply a distinction in our mode of conceiving the Divine Being, — what theologians call *distinctio rationis ratiocinalæ*, that is, a distinction which is only *eminently* or *equivalently* in God. In God himself there is no real distinction, as we have often occasion to repeat, between his essence and his attributes. He is not like creatures composed of matter and form, substance and quality, essence and attributes, for he is, as all our theologians teach, most pure and simple act. He is not wise, powerful, just, and good, in the sense of being endowed with the qualities expressed by these adjectives, but he is wisdom, power, justice, goodness, in their essence, their substance, and absoluteness. No one who maintains this, and all orthodox theologians do maintain it, can be such a simpleton as to call the Divine persons attributes, and still maintain that they are real distinctions in God. Consequently, the objection of the author falls of itself, for the doctrine against which it is urged is no better than a figment of his own brain.

“Thus, it is sometimes protested that, in the word *person*, nothing is meant beyond a ‘threefold distinction’; though it will always be observed that nothing is really meant by the protestation, — that the protester goes on to speak and reason of the three, not as being only somewhats, or distinc-

tions, but as metaphysical and real persons." Whether this is the case with some of the author's own brethren, or not, he knows better than we, and we confess we have noticed in some of the statements of Professor Stuart of Andover absurdities hardly less striking; but we find nothing of the sort among our own theologians. No orthodox theologian protests that the three Divine persons are merely *somewhats*, or distinctions, but all, without exception, maintain that the distinctions, the *somewhats*, are three really subsisting persons in the highest and most perfect sense of the word *person*. They assert, not only a distinction, but a distinction of real persons, and therefore never make the protest here alleged. The protest they make is, that by the distinction of persons they mean no distinction of the nature or essence of God, but simply a distinction in its terminus, so that the assertion of three persons, or *subsistentiæ*, does not deny the strict unity of nature or essence. To speak of the three persons, after this, as real persons, is no inconsistency, implies no contradiction. What the author means by a metaphysical person, and a metaphysical person that is real, we are not able even to conjecture. A metaphysical person that is real would, in our vocabulary, be a contradiction in terms. The distinction of persons, not of essence, in God, is not a metaphysical distinction, but a real distinction, and the Divine persons are real, not metaphysical, persons.

The illustration which the author notices and refutes, borrowed from the union of the soul, the life principle, and the body in man, the appositiveness of which escapes us, we have never seen adduced, and could never ourselves adduce it. And, indeed, of all illustrations borrowed from created things to help us to a conception of the sacred mystery, our theologians are in the habit of remarking, that they are unlike in more respects than they are like, and that none of them are ever to be taken throughout, or for more than some single point of resemblance, or analogy; for we must never hope, by our natural reason, to comprehend what is in itself this mystery of mysteries.

It is long since we have studied any of the standard works of the author's own sect, but we are inclined to believe that a serious study even of them would have given the author a more correct apprehension of the commonly received doctrine of the Trinity. His statements and ob-

jections induce us to believe that he has never even read a treatise on the Trinity written by an able theologian, and that his chief knowledge of the doctrine has been gathered from the writings of rationalists and infidels. When we had the misfortune and the shame of being, not only a Unitarian, but a Unitarian minister, we could have considered his representation of the doctrine substantially correct; but then, and we blush to say it, we knew the doctrine only from the statements of those whose very purpose it was to make it appear ridiculous and absurd. There is no resemblance between the doctrine of the Trinity we are taught by our theologians, and that we had learned from Unitarian and infidel books, reviews, and discourses; and not one of the objections we were accustomed to urge, or to hear urged, against the sacred mystery, has the least force or speciousness, when urged against the doctrine as actually taught by orthodox divines. The doctrine against which Unitarians and unbelievers direct their attacks is, for the most part, a creature of their own imagination, and their objections evince, when not their malice, only their own ignorance of the real matter in controversy. The high conceit the anti-orthodox have of their own intellectual superiority, on theological subjects, over their opponents, is founded on their ineptness. There are more things, and profounder things, in heaven and earth, than are dreamed of in their philosophy; and, generally, the *progress* which all classes of neologists so loudly boast consists precisely in their not apprehending the deeper sense of the theology from which they dissent, and their having taken up with a sense that lies altogether nearer the surface. We say this not idly, nor in a tone of sarcasm; but deliberately, with a full conviction, and ample evidence, of its truth. No neologist has ever yet gone back to the old theology, and penetrated its sense, but he has been struck with the depth, clearness, and justness of the views of the theologians at whom he had been previously accustomed to make himself merry.

But let us pass to the author's own statement and defence of the sacred mystery.

"To indicate, beforehand, the general tenor of my argument, which may assist you to apprehend the matter of it more easily, I here suggest that the trinity we seek will be a trinity that results of necessity from the *revelation* of God to man. I do not undertake

to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and, I think, for us all. I only insist that, assuming the strictest unity, and even simplicity, of God's nature, he could not be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures. These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms. As such, they bear, on the one hand, a relation to God, who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other, they are related to our human capacities and wants, being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or bring him within the discourse of reason; that also which is necessary to produce mutuality, or terms of conversableness, between us and him, and pour his love most effectually into our feeling." — pp. 136, 137.

"I do not undertake," says the author, "to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and, I think, for us all." Modesty is always commendable, but not always the affectation of modesty, as an excuse for not accepting, or even considering, a revealed dogma. The author attempts to make what the lawyers term a false issue, and to provide a means of escape, if accused of denying the Trinity, because asserting, as the Trinity of the Holy Scriptures, a trinity which lies, so to speak, below God, and is distinguishable from him. No theologian asks him to tell how the interior being of God is composed, for no one believes that it is composed at all. God is most simple and pure act, and therefore excludes from his interior being, or essence, all composition and all plurality of substance. How many times must we repeat this? Nobody questions, that to fathom the interior being of God is a matter too high for us; for every one concedes at once that it is superintelligible to every human intellect. But this is nothing to the purpose. The question relates, not to our ability or inability to fathom the essence of God, but to our ability or inability, with the aid of Divine grace, to apprehend and believe what God has himself supernaturally declared to us concerning his own interior being, or superintelligible essence. If God has made us a declaration concerning his own interior being, there is no modesty, no diffidence of our own abilities, in waving it aside, under the pretence that it is too high for us. God knows better than we do what is or is not too high for us; and to assume

that any thing which he has chosen to declare for our belief is too high for us to receive with filial submission, firm faith, and devout gratitude, is to assume to be wiser than God himself.

The author's subterfuge will avail as little as his affected modesty. The sacred dogma of the Trinity is admitted on all hands to involve a mystery, and if the Trinity be a mystery, it must necessarily pertain to the superintelligible, and therefore to the interior being, or essence, of God; for it is only in that interior being, or essence, that God is superintelligible. In respect to the universe, as author of the natural order, God is not superintelligible, but naturally intelligible; "for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, *are clearly seen*, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity."* We know from revelation, that God's superintelligibility is in his essence or interior being, in what he is in himself; for it is that which the blest see in the beatific vision, and which they can see only by the *ens supernaturale*, or the supernatural light of glory; and we know also from the same source, that what God is in himself is precisely what is declared to faith in the sacred mystery of the Trinity, on which depends the mystery of the Incarnation, and into which, as their principle and end, all the mysteries of our holy religion are resolvable at last. To exclude the Trinity, then, as pertaining to the essence or interior being of God, is to exclude the whole Christian order or new creation, in like manner as to exclude God as the intelligible would be to exclude the whole intelligible order, or natural universe.

No doubt God can in a supernatural or extraordinary way make us a revelation of facts and truths of the natural or intelligible order, and he has certainly done so in the Holy Scriptures, in which he has revealed historical events and precepts of the natural law. The more sober among American Unitarians, though admitting no other revelation, in some sense admit a revelation of this sort, and therefore claim to be Christian believers, and complain that injustice is done them when they are denied the Christian name, and placed in the ranks of those who reject the Gospel. A revelation of this sort has its value, and is indis-

* Rom. i. 20.

pensable to all but the very *élite* of our race; yet, in relation to the matter revealed, it is, as the Anglican Bishop Butler says, very falsely, of the Gospel, only “a republication of the law of nature.” It declares nothing not within the intelligible order, and manifestly contains, and it is the boast of Unitarians that it contains, no mystery; for mystery is not merely the unknown, differing from the known only in the simple fact of being unknown, but something which in its very nature is superintelligible to every human intelligence,—transcending not only the known, but, as to natural reason, the whole order of the knowable, and remaining, intrinsically considered, as much a mystery after it is revealed or declared as it was before. It is something which, in its very nature, cannot be intrinsically revealed, or laid open to us, in this state of existence, but only extrinsically declared. Now the question between believers and unbelievers turns, not on the supernatural or extraordinary revelation of the intelligible,—a revelation which, materially considered, Herbert of Cherbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, and Rousseau might as easily accept as Socinus, Priestley, Belsham, Henry Ware, or Dr. Channing,—but on the supernatural revelation or declaration of the superintelligible, of mystery, which even when revealed or declared is still mystery, and therefore apprehensible only extrinsically, with the understanding of faith, not intrinsically, with the understanding of knowledge. Evidently, then, to exclude the superintelligible from our theology is to exclude, along with the sacred mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity, the whole Christian order itself.

To explain Christianity so as to bring it within the intelligible order is to identify it with nature, to make it and nature one and the same thing, which, though attempted by all rationalists who do not wholly disavow the Christian name, is only an indirect and cowardly way of denying it entirely. The Christian order, as a distinct and substantive order, is conceivable only as transcending or lying above the order of nature, therefore only as superintelligible; for the order of nature and the intelligible order are one and the same. In the order of nature there may be much that is unknown, but there is nothing that is superintelligible; for the unknown in nature is of the same order with the known. The Christian order, then, since it is superintelligible, must be the creation of God in the sense in which

he is superintelligible. God, as we have seen, is superintelligible only in his interior being, in what he is in himself. The effect cannot be asserted without the cause, the creature without the creator, for otherwise atheism would be assertable, and men might be atheists without any impeachment of their common sense, which it would be both absurd and impious to maintain. Consequently, it is impossible to assert the Christian order at all, without asserting God's superintelligible essence or interior being — what he is in himself — as its cause, or creator. What he thus is, we of course, in this world, know only by faith, not by vision as do the blest in their beatified state; but still we must apprehend it in the same sense that we apprehend other declared mysteries, or we can assert nothing at all of the distinctive Christian order. Clearly, then, our author must exclude from his theology the whole Christian order, as distinguished from the order of nature, which is to deny it; or he must include in his theology some declaration of the interior being of God, or of what God is in himself. But he expressly excludes whatever pertains to the interior being of God, as too high for us, and places the only trinity he recognizes, not in God, but below him, and therefore really denies, whatever his intention, or the respectable name by which he may call himself, the Christian religion, and degrades himself to the category of unbelievers, if not to that of apostates.

The author complains in the outset of the orthodox statement, that it represents the Trinity as "belonging, not to the *machina Dei*, by which God is revealed, but to the very *esse*, the substantial being of God, or the interior contents of his being." The author here, as throughout, confounds the mystery of the Trinity with the mystery of the Incarnation, as we shall have frequent occasion hereafter to remark, — a blunder that would be unpardonable in the youngest catechumen. The Trinity is eternal; the Incarnation takes place in time. But let this pass for the present. The complaint is absurd. The author professes, sincerely or otherwise, to hold the substance, the reality, of the sacred dogma, as commonly received, and to object only to the form in which it is commonly stated or represented. If, then, he objects to a representation or form of expression which is essential to the statement of that substance or reality, he falls into the absurdity of objecting to a statement without

which he cannot state what he himself professes to hold. The substance or reality universally intended by the dogma as commonly received, does pertain to the very *esse* or substantial being of God, for it is God eternally subsisting as three distinct persons in the unity of one Divine nature, essence, or substance. To deny this is to deny, not merely the outward form, representation, or expression, but the inner form, the very substance and reality itself, of the sacred mystery. The author himself cannot deny this, for he professes to assert the proper Divinity of the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, against Unitarians, who maintain the contrary; and they cannot be properly Divine, that is, God, unless in God, for nothing below God, out of God, or distinguishable from God, is God. To represent the mystery as belonging, not to the substantial being of God, but to the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed, is to deny the very substance, the very reality, declared in the dogma, the precise thing the author professes he does not deny. He should complain of his own statement, then, not of the orthodox statement.

“The trinity we seek,” says the author, “will be a trinity that results of necessity from the revelation of God to man,” that is, a trinity that belongs, not “to the substantial being of God,” but to “the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed.” The author professes to be a Trinitarian minister; he is the pastor of a professed Trinitarian congregation, and is in this very discourse addressing an assembly of Congregational ministers, who profess to hold the Trinity, as commonly received by the Christian Church, to be a fundamental article of the Christian faith; and therefore the trinity he is seeking, at least the trinity he is bound by his own profession, as well as by the law of God, to seek, must be the true Christian Trinity,—the truth, substance, or reality intended by the orthodox statement of that sacred mystery. It is this he must ascertain, set forth, and defend, or fail in his avowed attempt. A trinity totally different from this, even if a truth, a reality, is nothing to the purpose. The moon in its order is as real as the sun, but not therefore is the sun the moon; nor is the moon the sun because it shines only by reflecting the light of the sun. The author may deny the Trinity, fall back on the intelligible, and be a Unitarian or an unbeliever, if he chooses, and is prepared to risk the consequences, but he

must not claim to be a believer in the Trinity in the orthodox sense, because he asserts another trinity, of an entirely different order. The Trinity of Christian orthodoxy is undeniably necessary, eternal, and self-existent, and no more dependent on creation or revelation than are the being and perfections of God in the sense in which he is naturally intelligible. Consequently, a trinity that is not necessary, self-existent, and eternal, whatever else it may be, is not the Trinity of Christian theology. The distinction of persons in the Godhead, understand what you will by it, is, if there is any truth at all in the orthodox dogma, an eternal distinction, and therefore it is perfectly idle to attempt to resolve it into certain imaginary or even real distinctions which originate in time, and have reference solely to God's manifestation of himself to man. A trinity, if such there be, that results of necessity from the revelation of God to man, is not eternal and self-existent, and therefore is not God, nor is God it; consequently, it is not the Trinity of Christian theology. If the author says there is no other trinity, he only denies the Trinity, and avows himself a Unitarian or an unbeliever, and vainly and falsely professes to hold the substance, the reality, of the orthodox dogma.

God "could not," says the author, "be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures." Understand the word *evolving* in a sense not pantheistic, and this is true, if we speak only of the Christian order; but not true if we speak of the intelligible order, for in this order God is, in regard to it, efficiently and sufficiently revealed, without being revealed as three distinct persons in one Divine substance. In the intelligible order, as author of nature, God is intelligible, his perfections, the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, from the creation, or foundation, of the world, being understood by the things that are made. Yet in this order he is not clearly seen as three persons. No trace, no intimation even, of God as Holy Trinity, is to be found by natural reason alone, in the whole natural order, and no man, left to that order alone, could ever have in the remotest degree even dreamed of the Trinity of Christian theology; because, as creator of the natural universe, the distinct persons have not each a distinct office, and therefore he is revealed in it to

natural reason only in the unity of his being. The simple fact, then, that men have entertained the belief that God is three distinct persons in one substance, of which the first hint is not in nature, is conclusive proof, if we consider it well, that it has been Divinely revealed; for that which in no sense exists cannot be an object of thought, and *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*. Error may be entertained, but error is always the misapprehension or perversion of truth, for pure falsehood, being pure negation, is absolutely unintelligible; but where there is no truth in the order of the error to be misapprehended or perverted, there can be no error. No man could have a false notion of God, if he had no notion of God at all. As there is nothing in nature that can in any sense suggest the notion of the Trinity to natural reason, uninstructed by revelation, the fact that the notion is entertained is a proof that it has been derived from God's supernatural revelation of himself, and is therefore a truth.

But if we pass from the order of nature to the Christian order, we concede that God cannot be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without being *revealed* as three distinct persons in one Divine substance. But why not? If he is not three persons in one substance, he can be; for it is absurd to suppose that God cannot efficiently or sufficiently reveal himself as he is, without revealing himself as he is not, or that in being revealed as he is not, he is efficiently or sufficiently revealed as he is. It will not do to say God can lie, or that he can tell the truth only by means of a falsehood. The reason, then, why God cannot "efficiently or sufficiently reveal himself to us without evolving a trinity of persons such as we meet in the Scriptures," must be, because he is in himself such three really subsisting persons in one essence, and because the Christian order is a new creation, in which God creates distinctively as three persons, or in which each of the Divine persons has a distinct office, so that it reveals him explicitly in his tri-personality, as the natural order reveals him explicitly only in the unity of his being. The natural universe is the work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but indistinctly, — "Let us make man," — the new creation is the work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost distinctly. And hence the baptismal formula is, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, *and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost*," in which the three persons are

distinctly marked. Here we may see the reason why the belief in the Holy Trinity is fundamental in Christian faith, and wherefore to deny the Trinity is not a secondary, but a primary or fundamental error,—the virtual denial of every truth pertaining to the Christian order; for it denies the whole new creation, by denying God in the sense in which he is its creator, its first and its final cause. It was not about a mere diphthong, as somebody has foolishly said, that the Catholics and Semiarrians contended in the fourth century, for in that diphthong was involved the whole question of Christianity or no Christianity. It is not for a mere scholastic subtilty, or vain theological distinction, that we contend against the Unitarians to-day, in contending for the sacred mystery of the Trinity, but for the whole Christian order, the whole new creation, against mere rationalism, naturalism, deism, or pantheism. Not without reason, then, does the orthodox believer hold him who denies or casts doubt on the sacred mystery of the Trinity to be no Christian believer, but the bitter enemy of the Christian religion and the souls of men.

Understood in the sense we here explain it, the author's assertion, that God "cannot be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us without evolving a trinity of persons such as we meet in the Scriptures," can be accepted. But this is not the sense in which he himself understands it. He does not mean that the three persons are evolved or manifested, because God is three eternally subsisting persons in one substance, but that the persons result from the revelation itself, or that God, in order to reveal himself efficiently or sufficiently to us, must assume three persons, or personate a father, a son, and a holy spirit. "These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation." The author holds, that God cannot reveal to us, in language, any thing of which we have not direct and immediate intuition, and that he can reveal himself only in so far as he exhibits himself to our intuitive apprehension. In order to do this, he must make use of such methods of self-exhibition as are adapted to the nature of our understanding. These methods are the personations, as in a drama, of the characters of a father, a son, and a holy spirit, and through these impersonations, by virtue of what we already know of the characters personated, as existing in the intelligible order, he extends our knowledge of himself. These persons

or personalities “bear, on the one hand, a relation to God who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other hand, they are related to our human capacities and wants, being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or to bring him within the discourse of reason.”

The trinity of persons said to be evolved in the process of revelation is not the absolute God, not God as he exists in eternity, conceived as existing in himself prior to all creation in time, or outward expression, but the revealed or manifested God. The following extracts may help our readers to seize the author's thought:—

“To bring the whole subject fully before us, let us endeavour, first of all, to form the distinctest notion possible of God, as existing in himself, and unrevealed. Then we shall understand the better what is necessary to reveal him. Of course we mean, when we speak of God as unrevealed, to speak of him anterior to his act of creation; for the worlds created are all outgoings from himself, and in that view, revealments of him. God unrevealed is God simply existing, as spirit, in himself.” — p. 137.

“Observe that, when God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through media. And as there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds, in fact, that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the One must appear in the manifold; the Absolute in the conditional; Spirit in form; the Motionless in motion; the Infinite in the finite. He must distribute himself, he must let forth his nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects, and signs. It must be to us as if Brama were waking up; as if Jehovah, the Infinite I am, the Absolute, were dividing off himself into innumerable activities that shall dramatize his immensity, and bring him within the moulds of language and discursive thought. And in whatever thing he appears, or is revealed, there will be something that misrepresents, as well as something that represents him. The revealing process, that which makes him appear, will envelop itself in clouds of formal contradiction,—that is, of diction which is contrary, in some way, to the truth, and which, taken simply as diction, is continually setting forms against each other.

“Thus, the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned him. He will think, deliberate, reason, remember, have emotions. Then, taking up all these manifold representations, casting out the matter in which they are cross to each other, and repugnant to the very idea of the God they represent, we shall settle into the true knowledge of God, and receive, as far as the finite can receive the Infinite, the contents of the Divine nature.” — pp. 139, 140.

“ ‘There is in God, taken as the Absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar,— a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite. In this respect, God is wholly unlike to us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colors, and types of words from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now, this Word, this Form of God, in which he sees himself, is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us. Conceive him now as creating the worlds, or creating worlds, if you please, from eternity. In so doing, he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation.’ ” — pp. 145, 146.

“ Thus, the Divine Word, or Logos, who is from eternity the Form, or in the Form of God, after having first bodied him forth in the creation and the government of the world, now makes another outgoing from the Absolute into the human, to reside in the human as being of it ; thus to communicate God to the world, and thus to ingenerate in the world Goodness and Life as from him. To make his approach to man as close, to identify himself as perfectly as possible with man, he appears, or makes his advent through a human birth,— Son of man, and Son, also, of God. Regarding him now in this light as set out before the Absolute Being (who he representatively is), existing under the conditions of the finite and the relative, we see at once that, for our sakes, if not for his own, he must have set over against him, in the finite, his appropriate relative term, or impersonation. A solitary finite thing, or person, that is, one that has no relative in the finite, is even absurd, — much more if the design be that we shall ascend, through it, to the Absolute ; for we can do this only under the great mental law of action and reaction, which requires relative terms and forces, between which it may be maintained. Besides, there may have been some subjective or internal necessity in Christ himself, (for we know nothing of his interior structure and wants,) requiring that, in order to the proper support of his attitude, he should have in conception some finite relative impersonation. For one or both these reasons, when he appears in the human state, bringing the Divine into the human, there results, at one and the same time, a double impersonation, that of the Father and that of the Son, — one because of the other, and both as correspondent or relative terms. As Christ himself appears in the finite, he calls out into the finite with him, if I may so speak, another representative of the Absolute, one that is

conceived to reside in the heavens, as he himself is seen to walk upon the earth. This he does to comfort his attitude, or more probably to make it intelligible; for if he were to say, 'Look unto me, and behold your God,' then his mere human person would be taken as a proof that he is only a flagrant and impious impostor; or else, being accepted as God by those who are more credulous, they would, in fact, receive a God by apotheosis, and under human boundaries. Therefore, he calls out into thought, as residing in heaven, and possessing celestial exaltation, the Father, who is, in fact, the Absolute Being brought into a lively, conversable, definite (therefore finite) form of personal conception, and sets himself on terms of relationship with him at the other pole; so that, while he signifies or reveals the light and love of God, in and through the human or subject life, he is able to exalt and deify what he reveals, by referring his mission to one that is greater and higher in state than himself, viz. the Father in heaven."— pp. 168, 169. •

"But, in order to the full and complete apprehension of God, a third personality, the Holy Spirit, needs to appear. By the Logos, in the creation, and then by the Logos in the incarnation, assisted or set off by the Father as a relative personality, God's character, feeling, and truth are now expressed. He has even brought down the mercies of his heart to meet us on our human level. So far, the expression made is moral; but there is yet needed, to complete our sense of God, the Absolute, another kind of expression, which will require the introduction or appearance of yet another and distinct kind of impersonation. We not only want a conception of God in his character and feeling towards us, but we want, also, to conceive him as in *act* within us, working in us, under the conditions of time and progression, spiritual results of quickening, deliverance, and purification from evil. Now, action of any kind is representable to us only under the conditions of movement in time and space, which, as we have seen, is not predicable of the Absolute Being abstractly contemplated. God, in act, therefore, will be given us by another finite, relative impersonation."— p. 171.

This last *developed* person, or personality, is the Holy Ghost, who completes the trinity of personal representations. The author, it will be seen, distinguishes between Absolute God and revealed God. God, as Absolute God, is no Trinity; but the revealed or manifested God is, and God is Holy Trinity only in the sense in which the manifested God, as distinguished from Absolute God, is God; that is, in a purely representative sense. The distinction between God himself and the representation of God to us is conceivable, but the representation is not itself God, and no distinction between God unrepresented and God repre-

sented is admissible or conceivable. The representation must represent him truly, as he is independent of the representation, or it is a false representation, and the God represented is not the true God, Absolute God. God as Absolute is God, neither more nor less than God, and all that is or can be predicable of God at all must be predicable of him conceived as necessary and eternal being, as prior to, and independent of, his representation or revealment, that is, in the language of the author, as God Absolute. A revelation does not make that which it reveals, nor in any sense whatever affect or modify it. If a true revelation, it declares the object precisely as it exists *a parte rei*; if it does not so declare it, it is a false revelation, and not to be trusted. No distinction, then, can be made between God unrevealed, the God Absolute, and God revealed, or represented to us. Whatever the process of revealment, or the methods of representation, they in no sense affect or modify God himself, nor are they themselves to be confounded with him, or to be taken for him, for their purpose is simply to present him to us as he is, independent of themselves. A representative trinity is then no real Trinity at all, and has nothing to do with the question before us, for the substance, the reality intended by the orthodox dogma, which the author professes to hold, belongs, not to the representation of God, but to God Absolute, as he is in himself, self-existent, eternal, immutable, immovable, and independent. To deny that he is Holy Trinity in this sense is simply Unitarianism, and none the less so because God is said to be Trinity in a representative sense.

“Thus the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned him.” As eminently existing in him, as the effect in the cause, they may be assigned, not only to the representation, or represented God, but to Absolute God, for all things do so exist in him, and all that is in God is God; but if really and literally assigned to God, as formally existing in him, they are falsely assigned, and the God thus represented is neither the revealed nor the unrevealed God, for he is no God at all. That such things may be assigned to him tropically or figuratively, to help our imaginations, and to give us a lively apprehension of him, is no doubt very true, but they are never to be taken literally. They are figures used, not to present him to our

reason, to our proper intellectual apprehension, but to our imagination and senses, and therefore, though modes of sensible apprehension, never enter into our rational conception of God. Sensible apprehension is always subject to the limitations of space and time, but rational apprehension is not, and it is not necessary to prove that we have rational apprehension. The God we are to call God revealed is God as declared to our rational apprehension, not to our sensible apprehension, and the God so declared must be identically the God undeclared; for between reason and its object there intervenes no idea, species, or representation. The idea is the reality, not a mere image or representation of it, and even when there are media of apprehension, reason never mistakes these for the object apprehended.

“When God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through *media*.” Cannot be to the senses, agreed, for we have, and can have, no sensible intuition of God, that is to say, God is not revealed to our senses, is for us no sensible object; cannot be to the understanding, denied, for that would be only saying that he cannot be revealed at all. The author himself agrees that God is one, infinite, absolute; then what is not one, infinite, absolute, is not God, but something else, or nothing. God must be revealed as he is, or else he is not revealed at all. Therefore, if revealed at all, he must be revealed as one, infinite, absolute. But if he cannot be so revealed, how does the author happen to know, or to be able to affirm, that he is one, infinite, or absolute? If God cannot be revealed as he is as unrevealed, how has the author been able to tell us what he is as unrevealed, and to say wherein what he calls God revealed is distinguished from “the God Absolute”?

“As there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the one must appear in the manifold; the absolute in the conditional; spirit in form; the motionless in motion; the infinite in the finite.” Bad philosophy, as well as bad theology, my dear Doctor. There are, in the author’s sense, no infinite media, we grant, for whatever is infinite is God, and God is not something between God and man. But that the one can be apprehended only in the manifold, we deny; for the manifold, that is, the multiple, is itself inconceivable without the intuition of

unity. The conditional is the negation of the absolute, and like all negation inconceivable without the positive denied. The finite is simply a negative conception, and for the same reason presupposes the conception of the infinite. The positive must always precede in the mind the negative, as St. Thomas teaches and proves. Consequently the conception of the one, the absolute, the spiritual, the motionless, the infinite, all of which are positive conceptions, must precede the conception of the manifold, the conditional, the material, the motional, the finite. The order of knowledge must follow the order of being, for what is not is not intelligible or knowable. No logical process can extract the one from the many, the absolute from the conditional, spirit from form, that is, in the author's sense, matter, the motionless from motion, the infinite from the finite, for the best of all reasons in the world, because they are not contained in them, and you cannot get from a thing what it has not. Logic is mere analysis, and analysis adds nothing to the conception analyzed; it only deduces or demonstrates what is already in it. The mistake into which many fall on this point is owing to the fact that they take the negative conceptions in the *sensus compositus*, in which sense is included, not only the purely negative conception, but also, obscurely it may be, the positive conception, which always precedes and accompanies it in the mind.

The author's doctrine, that God can be revealed only as finitely represented, derived from sensism, is only a denial, in other terms, that God can be revealed at all. "These three persons, or personalities," he says, "are the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms." The infinite, we need not tell the author, is indivisible, and must be conveyed entire, as a unit, or not at all. No finite form can convey the infinite, for no form can convey more than it can contain, and no finite form can contain the infinite. The infinite in or under finite forms is the finite, not the infinite. There can be no finite representations of the infinite, for no representation can exceed itself, and as the infinite is indivisible, the infinite finitely represented, that is, represented with limitations, is precisely the finite. God in or under finite forms is not God, but creature, if any thing. Thus, in our Lord, that which is limited, finite,

or conditioned is not God, but man, and Christ is God, because his person which has assumed human nature is Divine, not limited, not subjected to the human form,—which would be man assuming God, not God assuming man,—but remains God in all the infinite plenitude and independence of the Divine nature. The person of Christ is not in or under a human form, for if it were it would not be a Divine person, but a human person, since whatever is in the form of man is man. Christ is indeed in the form of man, yet not because he has, if we may so speak, parted with the form of God, and assumed that of man, but because he is literally and truly man as well as God, perfect man and perfect God in the unity of one Divine person. Either, then, God can be revealed without being represented in or under finite forms, or he cannot be revealed at all; for nothing finite is God, and nothing but the finite can enter into or be represented by finite forms. Hence the author's theory of a representative trinity, as "the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed," cannot answer the purpose for which he concocts it, and can be no medium through which God as he is can be represented, and God represented as he is not is not God, but a fiction.

But these imaginary, fictitious, or representative persons, according to the author himself, do not represent any thing to us of the interior being or essence of God. "I do not," he says, "undertake to fathom the interior being of God." "That is a matter too high for me, and I think for us all." Then his trinity of persons represents nothing to him of God in the sense in which God is superintelligible, not intelligible to us without it; and 'then it is quite superfluous. The author's whole theory is built on the assumption, that God is in himself unintelligible, and that he does not and cannot reveal himself as he is. This assumption is not warrantable. God, to the full extent to which the author supposes him representable by the trinity of persons he imagines, is naturally intelligible, is naturally a subject of thought, is naturally within the discourse of reason. His natural attributes and perfections, his unity, his eternity, his immensity, his wisdom, his justice, his goodness,—the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity,—are not only intelligible to us, but actually known, clearly seen from the creation or foundation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, as St.

Paul expressly declares. God, save as to what he is supernaturally in himself, is naturally intelligible, and it is only in and by his intelligibility that any thing is intelligible, for his light is the light of our light. The author's machinery for revealing God could not serve his purpose if it were needed, and would not be needed if it could.

The author forgets, also, the distinction between faith and knowledge, and is all the time considering what may be intrinsically known of God, not what God has extrinsically declared of himself for us to believe. It is true nothing can be declared to us in words, so as to be *intrinsically* known, of which we have not already intellectual apprehension. Words are signs, and can signify to *knowledge* only what the mind apprehends without them. Signs do not interpret themselves, and the mind must have in itself a key to their signification, or they can signify nothing to it. The word *tree* is no sign to me unless I have seen a tree. This, confined to the sphere of knowledge strictly so called, we readily concede; but in the sphere of faith, belief, whether human or Divine, we do not concede it, for the very characteristic of faith is to believe what is not seen, — *fides est credere quod non vides*, as says St. Augustine. If we could from signs learn nothing, obtain no intellectual apprehension at all, all belief, all faith, human as well as Divine, would be out of the question, and all revelation of the supernatural, and all history would be to us empty formulas and unmeaning words. This is a point the author has not duly considered. But as it is a point to which we must return, in our examination of his Discourse on "Dogma and Spirit," it will suffice to add here that God can reveal to us, so that we shall know it intrinsically, only what is within the naturally intelligible order, but that he can *declare* the superintelligible so that it shall be apprehended, though obscurely and extrinsically only, yet sufficiently for faith, and so that in faith something more than an empty formula or unmeaning word shall be present to the mind. Faith is not impossible, for without it it is impossible to please God, and faith, the blessed Apostle tells us, is *sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium*.* Hence the notion the author entertains, that nothing is declared to us of the Christian order beyond

* Heb. xi. 1, 6.

what is collected from God's exhibition of himself to our intuition, is unfounded, as we showed in replying, in our number for April last, to *The Mercersburg Review*. Consequently, as God in the natural order is intelligible, and as in the superintelligible order he is declared only to faith, — not revealed nor required for faith to be revealed to vision, — the author's supposed machinery for representing God is as unnecessary as illusory.

Finally, the author in some sort confounds the process of revelation with that which is revealed, the representation with the represented, otherwise he could not call his representative persons God. A little sound philosophy would have taught him that in knowledge there are but two things, the intellective subject, and the intelligible object, and that what is not *a parte rei* the one is the other. The old notion of species or representative ideas interposed between the intellective subject and intelligible object, and that what is immediately apprehended is not the object itself, but its *species, phantasm, idea, or image* in the mind, is now universally exploded, and was never in reality held, as the moderns have supposed, by the sounder scholastics. That we see all in the idea is, we believe, true, but the idea is not the representative of the object in the intelligible order, but the object itself, — is in fact, in the order of intelligibles, as St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Cardinal Gerdil teach, God himself. We say *St. Thomas*, for though he has the air of holding the contrary, and usually adopts the Peripatetic forms of expression, his principles, as Cardinal Gerdil has shown in his *Defence of Père Malebranche against Locke*, are not only not opposed to it, but do in reality imply it. But let this pass. It is undeniable that what is apprehended in the fact of knowledge is the object itself, not its image or representative. Hence what in the fact of knowledge is not object is subject, and therefore, in the intuition or apprehension of God, what is not God, or is distinguishable from God, is the intuitive or apprehending subject, that is, the human mind itself.

The author must concede that his trinity of persons pertains either to the subject or to the object. If he concedes the latter, he must maintain that the persons are not merely representative persons, but God himself, that is, three eternally subsisting persons in the unity of the Divine

substance, which is the orthodox doctrine; and then he must abandon his notion of a merely representative trinity, of a trinity that belongs not to the substantial being of God, but to the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed, and resulting of necessity from the revelation of God to man. In such case he must concede that his whole theory is from beginning to end false and illusory, with not the slightest foundation in reality; for whatever pertains to God is God, and nothing distinguishable from God is God, or can be said to pertain to him save as his creature. If, on the other hand, he distinguishes his trinity of persons from God, and makes it merely representative of God, as he evidently does, he makes it purely subjective, places it, not on the side of the object known, but on the side of the subject knowing, and then it is the subject itself, or a mere figment of the human mind, without any reality at all. Let him, then, do his best, and he can find no medium between the orthodox dogma of the Trinity, and bald, naked Unitarianism.

We insist on this last point as fatal to the author. His pretension is to place himself between the orthodox formula and the Unitarian formula, and to concede the objections adduced by the advocates of the latter, without surrendering the truth or reality intended by the friends of the former. The Trinitarian asserts that God is three real, distinct, and eternally subsisting persons in one Divine substance; the Unitarian denies this, and asserts, as its direct contradictory, that God is not three persons, but one only person, as he is one only substance. Against the Unitarian the author asserts, in words, God is three persons, as the Trinitarian maintains; but against the Trinitarian he asserts that these three persons are not three eternally subsisting persons in the Divine substance, but simply three representative persons, by which the unknown and unintelligible God is represented to us. But to assert three representative persons is not to assert any thing against Unitarians, for what they deny is, not that there are three persons, but that there are three persons eternally subsisting in the unity of the Divine substance or essence. Consequently, when the author denies them to be such persons, he concedes the whole Unitarian formula. So, on the other hand, the concession of three representative persons is the concession of nothing to the Trinitarian, for it is not

for three persons the Trinitarian contends, but for three real, distinct persons eternally subsisting in the unity of the Divine Being. He then does not deny the Unitarian error on the one hand, and save the Trinitarian truth on the other; but denies the Trinitarian truth, and asserts at best only the Unitarian error.

The fact is, the author falls below the Unitarian error, and denies not merely the tri-personality of God, but that God is himself person at all. The only personality he recognizes is a personality, not in God, but in the representation of God to us. God reveals himself as personal, not because he is so, but because it is only under a personal form that we can conceive him. He is personal only in relation to our mode of conceiving him, as he is said also to have hands and feet, to reason and deliberate, and to be subject to human passions. The error of the Trinitarian, according to the author, is precisely in affirming that what is true of the representation, — of the methods adopted, in consequence of our weakness, to bring God within our conceptions, — is true of him absolutely considered, or as he is in himself. As God has not in himself hands and feet, passions, &c., for he is pure spirit and impassible, so has he not personality in himself. Consequently, God absolute is impersonal, and the author's doctrine necessarily leads, if not to formal atheism, at least to formal pantheism.

ART. II. — 1. *The Village Notary; a Romance of Hungarian Life.* Translated from the Hungarian of BARON EÖTVÖS, by OTTO MENCKSTERN. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1850. 12mo. 3 volumes.

2. *Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady.* By THERESA PULSZKY. With an Historical Introduction, by FRANCIS PULSZKY. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1850. 8vo. pp. 375.

3. *The Hungarian Revolution.* By JOHANN PRAGAY. New York: George P. Putnam. 1850. 8vo. pp. 176.

4. *Parallels between the Hungarian and British Constitutions.* By J. TOULMIN SMITH, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn

Barrister at Law. From the Second English edition. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 8vo. pp. 64.

5. *The Christian Examiner*, for May, 1850. Art. VIII. Boston: Crosby & Nichols.

THE future historian of American popular delusions will find none more worthy of his consideration than that which obtains with regard to the liberty of the press. Our theory is, that the American press is free, the freest in the world, and in the letter of our laws there is nothing to the contrary; but in sober reality there is no press in the world less free or more fettered, for it has not only a master, but a master who is the worst and the meanest of tyrants. The mob is the censor of the American press.

Nor is this mob precisely of native origin and growth. We are pained and ashamed to say, that our masters are not our countrymen, but the scum of foreign demagogues cast upon our shores by the revolutionary tides of Europe since 1831. These miserable demagogues, keensighted as to the means of mischief, saw at once what a powerful weapon the American press would be in their hands when the time for violence should come. They have labored slowly, stealthily, surely, to obtain the control of it, and now make no secret of the fact that it is their slave. These are the foreigners against whom our fathers warned us, and theirs the foreign influences we were admonished to resist;—not, as fanatical or bigoted Protestants have foolishly imagined, the poor Irish Catholic emigrant, who comes here to escape oppression, to enrich us by his industry, and to bless us by his faith and piety. He is always welcome, for in his *Irish* character he is an important element in the sum of our national greatness, and in his *Catholic* character he cannot fail to exert a salutary influence in elevating and preserving our civilization, and in maintaining our republican institutions, by asserting the reality of religion and the supremacy of law,—two things indispensable to our political salvation, and not to be expected from Protestantism under any or all of its forms. No; the foreigners we have to dread are not the poor, industrious Catholics, who land on our shores, whether from Ireland or Germany; but those young and old infidels, who, having failed to complete the ruin of their respective countries by the conspiracies they have hatched, the rebel-

lions they have fomented, the revolutions they have attempted, have flocked hither, partly to escape the halter, and partly to demoralize our republic, that it may demoralize the world.

Whoever wishes a full demonstration of the extent of the power that these fugitives from justice and enemies of mankind wield amongst us, needs only to mark the course pursued by the American press with regard to the Red Republican revolutions of Europe in 1848. The mark of their iron boot was easily seen on the neck of almost every writer in the land. No publisher dared offer a book against these nefarious revolutionary movements; scarcely one editor dared hint that they were not wholly commendable, and the community were led to believe that they were glorious uprisings of the people in behalf of the inalienable rights of man. It is true, personal violence was seldom resorted to, for the time had not come to follow the example of the ruffians at Rome, who murdered Ximenes, editor of the *Labaro*, because he recommended a moderate and manly policy, — an example followed more than once in other places, — and, moreover, the master does not usually beat or kill his unresisting and obedient slave. These foreign mobocrats amongst us had other means of commanding compliance with their will, and of ruining any one who might show a disposition to oppose them, less offensive to American sentiment, and less hazardous, than plunging, in cold blood, a dagger into his heart.

The United States are and ought to be a republic. That is a question never left to their choice. It was settled for them by a higher power than their own. Erect a monarchy to-day, it will be a ruin to-morrow; call together an army to support it, and your army will fall into the pit dug by unseen hands for Sennacherib. Here we are bound by the law of God to be republicans, for here republicanism is the legitimate order. But there are two kinds of republics, as there are two kinds of monarchies. The absolute domination of the Czar differs infinitely less from the constitutional sway of Victoria, than the stars and stripes from the bloody democratic flag of Europe. The principles from which the American republicans and the European democrats start, the ends the two parties respectively propose to be attained, and the means they respectively employ, lie in totally different, and for ever irreconcilable orders. Ameri-

can republicanism is legal in its origin, loyal and conservative in its character; European democracy is mere wild anarchy. An American republican can be a good citizen; a European democrat, if consistent, must be a vile demagogue. The former can save his soul; if the latter get into heaven, Satan need not despair.

The press being under the control of a mob created by foreign demagogues, the ordinary sources of information are corrupted, and it becomes almost impossible for the mass of our citizens to get any correct intelligence of European political movements. There is not a more unmitigated tyrant in the world than your Simon Pure Red Republican, hoarse with yelling "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!" He will neither give you correct information, nor suffer you to get it. If the press he controls were content with simple advocacy of anarchy, the mischief would be far less. But no, he and his slaves must not only preach and teach the gospel of disorganization, but must be constantly on the alert that no word be uttered in contradiction, or if uttered, that it shall be discredited. It was almost impossible for the most impartially disposed of our citizens to get any correct information on European affairs while the struggle was going on. Care was taken that all news intended for our market should get a ruddy baptism, and if some one ventured to collect information from independent sources, a thousand tongues were ready to declare it a tory, a legitimist, a conservative, an Austrian, or a Russian lie, and the luckless wight, in most cases, was worried till he was fain to submit for the sake of peace, if not of life.

The notions which have been current among us with regard to the Hungarian rebellion is a case in point. People have classed the Magyar cause with that of the French, the German, and the Italian democrats, and supposed that "Young France," "Young Ireland," "Young Italy," "Young Germany," and "Young Hungary" were all members of the same family. In all the European countries in which revolutions were effected, or attempted, the parties were supposed to be the same, — on one side the awakened democracies, on the other fallen and flying sovereigns. It will be strange news to the mass of the American people, to be told that the Hungarian movement had nothing in common with democracy, save in so far as,

if it had succeeded in breaking the power of Austria, and dissolving the Austrian Empire, it would have prepared the way for the triumph throughout all Western and Central Europe of Red Republicanism, because it would have left standing no power competent to stay the revolutionary tide; and that, in itself considered, it was thoroughly aristocratic, and at bottom nothing but a war of the untitled Magyar nobility to maintain their "historical right" to domineer over the unfortunate peasants of Hungary. Yet such is the simple, naked fact, notwithstanding the abuse heaped upon a contemporary* for daring to intimate it, and notwithstanding Mr. Cass's stultification of himself in his anti-Austrian and unstatesmanlike speech in the Senate last winter, in which he made a ridiculous attempt to enlist the nation on the side of Hungary. That such is the fact, we trust to be able to prove before we close.

The works we have placed at the head of this article are all written to sustain the Hungarian rebellion, and three of them come from Magyar sources. *The Village Notary* is a romance, but it contains more truth than either the essay by Toulmin Smith, or that in *The Christian Examiner*, and may be recommended to those who wish to obtain a more exact notion of the state of things in Hungary than they can get from the perusal of political narratives and disquisitions. The author is an Hungarian noble, but his tutor was a radical of the French school, and Eötvös became the leader of the small, and utterly uninfluential, party of republicans. Pulszky says of him:—

"He wrote a novel, in which he put together a variety of small sketches and studies from nature, and formed them into one grand picture, for the express purpose of caricaturing the political doings in our counties. But, fortunately for the public, Baron Eötvös was a better poet than a politician, and his political pamphlet ripened, very much against his will, into one of the most interesting works of fiction that Hungarian literature can boast of. His book was eagerly read and enthusiastically admired; it was devoid of all political action."

The *Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady* form a very interesting volume. The lady is Theresa Pulszky. She is a Viennese, and after her marriage with Pulszky, who is an Hunga-

* *The North American Review*, July, 1849.

rian, she resided in Magyarland. Her husband was a patriot, and his share in the rebellion was large enough to have insured him the prison or the scaffold, if he had remained in Hungary. Mrs. Pulszky saw every thing in Hungary with his eyes, of course. An historical introduction, covering about a hundred pages, is prefixed to the narrative. It is a clear and rapid sketch of Magyardom from the invasion of Arpad to the beginning of the late rebellion, and the author, no doubt, endeavoured to write as fair a transcript of the Hungarian annals as he possibly could.

The Hungarian Revolution is a book got up for sale. It gives a sketch of the unfortunate war, and a brief account of the principal actors in the drama.

The Parallels between the Hungarian and British Constitutions is a very remarkable pamphlet. Its object is partly indicated by its name, and the author attempts to arouse the sympathies of Englishmen in behalf of the Magyars, because of a very striking similarity between the Hungarian and English constitutions. He maintains that the Hungarian struggle is substantially the same with that of England, when she renounced her allegiance to the last of the Stuarts, and, moreover, thinks that the Hungarian constitution, inasmuch as it provides for local institutions of a democratic nature in the counties and towns, is far superior to the British. The author and his friends had as little success in creating an excitement in England as similar parties have had in America. The newspapers there, as here, were thoroughly Magyarized, but a motion of sympathy in the House of Commons fell under the table, and received a contemptuous permission to lie there.

The article in the *Examiner* is an attempt, and the only respectable one hitherto made, to answer the case put by the *North American Review*. The writer, a lady, makes the most of her materials, and, by a skilful selection and arrangement of facts, she will doubtless convince some of her readers that "the worse is the better reason." Yet she can be fully answered without any other resort than to the facts stated by herself in the course of her article.

We suppose that the friends of Hungary will not complain of us for accepting the authors cited above as our guides, particularly as they are all written by persons who are intensely prejudiced in favor of the Magyar rebellion. We have read them carefully, and we are of opinion that

even a stronger case than that of the *North American Review* can be made out by facts unwillingly or unconsciously admitted by these authors. We shall accept their facts, and avail ourselves of no others, to sustain us in our dissent from their conclusions. The policy pursued by each is substantially identical. It is in setting in a very strong light every real or fancied affront received from Austria, in imputing to her malicious intentions whenever they are unable to deny the justice and expediency of her acts, and in saying every thing that can be said about Magyar bravery, generosity, and loyalty, and as little as possible about any thing which might impress the reader unfavorably towards the Magyars. In fact, these books amount to an apotheosis of Magyardom, which is *primâ facie* evidence against them as historical records; for the Magyars are simply men, after all, like the rest of us, and probably are not far above, or far below, the other nations of Europe in point of social and moral virtues. The case of Austria has not as yet fairly been put; for it is a great mistake to suppose that Mr. Bowen's article is an apology for Austria. When she tells her story, it will be very possible that an accurate summing up of accounts as they stand between her and the Magyars will not be quite as favorable to the latter as many good people have imagined, as the considerations we propose to offer may lead some to suspect.

In the beginning of the ninth century, the Magyars were yet tenants of the wilds of Central Asia. They were a savage tribe of Tartars, and several other swarms from the same Tartar hive had gone before them into Europe. The Huns and the Turks were their brethren in blood. The memory of Attila, the terrible king of the Huns, is cherished yet in Hungary. Madame Pulszky thus speaks of him:—

“At a small distance from Petronell, a high *tumulus* reminds the traveller of the mighty dominion of the Huns and their king Attila, whom modern writers treat merely as a destructive Asiatic chief, though tradition invests him with the noblest generosity and the most praiseworthy forbearance, as well as with that invincible bravery which the French and Italians ascribe to Charlemagne, and the Welsh to King Arthur.” — p. 9.

A pleasant bit of gossip from a Viennese girl! Her husband's country was her country, and his God was her God.

In the year 889, the Magyars entered Europe, and pitched their tents on the banks of the Danube. Europe found

that a nest of stark mad hornets had appeared in her midst. The Magyars were indeed dreadful neighbours to the nations around them. They pushed southward as far as Otranto, eastward to Constantinople, westward until they ravaged Provence, and northward as far as Bremen.

In the mean time, they came into the possession of Hungary in the following manner :—

“ When Arpad approached the confines of the country, he sent ambassadors to Swatopluk, to ask him for grass from the Hungarian heaths, and for water from the Danube, and in return he offered the Czechish king a white steed with a purple bridle. Swatopluk, who had no idea of the Oriental meaning of the demand, readily accepted the horse, and provided Arpad’s ambassadors with a plentiful supply of hay and water. Upon this, the Magyars advanced upon the great plain between the Danube and the Theiss. Swatopluk would have opposed them, but they offered him battle, and routed his army. The king of the Czechs was glad to make his escape on the very horse which he had accepted in exchange for his kingdom.”

The cruelties practised by the Magyars everywhere, and the indomitable courage which commonly insured them victory, made them so terrible to the Christians, that a new petition was added to the Litany :—“ From the cruel Magyars, Good Lord, deliver us !” In fact, the well-being of Europe, at that time, demanded their utter extinction, or their conversion to Christianity. They continued to harass their neighbours for half a century, when Henry the First chastised them severely, and shortly after they were subdued by Otho the First. The permanent establishment of Christianity in Magyarland dates from the year 1000, when St. Stephen was crowned king of Hungary. He sent ambassadors to Rome to acquaint the Pope with the conversion of the nation. Sylvester the Second sent him a golden crown, the holy crown of St. Stephen, which the Magyars always regarded as a sacred relic. Moreover, the Pope honored him with a patriarchal cross, and with the title of Apostolic King. The successors of Stephen often used these concessions of Sylvester to the great detriment of the Hungarian Church ; in fact, they sometimes appeared to regard the possession of the cross as an investiture of the spiritual rights of an Hungarian patriarch.

Up to this period the Magyars possessed all the virtues and all the vices of a barbarian soldiery. The conversion

of the nation made its civilization possible, and, in the progress of time, certain; but the savage manners of the Magyars seemed to present almost insurmountable obstacles to the holy work. St. Stephen preached the Gospel, and offered his people a living example of Christian life. He encountered an opposition no less stubborn to all his plans for political reform, but he lived long enough to see his institutions established upon a firm basis. Before his time, the nation was governed by chiefs of the race of Arpad, who were regarded by the haughty magnates, not as kings, but as leaders. At his accession, Stephen was called *primus inter pares*. He assumed the title and the authority of a king. He made a collection of the fundamental laws and customs of the nation, and published them under the title of *The Hungarian Constitution*, which, with a few alterations, was in force until the 4th of March, 1849, when it was abolished by the Emperor Francis Joseph. This constitution, given more than eight hundred years ago, is the venerable instrument which the Magyars of 1849 vainly essayed to defend by the effusion of their bravest blood. It establishes royalty upon a feudal basis, it guaranties the rights and privileges of the titled and untitled nobles, and leaves the immense majority of the people to a slavery so hopeless, that the revolutions of eight centuries only sufficed to make its abolition seem but the more impossible, and it is only now that there begins to be a prospect of its disappearance.

All the Magyar apologists have labored to obscure the relations which have hitherto subsisted between the nobles and the peasants, and the burden of their insinuations is, that the humane Magyars were always thwarted in their endeavours to ameliorate the condition of the peasantry by the ruthless despotism of Austria! One can hardly believe that impudence can be carried to such a height, yet it is. It will be well, then, to glance at the ameliorations which have been at any time effected or proposed in the condition of the serfs, and to see whence they have proceeded. We shall find, at least, that Austria has done somewhat more than is commonly supposed.

Hungary was peopled by a tribe of the Slavonic race. The Slavonians, or Slaves, are of Indo-Germanic origin, and their migrations into Europe began about five hundred years before the Christian era, and ceased in the seventh

century after Christ. They were then, as they are now, a most important race in point of numbers. They were divided into a number of independent tribes, inhabiting Russia, Poland, Silesia, Galicia, Pomerania, Slavonia, Hungary, Croatia, Servia, &c. Christianity did not effect much among them until the ninth century. Their most glorious epoch was in 650, when Samo united nearly all the tribes in one grand Pan-Slavonic empire, as brief and as brilliant as the empire of Napoleon, and its shadow, even at this day, visits the Slave in his dreams, and reminds him that his long-suffering race held a high position before the Magyar came,—before the houses of Hapsburg, of Hohenzollern, and of Romanoff were dreamed of. The Slaves in Europe number some seventy millions, and all speak in dialects of the same tongue. During the period which intervened between Charlemagne and Otho the First, they were nearly everywhere reduced to a servitude so great and so miserable, that the name of their race, which is said by their philologists to signify glory, has passed into modern languages to denote a person who cannot hope for liberty, and is our word *slave*. They have remained in the same degraded state in Hungary unto this day. In some other provinces they attained partial independence, and in others still they formed powerful states. Slavonia, Bohemia, and Poland are cases in point. Russia is the most signal example, now the only Slavonic nation which is independent, and by this title, as well as by almost common consent, she stands at the head of the race. Europe may yet become Cossack, for the gaze of Russia is steadily fixed upon a new Pan-Slavonic empire, and, if the dream is realized, this great race will command the world.

Swatopluk lost his kingdom for a horse, as we have seen. He fled, leaving his people to the mercies of the pitiless Magyars. The Slovacs resisted the invaders, but unsuccessfully. The original inhabitants who were serfs under their old masters remained serfs. All the Slovacs who were taken in arms were either killed or reduced to servitude. A great number of the Slovak nobles and freemen, who escaped this doom, fled to other provinces. A few remained, and voluntarily submitted to Arpad. In most cases, these were allowed to remain free, but they were contemned, as belonging to an inferior race. The Slaves in Hungary were very numerous, for, besides the aborigines who

remained in bondage, or were reduced to servitude, the Magyars annually brought prisoners captured in their predatory excursions, and these, with scarcely an exception, were bound to the soil. The Magyar in those days, whether leader or soldier, was a freeman. Pulszky says,—

“ The Magyars were free and equal in political rights, with the exception of the chiefs, who formed a high aristocracy among them. They were warriors when young, and herdsmen when old, and amidst the numbers of captive bondsmen and *native serfs*, they formed a *national aristocracy*.” — p. 30.

The Magyars were a nation of soldiers ; hence it is easy to see that they needed a numerous body of slaves to perform menial offices, and to till the ground which was seized by Arpad immediately after the conquest of the country, and divided among his followers.

Every Magyar was a freeman until the days of St. Stephen. The overwhelming majority of the natives were slaves. A few who submitted were allowed to remain free, but their freedom brought them privileges nearly equal to those of the free black in Carolina. The distinction of race became in a few years a settled thing ; so much so, that an attempt, on the part of St. Stephen, to open a wide door to their gradual emancipation did not meet with the success he anticipated. He made a law providing that a slave who embraced Christianity should obtain his freedom, and a freeman who persisted in his paganism should be enslaved. It is natural that a law of this sort, condemning the proud Magyar to servitude, and elevating the wretched serf to freedom, should meet with strong opposition, and it did.

“ Thonuzoba, chief of the Bissens, set the pagan Magyars an example, which taught them at once to escape from servitude and Christianity. He proceeded to Abad, on the banks of the Theiss, and dressed in full armour, and sitting on his horse, he caused himself to be buried alive, as an expiatory sacrifice to the gods. For he preferred death with his fathers to eternal life with Christ.” — Pulszky, p. 31.

Some of the obstinate pagans fled. A few were resolved to remain in Hungary, and yet cling to their errors. Where the authority of Stephen was acknowledged, these were enslaved, but it is not to be supposed that they remained slaves. The king not unfrequently employed force

to subject the stubborn unbelievers, and, as far as the Magyars were concerned, his law may have accomplished nearly as much as he expected. Pulszky says:—

“To the honor of the Magyars, we find that in almost every instance the example and the doctrines of their prince sufficed to open their minds to Christianity.” — p. 16.

No doubt of it. Such energetic preaching, combined with the terrible penalty threatened in case of recusancy, could scarcely fail in converting the Magyar, who covets social freedom, and abhors compulsory labor with an intensity that scarcely ever had a parallel in any land. The law of St. Stephen left the Magyars free, as it found them, with a very few and evanescent exceptions. But it worked no wonders for the natives who were in bondage. It is true that some of them were emancipated as soon as they declared themselves Christians. A few of these contrived to preserve their liberty, and to transmit it to their descendants, and hence there are some men in Hungary of Slavonic blood, who enjoy a certain degree of consideration in society. But in the eyes of a true Magyar, no length of time can efface the stain that is caused by descent from a Slave. Great talent will enable a man of the proscribed class to find favor with the poor Magyar population, or the untitled nobility of Hungary; but the magnate will scarcely endure his presence. Kossuth is an instance in point. He is a naturalized Slovak. Fortuitous circumstances, and a firm resolution to assert the privileges of the Magyar race against his brethren in blood, won for him the confidence of the untitled nobility. But the magnates of the kingdom stood aloof, with few exceptions, and their lukewarmness or hostility did much to ruin his cause. And it is more than probable that they refused to join his party, not because they were favorably disposed towards Croatia, but because the Magyar cause was intrusted to a man who was not of the dominant race.

Several circumstances go to prove that nearly all the Slaves remained in bondage, notwithstanding the liberal law of St. Stephen. The freemen were never taxed, and the public burdens were borne by those who were not free. This fact is significant, inasmuch as it indicates pretty clearly the relative proportions of the slaves and the freemen. Fifty years after the death of St. Stephen, we find

the slaves as numerous as ever, and, as few Magyars sank into servitude, and few or none were taken in war, it is clear that no great alteration had taken place in their condition. In fact, the difficulties which obstructed emancipation were very great. The chief hindrance arose from the indomitable pride of the Magyar, who could not stoop to the level of a man tainted with base Slavonic blood. Then who was to remunerate the master for the loss of his serf? This last was a very weighty consideration, and it is perfectly natural that it would afford a continual pretext for the evasion of the law, as in fact it did. The gleam of sunshine for the Slave, which came into the land with Christianity, soon disappeared. The great majority of the class that were naturalized or emancipated under Stephen sank again into bondage by the time the third generation was born. Pulszky corroborates all this. He says, —

“ Besides the three large classes of freemen, we find in this period a fourth class of citizens, the emancipated bondsmen, and the naturalized aliens, who were not called upon to do military service, who had no political rights, and who paid taxes to the king, but who were not subject to any one besides him. *This class produced*, in the course of time, the citizens of towns and the mass of the people, *those that are not freemen*, who are subject to their lords, who work for them, and who pay their taxes to them.” — p. 32.

This is one of Pulszky's significant admissions. It indicates precisely what liberty was worth to the Slave who was emancipated by the law of St. Stephen. The constitutional right of a Magyar is to do military service, to pay no taxes, and to enjoy full political rights, especially the right of suffrage. The emancipated bondsman was not to be a soldier, he was to pay taxes, and he was not to enjoy any political rights. Why, then, even in his best days, he was a *slave*. All that he gained was the privilege of becoming the king's slave. And when the royal power began to decline, as it speedily did, the Magyar regained his slave, and, in the language of Pulszky, the whole class “produced in time the *mass of the people*, who are slaves, who work for their lords, pay taxes, and are subject to them.” The Magyars are a nation of soldiers, and after they had carefully debarred the freedman from the privilege of voting, and compelled him to pay taxes, they could not devise a better method of drawing an impassable line between them and him than by refusing him admission into the ranks.

So it turns out, that, as a body, the Magyars were always freemen, and, as a body, the natives were always slaves. We are speaking of Hungary proper, not of Croatia, or of Transylvania. The Magyar *could* be condemned to slavery for some great crime, but the race was a race of freemen. A Slavonian *could* be emancipated, and his descendants might be distinguished, but the race was enslaved. In Hungary proper, a Magyar slave or a Slavonian freeman was an exception to the rule.

We have pointed out with some care the condition of the people at the period immediately following the promulgation of the Constitution by St. Stephen, because in all essential particulars their condition in 1840 was not much better than it was in 1040. Several improvements have been suggested, and some have been made in their favor, but the system has come down to our times very little changed for the better.

A closer view of the Hungarian Constitution will show yet more clearly what the mass of the people have had to endure from Magyar domination. The Constitution provides for a feudal state of society in its most objectionable form. The freemen were divided into three classes. The first comprised the magnates, the high nobility, and the bishops; the second, the lesser nobility and the proprietors; and the third, the soldiers. It was a maxim of Magyar law, that the common freeman has as much liberty as the greatest magnate, and that his proprietary rights are as sacred. The king was the owner of all the land, and the actual possessors held of him, under the usual condition of military service. In case of forfeiture, or of a family becoming extinct, the land reverted to the king. These three classes formed the Diet, or parliament of Hungary. The consent of this assembly was required to make the royal decrees laws. The parliament of Hungary is now composed of two houses, and some of the reformers of 1849 suddenly recollected that the upper house had no constitutional existence, whence they argued that it ought to be abolished. This was a retaliatory measure, designed to punish the resistance of the magnates to the measures of Kossuth, and their contempt for his Slavonic blood. It is true that the parliament formerly consisted of one house, or rather of one assembly. The members were all soldiers, and they met in an open field, armed to the teeth. The

great nobles were nearest to the person of the king, and, of course, they nearly monopolized his ear. Every measure that passed was in reality theirs or his. The lower nobility and the people were present simply to hurra! When the Magyars became civilized, they built houses for themselves and for the parliament. The practice of meeting in the open field was gradually abandoned, and, as the distinction between the magnates and the people became more strongly marked, the greater nobles began to deliberate, at first apart, and then in a separate hall. The Magyar people have still a constitutional right to be present at the meetings of the Diet, but it is physically impossible to get them all into one house.

This Diet sometimes had stormy sessions, denoting the ferocity of the Magyar character in those days. Queen Helen appears at the Diet of 1132, and asks for vengeance upon the persons who had deprived her husband of his eyes.

“Fanaticized by the queen’s speech, the magnates rose, and, drawing their swords, killed sixty-eight friends and advisers of King Koloman, because they suspected them of being privy to the mutilation of Bela. At another meeting of the magnates Helen stood forth and asked them whether they were of opinion that Boris was the legitimate son of Koloman. Those who replied in the affirmative, or who gave an evasive answer, were executed on the spot.”—Pulszky, p. 37.

The Slaves, the mass of the people in Hungary, were represented at this Diet precisely as the slaves of our Southern States are represented at Washington. The laws concerning the public burdens have been already noticed. No freeman could be taxed. This axiom was always regarded as absolutely immutable. A curious instance of the tenacity with which the Magyars cling to their old privileges was afforded a few years ago. A fine suspension bridge was thrown across the Danube, at Pesth. Count Szecheny, a magnate who had for some years interested himself in the cause of reform, urged the Diet to pass a law compelling every freeman who crossed the bridge to pay a small toll. The measure was vigorously opposed, not because it was inexpedient, but because it was unconstitutional, and no direct tax had ever been laid upon a freeman since the foundation of the kingdom. The Count carried his measure by a bare majority, for the untitled nobles were averse to the plan. It has always been thus. The villain popu-

lation have had to pay every tithe, tax, and burden that has been ever voted in parliament.

The land was held by freemen, of course, and no slave, under any circumstances, could own a single rood. So far as the administration of justice was concerned, he was subject to class legislation of the most oppressive character. Justice was supposed to emanate from the king, but the military governors had a constant jurisdiction in civil and in criminal cases, which generally weighed heavily upon the slave. A thief, if he were free, made restitution in money; if he were a slave, he lost his nose, or one of his eyes, and there was an end of the matter. This is a specimen of the distinctions that were enforced in all other cases where justice was to be administered. Another Magyar institution which weighed heavily upon the slaves was the *Statarium*. It was a species of court-martial granted to counties when the district was troubled by burglars, robbers, or house-burners. Seven judges were necessary, and if an accused person were found guilty, he was hung on the spot. It was necessary that the criminal should be caught in the act, or in the pursuit that followed, and a unanimous sentence was also requisite. This court was the terror of the slaves, for, although the judges were held responsible for each execution, yet when did the voice of a serf reach the court of the palatine?

Perhaps no Magyar law made the state of the peasant more utterly wretched than that which gave the lord power to imprison or punish his serf without appeal. This jurisdiction was authorized from the days of St. Stephen to our own times, and it is easy to conceive what a terrible engine it must have been in the hands of an iniquitous master.

“The second tower, at the extreme end of the park, decorated less picturesquely than the first, had a very different destination. It had been the jail, where used to be confined the prisoners of those feudal lords, whose manorial courts were endowed even with *criminal* jurisdiction. We did not prize this *privilege*, and therefore, as soon as we possessed it, surrendered it into the hands of the county authorities, who could detain the culprits in the extensive establishment on the principle of solitary confinement, which the county nobility had erected. To us, it was a great comfort to be able to dispense with the painful *duty* of sending the transgressors of the law into our dismal dungeon.”—Pulszky, p. 110.

This was written, not in 1049, but in 1849. This is one

of the "*historical* rights" which the court of Vienna vainly urged the Magyars to forego.

A thousand other lesser institutions served to distinguish the Magyar from the Slavonian. The freeman could not be subjected to a whipping, neither could he be chained. He was free from illegal or vexatious arrest, and the punishment to which he could be sentenced was proportioned to his dignity, unless when he was clearly convicted of a great crime. He elected his own magistrates, he enjoyed liberty of speech, and he could even prevent a forcible entry into his house by the officers of justice, with a simple protest, which he was bound to sustain in court within a reasonable time. The slave enjoyed none of these privileges. His very dress served to distinguish him from his master, for the Magyars have always been very solicitous concerning their national costume, and when they were bitterly incensed against the court of Vienna, the Emperor was always sure to regain their applause by causing his court to appear before them arrayed in the picturesque Magyar costume. Language was also an impassable barrier between Magyar and peasant. The Magyars neglected their own language for many years, and in the sixteenth century very many magnates could not read or write in the Magyar tongue. Since the close of that age, it has been cultivated with great success. But the Magyar would never condescend to speak in the Slavonian language, if he could avoid it, and hence the Latin has been for many centuries a living tongue in Hungary.

The foregoing sketch presents some of the principal features of the famous Hungarian Constitution, and of the customs which grew up from successive interpretations of that instrument. It is this Constitution for which the Magyars fought in 1849. It was in force until the 4th of March of that year. The greatest grievance of the Magyars always seemed to be, that Austria was determined to abolish it, if possible. Considering its intensely aristocratic provisions, it is easy to see that our sympathies, as Americans, ought in this matter to be given to Austria, for she was enlisted in behalf of human liberty. But the Magyars have hitherto regarded it as a sacred instrument.

"We are therefore justified by the experience of centuries in our hopes that the Constitution of St. Stephen will outlive the botch-work of the German theorists, who in 1848 attempted to overthrow

the institutions of the great king by means of a paper charter." — Pulszky, p. 19.

It is clear, then, that the Slaves, who formed two thirds of the population, supported the government, while they were denied all political, civil, and social rights, as far as these could be denied. An attempt has been made in several quarters, not only to deny these facts, but to deny that the freemen, as a body, were Magyars, and that the slaves, as a body, were of the Slavonic or original race. We have shown that it is so, by the testimony of our Magyar authorities. However, we will give another authority, out of the many at hand. Eötvös thus discourses : —

"The term *nobleman*, in the general Hungarian acceptation, means neither more nor less than a *freeman*; and the *peasants*, as the unprivileged class of the population, may be said to be in a state of *villainage*. The privileges of the Hungarian Constitution, namely, liberty of speech, freedom from unwarranted arrest, the privilege of not being subjected to corporal punishment, the right to elect their own magistrates, and a variety of similar immunities, are, in *all the charters*, described in terms which for a long time caused them to be confined to the descendants of the ancient conquerors of the country, or to those persons who obtained the freedom of Hungary by a grant of royal letters patent. The rest of the community, the Jews, Razes, Gypsies, Russnioks, and other tribes, are mentioned as guests, or strangers, who have no political rights. Whether bound to the soil, like the *peasants*, or migratory, like the Gypsies, they were alike unprotected by law, and at the mercy of all the whims, neglects, and cruelties of a legislature which bears traces at once of the fierceness of their Turkish neighbours, and the pedantic vindictiveness of the Hapsburgs. It was to break down the yoke which for so many centuries weighed upon the unfortunate *villains* and *aliens* of Hungary, that the reform party exerted itself against the Hungarian conservatives and the court of Vienna." — *The Village Notary*, Vol. I. Note 7.

The last flourish may pass for what it is worth. Mrs. Pulszky testifies clearly that the Slavonic tribes, as a race, were doomed to political death. Speaking of the downfall of the Viennese government, and of the great hopes in which the Slavonians indulged on account of their numerical superiority, she says : —

"They relied upon their numerical strength, neglecting to observe that the majority of their number were in civilization, wealth, and political consequence inferior to the other races, and on this account could not yet attain political ascendancy. . . . It

is one result of the *long prostration* which, at least in Austria and Hungary, *this manifold race has suffered*, that it has no national aristocracy. In consequence, the Slavonians became the most passionate democrats." — pp. 149, 150.

The famous manifesto of Ferdinand, in which he sides with the Magyars, and denounces Jellachich as a traitor, also testifies to the fact, that the Slavonic tribes inhabiting Hungary proper were bound to the soil.

"We were doomed to be mistaken," says the Emperor, "with you Croats and Slavonians, who owe to your union with Hungary the constitutional freedom *which alone amongst all Slavonic nations* you have been enabled to preserve for centuries."

We would not dwell upon this fact, were it not for the exertions of the Magyarized writers in England and this country to make it appear that the political and social distinctions in Hungary are founded upon classes, and not upon races. This assertion is negatived by all history, but we have chosen to prove its falsity from the mouths of Magyar apologists. It will be seen that they furnish abundant proof that the Magyars in Hungary proper were free-men, and the men of Slavonic blood were in bondage, and that this state of things, with a few exceptions, has endured since the entrance of the Magyars under Arpad.

In 1222, the untitled Magyars extorted from King Andreas the charter of the Golden Bull, which is to the Hungarian Constitution what Magna Charta is to the British. It secures to the poor nobles all the rights and privileges which serve to distinguish them from the peasants, especially full exemption from taxation, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. At the same time, this Bull protected them from the attempts which were from time to time made by the magnates to overawe them, and trample upon their privileges. The "villain population" were left in their old condition, and the new laws made escape from it more difficult than ever.

It would seem that, while the Slaves were separated from the Magyars by almost impassable barriers arising from political and civil distinctions, they managed, in many cases, to improve their own material condition. The Magyars in the time of Stephen were in a very barbarous condition. Seventy years after the promulgation of the Constitution, King Bela experienced the utmost difficulty in inducing them to amend their savage manners.

“Bela displayed a restless activity in his attempts to improve the state of the country, and to introduce the *essentials* of a higher civilization. He urged the Magyars to resign the vagrant tent, and to fix themselves in permanent homes. He appointed fairs in various market towns, and he coined a certain quantity of money, and thus created a circulating medium, in the place of the old barter trade.” — Pulszky, p. 22.

Towards the end of the twelfth century, the Magyars began to abandon their nomadic life, and to turn their attention to the cultivation of the internal resources of the country. From the year 1189, when Bela the Third married a daughter of France, the epoch of civilized Hungary begins. The accession of a prince of the house of Anjou to the Hungarian throne did much towards humanizing Magyardom. The great number of young Magyars who resorted to Paris, and the tide of French influence that poured into the land, soon changed the manners of the children of Arpad, and fitted them to appear with credit to themselves on the European stage. In fact, the nation attained the zenith of its glory under Louis the First, who reigned forty years. The savage feudalism of the Magyars was in some degree modified, and the Slaves were not, at this time, much below the servile standard in France. For the first time, the feudal system, as amended by Louis the Great, became a positive law of the land by its solemn recognition on the part of the Diet. The Slaves gained no political rights whatever; social distinctions between them and the Magyars and Magyarized foreigners were sternly maintained, but they were treated with greater humanity, and slowly, very slowly, the laws regulating their labor, and the nature of the tie that bound them to the soil, were amended. They were, in some favored localities, compelled to labor for their lords from two to four days in the week, and a portion of land, generally from twenty to forty acres each, was ceded to them, not as owners, of course, but as tenants. The laws provided that the Slave should not be violently deprived of his little holding. On those days which were not claimed by his lord, he could cultivate the farm ceded to him for his use. From it he had to support his family, to give one ninth of his harvests to his lord, and to pay *all* the public tithes, taxes, and other burdens. He had ceased to be a *slave*, in the more rigid acceptation of the term, and he had become a *serf*, — *adscriptus glebæ*, in the language of the law, — bound to the soil of his lord.

Sigismund, Emperor of Germany, king of Bohemia and of Hungary, meditated several reforms, and, among others, he devised a plan whereby at least one twentieth of the serfs might have regained their liberty. He granted several privileges to the towns, which, in the fifteenth century, were beginning to be of some importance. There were peasants bound to the soil, and yet wealthy enough to purchase their freedom, if permitted. Sigismund provided that, if such serfs would consent to go to the towns, free migration should be allowed, after all claims of the lord had been satisfied. One would suppose that an offer of this sort was a full emancipation of the serf, but it was no such thing. Town life was not so agreeable in Hungary as it is in enlightened countries. The Magyars eschewed it. The inhabitants of the towns were commonly Germans and Italians, who were in the charters styled *hospites*, guests. The *hospites* were of very little importance in Magyar eyes; they enjoyed municipal rights, but they were not represented in the Diet, and they had little or no share in the privileges secured by the common law to the elect race. The Magyars regarded them as somewhat above the Slaves, and far below themselves. Yet an admission into these municipalities was a step in advance for the serf, and a few managed to take it. Magyar opposition, however, rendered this and other measures of the king nearly fruitless. Their wrath was very great when he decreed the enrolment of one in every thirty-three peasants holding cessions of land. This was a fearful innovation, for every soldier was a freeman, according to the Constitution of St. Stephen, and only Magyars were soldiers. The king could do little or nothing in the face of prejudices which had been rooted for ages. "If he had no money to lavish," says Pulszky (p. 55), "he distributed patents of nobility, not bound to any special property, which therefore by no means answered the notions of the Magyars."

Another attempt was made to put arms into peasant hands, and the result was what might have been expected. It is always dangerous to put arms into the hand of a slave, unless his liberty is given with the weapon. The Magyars never desired their slaves to fight, because they might make the very natural mistake of confounding their masters with the public enemy. Moreover, the Magyar, who was always the most brilliant, if not the best, soldier in Europe,

looked upon the profession as a noble one. But the slaves were armed in 1512, and once assembled, for the first time during six hundred years, in arms, they were not disposed to lay them down without striking a blow for their long-lost liberties. The occasion was a crusade against the Turks. A great army was wanted, and the Magyars did not care to go. Accordingly, a royal decree permitted the serfs to enlist, when countless crowds flocked to the standard of the Chancellor Bakatsh. Instead of marching against the Turks, they marched against their oppressors. The Magyars had exerted themselves against this arming of the peasants, rightly judging that a general massacre would ensue, but their opposition had been fruitless. Dozsa, a man whose blood was supposed to have a Slavonic taint, was the leader of the fearful army.

“He told the people that the nobility was to be annihilated, and royalty abolished. Equal rights and equal duties were to be given and imposed upon every body. Hungary was large enough to keep all her children in plenty and ease. Such theories were highly palatable to the peasants, and, acting up to them, they assassinated the landed proprietors, sacked the cities, and burned the castles of the magnates. This was fearful, but still more fearful was the revenge of the nobility, who attacked and routed the peasant forces at Szegedin. Dozsa was placed upon a throne of red-hot iron, and crowned with a crown of the same metal; his captains were tortured and executed. And the Diet, which assembled after the insurrection, punished the peasantry by condemning them to servitude, binding them to the glebe, and depriving them of all political rights.” — Pulszky, p. 63.

The last sentence is a grain of Magyar dust, thrown at our eyes. If there were any of the poorer Magyars engaged in the rising, and if they were suffered to live, the sentence might apply to them. Summary vengeance was meted to the conquered peasantry.

The action of the Diet is more truly described by Eötvös (Vol. III. Note 3):—“The Diet declared that the peasants had forfeited *all* their rights. They were degraded to the state of serfs, *ad perpetuam rusticitatem*, they could *never* purchase their emancipation, and rise to the estate of citizens.” This law was enforced throughout the land. Some humane lords permitted their peasants to return to the old system of working for the castle a certain number of days in the week, and cultivating a piece of land for their own maintenance, and for the payment of the public

burdens, but the laws forbade any thing of this sort to be done.

An opportunity occurred in 1715, under Charles the Sixth, for the Magyars to conform to the laws of civilized Europe, in which feudalism had long disappeared. Several important constitutional reforms were proposed and carried in the Diet. A standing army was for the first time raised, and as the tax for its support was a new one, the Emperor desired the Magyars to pay it. They refused to do so, as it would be an atrocious violation of the Constitution to tax any free Magyar.

“ They protested that, as they were the proprietors of the land, and as every burden on the peasant was a burden on his landlord, it followed that all that the peasants paid was in reality paid by them, and that to tax peasant and landlord meant to tax the landlord twice.”—Eötvös, Vol. III. Note 3.

This reasoning was considered the perfection of logic in the Magyar assembly, and the poor peasant was accordingly taxed twice, or rather thrice. He had to pay his ninth to his lord, his tolls, taxes, and tithes to government, and the new war taxes besides.

We may here call attention to a remarkable fact. All the measures ever devised to oppress or enslave the people proceeded from Magyar sources. They had conquered the country, they had reserved the rights of freemen to themselves, and, with a few and generally fleeting exceptions, they reduced the entire Slavonic population of Hungary proper to a state of servitude. Besides being deprived of every shadow of political right, the peasant was incapable of owning land, he was held to pay all taxes raised in the kingdom, and he was scarcely allowed to pray for common justice, while a thousand privileges he was for ever incapable of enjoying served to remind him that he belonged to a degraded race. The only Magyar authority from whence relief was ever promised was that of St. Stephen, and we have seen how the good intentions of the king were frustrated by the force of circumstances. Louis the First and Sigismund made some wise decrees in favor of the peasants, but Magyar pride rendered them of no effect. Louis was a prince of the house of Anjou, and Sigismund of Luxembourg was also Emperor of Germany; hence both had wider views than were current in Magyardom. The Em-

peror Charles of Austria vainly attempted to induce the Magyars to pay the war taxes, as we have seen. At length the Empress Maria Theresa forced a reform into Hungary, in despite of Magyar opposition. In fact, she violated the Hungarian Constitution.

“Further, when, in 1764, the Diet refused to introduce a bill for the regulation of the relation of the peasant to the land-owner, which should distinctly define his rights and duties, she introduced by an absolute decree her *Urbarium* into Hungary, which, in spite of great defects, was yet very liberal for that period, and contained many elements of progress.” — Pulszky, p. 88.

Austria simply wished to have the rights and duties of the serf distinctly settled, and the Magyars were determined that they should remain as they always had been, in constitutional confusion. Such a law would be excessively inconvenient, for the peasant would appeal to it too often, and so thwart the will of his lord. And yet the new measure did not abridge the rights of the lord; it found the peasant in bondage, and it left him there. It only provided against a few of the worst features of the oppressive system. The peasant had to pay his ninth, and his taxes. He had, it is true, a piece of land to cultivate, and certain privileges in wood and turf cutting; but he was always liable to be oppressed in each of these particulars, and in ordinary cases without redress. The piece of land ceded to him might be exchanged for another, at the lord's caprice. The chief merit of the *Urbarium* was, that it clearly defined the rights and duties of the peasant in tax-paying, in wood and turf cutting, in the management and tenure of his little cession, and in a few other similar particulars. It simply protected the peasant from outrageous exactions, and yet, in the language of Pulszky, it was very liberal for that period. Foreign influence had proposed and partly introduced ameliorative measures into the system of Hungarian servitude, and here was a fourth, and the most efficient of all, emanating from the Austrian court, and enforced by an absolute decree, notwithstanding the negative vote of the Magyar Diet. The haughty sons of Árpád were so offended at the audacity of Austria in forcing liberty upon Hungary, that in the Diet of 1790, as Eötvös tells us, “they memorialized the crown about the manner in which the law had been introduced.”

Yet the Diet gave the law a provisional ratification un-

der the condition of a future revision. In fact, it would not have been safe to provoke the peasants and Austria by rejecting the decree. Nothing more was done by the Diet until the year 1836.

Joseph the Second, the son of Maria Theresa, attempted to abolish the whole Magyar system, and in their rage the Magyars refused, as they still do, to style him King of Hungary. Pulszky says of him :—

“ He was a perfect specimen of a German philosopher, respecting no historical rights, boldly overturning the ancient order of things. In vain he proclaimed toleration, in vain he studied to govern according to the law of reason ; his ordinances were not respected, because he had shaken the public rights to their foundation.”

At the Diet of 1790, a part of the imperial policy was seriously discussed,—that which related to the subject we are treating. But it was only discussed, for the Magyars were impracticable ; they could agree upon nothing. The Emperor Francis called the attention of the next Diet to the subject, but it was again postponed, probably on account of the increasing troubles fomented by the French Revolution. The wars that ensued left Austria no time to think of any thing but her own interests. In 1832, the subject was once more urged by the Emperor upon the Diet. The language of his Majesty was so plain, that Magyar apologists have no other way of disposing of it than by impeaching his intentions, as if every reform in this quarter had not emanated from the court of Vienna.

“ The Austrian cabinet, too prudent to enter into open contest with a movement which was evidently becoming national, affected to adopt the views of the liberal party, hoping, by an apparent and partial acquiescence, to allay the excitement of the public mind, and to restrain and direct a movement which it could not suppress. The royal propositions embodied some of the principal measures of reform projected by the liberals.”—*Examiner*, p. 476.

This Diet revised the Urbarium of Maria Theresa, and the articles show to what a fearful extent the slaves had been oppressed for nine hundred years. 'The judicial power was taken from the lord. This power in substance implied the right of the lord to erect himself into a court, and sit in judgment upon his slave. 'The Magyar law allowed no appeal of the serf from his master, but this Diet abol-

ished the iniquitous statute, and also empowered the slave to institute a suit against a noble. The right of free migration was enacted for the fourth time. The taxes had become very burdensome, and a few antiquated ones were abolished; the number of days the serf was bound to work for his lord was reduced, the quantity of land he could hold in cession was increased, and a law was passed making it *possible* for him to redeem his tithes and labor, whereby he might become owner of a small portion of the land.

These articles indicate a step taken in advance of Magyarism. Yet they leave the peasant as they found him, a slave. Most of them were substantially contained in the *Urbarium* which the court of Vienna *forced* upon the Magyars, and *all* of them were sustained by the imperial recommendation earnestly made at the opening of the Diet. How Austria can be deprived of the credit of introducing measures which she persisted in enforcing in the first instance by an absolute decree, in despite of the strenuous opposition of the Magyars, and which she afterwards repeatedly urged upon the Diet, is a problem which we leave to our Magyarized writers. The same Diet voted that nobles should no longer be exempted from arrest, and that they should pay toll when crossing the new suspension bridge at Pesth. All these measures encountered the most earnest opposition, says the *Examiner*, "from the old Magyar patriots, who regarded the institutions of their country with a superstitious affection, and in whose eyes it was a sacrilege to lay a finger upon one stone of the venerable edifice."

At the Diet of 1843, the Emperor again reminded the Magyars that it was necessary to prosecute the work of reform. The previous measures which had been carried, making a peasant *capable* of being a freeman, and of owning land, were in danger of becoming a dead letter, unless something further was done. The laws exempting freemen from taxation were also to be reconsidered. The Diet acted upon the recommendations of the court of Vienna so far as to decree that the peasant should be *capable*, not only of becoming a freeman, but of buying the property of a noble, and of holding office, — after his emancipation, of course. But how was he to obtain his freedom? The Diet would not hearken to any proposition contemplating the emancipation of the entire peasantry. There was no obvious method of remunerating the lord for the loss of his peasant.

Worse than this, the peasants in Hungary proper outnumbered the Magyars, and if they were all freemen, they would outvote and domineer over their former tyrants. So the only peasant who could possibly profit by the new law was he who was rich enough to purchase his freedom. As for holding office, or being received as an equal into Magyar society, he was *capable* of it, and so is a black citizen of Massachusetts *capable* of holding a high office in the State.

The sincerity of the Magyars in all these measures for the emancipation of the peasants may be accurately estimated from what passed in the same Diet when the proposition to equalize the taxes was under consideration. It is clear, that, while the peasants bore all the public burdens and the freemen were exempted from them, there could be no such thing as liberty or equality before the law, or fraternity in society. Strenuous attempts were made to induce the Magyars to submit themselves to a law equalizing the taxes and other burdens imposed by the state. The court of Vienna was backed by Szecheny in the upper house, and by the radicals in the lower assembly. But their eloquence was thrown away. "The royal propositions," says the *Examiner* (pp. 486, 487), "called the attention of the Diet to some of the principal measures of reform demanded by the liberal party. . . . The liberal party could not, however, yet succeed in obtaining the passage of a law for the equal distribution of the taxes." The Diet of 1843 found the peasant a slave, and it left him a slave.

We come now to the famous Diet of 1848, the last Magyar assembly that was, or perhaps ever will be, held. It opened on the 5th of July, four months after the revolution in Paris, and three after the insurrection at Vienna. The main business of the Diet was to suppress the disturbances caused by the Slaves, who were everywhere rising, and to extort as much as possible from the Emperor in his helpless state. But it was absolutely necessary to do something in relation to the peasant reform. A radical party had grown silently in the very bosom of Magyardom. It was headed by Baron Eötvös and Szemere. In the Diet the party embraced more than one twelfth of the members; but it found little favor with the magnates, and still less with the untitled nobility, who were at this time headed by Kossuth. "It was composed," says Pulszky, "chiefly of young men of letters, who, full of spirit and ability, were but too prone to

discover the weak and faulty parts of the county government. . . . Their leaders, though spirited and witty, failed in bringing their ideas home to the minds of their readers. The national instincts of the Magyars were opposed to such notions."

This party was untiring in its efforts to bring about a thorough reform in Hungary. It is probable that the liberal measures passed in preceding Diets, agreeably to the royal recommendations, would have been lost without their support. Many of them had a perfect understanding with the democrats of Paris and Vienna, and hence they knew, as early as 1846, that a general rebellion was in contemplation. The programme of 1847, published by some of the Hungarian opposition, and setting forth the reforms to be demanded at the Diet of 1848, met their concurrence as a *pro tempore* measure. They were probably sincere in wishing that the peasants should be admitted to the rights of Hungarian citizenship. Accordingly, when Kossuth decreed the emancipation of the peasants, he received their support. They had failed in a motion for a republic, but they were willing to vote for any measure that tended in that direction.

This measure of Kossuth has been extolled far more than it deserves. It is true that he decreed the emancipation of the slaves, but the measure could not fail to be illusory. It was necessary to promise the peasants something, to keep them friendly, or at least quiet, during the coming struggle. It may be that Kossuth meant, by a bold stroke, to anticipate the court of Vienna, which made the same decree on the 4th of March, 1849. The young Emperor ascended the throne on the 3d of December, and it was immediately whispered that he would do what he did in three months for the Slaves. At the end of the same month, Kossuth's party had not carried their measure in all its necessary details. They were yet discussing the question how the lord should be remunerated for the loss of his slave, and Kossuth could think of no better way than by robbing the Church of her lands. This last consideration we offer simply as a conjecture, but it is certain that the menacing position of the Slaves rendered some act in their behalf imperiously necessary, and Kossuth promised them what he must have known he could not perform, and his promise was received by them for just what it was worth.

The reasons why he could not perform it are evident. The party represented by him was the mass of the Magyar nation, the untitled nobility. This has been denied, but uselessly. Nothing is more certain than that the magnates, with scarcely an exception, kept aloof from him and from his party.

“Szechenyi’s followers were members of the high aristocracy, who resided in the metropolis, and scarcely ever busied themselves about the county elections.”—Pulszky, in *Eötvös*, p. v. “Kossuth’s party was supreme, both in strength and in numbers. The middle classes and the gentry belonged to it.”—*Ibid.* The middle classes here mentioned were the poor Magyar population, the untitled nobility. Now this party would have been utterly swamped, destroyed, by the measure of unfettered emancipation, as it was proposed by Kossuth. For the Slaves outnumbered the Magyars in Hungary, and they would outvote them, of course; the sceptre would pass from the master to the slave of nine hundred years standing, to the slave embittered by the unredressed wrongs of so many ages, and who hated his master as truly as his master hated, feared, and despised him. Considering the relations between Magyar and Slave as they have subsisted for so many centuries, it is easy to see what would be the consequence if the latter once obtained the ascendancy which Kossuth *promised* him. Magyardom would be utterly swamped. It would be annihilated in the Diet, and in all the county and town elections. Could any Magyar propose such a suicidal measure? Moreover, the Magyar untitled nobility comprised thousands who were utterly beneath many peasants in point of personal property and attainments. And yet the meanest Magyar was immeasurably above the Slave most distinguished for virtue, talent, and personal wealth, on account of the rights and privileges secured to his race. The following observation of Pulszky will not only afford additional proof of the fact, that, as a general rule, the only *freemen* of Hungary were *Magyars*, but it will give an exact description of the party represented by Kossuth:—

“The nobles were, in fact, all those who possessed the full and uncurtailed privileges of citizenship, and *this in right of birth*, not of property, comprehending, not only many little cultivators who tilled with their own hands the plot of land they themselves possessed, or rented from wealthier owners, but even many who sup-

ported themselves by the very useful, though not very aristocratic, pursuits of butchers, bootmakers, tailors, and *grooms*. These nobles, setting aside other personal privileges which they enjoyed, were the county electors. The whole number of voters has been estimated at *six or seven hundred thousand persons* in a population of *fourteen millions*."—p. 117.

The magnates of Hungary had little to fear from peasant emancipation if they received pecuniary remuneration, but what a loss would accrue to these untitled nobles who were distinguished from the Slaves only by their Magyar rights! "The common soldiers," says Pulszky (p. 305), "the alone unequalled heroes of the day, were sons of the people, upon whom Kossuth's influence ever remained unquestioned." Kossuth's measure, then, was opposed by the magnates because he could not make good their loss, and the untitled nobility would not hear of any thing more than a *promise* of it, because it would utterly ruin them, as Magyars, if carried into effect.

But there is abundance of other proof, that the measure was simply promised to gain time. We have seen that the Magyars were, from the earliest times, opposed even to an amelioration of the peasant condition. The *emancipation* of the peasants would have amounted, not to a reform, but to the *utter destruction* of the Hungarian Constitution. This is evident, because it is an instrument expressly designed to secure the eternal ascendancy of the Magyar race. And the other plans and declarations of Kossuth show that he was determined to maintain this constitution at all hazards. Austrian infringements upon it constituted one of the pretexts for the war. "The German democrats were estranged from the Magyars, because these were not willing to destroy nobility."—Pulszky, p. 150. "Hungary, which refused to give up its *nationality*, and to destroy aristocracy, was considered as a dangerous enemy by the Slavonic and Bohemian parties."—*Ibid.*, p. 199. The Hungary of which the authoress speaks in these places was the Hungary represented at the Diet of 1848–49; it was the untitled nobility, headed by Kossuth. "Nobody believed that the English aristocracy would allow the only *sound* aristocracy of the Continent to be destroyed by Austria."—*Ibid.*, p. 288. We give one more extract from the declaration of independence.

"The form of the government to be adopted for the future will

be fixed by the Diet. But until this point shall be decided on the basis of the *ancient and received principles which have been recognized for ages*, their possessions and dependencies shall be conducted by Louis Kossuth."

We have seen that this Kossuth party had no leaning whatever towards republicanism. In fact, the Magyars offered to recognize the young Emperor as king, if he would swear to maintain the Hungarian Constitution. The Emperor answered with the Constitution of the 4th of March, and from that moment all hope of accommodation ended. The new Constitution declared the peasants free. Now Kossuth had *promised* the same thing, but he knew that the Emperor would *do* it. Francis Joseph proposed to remunerate the proprietors, not by robbing the Church, but by selling the crown lands in Hungary. The untitled nobility, headed by Kossuth, saw that the peasant emancipation would ruin Magyardom for ever, and then, that is, *after* the Emperor had decreed it, and sent an army to enforce that and other measures, the Diet declared Magyardom independent of Austria!

Two things are evident from this recital of a few among the many facts given by our Magyar authors. One is, that the Magyars have always opposed every plan for the amelioration of the condition of the slaves, and that *Austria* deserves the credit of doing nearly all that has been done in this field. She has entreated and recommended the Magyars to be just to the peasants. She has gone to the length of forcing them, sorely against their will, to give them a beggarly instalment of justice. Finally, on the 4th of March, 1849, she abrogated the whole Constitution, which was inseparably connected with the iniquitous system. So that Austria has all along been the *real* champion of freedom in Hungary. So far as the relations between the races are concerned, the only liberty she has opposed is the liberty of one race to hold another in a subjection compared to which our Southern slavery is freedom. The other conclusion is, that, when Americans believed the Magyars to be at all disposed to favor a republic, they never were more shockingly deceived. In England they understood the matter far better. The only great mistake made there was in believing that the distinctions of the Hungarian Constitution, to uphold which Kossuth plunged the country into a disastrous war, were distinctions founded

upon classes only, and not upon *races*, as we have shown they are. This huge lie was told in England to make the people believe that the two Constitutions were exactly alike, for all the distinctions recognized in England by the Constitution are predicated of classes. For the rest, the people of England thoroughly understood that the Magyar movement was essentially aristocratic, and their sympathies for it were challenged on this account. In France, too, the aristocratic character of the whole affair was well understood. Lamartine, in his book on the republic, says:—"I do not pretend that a quarrel of a part of the Hungarian people, the Magyar race, against another part, the Sclavic race, and that struggle of Hungary, thus divided with itself and against Austria, was the least in the world a French, or even a democratic cause. I know perfectly well that it was nothing of the sort. It was a civil war among the Hungarians themselves, growing out of quarrels historical in their origin, and out of jealousies of race."

Persons who have read the Hungarian declaration of independence have doubtless observed that the Magyars in *every part of it* darkly insinuate the real cause that drove them to make that declaration, and *nowhere* expressly mention it. That cause was the great act of the Emperor, whereby, on the 4th of March, he struck the chains from the limbs of ten million subjects of the Slavonic race inhabiting Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania,—chains which they had worn for nine centuries,—and decreed that the four million Magyars should *only* be freemen, and that the Slaves should be as free as their old oppressors. The Magyar grandees cared little about it, so that they were repaid for their loss, for they would then occupy a place with reference to the late peasants and the *late* untitled nobles which an English nobleman occupies with reference to the mass of the people. Nay, it is very probable that the haughty magnates were pleased with the change. Their behaviour during the war, their steady opposition to Kossuth, seem to prove it, and the reason may have been, that the magnate would no longer be elbowed by his own Magyar noble groom at the election, or be reminded that the poor Magyar claimed, with himself, and quite as strenuously, the privileges of blood, and was as decided an aristocrat as the grandee. It was to avoid unpleasant reminders of this sort that the magnate rarely appeared at county meetings,

and it is quite likely that he was little disturbed to see the whole body of poor nobles lost in the great Slavonic tide of slaves emancipated by Austria. To this emancipation, which was the death-warrant of untitled Magyardom, the world is indebted for the grandiloquent and not very veracious Hungarian declaration of independence. Bearing in mind what has hitherto been said, we are prepared to comprehend the meaning of passages in that document like these:—"It was only necessary that Austria should not envy the Magyars the moderate share of constitutional liberty which they timidly maintained with rare fidelity to their sovereigns." "The house of Austria has publicly used every effort to deprive the country of its legitimate independence and Constitution, designing to reduce it to a level with the other provinces long since deprived of freedom." "Hungary only asked that its Constitution might be guaranteed, and its abuses rectified." "The young Emperor declared his intention of depriving the nation of that independence which it had maintained for a thousand years."

Expressions like these occur in every paragraph, and their meaning is obvious. The Magyars mingle with this complaint another grievance of the first magnitude. Austria had not only emancipated the peasants of Hungary, but she had finally delivered Croatia and Transylvania from the tyranny of Magyardom. The Magyars claimed both these provinces as theirs.

It has been well observed, that if the cause of the Magyars against Austria was worth any thing, that of the Croats against the Magyars was unimpeachable. The real quarrel of the Magyars with the Emperor was, not that he had deprived them of their freedom, which is a ridiculous accusation, since the new republican Constitution of Austria secures to them a freedom really greater than they enjoyed before, but that he had annulled their privilege of holding millions in entire or partial bondage. The quarrel of the Croats with the Magyars was, that these had oppressed Croatia to an extent that had exhausted the patience of the nation, and that it had accordingly drawn the sword to assert its independence. The Magyars asked to be exalted above the Croats, the Croats asked to be equal to the Magyars. Hence the civil war in Hungary between the two races. At first, the court of Vienna seemed disposed

to favor the Magyars, but sober, second thought enlisted her on the side of the oppressed Croats.

Croatia was settled by a Slavonic tribe as early as the year 652, more than two centuries before the descent of the Magyars into Europe. Hungary was already peopled by the Czechs and Serbs, when Arpad overran the country, and reduced the greater part of the natives to servitude. Croatia bounded Hungary on the south, and it afforded an asylum to many fugitives from the neighbouring tract of the conquered country. It is probable that the natives of Southern Hungary, as well as the Croats, belonged to the Illyrian branch of the Slavonic family; and the Croats, partly from sympathy, partly from fear, began to regard the Magyars as the common enemy, and the two nations have since entertained for one another any thing but friendly feelings. It has been remarked often, that Croatia is the Ireland of Hungary. It is certain that the cause of Croatia against the Magyars is substantially that of the Irish Catholics against England. The Henry the Second of *Magyar* Croatia was Ladislas, the sixth Christian king of Magyar-land. He subdued the Croats about the year 1090, nearly two hundred years after the irruption of the Magyars into Hungary. Under his successor, Koloman, the Croats attempted to free their country from the foreign yoke. "They believed," says Pulszky (p. 27), "that the new king was utterly ignorant of the trade of arms. He suppressed the insurrection, and completed the incorporation of Croatia." The last expression is a figure of speech. Andreas, the younger son of Bela the Third, seized Croatia and Dalmatia, and held them until the death of his brother Emrich enabled him to ascend the Hungarian throne. Under Andreas the Third, the last monarch of the house of Arpad, the Croats, who had never ceased to trouble the frontier, rose against the Magyars, and for a time they were virtually independent. It appears that they were pretty thoroughly subdued under Louis the Great, who was crowned in 1342. When his daughter, Maria, was crowned queen, the Croats again flew to arms, and the queen, hoping that her beauty and innocence would plead strongly in her favor, attended by a small army of Magyars, ventured into Croatia. But the Croats received her very much as Duffy proposes to receive Victoria. "The Croats proved inaccessible to romantic sentimentality.

The Ban Horvathy attacked the Hungarian guards at Diakovár, and defeated them; Gara and Forgács were, in spite of their heroic resistance, dragged from their horses, and beheaded under the very eyes of the queen, and of her mother, who were plundered of their jewels, and imprisoned in the Dalmatian castle of Novigrod."—Pulszky, p. 53. Sigismund of Luxembourg was elected king, and, by a treaty with the Ban Horvathy, the queen was liberated. Her mother had been previously executed by the vindictive Croats. Croatia maintained its independence for some years, notwithstanding Sigismund had entrapped upwards of twenty chiefs at Buda, by solemn promises of amnesty, and had them executed on the spot. Until the fall of the Hungarian branch of the house of Anjou, which happened when Louis the Second was defeated and slain by the Turks at Mohacs, in 1526, Croatia remained in an unsettled state. When Ferdinand of Austria was elected by the Magyars king of Hungary, the Croats, who never lost an opportunity of troubling their hereditary enemies, and, moreover, were by no means anxious to have a German rule over them, declared in favor of Zapolya, the rival of Ferdinand. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, a new source of dissension arose between the Magyars and the Croats. The principles of the so-called Reformation found favor among the Magyars, while Croatia steadily resisted all attempts to graft the new doctrines upon her soil. The Catholic Magyars speedily lost their ascendancy in the Diet, and did not recover it until 1647. During this time Hungary was in a deplorable state, and the Protestant party, as if to involve every thing in inextricable confusion, did not hesitate repeatedly to invoke the assistance of the Turks. Croatia also suffered much, in common with Hungary, from the incessant inroads of the Turks, who, at one time, possessed more than one third of the entire kingdom. After the expulsion of the Mahometans from the Empire, Croatia was forced to be content with a union, such as it was, with Hungary; but the national discontent, which had been kept alive eight hundred years, declared itself emphatically in 1848, when the Croats flew to arms at the call of Jellachich, and began the series of offensive measures against the Magyars, which, in 1849, resulted in the independence of Croatia.

The Emperor Ferdinand, in his first manifesto to the

Croatians and Slavonians, truly says that they alone among the Slavonic nations have been enabled to preserve a certain degree of constitutional freedom for centuries. This was because the Croats, who were always good soldiers, never lost an opportunity of annoying the Magyars, and these were compelled to recognize the Croats as, in a certain sense, a distinct nation. They seldom granted any thing to Croatia, unless when the strong hand forced them to do it. There were serfs in Croatia and in the other Slavonic provinces, as well as in Hungary; but in Magyarland the freemen and the serf were of different races, and this circumstance made a wide difference between the lot of the serf in Hungary, and his lot in Croatia. Where the lord and the slave are of the same race, the peasant often can and does rise above the condition in which he was born. The tie of blood always exerts a mitigating influence upon the feudal relations founded merely upon class distinctions. Croatia had a sort of diet of her own, and a Ban, or governor, who was generally of Slavonic blood. There was also a local supreme court of justice, called the Banal Table, and another tribunal for the hearing of civil causes. But the local assembly of the Croats had less power than was lodged in the Irish Parliament. The Magyars allowed them to enjoy some of the forms of constitutional government, which were rendered almost null by the inborn pride of the ascendant race. *The Examiner* (p. 494) says that "the citizens of Croatia were in many places debarred from the exercise of their political rights. They were attacked and driven from the place of elections by the members of the Illyrian faction, furnished with arms from the public arsenals. In vain they appealed to the king." The citizens of whom she speaks were Magyars, or Magyarized Slaves. The Illyrian faction comprehended the great majority of the inhabitants of Croatia and Slavonia, who were of Slavonic blood. The Magyars were not disposed to favor Croatia, because she had ever been a thorn in their sides. Then their own slaves in Hungary were of the same race as the Croats, and hence their pride forbade them to acknowledge these as equals. The game of Saxon and Celt was played in Croatia as well as in Ireland.

Language was another bone of contention. The Magyars scorned to speak in the Slavonic tongue, and the

Slaves hated the Magyar language too much to learn it. Yet it was one of the loudest complaints of the Croats, that the Magyars were resolved to introduce their language everywhere in Croatia, not only in the courts of justice, but in every public institution where it was at all practicable. It is pretty certain that these complaints were well founded. England endeavoured in a similar way to naturalize the English language in Ireland, and she has partially succeeded. Moreover, the Croats averred that the Magyars had from the beginning pursued a system towards Croatia, calculated to annul the best local and national rights of the people, and to Magyarize the country. The Magyars inhabiting Croatia too loudly and offensively asserted their privileges of blood. Then the Magyar central Diet exercised controlling influence over all the concerns of Croatia, and, of course, discountenanced every effort of the Croats in a national direction, and aimed to introduce into the land Magyar institutions, as far as practicable. The Parliament of England has steadily pursued a similar course with reference to Ireland, and with what success every Irishman can tell. This central Diet of Hungary was composed of two houses. The deputies of the lower house numbered from four to five hundred. Croatia, as a province of Hungary, was allowed to send deputies to the Diet. How many? Perhaps twenty? "Croatia," says the *Examiner*, "sent three deputies to the Diet, one of whom sat in the upper, and two in the lower house." It is easy to conceive what would be the treatment of the two Slaves in an assembly of nearly five hundred Magyars. The Magyars in the whole kingdom numbered four millions, and they were represented by the five hundred deputies. Croatia, with a population of nearly two millions, sent three men to represent her. In effect, the four or five Slave deputies who received a scornful permission to sit in the Diet with five hundred Magyars, represented a Slave population of nine millions. Daniel O'Connell, in the Imperial Parliament, called his brethren a race of hereditary bondsmen, and yet Ireland was far better treated at Westminster than Croatia in the Diet. The Croat deputies had always insisted upon speaking in Latin in the Diet. But in 1836, says Pulszky (p. 100), "the law [the Magyars] decided that henceforth the Magyar should be the language of the Diet, granting an exception to the

Croatian deputies only, who continued to speak in Latin. In 1844 it was decreed that in the Diet the Croatian members should likewise use the Magyar tongue, but should be allowed *six years more to learn it.*"

So the Croats rebelled in 1848. Jellachich crossed the Drave, and carried the war into Magyarland. Croatia is now an independent province of the Empire. Our democrats, who have so stupidly supposed that the Magyar cause was the cause of republican principles, will do well to study the Magyar declaration of independence, in which the Croats are denounced in almost every paragraph as *rebels*, and with a bitterness that scarcely has a parallel in the most envenomed proclamations of wrathful kings. Yet, reasoning from democratic principles, the Slaves of Croatia had a "*sacred right of revolution*," to be exercised according to their *sovereign* will. Yet, setting aside this argument *ad hominem*, nothing is more certain than that Croatia had always been very badly treated by Magyardom. Whoever recognizes the justice of the Irish cause cannot avoid acknowledging that the Croatian cause was as good.

An attentive consideration of the facts we have thus far adduced will make it evident that the Magyar cause, on which so much sympathy has been wasted in this country, was not only anti-republican, but radically a bad cause. The whole trouble in Hungary arose from the fact that the Slave population almost simultaneously revolted against the Magyars, who had oppressed them for so many ages. It was simply a civil war, — a war of races upon Hungarian ground. The Austrian government was neutral. "The transactions of Croatia with Hungary," says Pulszky (p. 165), "could legally be settled between them without any interference from Austria." "From Vienna, likewise," (*Ibid.*, p. 169,) "volunteers came to Hungary. Since Jellachich had crossed the Drave, enlistments for the Magyars had publicly taken place in Vienna, with the knowledge of the Minister of the Interior. Baron Dobblhoff looked on the Croatian invasion as a matter in which he was wholly neutral. He permitted the enlistment for the Magyars, and simultaneously an enrolment for Jellachich." In fact, Jellachich professed to fight in the name of Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria, and the Magyars denounced him in the name of the same Ferdinand, King of Hungary. This

neutrality of Austria could not long be maintained, of course, because, although the seat of war was not in the hereditary dominions of the Emperor, yet it was actually threatening to ravage a part of his empire. Jellachich did not cross the Drave until the 9th of September, 1848. The Emperor had forbidden him to hold the southern Slave congress at Agram, and had on the 10th of July issued his famous manifesto, in which he openly sides with the Magyars, and denounces Jellachich as a traitor. By the end of September, it was pretty evident that the court of Vienna had determined to leave the Magyars to their fate, and encourage Jellachich. Yet the Magyars continued to denounce the Croats in the name of Ferdinand, King of Hungary. When the young Emperor, Francis Joseph, ascended the throne, on the 2d of December, the Magyars hoped that he might assist them in crushing the *rebellion* of the Croats, and the Diet signified that Magyardom would recognize the new monarch, if he would consent to be crowned with the crown of St. Stephen, and acknowledge the *legal rights* of Hungary, that is, the ascendancy of the Magyars over the other races. It was not until the 4th of March, 1849, when Francis Joseph gave his remarkably republican constitution to the Empire, which deprived the Magyars of their "historical privileges," leaving them in a state of perfect equality with the Slaves, that they declared Hungary independent of the Empire.

Here our limits compel us to pause for the present; but our readers may expect the conclusion of the sketch, and a full defence of the Austrian government, in our next number.

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- ART. III.—1. *Sessio Quarta Concilii Tridentini vindicata, seu Introductio in Scripturas Deutero-canonicas Veteris Testamenti*, per ALOISIUM VINCENZI SAMMAURENSEM, in Romano Archigymnasio Litterarum Hebraicarum Professorem. Romæ. 1842.
 - 2. *The Holy Scriptures, their Origin, Progress, Transmission, Corruptions, and True Character*. London: Charles Dolman. 1850.
 - 3. *The Church of Rome self-convicted of Error, with Regard*

to the Canon of the Scripture, and Tradition. Church Review, New Haven, October, 1850, Art. VI.

THE last publication on our list is that which determines us to introduce to our readers the learned Professor in the Roman University, author of the work first mentioned, who, with immense erudition, has vindicated the canon of Scripture sanctioned by the Council of Trent. As the work is rarely to be seen on this side of the Atlantic, we shall freely avail ourselves of its contents to meet the objections so recently put forward by the Reviewer, but which Vincenzi found in the pages of Horne, and which have been repeated by a thousand pens from the days of Luther and Calvin. It is the privilege of Protestants to acknowledge no final judgment, and consequently to press on our attention, with the freshness of novelty, difficulties which had been fully weighed before any definitive action was taken by the Church tribunals. "Even though vanquished they can argue still," and, like defeated litigants, they are ready to state anew the reasons in their favor, to produce their witnesses, and to prove the injustice of the verdict and sentence pronounced against them. We venture to invite attention, at the same time, to the second work on our list, which has no pretensions to originality, but presents a considerable amount of useful information on a most interesting topic. It should be circulated as widely as possible, in order to bring before all the evidences on which the Bible is received, and the means by which its study may be made a source of instruction and improvement. For Protestants no question is more perplexing than these:—On what grounds do you hold the Bible to be the word of God? How do you know with certainty its meaning, even in regard to the chief mysteries and doctrines? They indeed, with apparent confidence, allege that its pages bear the impress of inspiration, and that the whole Christian world acknowledges it, and add, that its meaning in all necessary things is plain to the sincere inquirer; but this is a mere begging of the question, an implied appeal to the authority of the Church, which is haughtily rejected. Their own endless divisions and their uncertainty prove to demonstration that its meaning is not easy to be ascertained.

They seek to make a diversion by reproaching us with

adding to the ancient Jewish canon a number of books wholly destitute of any Divine character. The adherents of the Church of England left these books in the undisturbed possession of canonical authority during the reign of Edward the Sixth, as the Homilies set forth in his time plainly show, since they quote them as Holy Scripture, and ascribe them to the Holy Ghost; but, strange to say, the Articles, which approve of the Homilies as containing “a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times,” give those books only this very qualified praise:—“The other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners; but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine.” This reserve might be very wise in the days of Jerome, whenever a doctrine was to be proved against those who did not recognize those books as divine; but it is unnecessary in regard to those who believe them to be dictates of the Holy Ghost, such as the Homilies proclaim them. The rule laid down in the Articles to discriminate Scripture is most unfortunate in its application:—“In the name of the Holy Scripture we do understand those canonical books of the Old and New Testament, of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church.” Yet at the close of the same Article it is said,—“All the books of the New Testament, as they are commonly received, we do receive and account them canonical.” Now it is notorious that doubt was long entertained in the Church, by large and influential portions of it, regarding several books thus commonly received in the sixteenth century, namely, the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third Epistles of John, the Epistles of James and of Jude, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. How, then, could the authors of the Articles reconcile this fact with their rule to acknowledge as canonical those only of which there never was any doubt? Mr. Newman, when writing Tract No. XC., contended that the doctrine of the Church of England in regard to the books called by her Apocryphal, by us Deutero-canonical, could be made to harmonize with that of Trent, by the aid of the strong expressions of the Homilies; but it would puzzle even him to reconcile the Homilies with the Articles, or the sixth Article with itself. Yet, with such contradictions staring him in the face, the Reviewer undertakes to convict Rome of inconsistency.

The Council professed to follow the examples of the orthodox fathers, which plainly meant the primitive and general tradition of Christian antiquity. The Church takes no individual father as a guide, although she sometimes confirms by her sanction the doctrine which has been vindicated successfully by some individual. In professing reverence for the fathers generally, she acknowledges that what they taught with unanimity as the faith originally delivered, was such in reality ; and that the great facts on which the transmission of doctrine depends, may safely be admitted on their testimony. They are competent witnesses as to the books generally read in the churches as Divine Scripture, and their judgment, when unanimous, or nearly such, is entitled to great deference. Far greater importance is ascribed to them as prelates of the Church, in Council, declaring doctrine, or facts connected with doctrine, than as writers composing doctrinal treatises, or interpreting Scripture ; since the combination of views and concurrence of testimonies necessarily carry with them greater weight, to say nothing of the promises of Divine assistance to those who are gathered together in the name of Christ.

The fidelity and simplicity with which the Council of Trent acted on these principles, in determining the canon of Scripture, are manifest. The fathers did not stop to inquire what bearing any particular book might have on the controversies of the day ; but, as a preliminary measure for all doctrinal investigation and judgment, they declared what books had been transmitted in the Church as sacred and canonical. They opened the archives of the Apostolic See and of the local churches, and drew forth the catalogues which were composed by Popes and Councils in the fifth and fourth centuries, to republish them as authentic lists of the sacred books. A Roman Council, consisting of seventy bishops, under Gelasius, at the close of the fifth century, had published a canon of Scripture, conformable to a list given by Innocent the First at the commencement of that century, with a mere verbal discrepancy in some manuscripts as to one book of Esdras, omitting Nehemias, and one book of the Macchabees. In the year 397, an African Council, held at Carthage, consisting of very many bishops, among whom Augustine was preëminent, promulgated a canon exactly the same as that which Innocent, a

few years afterwards, communicated to the Bishop of Toulouse. The same list of books is recorded by St. Augustine himself, in his book on Christian doctrine, with this preliminary remark:—"The whole canon of Scripture consists of these books." Here, then, was a canon approved of by the prelates of Africa and Italy in two numerous Councils, at an interval of a century, confirmed by two illustrious Pontiffs, and published anew in the fifteenth century to the Jacobites, at the time of the Council of Florence. It had the support of Augustine, truly a host in himself, who, in his writings as well as in the assembly of his colleagues, declared it to be conformable to primitive tradition. No other canon was known to have been published by the authority of any Pope or Council, unless, perhaps, at Laodicea, in Phrygia, by an assembly of twenty or thirty bishops, in 363, or about that period. Of the authenticity of this canon there was reasonable doubt, since it is wanting in some manuscripts, and it seems to have exercised no influence on the judgment of subsequent Councils, or on the minds of Christian writers generally. It is untrue that it was confirmed by the Fourth General Council, as the Reviewer most strangely affirms; for the mere mention of a collection of canons is not equivalent to confirmation, and in the judgment of the learned, those of Laodicea were not comprised in that collection. Paley more candidly acknowledges that its authority does not seem to have extended any farther than the province, and that Christian writers after that time treated of the sacred books without any reference to the decision at Laodicea. In this catalogue, which we think was added to the decrees by some one more attentive to Jewish sentiments than to the general usage of the churches, the books styled Deuterocanonical are omitted, with the exception of Baruch and the Epistle of Jeremias, which found favor with many who did not recognize the other writings. Whatever may be thought of the authenticity of the canon, it could not induce a moment's hesitation on the part of the fathers of Trent, who had before them several concordant lists framed by numerous Councils, approved by Popes, and confirmed by the general usage of the whole Church from the remotest antiquity. Accordingly, they published anew the canon of the Council of Carthage, and hurled anathema against the man who would dare deny the sacred and

canonical character of the books which it contained. Will any one pretend that this proceeding was not in accordance with the examples of the orthodox fathers? Were not the prelates of these two great Councils of Italy and Africa orthodox? Were not Augustine, Innocent, Gelasius, eminently worthy of this character? Even the Oriental schismatics have not ventured to dispute the correctness of the judgment of the Council of Trent on this point, since in 1672 a Greek synod held at Jerusalem under the Patriarch Dositheus acknowledged the same books as canonical Scripture, conformably to ancient usage and primitive tradition.

But the Reviewer alleges that many fathers adhered to the Hebrew canon. Granting for argument's sake that they so adhered before Councils had drawn up an authoritative catalogue, or given it a solemn sanction, surely it was consistent on the part of the Tridentine fathers to prefer the judgment of ancient Councils to the opinions of individual fathers. Councils in all ages have professed to be guided by primitive tradition, and to declare with authority what was taught by the fathers, and what is contained in the sacred writings. "This," they cried, "is the faith of the fathers: we all believe this." The judgment of a Council freely assembled, whose decrees are acknowledged throughout the Church, is justly presumed to afford the best evidence of the previous teaching of the fathers, which is examined, compared, and summed up, to prepare for the decision. It is a verdict of the assembled prelates, pronounced after a patient hearing of the witnesses. Those who object some passages of the fathers apparently inconsistent with the judgment of the Council are like persons judging of the merits of the case from desultory and vague statements, without that full knowledge which the comparison of testimony affords. With the same show of reason with which the Episcopalian alleges testimonies against the authority of the sacred books, the Arian objects the unguarded expressions of the ante-Nicene fathers, to overthrow the Divinity of Christ.

We must beg the indulgence of our readers, whilst we treat somewhat diffusely of the Hebrew canon. It is very commonly supposed that the inspired writings of the Old Testament were collected together by Esdras, after the return of the people from captivity, and solemnly proposed

to public veneration. This belief rests chiefly on some statement in an apocryphal book bearing his name, but which the Church has rejected. No evidence can be furnished that the Jews had a canon in its modern acceptation, although they certainly had a number of books which they venerated as composed under Divine inspiration. The law of Moses was publicly read for their instruction; the history of God's dealings with their fathers, as traced by the pencil of inspired historians, was presented to them; the psalms, which celebrated the mercies and wonders of the Deity, were chanted in their religious assemblies; the record was carefully preserved of predictions which the inspired seers had uttered; in a word, the oracles of God were intrusted to them. It is not improbable that Esdras collected together all the sacred books which were to be found; but it is utterly unlikely that he undertook to seal the collection, as if God had bound himself to add no new manifestation of his Spirit. Josephus, indeed, assigns as a reason why the works subsequently written did not obtain the same high degree of veneration, that the succession of prophets was not maintained; but the testimony and judgment of the Jewish historian can scarcely be deemed conclusive whilst the books themselves afford intrinsic evidence of the outpouring of the Divine Spirit, and our Lord himself warrants us in believing a succession of prophetic teachers down to John.* Certain it is that the books in question were received with high reverence among the Hellenistic Jews, of whom a hundred and twenty thousand lived at Alexandria under Ptolemæus Philadelphus. The Greek version of the Scriptures, called the Septuagint, is believed to have been made for their use; and the books styled Deutero-canonical were composed chiefly for their instruction. During more than three centuries before the coming of Christ the Hebrew language had declined, and Chaldean and Greek had become familiar even to the Jews of Palestine, whilst their brethren scattered abroad lost almost all knowledge of their ancient tongue. Together with the version of the Hebrew books, they kept the more recent works written in Chaldean or in Greek, read them in their religious assemblies, and bound them up in the same collection, as Beveredge testifies, — “publice legi, et eodem quo libri vere

* Matt. xi. 13.

Θεόπνευστοι volumine scribi solebant." Walton, in the Prolegomena to his Polyglot, states that they passed from the Hellenistic Jews to the Christian Church.

The Jews of Palestine, who were not so well acquainted with most of these works as their brethren of Alexandria, seemed to cling more exclusively to the Hebrew books, which came down to them with the seal of venerable antiquity. By a special mode of counting them, they discovered a conformity in number to the twenty-two letters of their alphabet, and scrupled to admit any more, as if God had bound himself to limit the number of inspired works to that of the Hebrew alphabet! Josephus did not disdain to notice this fancy, which has served to many as a pretext for rejecting the Deutero-canonical books.

The earliest Christian writers, Barnabas, Clemens Romanus, Polycarp, Irenæus, freely quoted these books as Scripture, in the same manner as the other books. Several passages from Wisdom are found in the celebrated letter of Clemens to the Corinthians, which was for a long series of years read publicly in the churches, in testimony of its great excellence. He dwelt especially on the heroism of Judith, the subject of one of these books. St. Polycarp warns the Philippians "not to procrastinate when it is in their power to do good," enforcing the admonition by the words of Tobias, "Alms deliver from death." St. Irenæus uses the words of Wisdom,— "The just shall shine like the sun in the sight of their Father." He quotes a passage of Baruch as of Jeremias, with whom he was often identified, because he was his scribe; he numbers Tobias among the prophets; and in other instances he employs these books as sacred Scripture. Hippolytus Romanus, Arnobius Lactantius, Julius Maternus Finnicus, and Phæbadius, writers of the third and fourth centuries, are brought forward by Vincenzi as witnesses of the acknowledged authority of those books, which they quote in the same manner as the other inspired writings. These establish satisfactorily the primitive tradition of the Church, which included them in the canon.

We cannot deny that some mist of doubt was raised by the well-meant zeal of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who, in the decline of the second century, undertook a journey to Palestine to ascertain what books were commonly received as inspired by the Jews of those parts. The omission of

the books known chiefly to their brethren of Alexandria was calculated to perplex the minds of those who might not be fully informed of the Apostolic tradition on the subject; and the distinction, being once made, was observed by many with a view to mark those books whose authority might be urged successfully against the Jews. Most, if not all, of the fathers who admitted this distinction quoted the works at other times as Divine Scripture, which warrants us in interpreting their statements elsewhere in harmony with the general tradition, whereof they themselves furnish evidence. The books continued to be read publicly in the churches, as had been customary from time immemorial, and to be quoted as of Divine authority.

Origen, in his commentary on the first Psalm, expressly states that he gives the Hebrew canon, without at all intimating that he denies the authority of the books which are not contained in it. His sentiments on this subject admit of no ambiguity, since throughout his works he cites them as Holy Scripture. To mention only one passage in his third book against Celsus (cap. 72), he quotes, as a definition given in the Divine Word, a passage from Wisdom, vii. 25. The curious may find numerous quotations from his works in the learned treatise of the Roman Professor. His letter to Africanus, who was somewhat perplexed by the omission of the history of Susanna, and other facts, in the Hebrew text of Daniel, shows his unwillingness to regulate the Christian Scriptures by Jewish authority. He asks indignantly, — “Did not Providence, which gave the sacred Scriptures to the Christian churches for their edification, take care that they should be incorrupt?”

Eusebius, as an historian, stated after others the Hebrew canon, but he himself freely used the Deutero-canonical books, as Divine Scripture, to prove the coming of Christ. Thus he quotes “the Divine words” of Baruch, in his *Evangelical Demonstration*, Lib. VI. cap. 19. He also quotes as Scripture the prayer of Susanna (Lib. VI. cap. 1, *Præp. Evang.*), and numbers among the prophecies a passage of Wisdom (Lib. X. cap. 14.)

Hilary of Poitiers, following Origen, gave the Hebrew canon in his Preface to the Psalms, but certainly without meaning to detract from the authority of the other books, which he expressly quoted as Divine Scripture. Thus, on Psalm cxxv. he quotes as witnesses the Three Children sing-

ing in the furnace, Daniel in the lion's den, Eleazar faithful to the law despite of his persecutors, and the seven Macchabees with their mother, martyrs, who gave thanks to God when suffering unheard-of torments. He quotes the words of Wisdom, as of a prophet, Psalm cxviii. He employs the testimony of Susanna against the Arians, and quotes the prophetic words of Wisdom and of Baruch, to enforce the Divine doctrine against the Arians (*De Trin.*, Lib. I. et V.) The son of Sirach is also brought forward by him, and the language of the martyr Macchabee is addressed to the impious Emperor Constantius. "From his testimony," to use the words of the Reviewer, "we may perceive in what estimation the Apocrypha [Deuterocanonical writings] were held in the western part of the Roman Empire." Catholics and Arians alike acknowledged their Divine inspiration.

Epiphanius of Salamis "does not sanction," if we believe the Reviewer, "a single book of the Apocrypha," because, forsooth, he gives the Hebrew canon, and explains how the Jews contrive to make twenty-seven books count as twenty-two, in order to suit the number of letters in their alphabet! Yet he quotes Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, and the Canticle of the Three Children, as Divine Scripture. (*In Ancorato*, cap. 12, *et contra Basilidianos Hær.* VI. cap. 6, et Lib. II. *contra Origenem Hær.* XLIV. cap. 36.) He recites the history of Susanna, alleges the prophecy of Baruch, numbers Judith among the prophetesses, and extols the seven martyr Macchabees.

Jerome is the last hope of the Reviewer. He indeed states that the Church does not receive those books among the canonical Scriptures, or use them for the establishment of doctrine, although she reads them for the edification of the faithful. This can imply no more than that as yet no solemn definition of their canonical authority had been pronounced. He, however, translated the book of Judith, because it was on record that the Nicene Council had numbered it among the Sacred Scriptures, incidentally we suppose, rather than by an express declaration. He yielded to the request of some prelates, who urged him to translate Tobias, judging it right to gratify Christian bishops, although he should thereby incur the censure of haughty Pharisees. When blamed by Ruffinus for rejecting the portions of Daniel and Esther which were wanting in the

Hebrew text, he repelled the charge as a calumny, and alleged that he had stated the objections of the Jews, rather than his own sentiments. In fact, he expressly quotes Ecclesiasticus as Divine Scripture.*

We could multiply quotations, furnished us by Vincenzi and other authors, besides many which we ourselves have culled from the orthodox fathers, which prove that the Divine inspiration of those books was admitted even by those writers who, as critics or historians, gave the Hebrew canon. If any spoke of them with reserve, or quoted them less frequently, it was because they could not safely be urged against the Jews, or because their authority had not been solemnly defined and proclaimed. They were everywhere read in the churches, and "listened to," as St. Augustine testifies, "by all Christians, from the bishops down to the humblest of the faithful laity, by penitents and catechumens, with the veneration due to Divine authority."† This illustrious father strongly insisted that the Christian canon should not be regulated by that of the Jews of Palestine, since the Church of Christ was led into all truth by the Spirit given for her guidance. "We must not omit those books which we know to have been written before the coming of Christ, and which are received by the Church of the Saviour himself, although they be not received by the Jews."‡

If any one wish for an unprejudiced and early witness of the regard which was had to the books in question, let him take in hand the works of St. Cyprian, who quotes them indiscriminately with the other Divine Scriptures, and expressly designates them as words of prophecy and inspiration. The writings of Chrysostom, Ambrose, Basil, will answer the same purpose.

The irreverence with which even Episcopalians speak of these books is contrary to the language, not only of the Homilies, but even of the Articles, which acknowledge them to be serviceable "for example of life and instruction of manners." Every one who reads the books of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom must confess that they abound with lessons of virtue. They are, however, commended to our reverence by higher considerations, since they contain re-

* *Ep. XXXIV. ad Julian.*

† *De Præd. Sanct., cap. XVI.*

‡ *In Speculo.*

markable predictions of the sufferings of the Son of God. Compare Wisdom xxi. 17 with Matthew xxvii. 40, 42, and you will be forced to acknowledge that scarcely a more remarkable coincidence of fact with prophecy can be met with in any other portion of the sacred writings. The harmony of the moral teaching is not less striking. Our Lord in directing us to "give to every one that asketh," Luke vi. 20, seems but to repeat the injunction of Tobias, "Turn not away thy face from any poor man." (Tob. iv.) He honored by his presence the Feast of the Dedication, whose institution, as Campbell observes, is recorded in the Books of the Macchabees. Compare John x. 22, 1 Mac. iv. 41, 2 Mac. i. 68. In describing the importunity of the widow soliciting justice from an unjust judge, he used the language and terms of Ecclesiasticus xxxv. 22. Campbell candidly says,—“To me it appears very probable, considering the affinity of the subject, that the Evangelist had in the expression he employed an allusion to the words of the Jewish sage.”

To those who have observed the manner of quoting the ancient Scriptures adopted generally by the sacred writers of the New Testament, the correspondence of sentences and phrases between them and the Deutero-canonical books will appear equivalent to express quotation. "From woman," says Ecclesiasticus, "is the beginning of sin, and through her we all die." (xxv. 24.) The account of original sin given by the Apostle is strikingly similar. Rom. v. 12. We must leave our readers to compare his description of the blindness of the philosophers in not recognizing God by his works, with the language of the Book of Wisdom on the same subject. The son of Sirach tells us, "In every gift make bright thy countenance"; and Paul proclaims that "God loveth the cheerful giver." The sufferings of the ancients are graphically represented by the Apostle in a manner to mark especially the Macchabee martyrs, the term "tympanum," which he uses (Heb. xi. 35), being expressive of a punishment not elsewhere recorded. In fine, the attributes of the Son of God, as delineated by the Apostle, bear a striking conformity to the description in the Book of Wisdom; for "she is the splendor of eternal light." (Wisdom vii. 26.) The same term ἀπαύγασμα is used Heb. i. 3.

The conduct of the Catholic Church at Trent, in adhering

to the canon framed above eleven centuries before at Carthage, contrasts most favorably with the course pursued by innovators. Luther treated the Epistle of James as of straw, because it stood in the way of his doctrine of justification by faith. The ingenuity of Calvin smoothed away the difficulty, and he felt willing to receive all the books of the New Testament. The Books of the Macchabees, being favorable to the practice of offering prayer and sacrifice for the departed, were obnoxious to the whole body of Reformers. In order to rid themselves of their authority, they did not hesitate to fall back on Jewish ground; and although they found these books supported by the Hellenist Jews, they deemed it enough that they were not received by those of Palestine to authorize their rejection. Not to appear to make common cause with Jews, the Church of England availed herself of the doubt which was once entertained by some of their canonical authority, without considering that by this principle several books of the New Testament must also be abandoned. Thus error is in contradiction with itself, whilst the Church, having displayed a wise toleration when there was any room for question, decided with solemnity, on mature examination, in strict conformity with primitive tradition, usage, and teaching, from which the doubts or errors of individuals could in no wise derogate. It is time that all should acquiesce in a decision supported by such evidence, and free from all appearance of bias. Ecclesiasticus, which is acknowledged by Horne to contain a collection of most pure moral precepts, and to have met with general and deserved esteem throughout the Western Church, should be in the hands of our youth, to guard them against the seductions of pleasure, and stimulate them to the practice of virtue. Tobias, which he acknowledges was cited with respect by the early fathers of the Christian Church, and which, by the simplicity of its narrative and the pure and moral lessons which it inculcates, has won popularity, should be perused by those about to enter the married state. "Wisdom" should be studied by all, in order to know the vanity of worldly pursuits, and the different results of a life of virtue or of vice. The Macchabees should be read to see the wonderful support vouchsafed to the ancient people of God under cruel persecution. In fine, all those books abound with edification,

and bear intrinsic characters of inspiration far more striking than many books of the Hebrew canon; so that he who casts them aside irreverently incurs a fearful responsibility.

ART. IV.— *Conscience and the Constitution, with Remarks on the Recent Speech of the Hon. Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United States on the Subject of Slavery.* By MOSES STUART. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1850. 8vo. pp. 119.

PROFESSOR STUART appears to have written this heavy pamphlet from patriotic motives, with an earnest desire to allay the uncalled for popular agitation on the subject of negro slavery, and to contribute his share towards the maintenance of domestic peace, and the preservation of the Union. His chief purpose appears to have been to remove the scruples of some of his friends, by showing that a man may with a good conscience support the Federal Constitution although it recognizes slavery, and requires the slave escaping into a non-slaveholding State to be given up on the demand of his owner; and though he is no great proficient in moral theology, and his style is prolix, prosy, and at times even garrulous, he has shown this to the satisfaction of all but mere factionists and cavillers.

We do not think that the learned Professor has made out his case as conclusively as he might have done. He is a man of respectable ability and attainments, but not remarkable for the strength or acuteness of his logical powers. He makes now and then a slip, of which an uncandid critic might take advantage. He is strongly opposed to slavery, but wishes at the same time to prove that the Christian may with a good conscience be a slave-holder. In order to prove this, he asserts and proves that slavery is not *malum in se*, and therefore, if a sin at all, it is so only *per accidens*. But in order to justify his inveterate hostility to slavery, he maintains that it is always and everywhere an evil, and excuses the old patriarchs for holding slaves on the ground of invincible ignorance! In the darkness of those early ages men knew and could know

no better! This we need not say is in contradiction to his assertion that slavery is not *malum in se*. But passing over slips of this sort, — somewhat common in all Professor Stuart's writings that have fallen under our notice, and which proceed from that want of intellectual culture and logical discipline so manifest in all Protestant education, — and looking only to the main design and argument of the pamphlet, we can very cheerfully commend it to our Protestant readers.

For ourselves, we need not say, for we have often said it, that we agree with Professor Stuart that slavery is not *malum in se*. We hold that in some cases at least slavery is justifiable, and to the slave even a blessing. To the slave it is always good or evil according as he wills it to be one or the other, or according to the spirit with which he bears it. If he regards it as a penance, and submits to it in a true penitential spirit, it is a blessing to him, a great mercy, — as are on the same condition to every one of us all the sufferings and afflictions of this life. We should covet in this world, not happiness, but suffering, and the more grievous our afflictions, the more should we rejoice and give thanks. Christianity does not teach carnal Judaism, but condemns it, and commands its opposite as the condition of all real good, whether for this world or for that which is to come. To the master, slavery is not an evil, when he does not abuse it; when he has not himself participated in reducing those born free to servitude; when he treats his slaves with kindness and humanity, and faithfully watches over their moral and religious well-being. The relation of master and man, as to the authority of the former and the subjection of the latter, differs in nothing from the relation of father and son while the son is under age, and there is nothing which necessarily makes the relation less advantageous to either party in the one case than in the other.

That slavery as it exists in our Southern States is for the most part an evil, we do not doubt; but it is so accidentally, not necessarily. The evil is not in the relation of slavery itself, but in the fact that the great body of the masters do not bring up their slaves in the Church of God, and train or suffer them to be trained to observe the precepts of the Divine law. The mass of the slaves in this country grow up in heresy or heathenism, to the everlasting destruction of their souls. Here is the evil we see and

deplore,—an evil, however, which none but Catholics do or can feel with much vividness. It is an evil which does not and cannot weigh much with Protestants, for the slaves are in general as little heathen and as orthodox as their masters. If the masters were good Catholics, as they ought to be, and are under the condemnation of God for not being, and brought up, as they are bound to do, their slaves in the belief and practice of the Catholic religion, there would be no evil in negro slavery to disturb us. The only evils we see in it are moral and spiritual, inseparable from heresy and heathenism. The physical and sentimental evils, or pretended evils, about which Abolitionists and philanthropists keep up such a clamor do not move us in the least. We place not the slightest value on what the men of this world call liberty, and we are taught by religion that poverty and suffering are far more enviable than riches and sensual enjoyment.

But conceding the evil of slavery as it exists in this country, it is far from certain that it is an evil that would be mitigated by emancipation, or that emancipation would not be even a greater evil. The negroes are here, and here they must remain. This is a “fixed fact.” Taking the American people as they are, and as they are likely to be for some time to come, with their strong Anglo-Saxon pride, Anglo-Saxon prejudices, and Anglo-Saxon devotion to material interests, and hatred or disregard of Christian truth and morals, it is clear to us that the condition of the negro as a slave is far less evil than would be his condition as a freedman. The freed negroes amongst us are as a body, to say the least, no less immoral and heathen than the slaves themselves. They are the pests of our Northern cities, especially since they have come under the protection of our philanthropists. With a few honorable exceptions, they are a low, degraded, filthy set, steeped in vice and overflowing with crime. Even in our own city, almost at the moment we write, they are parading our streets in armed bands, for the avowed purpose of resisting the execution of the laws. Let loose some two or three millions like them, now held in slavery, and there would be no living in the American community. Give them freedom and the right to vote in our elections, and the whole country would be at the mercy of the lowest and most worthless of our demagogues. With only Prot-

estantism, indifferentism, infidelity, or savage fanaticism to restrain them, all their base and disorderly passions would be unchained, and our community would be little else than a hell upon earth. No; before we talk of emancipation, before we can venture upon it with the least conceivable advantage to the slaves, we must train them, and the American people also, to habits of self-denial and moral virtue under the regimen of the Catholic Church, which alone has power to subdue the barbarous elements of our nature, and to enable men of widely different races, complexions, and characteristics to live together in the bonds of peace and brotherhood. We cannot, therefore, agree with Professor Stuart in his demand for emancipation, and we are decidedly opposed, for the present at least, not only to the fanatical proceedings set on foot by our miserable Abolitionists and philanthropists to effect emancipation, but to emancipation itself. In the present state of things, emancipation would be a greater evil than slavery, and of two evils we are bound to choose the least. We have heard enough of liberty and the rights of man; it is high time to hear something of the duties of men and the rights of authority.

We write deliberately, and are prepared for all the obloquy which may be showered upon us for what we write. The cry of liberty has gone forth; we, as well as others, have heard it; it has gone forth and been echoed and re-echoed from every quarter, till the world has become maddened with it. The voice of law, of order, of wisdom, of justice, of truth, of experience, of common sense, is drowned in the tumultuous shouts of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity! — shouts fit, in the sense they are uttered, only for assembled demons declaring war upon the Eternal God. But this should be our shame, not our boast. It ought not to be, and, if the world is to continue, must soon cease. Society cannot subsist where the rights of authority are forgotten, and loyalty and obedience are foresworn. There is no use in multiplying words on the subject. Man is a social being, and cannot live without society; society is impracticable and inconceivable without government; and government is impossible where its right to command is denied, or the obligation to obey it is not recognized. It is of the essence of government to restrain, and a government that imposes no restraint, that leaves every one free

to do whatever seemeth right in his own eyes, is no government at all. The first want of every people is strong and efficient government, — a regularly constituted authority, that has the right and the power to enforce submission to its will. No matter what the form of your government, no matter in whose hands the power is lodged, — in the hands of the king, of the lords, or the commons, — it must, in so far as government at all, be sovereign, clothed, under God, with supreme authority, and be respected as such, or society is only Bedlam without its keeper.

This is the great truth the American people, in their insane clamor about the rights of man and the largest liberty, that is to say, full license to every man, lose sight of, or in reality deny; and it is on this truth, not on liberty, for which all are crying out, that it is necessary now to insist, both in season and out of season. There may be times and countries when and where the true servants of God must seek to restrict the action of government, and lessen the prerogatives of power; but assuredly here and now our duty is not to clamor for liberty or emancipation, but to reassert the rights of authority and the majesty of law. You will be decried, if you do so. No doubt of it. But what then? When was it popular to insist on the special truth demanded by one's own age? When was it that one could really serve his age or country without falling under its condemnation? When was it that the multitude were known to applaud him who rebuked them for their errors, exposed to them the dangers into which they were running by following their dominant tendencies, and presented them the truth needed for their salvation? What great or good man ever proposed to himself to serve his fellow-men by following their instincts, flattering their prejudices, and inflaming their passions? Who knows not that error and sin come by nature, and that virtue is achieved only by effort, by violence, by heroic struggle against even ourselves? Is not the hero always a soldier? Let, then, the multitude clamor, let the age denounce, let the wicked rage, let earth and hell do their worst, what care you, heroic soldier of the King of kings? Go forth and meet the enemy. Charge, and charge home, where your Immortal Leader gives the word, and leave the responsibility to him. If you fall, so much the greater glory for you, so much the more certain your victory, and your triumph.

But we are straying from the point we had in mind when we set out. Our purpose was, to offer some remarks on what is termed "the higher law" to which the opponents of the recent Fugitive Slave Law appeal to justify their refusal to execute it. The Hon. Mr. Seward, one of the New York Senators, in the debate in the Senate during the last session of Congress on the Fugitive Slave Bill, refused to vote for the measure, although necessary to carry out an express constitutional provision, on the ground that to give up a fugitive slave is contrary to the law of God; and the Abolitionists and Free Soilers refuse to execute the law, and even in some instances resist its execution, on the same ground. When the honorable Senator appealed from the Constitution to the law of God, as a higher law, he was told by the advocates of the bill, that, having just taken his oath to support the Constitution, he had debarred himself from the right, while retaining his seat in the Senate, to appeal from it to any law requiring him to act in contravention of its provisions. The Abolitionists and Free Soilers immediately concluded from this that the advocates of the bill denied the reality of any law higher than the Constitution, and their papers and periodicals teem with articles and essays to prove the supremacy of the law of God. The question is one of no little gravity, and, to our Protestant friends, of no little perplexity. We may, therefore, be allowed to devote a few pages to its consideration.

We agree entirely with Mr. Seward and his Abolition and Free Soil friends, as to the fact that there is a higher law than the Constitution. The law of God is supreme, and overrides all human enactments, and every human enactment incompatible with it is null and void from the beginning, and cannot be obeyed with a good conscience, for "we must obey God rather than men." This is the great truth statesmen and lawyers are extremely prone to overlook, which the temporal authority not seldom practically denies, and on which the Church never fails to insist. This truth is so frequently denied, so frequently outraged, that we are glad to find it asserted by Mr. Seward and his friends, even though they assert it in a case and for a purpose in which we do not and cannot sympathize with them.

But the concession of the fact of a higher law than

the Constitution does not of itself justify the appeal to it against the Constitution, either by Mr. Seward or the opponents of the Fugitive Slave Law. Mr. Seward had no right, while holding his seat in the Senate under the Constitution, to appeal to this higher law against the Constitution, because that was to deny the very authority by which he held his seat. The Constitution, if repugnant to the law of God, is null and void, is without authority, and as Mr. Seward held his seat by virtue of its authority, he could have no authority for holding his seat, after having declared it to be null and void. This is an inconvenience he does not appear to have considered. The principle that would have justified his refusal to obey the Constitution would have deprived him of his seat as a Senator. Moreover, the question of the compatibility or incompatibility of the Constitution with the law of God was a question for him to raise and settle before taking his senatorial oath. Could he conscientiously swear to support the Constitution? If he could, he could not afterwards refuse to carry out any of its imperative provisions, on the ground of its being contrary to the higher law; for he would in swearing to support the Constitution declare in the most solemn manner in his power, that in his belief at least it imposed upon him no duty contrary to his duty to God, since to swear to support a constitution repugnant to the Divine law is to take an unlawful oath, and to swear with the deliberate intention of not keeping one's oath is to take a false oath. After having taken his oath to support the Constitution, the Senator had, so far as himself was concerned, settled the question, and it was no longer for him an open question. In calling God to witness his determination to support the Constitution, he had called God to witness his conviction of the compatibility of the Constitution with the law of God, and therefore left himself no plea for appealing from it to a higher law. If he discovered the incompatibility of the imperative provisions of the Constitution only after having taken his oath, he was bound from that moment to resign his seat. In any view of the case, therefore, we choose to take, Mr. Seward was not and could not be justified in appealing to a law above the Constitution against the Constitution while he retained his seat under it and remained bound by his oath to support it.

It is then perfectly easy to condemn the appeal of the Senator, without, as Abolitionists and Free Soilers pretend, falling into the monstrous error of denying the supremacy of the Divine law, and maintaining that there is no law above the Constitution.

What we have said is conclusive against the honorable Senator from New York, but it does not precisely apply to the case of those who resist or refuse to obey the Fugitive Slave Law now that it has been passed. These persons take the ground that the law of God is higher than any human law, and therefore we can in no case be bound to obey a human law that is in contravention of it. Such a law is a violence rather than a law, and we are commanded by God himself to resist it, at least passively. All this is undeniable in the case of every human enactment that really does command us to act contrary to the law of God. To this we hold, as firmly as man can hold to any thing, and to this every Christian is bound to hold even unto death. This is the grand principle held by the old martyrs, and therefore they chose martyrdom rather than obedience to the state commanding them to act contrary to the Divine law. But who is to decide whether a special civil enactment be or be not repugnant to the law of God? Here is a grave and a perplexing question for those who have no Divinely authorized interpreter of the Divine law. The Abolitionists and Free Soilers, adopting the Protestant principle of private judgment, claim the right to decide each for himself. But this places the individual above the state, private judgment above the law, and is wholly incompatible with the simplest conception of civil government. No civil government can exist, none is conceivable even, where every individual is free to disobey its orders whenever they do not happen to square with his private convictions of what is the law of God. The principle of private judgment, adopted by Protestants in religious matters, it is well known, has destroyed for them the church as an authoritative body, and put an end to every thing like ecclesiastical authority; transferred to civil matters, it would equally put an end to the state, and abolish all civil authority, and establish the reign of anarchy or license. Clearly, if government is to be retained, and to govern, the right to decide when a civil enactment does or does

not conflict with the law of God cannot be lodged in the individual subject. Where then shall it be lodged? In the state? Then are you bound to absolute obedience to any and every law the state may enact; you make the state supreme, absolute, and deny your own principle of a higher law than the civil law. You have then no appeal from the state, and no relief for conscience, which is absolute civil despotism. Here is a sad dilemma for our uncatholic countrymen, which admirably demonstrates the unsuitableness of Protestant principles for practical life. If they assert the principle of private judgment in order to save individual liberty, they lose government and fall into anarchy. If they assert the authority of the state in order to save government, they lose liberty and fall under absolute civil despotism, and it is an historical fact that the Protestant world perpetually alternates between civil despotism and unbridled license, and after three hundred years of experimenting finds itself as far as ever from solving the problem, how to reconcile liberty and authority. Strange that men do not see that the solution must be sought in God, not in man! Alas! reformers make a sad blunder when they reject the Church instituted by God himself for the express purpose of interpreting his law,—the only protector of the people, on the one hand, against despotism, and of government, on the other, against license!

But the people cannot avail themselves of their own blunder to withdraw themselves from their obligation to obey the laws. Government itself is a Divine ordinance, is ordained of God. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation." We do not say that all the acts of government are ordained of God; for if we did, we could not assert the reality of a law higher than that of the state, and should be forced to regard every civil enactment as a precept of the Divine law. In ordinary government, God does not ordain obedience to all and every of its acts, but to those only of its acts which come within the limits of his own law. He does not make civil government the supreme and infallible organ of his will on earth, and therefore it

may err, and contravene his will ; and when and where it does, its acts are null and void. But government itself, as civil authority, is a Divine ordinance, and, within the law of God, clothed with the right to command and to enforce obedience. No appeal, therefore, from any act of government, which in principle denies the Divine right of government, or which is incompatible with the assertion and maintenance of civil authority, can be entertained. Since government as civil authority is an ordinance of God, and as such the Divine law, any course of action, or the assertion of any principle of action, incompatible with its existence as government, is necessarily forbidden by the law of God. The law of God is always the equal of the law of God, and can never be in conflict with itself. Consequently no appeal against government as civil authority to the law of God is admissible, because the law of God is as supreme in any one of its enactments as in another.

Now it is clear that Mr. Seward and his friends, the Abolitionists and Free Soilers, have nothing to which they can appeal from the action of government but their private interpretation of the law of God, that is to say, their own private judgment or opinion as individuals ; for it is notorious that they are good Protestants, holding the pretended right of private judgment, and rejecting all authorized interpretation of the Divine law. To appeal from the government to private judgment is to place private judgment above public authority, the individual above the state, which, as we have seen, is incompatible with the very existence of government, and therefore, since government is a Divine ordinance, absolutely forbidden by the law of God, — that very higher law invoked to justify resistance to civil enactments. Here is an important consideration, which condemns, on the authority of God himself, the pretended right of private judgment, the grossest absurdity that ever entered the heads of men outside of Bedlam, and proves that, in attempting to set aside on its authority a civil enactment, we come into conflict not with the human law only, but also with the law of God itself. No man can ever be justifiable in resisting the civil law under the pretence that it is repugnant to the Divine law, when he has only his private judgment, or, what is the same thing, his private interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, to tell him what the Divine law is on

the point in question, because the principle on which he would act in doing so would be repugnant to the very existence of government, and therefore in contravention of the ordinance, therefore of the law, of God.

Man's prime necessity is society, and the prime necessity of society is government. The question, whether government shall or shall not be sustained, is at bottom only the question, whether the human race shall continue to subsist or not. Man is essentially a social being, and cannot live without society, and society is inconceivable without government. Extinguish government, and you extinguish society; extinguish society, and you extinguish man. Inasmuch as God has created and ordained the existence of the human race, he has founded and ordained government, and made it absolutely obligatory on us to sustain it, to refrain in principle and action from whatever would tend to destroy it, or to render its existence insecure. They who set aside or resist the Fugitive Slave Law on the ground of its supposed repugnance to the law of God are, then, no more justifiable than we have seen was the honorable Senator from New York. In no case can any man ever be justified in setting aside or resisting a civil enactment, save on an authority higher than his own and that of the government. This higher authority is not recognized by the Abolitionists and Free Soilers; they neither have nor claim to have any such authority to allege; consequently, they are bound to absolute submission to the civil authority, not only in the case of the Fugitive Slave Law, but in every case, however repugnant such submission may be to their private convictions and feelings, or what they call their conscience, for conscience itself is respectable only when it is authorized by the law of God, or is in conformity with it.

That this is civil despotism, that is, the assertion of the absolute supremacy of the state, we do not deny; but that is not our fault. If men, by rejecting the Divinely authorized interpreter of the law of God, voluntarily place themselves in such a condition that they have no alternative but either civil despotism or resistance to the ordinance of God, the fault is their own. They must expect to reap what they sow. They were warned betimes, but they would heed no warning; they would have their own way; and if they now find that their own way leads to death, they have only themselves to blame. It is not we who

advocate despotism, but they who render it inevitable for themselves, if they wish to escape the still greater evil of absolute license. As Catholics we wash our hands of the consequences which they cannot escape, and which any man with half an eye might have seen would necessarily follow the assertion of the absurd and ridiculous, not to say blasphemous, principle of private judgment. We have never been guilty of the extreme folly of proclaiming that principle, and of superinducing the necessity of asserting civil despotism as the only possible relief from anarchy. We are able to assert liberty without undermining authority, and authority without injury to liberty; for we have been contented to let God himself be our teacher and our legislator, instead of weak, erring, vain, and capricious men, facetiously ycleped *reformers*. As Catholics, we were not among those who undertook to improve an Infinite Wisdom, and to reform the institutions of the Almighty. We are taught by a Divinely authorized Teacher, that government is the ordinance of God, and that we are to respect and obey it as such in all things not repugnant to the law of God; and we have an authority higher than its, higher than our own, to tell us, without error or the possibility of error, — because by Divine assistance and protection rendered infallible, — when the acts of government conflict with the law of God, and it becomes our duty to resist the former in obedience to the latter. Civil authority is respected and obeyed when respected and obeyed in all things it has from God the right to do or command; and liberty is preserved inviolate when nothing can be exacted from us in contravention of the Divine law, and we are free to disobey the prince when he commands us to violate the law of God. We then do and can experience none of the perplexity which is experienced by our uncatholic countrymen. We have an infallible Church to tell us when there is a conflict between the human law and the Divine, to save us from the necessity, in order to get rid of despotism, of asserting individualism, which is the denial of all government, and, in order to get rid of individualism, of asserting civil despotism, that is, the supremacy of the state, the grave of all freedom. We have never to appeal to the principle of despotism nor to the principle of anarchy. We have always a public authority, which, as it is inerrable, can never be oppressive,

to guide and direct us, and if we resist the civil law, it is only in obedience to a higher law, clearly and distinctly declared by a public authority higher than the individual, and higher than the state. Our readers, therefore, will not accuse us of advocating civil despotism, which we abhor, because we show that they who reject God's Church, and assert private judgment, have no alternative but despotism or license. They are, as Protestants, under the necessity of being slaves and despots, not we who are Catholics. We enjoy, and we alone enjoy, the glorious prerogative of being at once freemen and loyal subjects.

There is no principle on which the Abolitionists and Free Soilers can justify their resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law. They cannot appeal to the law of God, for, having no authority competent to declare it, the law of God is for them as if it were not. It is for them a mere unmeaning word, or meaning only their private or individual judgment, which is no law at all, and if it were would at best be only a human, and the lowest conceivable human law. The highest human law is unquestionably the law of the state, as the state is the highest human authority conceivable. No appeal can then lie from the state to another human authority, least of all to the individual; for appeals do not go downwards, do not lie from the higher to the lower, as ultra democracy would seem to imply. The highest conceivable human authority has passed the law in question, and in so doing has declared it compatible with the law of God; and as its opponents have only a human authority at best to reverse the judgment of the state, nothing remains for them but to yield it full and loyal obedience.

We have dwelt at length on this point, because it is one of great importance in itself, and because we are anxious to clear away the mists with which it has been surrounded, and to prevent any denial on the one hand, or misapplication on the other, of the great principle of the supremacy of the Divine law. The misapplication of a great principle is always itself a great and dangerous error, and often, perhaps always, leads to the denial of the principle. Mr. Seward and his friends asserted a great and glorious principle, but misapplied it. Their opponents, the friends of the Constitution and the Union, seeing clearly the error of the application, have, in some instances at least, de-

nied the principle itself, and their papers North and South are filled with sneers at *the higher law* doctrine. The one error induces the other, and we hardly know which, under existing circumstances, is the most to be deprecated. Each error favors a dangerous popular tendency of the times. We have spoken of the tendency, under the name of liberty, to anarchy and license; but there is another tendency, under the pretext of authority, to civil despotism, or what has been very properly denominated *Statolatry*, or the worship of the state, that is, elevating the state above the Church, and putting it in the place of God. Both tendencies have the same origin, that is, in the Protestant rejection of the spiritual authority of the Church on the one hand, and the assertion of private judgment on the other; and in fact, both are but the opposite phases or poles of one and the same principle. The two tendencies proceed *pari passu*, and while the one undermines all authority, the other grasps at all powers and usurps all rights, and modern society in consequence is cursed at once with the opposite evils of anarchy and of civil despotism. The cry for liberty abolishes all loyalty, and destroys the principle and the spirit of obedience, while the usurpations of the state leave to conscience no freedom, to religion no independence. The state tramples on the spiritual prerogatives of the Church, assumes to itself the functions of schoolmaster and director of consciences, and the multitude clap their hands, and call it liberty and progress! We see this in the popular demand for state education, and in the joy that the men of the world manifest at the nefarious conduct of the Sardinian government in breaking the faith of treaties and violating the rights of the Church. When it concerns the Church, the supremacy of the state is proclaimed, and when it concerns government or law, then it is individualism that is shouted. Such is our age, our boasted nineteenth century.

Now there is a right and a wrong way of defending the truth, and it is always easier to defend the truth on sound than unsound principles. If men were less blind and headstrong, they would see that the higher law can be asserted without any attack upon legitimate civil authority, and legitimate civil authority and the majesty of the law can be vindicated without asserting the absolute supremacy of the civil power, and falling into statolatry,—

as absurd a species of idolatry as the worship of stocks and stones. The assertion of the higher law, as Abolitionists and Free Soilers make it, without any competent authority to define and declare that law, leads to anarchy and unbridled license, and therefore we are obliged, as we value society, law, order, morality, to oppose them. On the other hand, the denial of the higher law as the condition of opposing them asserts the supremacy in all things of the state, and subjects us in all things unreservedly to the civil power, which is statolatry, and absolute civil despotism. No wise and honest statesman can do either. But—here is the difficulty—the Protestant statesman is obliged to do one or the other, or both, at one moment one, at the next moment the other. This is what we have wished to make plain to the dullest capacity. Protestantism is clearly not adapted to practical life, and its principles are as inapplicable in politics as in religion. There is no practical assertion of true liberty or legitimate authority on Protestant principles, and neither is or can be asserted but as men resort, avowedly or otherwise, to Catholic principles. Hence the reason why we have been unable to discuss the question presented, and give a rational solution of the difficulty, without recurring to our Church. In recurring to her, we have, no doubt, offended the friends of the Constitution and the Union, the party with whom are our sympathies, as much as we have their enemies; but this is no fault of ours, for we cannot go contrary to what God has ordained. He has not seen proper so to constitute society and endow government that they can get on without his Church. She is an integral, an essential element in the constitution of society, and it is madness and folly to think of managing it and securing its well-being without her. She is the solution of all difficulties, and without her none are solvable.

For us Catholics, the Fugitive Slave Law presents no sort of difficulty. We are taught, as we have said, to respect and obey the government as the ordinance of God, in all things not declared by our Church to be repugnant to the Divine law. The law is evidently constitutional, and is necessary to carry out an express and imperative provision of the Constitution, which ordains (Art. IV. Sect. 2), that “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in

consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." This is imperative, and with regard to its meaning there is no disagreement. By this the slaveholders have the right to claim their fugitive slaves in the non-slaveholding States, and the non-slaveholding States are bound to deliver them up, when claimed. For the purpose of carrying out this constitutional provision, Congress passed a law, in 1793, which has proved ineffectual, and it has passed the recent law, more stringent in its provisions, and likely to prove efficient, for the same purpose. We can see nothing in the law contrary to the Constitution, and, as high legal authority has pronounced it constitutional, we must presume it to be so. Nobody really regards it as unconstitutional, and the only special objection to it is, — what is no objection at all, — that it is likely to answer its purpose. Now as the law is necessary to secure the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the Constitution, and as our Church has never decided that to restore a fugitive slave to its owner is *per se* contrary to the law of God, we are bound to obey the law, and could not, without resisting the ordinance of God and purchasing to ourselves damnation, refuse to obey it. This settles the question for us.

As to Protestants who allege that the law is contrary to the law of God, and therefore that they cannot with a good conscience obey it, we have very little in addition to say. There are no principles in common between them and us, on which the question can be decided. We have shown them that they are bound to obey the civil law till they can bring a higher authority than the state, and a higher than their own private judgment, to set it aside as repugnant to the law of God. This higher authority they have not, and therefore for them there is no higher law. Will they allege the Sacred Scriptures? That will avail them nothing till they show that they have legal possession of the Scriptures, and that they are constituted by Almighty God a court with authority to interpret them and declare their sense. As this is what they can never do, we cannot argue the Scriptural question with them. We will only add, that there is no passage in either the Old Testament or the New that declares it repugnant to the law of

God, or law of eternal justice, to deliver up the fugitive slave to his master; and St. Paul sent back, after converting him, the fugitive slave Onesimus to his master Philemon. This is enough; for St. Paul appears to have done more than the recent law of Congress demands; he seems to have sent back the fugitive without being requested to do so by his owner; but the law of Congress only requires the fugitive to be delivered up when claimed by his master. It will not do for those who appeal to the Sacred Scriptures to maintain either that St. Paul was ignorant of the law of God, or that he acted contrary to it. This fact alone concludes the Scriptural question against them.

But we have detained our readers long enough. We have said more than was necessary to satisfy the intelligent and the candid, and reasoning is thrown away upon factionists and fanatics, Abolitionists and philanthropists. There is no question that the country is seriously in danger. What, with the sectionists at the North and the sectionists at the South, with the great dearth of true patriots, and still greater dearth of statesmen, in all sections of the Union, it will go hard but the Union itself receive some severe shocks. Yet we trust in God it will be preserved, although the American people are far from meriting so great a boon. After the humiliation of ourselves, and prayer to God, we see nothing to be done to save the country, but for all the friends of the Union, whether heretofore called Whigs or Democrats, to rally around the Union, and form a grand national party, in opposition to the sectionists, factionists, and fanatics, of all complexions, sorts, and sizes. It is no time now to indulge old party animosities, or to contend for old party organizations. The country is above party, and all who love their country, and wish to save the noble institutions left us by our fathers, should fall into the ranks of one and the same party, and work side by side, and shoulder to shoulder, for the maintenance of the Union and the supremacy of law. We see strong indications that such a party is rapidly forming throughout the country, and we say, let it be formed,—the sooner the better. Let the party take high conservative ground, against all sorts of radicalism and ultraism, and inscribe on its banner, **THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION, AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW**, and it will command the support, we doubt not, of a large majority

of the American people, and deserve and receive, we devoutly hope, the protection of Almighty God, who, we must believe, has after all great designs in this country. Above all, let our Catholic fellow-citizens in this crisis be faithful to their duty, even though they find Mr. Fillmore's administration and our Protestant countrymen madly and foolishly hostile to them; for on the Catholic population, under God, depend the future destinies of these United States. The principles of our holy religion, the prayers of our Church, and the fidelity to their trusts of the Catholic portion of the people, are the only sure reliance left us.

ART. V. — 1. *The Decline of Protestantism and its Cause.*

A Lecture, delivered in St. Patrick's Cathedral, on the Evening of November 10, 1850. By the Most Rev. JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Archbishop of New York. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 8vo. pp. 28.

2. *Developments of Protestantism, and other Fragments.*

Reprinted from the "Dublin Review" and "Tablet." London: Richardson & Son. 1849. 16mo. pp. 166.

THESE remarkable pamphlets indicate the commencement of a new era in the controversy between Catholics and Protestants in Great Britain and this country. Hitherto, in both countries, Catholics have been accustomed to apologize for their religion, and explain away its offensive points, appearing to be content with repelling the calumnies invented against it, and showing that, upon the whole, it can compare advantageously with the best form of Protestantism. These pamphlets, as well as several other recent publications, prove that the day for this is passing away, and that Catholics are beginning to shake off their timidity, to assume in controversy their legitimate position, and to speak in the bold and energetic tones which become them; that, instead of stopping to refute anew objections which have been refuted a thousand times, and to repel calumnies which will be repeated as often as repelled, they are carrying the war into the enemy's country, and compelling Protestantism to defend itself. This is a great and important change of tactics. So long as Prot-

estantism is suffered to act on the offensive, to vent all manner of calumnies, and to urge all manner of objections, and we, simple souls, confine ourselves to the task of merely refuting them, it can maintain the appearance of a formidable opponent, and throw a cloud of dust in the eyes of the ignorant and prejudiced multitude; for it never heeds our refutations of its calumnies and objections, but continues always to repeat them as if we had said and could say nothing against them. But the moment we turn our arms against it, and force it to give an account of itself, its weakness is at once apparent to all the world. It has no ground on which to intrench, and no arms with which to defend itself, except those of the state.

The simple announcement, by such a man as his Grace of New York, of a Lecture on the Decline of Protestantism, together with the cause of that decline, is a pregnant event in the modern religious world, and must strike on the ears of Protestants as the trump of doom, filling their hearts with fear and perplexity. He is not a rash man, disposed hastily to commit himself. No man feels more delicately the pulse of his age and country, or marks more accurately their various tendencies. When such a man, occupying so high a rank in the Church and in society, proclaims in his own cathedral, and before the world, that Protestantism has declined, is declining, and must continue to decline, we may rest assured that such is the fact, the certain and undeniable fact. But he not only proclaims it; he triumphantly proves it, and, if any one wishes for more detailed evidence than he gives, it may be found in the second publication on our list, a work of rare sagacity and intelligence.

The views, facts, and reasonings of these remarkable publications are not precisely new to the readers of this journal, for we have often set them forth, in our humble way; but we are not a little gratified to find them so much more clearly, eloquently, and learnedly expressed than it was in our power to express them, and confirmed by authority so high as that of the Archbishop of New York, and so respectable as that of the learned and philosophical author of the essay on the Developments of Protestantism. Our own position, prior to our conversion, in the more advanced ranks of the Protestant community, gave us facilities for judging of the real character, tenden-

cies, and prospects of Protestantism not enjoyed by every one, and it was only after having proved, philosophically and historically, that it must, in so far as left to follow its own nature, decline into infidelity, heathenism, and absolute nullism, that we ever consented to abandon it. We saw that it had done the best that it could do, that it was incapable of amendment, and that, whatever else might be true or salutary, it in all its forms was false and of evil tendency, good neither for this world nor for that which is to come. We saw that, as a matter of fact, whatever it was in its origin, it had now ceased to bear a religious character; that as a theology it was absurd, as a philosophy ridiculous, as politics, either anarchy and unbridled license or absolute civil despotism; in a word, in so far as it pretended to be any thing more than a low form of heathenism, it was simply what that genuine Protestant Carlyle calls *a sham*. We saw that *Protestant* Christianity was a contradiction in terms, and that we had no alternative, unless we could content ourselves with saying two and two are five, but absolute infidelity or Catholicity. But when we have said so, many have been disposed to discredit us, and to set down our conclusion to our alleged ultraism, or tendency to run to extremes. The publications before us, from men who cannot be accused of the tendencies always falsely laid to our charge, abundantly confirm and triumphantly establish, in a manner at once popular and profound, all that we have contended for, as the following from the Archbishop's Lecture will fully show. The extract is long, but it is to the purpose, and we are happy to enrich our pages with a passage so eloquent and instructive.

“Protestantism began in the year 1517. It had then a solitary representative; and as regards religion, his voice was the only discordant sound that could have been heard in western Christendom. All had been united, all had subsisted in the harmony of one belief; and although scandal existed then, as now, and abuses of individual living were known; and although public and private morals might have furnished much ground for complaint, still, at least there was one ideally perfect, central rallying-point, on which men's minds were united,—the beauty, simplicity, and *Unity* of the faith of the Catholic Church, which God had established for the salvation of men. From this central point the new doctrine took its bearings of direct and indirect antagonism, and spread on every

side. It became the theme of general dispute, and into that dispute were promptly infused projects of political ambition, popular discontent, and every species of human element and of human motive calculated to give impulse to the new principle, which in itself, if it were true, would have been altogether worthy of the admiration of its adherents, and would have been well calculated to spread abroad the doctrine thus introduced and propagated with a rapidity to which there is no such thing as a parallel in the history of the Christian Church, or in the annals of the human race. From Wittenberg it spread throughout Northern Germany. It reached, in a different form however, the Cantons of Switzerland. It penetrated the empire of France. It took possession of Prussia. It pervaded Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, England, and Scotland. It conquered them all ; — and it met a successful resistance only on the western borders of Europe. The Irish nation stood together against it, and struggled with constancy, perseverance, and determination ; and although the battle has lasted for three hundred years, and although that down-trodden nation has suffered intensely for its adherence to principle, still it has not given way to Protestantism. I cannot consider this as altogether the result of chance, for I can almost persuade myself that God in his providence permitted that there should be one western border of Europe upon which the eye of the pilgrim to this *free* hemisphere should rest for the last time, as upon Catholic soil, and that he should thus continue to cherish the old associations of the Holy Catholic Faith, by which all Europe had been, and the rest of the world might, finally, be emancipated from barbarism and infidelity.

“ What is very remarkable is, that Protestantism should have made such progress in so short a time ; — that, within fifty years from its origin, it should have conquered and taken possession of every inch of ground, of which it is in possession at this day ; so that an old man of 1567 could see Protestantism triumphant in all the nations I have mentioned, and look back to the memory of boyhood, when he knew Brother Martin Luther, a pious monk, as Macaulay remarks, or what is nearly the same, remembered him, the young father of Protestantism, a fugitive from the laws of his country, seeking and happily finding a safe hiding-place in the suburbs of some obscure German village.

“ O, how Protestantism must have been surprised, astounded, and overwhelmed at the immensity and variety of the spoils, into the possession of which it so speedily entered ! Yesterday it was proscribed ; to-day it is master of kingdoms, thrones, armies, provinces, treasures, and the accumulated religious and charitable offerings of Catholic generations for a thousand years ! It came rapidly into the possession of what it had never labored to create ; it reaped where it had never sown ; and the toil of the husband-

man, who had cultivated the soil before, accrued to the benefit of his adversary, and was unrewarded. It found itself in possession not only of these, but of the Catholic churches,—and when I say Catholic churches, you will not understand me to mean such churches as we in our cold charity and poverty have been able to erect, but those great churches that were projected on a magnificent scale, and in the spirit of an age that religion had inspired, when acres were taken into the plan, after the Catholic forefathers of the Protestant occupants of all this ecclesiastical wealth, from age to age, had been making their offerings at the shrine of the one Church:—temples, not perhaps esteemed as worthy of God; but, at all events, such palaces, so to call them, for the veiled presence of Divine majesty and mercy among men, as might indicate at least to all time, *their* gratitude towards their merciful Creator and Redeemer. Protestantism took possession of them all, and found them so vast that it never has been able since to fill them with worshippers. The congregations of many of them now assemble in the choir, a part of the church which had been exclusively set apart for the clergy. And not alone the churches, but the universities, with all their endowments and benefices as depositories of learning. All, all, passed promptly into the hands of Protestantism.

“I make these statements to show how little Protestantism has accomplished compared with the immensity of its means. If Protestantism had been what it professed to be, it found itself almost by surprise put in possession of the means wherewithal to carry its triumphs to the ends of the earth. The Church of Christ itself, the Catholic Church, was for three hundred years obliged to dwell in the Catacombs of Rome, not daring, or scarcely daring, to show itself; and when it did, it was with a prospect of martyrdom; but Protestantism seized upon a large portion of the wealth of Christendom, and became the master of kings and armies, senates and nations, universities and churches, and every thing that Catholics had, in the gradual accumulation of their charities for ages, contributed to erect for civilization and religion.

“We will now, therefore, regard Protestantism in its purpose. What was its mission? Its mission, according to its own statements, was to renovate a faded, fallen, and false Christianity. Its mission was to introduce a pure and perfect religion, as a substitute for that ‘apostate church,’ as it called the Catholic faith, from which itself went forth; and if this were its purpose, we should suppose it would take *certain* grounds in reference to its mission; for if it were conscious of the possession of truth, if it really believed it had now taken the form in which God would have the world to be saved, it was bound to propagate itself, to make itself known, to speak in a consistent, uniform, and unequivocal lan-

guage, so that it might accomplish, in time, something like what the pretendedly faded Church had indisputably accomplished, in its time before.

“Two things particularly it was bound to accomplish. One was, to convert pagan nations and Catholic nations ; and the other was, to preserve itself : for, if it lost itself, in attempting to gain others, it would show that it was not what it pretended to be, but something not having that light and truth of which God is the author.

“I should perhaps attempt a definition of what Protestantism is. I have looked into the expositions of its most prominent advocates, but among them all I have sought in vain for any thing like a scientific or logical definition ; nor can I conceive it possible to give such a definition of the word Protestantism. However, I will take it in the fairest light of which it is susceptible, and endeavour to give a definition by the elements of which it is composed. I take it that Protestantism is a general term, indicating that an individual accepting it explicitly protests against the Catholic Church in the first instance, but implicitly against all ecclesiastical authority ; and claims, on the other hand, the right of taking the Holy Scriptures, reading them for himself, and taking the meaning and light which they reflect upon his mind as the religion of Christ. I am aware that, in order to determine its decline or progress, it is expedient that we should fix upon what was understood by Protestantism at the period to which I refer. I will therefore take the period of 1567, when Protestantism was comprised under three great divisions :—the Lutheran, the Calvinistic, and the Anglican ; and, looking at the symbolical books of that period, it is to be understood as comprising two elements, one negative, the other positive. There is one aspect of the decline of Protestantism which can afford no comfort to the most ardent adherent of the Catholic Church, and that aspect is seen in the tendency of Protestantism to rationalism and infidelity. Protestantism comprised, originally, a great number of the primitive truths of Christianity. These truths were doctrines which the first separation from us did not prevent Protestants from carrying forth with them ; I mean the great mysteries of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation of the Saviour, the Redemption by the Son of God, Original Sin, the Holy Eucharist, with or without the belief of the Real Presence, and others, sanctioned in Christ’s Church. These were the *positive* doctrines embodied in their symbolical books ; while Prayers for the Departed, Transubstantiation, the Intercession of Saints, and so many other doctrines that had been the faith of Christendom, were excluded and cut off, and this formed the *negative* phase. You have, therefore, these two principles ; and beyond these I cannot pretend to define what Protestantism is :—for if you pass from the generic title to the specific variety, and trace out its development from one

denomination to another, down to the latest phase of human error, you will find in them all these two elements, — this and this, no ; and this and this, yes. They all vary, and yet all profess to be guided by their own private interpretation of the Scriptures alone, while all agree in protesting against the Church of God. All of them protest against every species of authority, and all of them, still, retain some of the prominent and positive doctrines of the Christian Church, which become a test of religious association and a special ground of communion. We cannot, therefore, at this day, but regret that what was positive in those times has ceased in a great measure to exist in the Protestantism of the present day ; but if it once included all these fundamental doctrines, how great has been its decline on the side of Latitudinarianism ! I have written for this lecture perhaps some fifteen or twenty pages of authorities alone, and I have been obliged to put them all aside, because, if I should attempt the labor of quoting authorities, to make thorough work of it, I should have to occupy my whole time with them. But then what authorities should I have had to quote ? Why the authorities of Protestant writers, some calling themselves by one denomination and some by another ; but all of them showing the actual condition to which Protestantism has been reduced, on the very fields of its first and most astonishing triumphs. Do you speak of Germany ? In Germany, the doctrines regarding the Trinity are held, if held at all, only by the uneducated and ignorant ; but as for your preachers in the pulpit, as for your doctors of theology, and great men of every department, they have no conception of any such belief. Rationalism has taken the place of Protestantism, although men still claim the name, from the meaning and purport of which they have so widely departed. Do you speak of the facts usually referred to in proof of Christianity, the miracles, for instance, recorded in the Holy Scriptures ? They explain them all away. They apply the dreamy analogies of Mesmerism to the works of the Redeemer, and pretend, among other cases, that the man stricken with palsy was cured by Christ, because he had a deep insight into human nature, and knew the power of imagination, when he took the palsied man by the hand, fixed his eye upon him, and effected a cure. This is their explanation of Scripture ; and yet they are enjoying the emoluments of Protestantism, which were originally provided, in one form or another, for the support of the Catholic clergy, but which are now transferred to modern Protestantism, the principles of which are sapping and undermining the vital doctrines of Christianity in such a manner, that in a short time you shall see their dominions a wilderness of Paganism, and made all the more terrible because their inhabitants have been civilized.

“ Do you go to Switzerland, where Calvin established Protestant-

ism, and kept alive for a time the doctrine of the Trinity? In Geneva, if they have a patron saint, it is not John Calvin, but Jean Jacques Rousseau. His sentiments are the prevailing sentiments of those who call themselves Christians, and they are preached from the very pulpit from which the great father of that stern sect of Protestants once uttered his subtle but desperate scheme of predestination. In his day, if a man in Geneva professed disbelief in the Trinity, he ran the risk of capital punishment. But now, how changed! If a man in that city, at the present day, professes to believe in the Trinity, as Calvin believed it, he will not be burned to death, — he will only be laughed at!

“Go to France. The condition of Protestantism is nearly, if not quite, similar. Travellers tell us, that the temples there represent but a mockery of a memory of a departed creed; — that they are chill and dark, and that their preachers, if they speak of Christianity at all, speak in the rationalistic language of Germany.

“Go to Sweden; and all again is cold and stiff as iron; although the government holds dominion, and freedom of conscience, as we understand it, is unknown. There is, it is true, an apparent conformity to established forms in this and other northern states of Europe, which might deceive; but the explanation is, that the civil power will not tolerate any other outward forms of religion. We read, for instance, but the other day, of a painter, and a man of genius, inspired by the enthusiasm of what is warm and beautiful in art; and who, whether from this or from some higher impulse, wished to become, and did become, a Catholic; — whereupon he was banished from his native land, and all his property confiscated.

“Let us pass to England. Protestantism has not been able to preserve itself, even there. Look over its social and religious history from the year 1567 to the present day. See what England has passed through; and, at this day, Protestant though it still be in name, in feeling, and in law, yet it appears to be utterly unconscious of what really constitutes its religious life and mission. It seems to have no principle of self-explanation, nothing that is calculated to impress on others any respectful or reverential idea of what it is; utterly incapable of preserving the doctrines, which it thought belonged to itself, from the ruthless invasion of every advocate of error. On the other hand, if you look for any thing like propagation of Protestantism in the Catholic or Pagan world, you look in vain. It is long, indeed, since it felt the necessity of attempting something like what had been accomplished by the Catholic Church, in the conversion of the heathen; — and we find that as early as 1701 missionary societies were instituted. What they did, however, is a blank, so far as history is concerned. We know that, within our own memory, millions and millions of money

from England and these United States, and hundreds if not thousands of missionaries, have been sacrificed in the attempt to do something towards propagating Protestantism in the Pagan world; — and, I will say boldly, without success. I am aware that they speak of success in the Sandwich Islands; but I believe that the success of Protestantism even there, as a religion capable of propagating itself, on farther investigation will be found to be altogether illusory. We know that the population has diminished more than one half since it came under the influence and government of what are called missions; and we know farther, for we have it from their own writings, that the conversion of those who remain is of so doubtful a type, that during one period they passed a civil law *enforcing* attendance at public worship, and under its operation the inhabitants were driven to church; but now, for some eighteen years or so, since the law was repealed, their churches are getting empty; so that I conceive Protestantism will no more succeed in converting the inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands, than the Puritans did in converting the tribes of Indians, whom they drove from their hunting-grounds in the northern and eastern portions of the United States.

“ These failures to convert Pagans, therefore, are symptoms of decline; and if this failure comes, on one side, from the rejection of Catholic authority, or from the withholding its primary doctrines, must we not conclude that all those infidel systems which have grown out of Protestantism have grown out of it at its own expense? We must either admit that all Germany, and France, and Holland, have declined from Protestantism, and gone into the cold and dark regions of infidelity; or we must still call these nations Protestant, and allow that one condition of their Protestantism is the denial of the doctrines of the Trinity, and the holy mysteries of the Christian faith. Protestants would, I believe, universally assert the distinction. They speak of the *orthodox* denominations, as distinguished from what they consider heterodox or infidel varieties. If, therefore, both are not equally Protestant, how vastly has Protestantism declined in the direction of unbelief, skepticism, and heathenism ! ” — pp. 5 – 14.

There is no gainsaying this. Protestantism reached its limits in 1567, or by the close of the first fifty years of its existence, and it has not enlarged its territory one inch since, except by colonization in countries then unknown to the civilized world, or but recently discovered. No nation is Protestant now that was not Protestant then, and large districts in Europe, especially in Savoy and Germany, then Protestant, are now Catholic. Even in France, the Protestants and unbelievers combined are not to-day so

large a proportion of the French people as were the Huguenots in the reigns of Henry the Second and Charles the Ninth. Protestantism has never made a single conquest from the gentile world, and for over two hundred and eighty years, that is, for nearly the whole period of its existence, it has made no conquest from Catholic nations. Its expansive power was almost instantly exhausted, and it has been gradually losing the ground it originally occupied. This is a remarkable fact, well worthy of the serious meditation of every Protestant. It proves that Protestantism is struck with sterility; that it is destitute of true reproductive energy, and is destined at no distant day to dwindle into an insignificant sect, or finally to disappear from the earth it has not blessed. Another fact equally remarkable, and which no Protestant can have the hardihood to deny, is the entire falsification, by the event, of all the predictions and promises of the pretended Reformers. Nothing has been realized of what was promised. In no country, in no respect whatever, has Protestantism proved to be what we were told in the beginning it would be. It promised to restore the Gospel, from which it dared to say the Church had apostatized, and for the Gospel it gives us mere rationalism, transcendentalism, and heathenism, and it has made the Bible, as somebody has said, a fiddle, on which a skilful performer may play any tune he pleases. In the United States, according to the American Almanac, — Protestant authority, — over one half of the adult population belong to no religious society whatever, and are really heathen. The majority of the American people are what are waggishly, but expressively, called Nothingarians, although good Protestants in their hostility to the Catholic Church. In all Protestant nations faith is gone, morality is gone, and principle is gone. The least depraved among them may vie not unsuccessfully in immorality and unnatural crimes with the more depraved nations of heathen antiquity. The sin of Sodom is far from being unknown, and infanticide is quite too common even in our own country to permit us to reproach the modern Chinese with the exposure of infants.

These results should not surprise us. Human nature is, since the Fall, depraved, rotten, and there are no vices too filthy or crimes too foul for it to fall into when left to it-

self, without being elevated, strengthened, and sustained by the sacraments which Protestantism rejects. Even in Catholic countries, where faith still survives, and the graces of the sacraments are insisted upon and within reach, the depravities of human nature manifest themselves, and multitudes roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue. How much more so in Protestant countries, where there is no faith, no adequate moral instruction, no sacraments, and nothing but pride and a mere regard to public decorum to aid and protect virtue! The only solid foundation of virtue, private or public, is Christian faith, and its only safeguards are the Christian sacraments. Where these are wanting, you may indeed have for a time polished manners and kindly sentiments, but no genuine virtue, for men cannot without grace fulfil even the law of nature. It is nothing surprising, then, that nations under Protestantism should lapse into all the vices, immoralities, and unnatural crimes of heathenism.

The decline of Protestantism in regard to Christian doctrine was in the natural course of things, and the infidelity and heathenism in which it everywhere results are only its legitimate development, the realization of what it originally *meant*. From the first, Protestantism contained the seeds of its own destruction. We cite again the Archbishop at length.

“But now the question comes up, What causes have prevented Protestantism from taking that spread, and exercising that influence over the human race, which should have distinguished a system, having, or claiming to have, the blessing and favor of God? The causes are no doubt many; but I think the primary cause, of which the others are consequences, is to be found in the very elements of Protestantism itself; — for I conceive that God has given to man but two general principles of guidance. One is Divine authority, which, as being Divine, is above him; and the other is reason, which is in him. If it be said that we, Catholics, because we admit authority, do not exercise our reason, we have an answer which is obvious, and ought to be satisfactory; — and it is this: If you ask our reason for submitting to authority, we answer, that, in the exercise of that faculty, we have arrived at the conclusion that God, having made a revelation, has appointed a Church, to be the depositary and witness of his truth, and the guide to his people, to the end of the world. Now, if this be true, what can be more natural or *rational* than to submit our *reason* to the teachings and guidance that God himself has appointed? But

on the other hand, the Protestant system, from the beginning, essentially casts off all authority. It is very difficult to say now, what were, if any, the philosophical motives for asserting this principle, — whether asserted by accident, whether it was intended really to be a central and abiding point in the new system, it is difficult to say ; — but one thing is perfectly clear and obvious, — that the first exigency of condition in Protestantism was to **PULL DOWN**. Its first mission was not to build up, but to pull down ; and a more fruitful or efficient principle of encouragement for the destruction of whatever did exist never could have been devised by the perverted and perverting ingenuity of man, than the principle which made every human being the supreme judge of what was right and true, — with the injunction to reject all authority. Hence, therefore, the first destructive principle of Protestantism was a condition of necessity, though its votaries seem never to have had the foresight to reflect or perceive that this principle could be turned against any thing else, and in a little time, even against itself. But having once proclaimed the principle, it could not deny the consequences. Hence, after the first ebullition of that species of half political, half religious revolution, they began to draw the semblance of a creed around themselves, and to throw some restraints over the private reasoning of their own adherents. This attempt at restraint is the other element of Protestantism, and from that period, until the present day, supposing it to be thus constituted, it is manifest that it never could, under such principles, either preserve or propagate itself. And why ? Because these two principles came in contradiction one with the other. How can you make me free to read the Holy Scriptures and judge for myself, if you tie me down to your Augsburg Confession, your Westminster Catechism, or your Thirty-Nine Articles and Homilies ? What kind of freedom is that ? The freedom you proclaimed invited me to desert the Catholic faith, in order, as it would now seem, to put my neck into the yoke **you** have framed. You give with one hand, and take away with the other that which you had given. Now, therefore, I must be consistent with you. Whatever systems or confessions **you** have made, God is invariable ; and, following out his light and yours, I see you are in contradiction with yourselves, and cannot continue to have any active existence. Either reject authority, and make every man free to follow his own judgment, or admit authority ; and if you admit authority, then you recall your own principle ! Be candid, then, and do not deceive us with words. If you mean that we are to shape our belief according to your articles, tell us so. If we have reason to think you are teaching from God, we will follow you ; but, as it is, you adopt a principle which is destructive of every doctrine of your own system, and which, at the same time, de-

prives you of the right of correcting, and calling back, those who wander from your arbitrary standard of Christian belief. Hence it is, that all those persons who go in the direction of rationalism go on the first principle of Protestantism; and all those who accept authority and find it not in the system of Protestantism, and discover there no guaranty of a certain faith, one after another come back to the faith of their ancestors. This principle has followed Protestantism into every department of its quasi religious life. It is like the blood in the human system. It springs from the heart of Protestantism, and pervades the whole extremities. Hence the number of sects. No man can enumerate their shades and varieties. It would be vain to attempt it. But all of them are justified in their character, by the very first principle of separation from the association to which the primitive founders had belonged. Hence it is, too, that Protestantism has lost all organic influence over the masses of mankind, and that it has so lost all capacity to preserve even its own doctrines, that it is paralyzed, powerless, speechless; or if it speaks, its words are of no import. It has lost all central force; and because it was conscious of this defect from the beginning, you will observe that it immediately attached itself, in every instance, to the state, so that kings and courts became its master from the hour of its birth. It is free, and professes to be free, *only* in these United States; and of the use which it makes of its freedom, even here, none of its advocates have any great reason to be proud.

“It is said that it has emancipated nations. This is not the fact, but even if it were so, it was at the expense of *its own* liberty, seeing that itself became a state-slave from the first hour of its existence. Protestantism at this day, wherever it is established in the Old World, is but a part of the state. You may speak of its Consistories, Presbyteries, and Synods, of its Bishops, Ministers, and Dignitaries, but you will find them without a tongue to defend their own rights, or to define its doctrines, except the tongue which the sovereign or his civil minister puts into their mouths. In England itself, the country which has succeeded the best with Protestantism, have we not seen, but the other day, a dispute arising between a Presbyterian and his Bishop about the nature and efficacy of the sacrament of baptism? — a topic which has been decided by the voice of universal Christendom for eighteen hundred years! In this dispute the Bishop had no authority or right of judgment over the Presbyterian. On the contrary, he was opposed by the Archbishop; and there were the Presbyterian, Bishop, and Archbishop, all learned professors of Protestant theology, and they could not define the doctrine of their church with regard to baptism, until it was made known to them by a civil officer, a judge on the bench; and to *his* opinion they were obliged to submit. Yet these Presbyteries, Bishops, and Archbishops speak to us of setting, or having set,

nations free ; they speak to us of the freedom of countries where the religion of which they are ministers is adopted and patronized by the sovereign and by the state ! No doubt. But the connection between the church and the state rules, as I take it, that the church in such countries is a mere function or department of the government, in which the sovereign speaks to the Bishop, or the Judge on the bench to the Presbyter or the Metropolitan, as he does to the admirals of the navy, or the officers of the army.

“ How then can Protestantism succeed in preserving itself, or in converting the erring world ? And again, to speak of the *causes* of its want of success in preserving its own doctrines or in converting nations ; — how has it been or how is it now possible for Protestantism to succeed ? Its missionaries, for instance, carry with them double elements, the positive and the negative, namely, ‘ Such and such doctrines to be accepted, and such and such others to be cast aside.’ Indeed, they often cast away all creeds as known to other men, and have no creed of their own except as they read and choose to interpret the Scriptures. We hear of companies of missionaries going to convert heathen nations, and of their holding consultations from day to day on board ship, to agree, in some manner, as to what kind of doctrines they shall preach and present to the heathen. We have an instance of one of their distinguished members who left this country as a missionary, who himself became converted on the voyage, and was baptized into a new sect on reaching the Pagan land. What has been the consequence of all this wavering, instability, and uncertainty ? It has been the same as that which has produced the divisions, and weakened any power that ever existed in the Protestant system of religion. It is natural, and to be expected, that the heathen will say to such men, ‘ How can we hearken to the voice of missionaries who come to us conflicting with each other in doctrine ? They should not come to us with contrary or mutilated messages from the Son of God. We shall remain as we are, till your learned missionaries agree among yourselves.’ They have also still farther confounded the simple judgment of the Pagan. By the fact of being Protestants, they must necessarily commence the history of their religion, by saying that Christ established a Church for the purpose of propagating his doctrine, but that after fifteen hundred years it had failed, and *they* had come to renew it. How can the savage inwardly digest a story like that ? How quickly will he, with the perception of natural instinct, not to say talent, reply, ‘ How can I know what confidence to put in you, if the Author of Christianity himself failed in his Church ? ’

“ Thus, on every side, that inherent defect, that one principle which is self-destruction, has followed Protestantism in every one of its undertakings ; — so that, at the present day, it does not in

reality hold together as a system of doctrines. There is no heart in it, no intellect, no comprehensive or comprehensible body of principles, by which men could be brought into religious and harmonious association with one another." — pp. 16 – 21.

Protestantism could not, if left to the free action of the human mind, but develop itself, and in accordance with its own essential nature. In the bosom of the Catholic Church there is development of life in obedience to the truth, but no development of doctrine, save such successive explications and definitions as are necessary to preserve the splendor, purity, and integrity of the original deposit of faith against the novel heresies and errors which, in consequence of men's perversity and subtle curiosity, from time to time arise to obscure, controvert, or deny it; because in matters of faith the Church teaches from the first the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and thus leaves no room for development or variation of doctrine without lapsing into error. Development of doctrine, as distinguished from development of practice, is predicable only where the truth is but partially communicated to the mind, or communicated mixed with falsehood, for it proceeds always from the effort of the mind to eliminate what it regards as the false element, and to complete, or realize the potentiality of what it regards as the true element. Protestantism had originally at best only a partial truth, and this truth it held mingled with falsehood. Even by its own confession, it was not the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Truth and falsehood are necessarily repugnant to each other. There was originally an innate repugnance between their several elements of doctrine professed by Protestants, and they had at best only a few fragments of the truth. Hence Protestantism could not remain fixed and invariable. Wherever the mind was free, it must struggle to get rid of this innate repugnance or contradiction, and to complete its view of truth.

Development must follow the inherent law or essential nature of its subject. Development in the vegetable must follow the inherent law of the vegetable world; in the animal, the inherent law of the animal world; in doctrine, the inherent law or essential principle of the doctrine, as Mr. Newman has satisfactorily proved in his theory of development, — a theory as profound and true when applied to heretical sects and doctrines as it is false

and dangerous when applied in the bosom of the Church to Christian doctrine, that is, the Catholic faith, objectively considered. Protestantism, then, if not prevented by external causes, must not only develop, but it must develop according to its own inherent law, or essential nature, and this it must do by eliminating whatever is repugnant to it, assimilating whatever is in accordance with it, and realizing its potentiality, or pushing its essential principle to its last logical consequences.

The inherent law or essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation. Protestants, when they went forth from the Church, professed, it is true, to retain a certain number of Christian doctrines, and Protestantism taken as originally professed consisted of these doctrines and the principles it asserted in protesting against the Church, or in denying its authority. But these Christian doctrines, so far as it held them at all, it held in common with the Church, and therefore they did not and could not constitute its essential nature, its distinguishing characteristic, as Protestantism. If it had taken them for its point of departure, and eliminated what it held incompatible, and assimilated what was in accordance with them, that is, purified and completed them by development, it would have been obliged to abrogate itself, and return to the Church against which it protested. Its inherent law, its essential principle, its distinguishing characteristic, could not lie in what it held in common with the Church, but must necessarily lie in what it opposed to the Church, as the ground of its rejection of her authority. It must reject the Catholic Church, be a protest against her, let it be whatever else it might. The concession of the Church, or the recognition of her authority, in any sense or degree conceivable, was fatal to itself, the total destruction of its own being. It could be only by being Protestantism, and it could be Protestantism only by being opposed to Catholicity; and hence we find, historically, that Protestants, though differing among themselves in all else, agree to a man in protesting against the Church, and denying her authority. The principle of this denial of the authority of the Church, then, must be the essential principle, the distinctive nature, of Protestantism.

The principle of this denial is what is termed the right of private judgment. But the assertion of the right of pri-

vate judgment is at bottom only the denial of the right of any authority to control the judgment, that is, the simple denial of authority itself. In denying the authority of the Church on the strength of private judgment, the pretended Reformers did not deny it on the strength, or in obedience to the commands, of another authority opposed to hers, but on no authority at all. Their denial of her authority was then a simple negation, in which nothing was affirmed, and therefore the essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation. We grant that the pretended Reformers did not formally assert the right of private judgment, but they implied it, since in denying the authority of the Church they asserted no authority to justify their denial. It is true, they alleged the written word, but this amounted to nothing; because in alleging it they alleged nothing peculiar to themselves, no *authority* opposed to the Church. The Church asserted the authority of the written word as well as they, and their distinguishing mark was not in asserting the authority of the written word, for that authority no Catholic denies, but in asserting the written word as privately interpreted, that is, in denying all authoritative interpreters, and therefore all authoritative interpretation of it; which was, in effect, not the assertion, but the denial, of the authority of the written word, as the subsequent developments of Protestantism have amply proved. The written word is authoritative only in its sense, and its sense can be authoritative only in so far as authoritatively determined and applied. It is true also, that the pretended Reformers alleged the written word interpreted by the private illumination of the Holy Ghost; but this was only their private allegation, made on the strength of their private judgment, and therefore on no authority at all. Their peculiarity here was not in asserting the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost, for that every Catholic asserts, but in asserting their right of determining by their own private judgment whether the spirit by which they were moved was or was not the spirit of God; and hence the distinguishing trait of the allegation as a Protestant principle was the assertion of private judgment against the authority of the Church, that is, the denial of her authority on no authority. Hence, notwithstanding these two allegations, our assertion remains true and undeniable, that the essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation.

It follows from this, that the development of Protestantism must necessarily consist in the development of the principle, if we may so speak, of denial or negation, in eliminating whatever it originally held along with it repugnant to that principle, and in carrying it out to its last logical consequences. But, from the nature of the case, this must be a successive throwing off of truth, and a gradual denial of all things. The elimination of every positive element, and the pushing of denial to its last logical consequences, is universal negation, the denial of God and the universe, — absolute nullism, which is absolute falsehood! This is the final term of Protestantism, what it originally meant, or was, potentially, from the first, in so far as Protestantism. Hegel and several others, in their speculative theories, have reached this final term, but the great body of the Protestant people draw up a little this side, though without any good reason in their own system for doing so, except that universal negation is necessarily the negation of itself, and pure falsehood, being a nonentity, is absolutely unintelligible; for, as we have often occasion to say, what is not, is not intelligible. Men may invent theories which imply absolute nullism, but all such theories are self-destructive, and can never be practically carried out; for negation is intelligible only by virtue of some affirmative principle, and falsehood only by virtue of the truth it denies. Hence, if there were no Catholic Church, Protestantism would be absolutely inconceivable, and if it could succeed in denying it and getting actually rid of it, it would itself become absolutely extinct, or at best only an unmeaning word. In consequence of the purely negative character of Protestantism, the number of pure and consistent Protestants must always be small, because common sense will always in most men be stronger than theory. Nevertheless, by the invariable law of development, the whole Protestant body must be always tending to be more and more thoroughly Protestant, and therefore be always struggling to throw off more and more of what little of truth they may have held in solution, and to approach nearer and nearer to pure unmixed falsehood. This is clear *a priori*; and it is proved by the whole history of Protestantism during the last three hundred years. The decline of Protestantism, under a doctrinal point of view, lay, as we have said, in the ordinary course of things,

for the development of negation, that is, the growth of negation is necessarily a decline, an approach towards ceasing to be, that is, to nonentity.

It should then excite no surprise, that Protestantism has successively eliminated the Christian doctrines which the pretended Reformers originally retained from the Church. These doctrines were affirmative, and necessarily foreign and repugnant to its essential principle, which it must preserve or cease to be Protestantism. It was doomed to eliminate them, and lapse into pure rationalism, transcendentalism, heathenism. It has done so, and it cannot help itself. All its attempts to retrace its steps, whether in England, Germany, or this country, and to take its stand nearer to Christian truth, are in vain, and only accelerate its general decline. It has no remedy, for it has no recuperative energy, no living principle. Its being is non-being, its life is the negation of life, and its movement is the movement of dissolution, of the body after life has departed, subjected to the operation of the natural chemical agents. It is strange that Protestant nations, not lacking in the cultivation of letters and affairs, should not have sooner discovered that the body they clasp to their bosoms, and on which they lavish their caresses, is a lifeless corpse, a mass of putrefaction, soon to be a ghastly and grinning skeleton. It is strange that they have been so slow in discovering the imposition which has been practised upon them, and that they should continue to glory in the pretended Reformation, even after having learned by their own bitter experience that of all the fine things it promised them it has given them none. Are they fools? In the one thing needful, most assuredly. They are among those of whom the Apostle speaks, who, "esteeming themselves wise, become fools," who, "ever learning, are never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." So it is. When men yield to their own fancy and follow the suggestions of their own pride, they lose their powers of discernment, and become the prey of every false illusion. Good seems to them evil, and evil seems to them good; truth wears to them the garb of falsehood, and falsehood the garb of truth; light is to them darkness, and darkness, light. Following their own foolish hearts, their minds become darkened, and God gives them up to a reprobate sense, and permits them to be carried away by strong de-

lusions in punishment for their rejection of the truth and consent to iniquity. They have, like the old carnal Jews, eyes, but they see not, ears, but they hear not, hearts, but they understand not. Yet, singularly enough, they imagine themselves enlightened, fancy themselves learned and wise, and use great, swelling words, as if they really knew and were saying something. Alas! how little do they suspect the ridiculous figure they cut in the eyes of Catholics, and how we should laugh at them, did not our charity subdue our risibility, and lead us to compassionate them. Alas! we cannot laugh at them; we can only weep for them. They have souls, souls for whom Christ shed his precious blood on the cross, — souls, capable of endless happiness through the grace of our Lord, or of the eternal tortures of hell. Why should they be lost? Dear Catholic friends, pray for them; besiege Heaven, day and night, with prayers for their conversion. O Mary, Refuge of sinners, pray for them, and present our prayers to thy Divine Son, that he will open their eyes, save them from themselves, and enable them to love him with their whole hearts, and thee as their sweet mother.

His Grace might have enumerated among the causes, no less than among the effects, of the decline of Protestantism, the partial relaxation in most Protestant countries of the barbarous penal codes enacted, and for a long time rigidly enforced, against the profession and practice of the Catholic religion. Protestantism was favored in its origin by the civil authorities, anxious to get rid of the restraints always imposed on their despotism by the Papacy; and it is a well-known fact, that the pretended Reform was never able to establish itself in any country, except by the strong arm of the secular power. To this not a single exception can be named. Protestantism never spread, became predominant, and sustained itself by the peaceable study of the Sacred Scriptures, free discussion, and moral suasion, but it owes its success to confiscations, fines, dungeons, scaffolds, and wholesale massacres, authorized by the civil authority. Its infancy, indeed, was baptized in blood, as its youth and manhood were nourished by it, but it was the blood of persecuted Catholics, not of its own martyrs. Unlike the early Catholics, under pagan Rome, who conquered the world not by slaying but by being slain, Protestants have made all their conquests by killing, and at-

tempted to secure their conquests by penal codes against Catholics, which would have afforded many valuable hints to a Nero, a Decius, or a Diocletian, and this, too, while they openly acknowledged that salvation was attainable in the Catholic communion!

The relaxation of these codes, either by a formal repeal or by suffering them to fall into desuetude, and the consequent partial toleration of the Catholic worship in Protestant countries, have operated seriously to the disadvantage of Protestantism; which could never stand a moment before its Catholic opponent, when it had not taken the precaution to dig out that opponent's tongue, and to bind him hand and foot. In an open field, with fair play, it never gained, and never could gain, any thing, but a shameful defeat, and Great Britain, while we are writing, confirms it, by proposing to reënforce, or to reënact, her old penal code against Catholics. In itself, Protestantism never had any strength, and it is never able in a fair argument to make even a show of defending itself. Hence everywhere it shrinks from argument, if there is any prospect of a reply. It cannot be coaxed or shamed into a discussion with Catholicity on equal terms, and now that it has no longer the strong arm of the civil law to fell its opponent, it resorts solely to petty squibs, to gross calumnies, or coarse vituperations, and the exhibition of obscene Leahys and Maria Monks. But these things after a while lose their savor, and its resources fail. What shall it do? Its sole strength — after the ignorance of the multitude, the gullibility inherent in all genuine Protestants, the pride of the human heart, and the depraved tastes, instincts, and passions of human nature — is and always has been in the civil government, and just in proportion as that abandons it, it dwindles into an insignificant sect, or lapses into the lowest form of Sadduceeism and gentilism. So true is this, and so rapid have been the decline of Protestantism and the growth of Catholicity under the relaxation of the old penal codes, that we expect to see efforts speedily made in all Protestant nations to revive them.

In point of fact, in those Protestant nations which profess to tolerate Catholicity, as well as in this country, which professes to recognize its equal rights, the state is constantly exerting its force in favor of Protestants, and against Catholics. It is still the state that supports Prot-

estantism, and its whole political and social action is directed against the Church. It liberally endows Protestant institutions of learning, taxes Catholics to support schools, to which in comparatively few instances can Catholics with a good conscience send their children, and even in liberal Massachusetts refuses to grant a simple charter of incorporation to a Catholic college. The whole system of state education, now so earnestly insisted on, and which no one can oppose without being charged with opposing education itself, is only insisted on because it is believed to favor infidelity, that is, Protestantism, and check the growth of Catholicity. The various philanthropic institutions, Farm Schools, Houses of Reformation, Normal Schools, and the like, are protected and favored by the state, solely with a view to the suppression of Popery and the preservation of Protestantism. But bad as these all are, and as much as the state may do through them, Catholicity, if tolerated at all, spreads and will spread. The knowing amongst Protestants see it, and, as they have relaxed nothing in their hatred of the Church, we may expect them ere long to demand more efficient and stringent measures against us. But we are pretty sure that it is too late for them, even if they obtain such measures, to succeed.

Our reason for thinking it too late for the revival or enforcement of the old penal codes with success, is not only in the actual decline of Protestantism, but in the new and imposing attitude assumed by Catholicity. Two years ago we were told from Protestant pulpit and press that it was all over with Popery. The Holy Father was in exile, and the capital of the Catholic world was in the hands of a ruthless demagogy, of infidel ruffians, paid by Protestant contributions, and sworn to overthrow the Catholic Church. All Europe was in commotion, social order was broken up, and it seemed that the civilized world was abandoned to the Red Republicans and Socialists, the emissaries of hell, and the determined enemies of God and man, of the Church and of the state. Two years have passed, and the Holy Father is restored to his temporal possessions, the chains with which civil despotism in France and Austria, Spain and Portugal, had bound the spiritual power are nearly all broken, and the Church, rising from the servile posture in which she had been

bound, resumes her pristine energy, and addresses the nations in the free, bold, and commanding tone, which the world has not heard before during these last three hundred years. England, out of hatred to Catholicity, fostered the conspiracy of Mazzini, and sent a cabinet minister to excite rebellion in all Italy, and the Church answers to her insolence by the National Council of Thurles, and the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy, with Cardinal Wiseman at its head. In France, we have, after so many years' silence, once more the free voice of the Church, and we see the state kneeling at her feet and imploring her to save French society from anarchy and total destruction. "The Gallican liberties" have become only a faint reminiscence, and the Gallican Church feels that her only safety is in filial submission to the chair of Peter. In Austria, the noble and pious young Emperor has given the death-blow to Josephinism, and restored to religion her freedom. Spain recalls her exiled prelates, and Portugal yields to the wishes of the Holy See. Catholic nations awake from their slumbers, shake off the timidity which had for centuries paralyzed their efforts, and on all sides Protestantism is assailed as it never has been before. It had brought all Europe to the verge of ruin; it had well-nigh precipitated the whole civilized world into barbarism, and the stern voice of indignant nations is heard calling it to stand forth and show cause why judgment shall not be executed against it. And it has no answer to give. Here is what encourages us. Catholics are becoming Catholics, are beginning to feel, as amid the disasters of so many centuries they had not dared feel, that God is for them, and no enemy can prevail against them. This is all that was ever wanting to make an end of Protestantism, or at least to compel it to retire into some dark corners, to be forgotten save by the antiquarian, or the curious traveller delighting to detect the remains of lost tribes.

Undoubtedly the Church in this world must always be the Church Militant, and we are never to expect her to be entirely free from either internal or external enemies. Her life through the ages is and must be the life of the individual believer, that of constant vigilance and unremitted warfare. Perfect peace and security are not to be attained to in this world; the victory is fully gained only at the end, and the triumph is reserved for heaven. Nevertheless,

as her heavenly Spouse visits from time to time the faithful soul with sweet and ineffable consolations, so does he visit and console his Church; and it is not too much to believe, that he is about to visit and reward her fidelity with new consolations. We do not expect Protestantism, now mere Carnal Judaism and heathenism, will wholly disappear from the face of the earth, but we do believe that its power is broken, and that it should no longer be regarded as a formidable opponent. The woman has bruised its head, and the good God is about to visit the nations more in mercy than in judgment. We Catholics, while we watch and pray, may take hope, that we have seen the darkest days, and that Christ, who loves his Church and gave his life for her, descends to console her for her past sufferings, and for the insults she has recently received from her enemies. While we humble ourselves in the dust for our sins and short-comings, we may take new courage, and press forward with renewed ardor to the charge against the enraged but disheartened enemies of the Lord and of his Immaculate Spouse. Especially may we do so in this country, where we need nothing but courage, fidelity, and perseverance.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *John O'Brien, or the Orphan of Boston: a Tale of Real Life.* By Rev. JOHN T. RODDAN. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 12mo. pp. 264.

THE change which has taken place in the tone of our American Catholic literature during the last few years is not a little encouraging. It is more thoroughly Catholic, more manly and independent, more bold and energetic, and at the same time none the less really civil to those of our countrymen who are attached to heretical communions. There is no lack of charity or of civility in the cheerful utterance of the Gospel, and in plainly telling those who are outside of the Catholic Church that they are out of the ark of safety. It is not we who say it, on our personal authority, as our private opinion or belief, but it is the Church who says it, on the authority of Him who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Nor do we say it in wrath, or in hatred or ill-will towards the heretical

and unbelieving; we say it because it is God's truth, because it is of the last consequence to them that they should know it, and because we love them for God's sake, and in our charity would save them from the fearful doom to which we see that they are exposed.

We are glad to see that our authors are less anxious about defending the Church than they were, — that they are less disturbed by the various objections urged or calumnies vented against her, and more in earnest to make Protestants aware of their own slippery foundation, and their absolute need of the Catholic faith and Sacraments. The Church is safe. The wrath of man and rage of devils cannot affect her. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household? In religious matters Protestants are neither candid nor well informed. To honorable controversy they are ill disposed, and ill qualified for it. They heed nothing we say in our own defence, and to our arguments for the Church they can never be induced to attempt a sober and candid reply. They have never learned to reason, are incapable of reasoning in religious matters, and, let us say what we will, they continue merely to declaim and vituperate as if we said nothing, and to repeat ridiculous slanders a thousand times denied and refuted. The only way in which we can reach and do them good is to press them hard on their own principles and doctrines, and by our vigorous and well-aimed attacks make them feel their own nothingness. We must put them on their defence, and drive them from their last intrenchments. In this way we may shame them out of their absurdities, and force them to listen to the truth which saves.

These reflections are suggested by the little work before us, which, though not in all respects perfect, is a masterly production, and written on the principle we most heartily approve, by one who knows whereof he affirms. It is an original work, — original in its conception, its plan, and its style. Its style is peculiar, and not precisely to the taste of every reader, and by some will be regarded as deficient in dignity and polish; but it is free, bold, dashing, clear, and simple. It is not the style most approved by critics, but it is the style which experience in all ages and countries proves to be the most natural and effective. If we wish to reach and move the heart, we must never stand on our own dignity, or waste our strength in efforts to conciliate the good-will of the fastidious. We must break through many a conventionalism, and forget ourselves in the effect we would produce. We may easily be too correct, too polished, and too dignified, to be effective. The saints often appear singular, not to say eccentric, to those not saints. Mr. Roddan writes without any thought of himself, with entire self-forgetfulness, and seeks only to convey the thought and produce

the impression he wishes, without the least reference to his own reputation. His mind is remarkably active, fresh, and vigorous, and he transfers it with unrivalled felicity to his glowing pages. In them all is life and movement, and the reader cannot but read on, carried away by a power he sees not, and captivated by a charm he does not once think of stopping to analyze.

Mr. Roddan is remarkable for the ease with which he grapples with the most difficult problems of philosophy and theology, and brings them within the reach of the ordinary mind. His book can be read with interest by the mere child, and with instruction by the man of mature intellect. In this respect he has scarcely an equal. He is not less remarkable for his graphic power. His descriptions are unrivalled, and in reading them we see the objects described, and live the scenes presented. His story is a simple story of a poor orphan boy, and in no instance transcends ordinary life; it is told in the simplest manner imaginable, and yet it has all the interest of an exciting romance. It apparently owes little to the imagination, and taken in detail it indicates little of a poetic temperament, and yet we have found few works of imagination or creations of the poet equally effective in chaining the attention, and keeping alive the interest of the reader. Humble as are its pretensions, it is a work of real genius, as well as of consummate skill and ability, and must place the author with good judges in the front rank of our best American authors.

John O'Brien is not a model character, and is by no means held up, or to be held up, for imitation. This perhaps is a defect. Taking him as the ideal, the ideal of the book is not high enough, and this would be a serious objection, if the work were intended to be read solely by the boys of the class to which John belongs. No boy will rise as high as he aims, and every one should therefore be taught to aim at the highest, lest in practice he fall too low. But the author had another purpose in view; he wrote, not only for the instruction of boys, but still more for the instruction of parents and guardians. He did not aim at setting before the young a model for them to imitate, so much as he did at making us acquainted with the real character of the class of boys who throng our streets, trouble our police, fill our Houses of Reformation and Refuges for Juvenile Offenders, and are not seldom regarded as utterly hardened and incorrigible. Owing to the poverty of a large class of our people, their little acquaintance in their own country with the dangers of town life, and their neglect or inability, from various causes, to educate their children as they should be at home, there is in all our cities an undue proportion of Catholic children, orphans, or worse than orphans, that crowd our streets, and grow up rowdies. There is no denying the fact, whether we speak of Boston or any other of our larger Atlantic cities. These boys are the

principal subjects of our petty police, and as they grow up furnish a formidable number of subjects for the higher police. The evil in both a religious and social point of view is great, and cannot by any person of right feelings be regarded with indifference. That these boys are bad enough nobody denies, and that Catholics have by no means done all they could, and all they were bound by their religion to do, to correct and save them, nobody can pretend. We have much in this respect to answer for.

But Mr. Roddan has undertaken to show, and no one was more competent to do it, that these boys are by no means so depraved as is commonly supposed, and that, with a little vigilance and a little judicious kindness, they might easily be made an honor to our community, instead of being its plague-spot. The Catholic population, again, are far less inexcusable than might seem at first sight. They are to a great extent strangers in the country, ignorant of its peculiar temptations and dangers, and for the most part poor, and obliged to strain every nerve in order to live. They have good intentions and exhaustless charity, but they lack means. The wealth that should supply the means is not in their hands, and the charitable institutions of the country are not under their control. Here is the difficulty.

There is, no doubt, ample provision made in our Boston community for the maintenance and education of orphans and unprotected boys, but this provision, so far as made by the public or private charities of Protestants, and which suffices in great measure for Protestant boys, who are not expected to have any other virtues than thrift and public decorum, is so made that our children cannot avail themselves of it without extreme peril to their souls. The difficulty is, not that Protestants are not liberal enough with their means, that they are not ready enough to contribute both time and money, but it is that they will furnish their aid only in such a way as to prevent our boys from growing up Catholics. They will not coöperate with our clergy and our Religious, and leave them to look after the faith and morals of Catholic children, but will operate in their own way, and make all their institutions and charities the means of providing for the body at the expense of the soul. Here is the reason why we regard, and cannot but regard, your Reverend Welleses, Barnards, and Bigelows, and your Deacon Grants, with their associate philanthropists, as practically the emissaries of Satan, the prime conspirators against the souls of our poor boys. We impugn not their motives nor their liberality, but we tell them very plainly that the practical effect of their efforts is, when not to train our children to the dungeon or the scaffold here, to deliver them over to eternal damnation hereafter, and hence we regard their labors and charities with horror rather than with gratitude.

The boys we speak of must either be trained up Catholics, or be

the pests of society. This may be regarded as a "fixed fact." They will either have the Catholic religion or no religion. The simplest and most effectual way of remedying what we all, Catholics as well as Protestants, regard as a great evil, would be for the public authorities, private associations, and liberal individuals, to aid our clergy in training up these children in the religion of their parents, that is, to relieve the Catholic poor as Catholics. Our clergy should have free access to all those public institutions which receive our unfortunate, vicious, or criminal Catholics, whether old or young, and private associations and individuals should make the Catholic clergy or the Sisters of Charity their almoners, as far as the Catholic poor are concerned. In this way the evil could be removed at one half the expense of the present Protestant charities, which serve only to increase that evil. The most scrupulous Protestant might with a good conscience consent to this, for no Protestant doubts, or pretends to doubt, that salvation is attainable in our Church, or dares maintain that it is necessary to become a Protestant in order to be saved.

But we have opened too vast a subject to be discussed in a brief literary notice. *John O'Brien* will be found to contain many valuable hints on it, and some suggestions of great importance, especially to Catholics. The author is master of the subjects on which he touches, and he gives us lessons from experience that we shall do well to heed.

We have spoken of the Catholic boys that throng our streets, but we are far from regarding these boys as worse than Protestant boys, or, in fact, as half so really vicious. The characteristic of Protestants is to display their virtues and conceal their vices; that of Catholics, especially of Irish Catholics, is to display their vices and to conceal their virtues. In the former expect no more virtue than you see, in the latter no more vice than appears at first sight. Our poor Irish Catholic boys have no hypocrisy, and are very careless as to appearances, but they have warm hearts, affectionate dispositions, and good principles. They are rarely led into vice except through their love of fun and their fine social feelings. Then, again, far more is laid to their charge than they are guilty of. A Protestant boy, cool, calculating, hardened, and hypocritical, often commits an offence, and then charges it upon some poor Irish boy, and appears in the Police Court as a witness against him. What avails it that this poor Irish boy protests his innocence? Who believes him? Was a Yankee boy ever known to tell a lie? We are Yankee born and bred, with probably not a drop of Celtic blood in our veins, but we confess that familiar acquaintance with these poor Irish boys, even those regarded as abandoned, has made us wellnigh ashamed of our Yankee descent. We know what Yankee boys are, and they are not to be named in the same day with these poor Irish Catholic boys in our streets.

2. — *Report of the Case of JOHN W. WEBSTER*, Master of Arts and Doctor of Medicine of Harvard University, Member of the Massachusetts Medical Society, of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of the London Geological Society, and of the St. Petersburg Mineralogical Society, and Erving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy in Harvard University, *indicted for the Murder of GEORGE PARKMAN*, Master of Arts of Harvard University, Doctor of Medicine of the University of Aberdeen, and Member of the Massachusetts Medical Society, *before the SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS; including the HEARING ON THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR, the Prisoner's CONFESSIOAL STATEMENTS AND APPLICATION FOR A COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE, and an APPENDIX, containing several interesting Matters never before published.* By GEORGE BEMIS, Esq., one of the Counsel in the Case. Boston: Little & Brown. 1850. 8vo. pp. 628.

THIS is a full and authentic report of the case of Dr. Webster, and leaves nothing to be desired for the complete understanding of it in all its details, down to the execution of the unhappy murderer. We are glad that Mr. Bemis, than whom no one was or could be better qualified to prepare it, has published it, not only because the case is one of deep and startling interest, but because it gives those persons abroad who have so freely censured the court and jury which tried Dr. Webster, an opportunity to retract their censures, and to reflect on the propriety of being less rash in their future judgments. No man of sound mind can read the evidence as here reported, and not be forced to the conclusion that Dr. Webster was legally and justly convicted of the murder of Dr. George Parkman. The evidence, although circumstantial, was full and irresistible, and the jury could not have done otherwise than return a verdict of guilty, without perjuring or stultifying themselves. We were ourselves among the last, prior to his conviction, to believe in the guilt of Dr. Webster; but the evidence, as reported in the newspapers at the time, forced us to believe it. Yet if we had retained any doubt, the report before us, and which gives the evidence as it was given before the jury, would have completely removed it. The case is one of profound interest, and triumphantly refutes the common objections as to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. It proves that such evidence may be irresistible, and amply sufficient to warrant conviction. That the verdict was just, no one can now pretend to doubt, for Dr. Webster, finally, clearly and unequivocally confessed it to be so.

We look upon this case as the most important which has occurred in our Commonwealth. The conviction and execution of John W. Webster have proved, what was becoming extremely doubtful, that

law can be enforced in this Commonwealth, and despite all the influences that can be brought to bear against it. No State in the Union has so disgraced itself by its fanaticism and mock philanthropy as Massachusetts. On the one hand, it has struggled to revive the sort of legislation introduced by Calvin into Geneva, and, by means of associations and committees, to determine what we shall eat and what we shall drink, when go to bed and when get up, thus depriving us of the last remains of individuality, of personal freedom and independence ; while, on the other, it has labored, through a maudlin sentimentality, with equal zeal and success, to mitigate legal severity, and to suffer the gravest crimes to go unpunished. The very idea of legal punishment has been condemned as inhuman, and never to be tolerated by a Christian people. A universal sympathy has been got up for all violators of the law, and the greater the rogue the more tenderly is he to be treated. The whole pack, "Tray, Blanche, Sweetheart, little dogs and all," are let loose upon every one who dares hint that some portion of public and private sympathy should be reserved for the virtuous and unoffending, wronged by the violators of the law, and whoever ventures to assert that it is the duty of the magistrate to avenge them is wellnigh worried to death. When Dr. Webster was put upon his trial, it was a question whether the law should reign in this Commonwealth, or whether it was henceforth to be an unmeaning word, and every species of crime and disorder to be tolerated. Considering the evidence in the case, more was at stake than the life of a single man, and on the verdict of the jury and the execution of the sentence of the court depended the life or death of the Commonwealth itself. Had the court and jury failed in their duty, and the Executive shrunk from the vindication in all its rigor of the violated law, legal order would have been utterly prostrated, and there would have reigned here henceforth only the most frightful anarchy. There would have been no safety for person or property, and all would have been given over a prey to lawless passion, ferocious fanaticism, and maudlin sentimentality, with soft words on its lips and the most deadly malice in its heart.

The conviction and execution have proved that law *can* still be executed in Old Massachusetts, notwithstanding all that has been done to undermine its authority in the hearts of the people. This itself is much. They have served also to open the eyes of many people to the necessity of maintaining the laws, and to the inevitable tendency of the loose notions and false philanthropy which have hitherto been so fatally cherished amongst us. The anti-hangman party has in consequence received a severe check, and the Channings, Parkers, and Spears are now at a heavy discount. If such a cold-blooded murder as that of Dr. Parkman, by such a man as Dr. Webster, can take place in one of our public institutions in

open day, people ask, who is safe, and what security have any of us? They begin, also, to reflect on their favorite doctrine of the dignity of human nature, and the pretence that crime is one's misfortune rather than his guilt. Here were none of the circumstances usually alleged in palliation of the most diabolical crime. Here was no low, degraded outcast from society, no poor, ignorant, uneducated vagabond, but a man highly educated, of refined intellectual culture, moving in the most respectable and cultivated circles, the member of an honorable profession, a Professor in our oldest and most renowned University, and enjoying a high reputation throughout the whole scientific world. This man murders, murders in open day, and murders his oldest, his long-trying and best friend, after having shamefully defrauded him. Who after this can doubt the reality of the malice of the human heart, and look upon the most heinous crimes as one's misfortune rather than his guilt?

The whole tragedy has tended to prompt serious reflection in our community, and to turn the current of our thoughts in a more safe and rational direction. It has refuted innumerable theories, stripped off many disguises, and exposed modern philanthropy in its nakedness. Some good does Providence thus, in his inscrutable wisdom, educe from the shocking crime, and fearful punishment, and we trust the lesson in the long run will prove as salutary as it has been painful. We are not among those who demand cruel and barbarous punishments; by our natural disposition we are inclined to range ourselves among those who seek to mitigate them; but we are far from agreeing with the author of *Paul Clifford*, who cites with approbation the saying of the debauched demagogue, John Wilkes, that "the very worst use you can put a man to is to hang him." Sometimes it is the very best use, and the only use, you can put a man to. His execution on the gallows has the use, when deserved, of vindicating the outraged law, and protecting the lives of the innocent, who should be at least as dear to us as the guilty. The execution of Dr. Webster has brought our community to a pause, and will induce it, we trust, to retrace its steps, to return to the good old ways, and to distrust all novel theories, and alleged new discoveries, in morals or in criminal jurisprudence.

3. — *Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe.* Written in Spanish by the Rev. J. BALMEZ. Translated from the French. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 501.

WE cannot better introduce the first American edition of the great work of Balmez on Civilization, than by copying and adopt-

ing as our own the following admirable notice of it from that excellent paper, *The Pittsburgh Catholic*, one of the best conducted, most spirited, and most truly Catholic journals we are acquainted with.

“ Protestants no longer contend that they have a system of religion ; they have ceased all profession of regard to dogmatic truth, and no longer claim that they have benefited the human race, by discovering any new, or superior, means of saving the human soul. But one thing they do still boast, — that they disenthralled the minds, and struck the fetters off the limbs of their fellow-men. They admit that they have done little or nothing for the soul of man, but they claim that they have done a great deal for his body. This work is an answer to those arguments based on the real or fancied temporal superiority of Protestant to Catholic countries.

“ Balmez, its author, was a priest of Spain, whose death, at the early age of thirty-eight years, occurred but very recently. His first literary production was published in 1840, — he died in 1848. His attention was turned to the erroneous views so common in regard to the supposed temporal benefits conferred upon the human race by Protestantism. The result of his researches and reflections was the elaborate work now before us. ‘ What do history and philosophy say on this subject ? How has man, either individually or collectively, considered in a religious, social, literary, or religious point of view, been benefited by the reform of the sixteenth century ? Did Europe under the exclusive influence of Catholicity pursue a prosperous career ? Did Catholicity impose a single fetter on the movements of civilization ? ’ These are the questions which he discusses, and discusses so ably and impartially, with such fulness and minuteness of detail, with so much earnestness, and, withal, with such warm and lofty eloquence, as to set the question for ever at rest with all honest men sincerely desirous of truth, who give to this treatise that attention which it most richly merits.

“ We shall not attempt any analysis of the contents of the work ; the book, to be appreciated, must be read and studied, as we trust it will be read, by all Catholics capable of understanding it, and by all Protestants who think, or are in the habit of saying that they think, the Catholic Church opposed to civil liberty. For the benefit of such, and by way of giving a brick as a sample, we make the following extract from the thirteenth chapter, — ‘ *Protestantism and Catholicity considered in their relations to social progress. Preliminary coup d’œil.* ’

“ ‘ Our hearts swell with generous indignation when we hear the religion of Jesus Christ reproached with a tendency towards oppression. It is true that, if you confound the spirit of real liberty with that of demagogues, you will not find it in Catholicity ; but if you avoid a monstrous misnomer, if you give to the word liberty its reasonable, just, useful, and beneficial signification, then the Catholic religion may fearlessly claim the gratitude of the human race, *for she has civilized the nations who embraced her, and civilization is true liberty.* It is a fact now generally acknowledged and openly expressed, that Christianity has exercised a very important and salutary influence on the developments of European civilization ; if this fact has not yet had given to it the importance which it deserves, it is because it has not been sufficiently appreciated. With respect to civilization, a distinction is sometimes made between the influence of Christianity and that of Catholicity ;

its merits are lavished on the former, and stinted to the latter, by those who forget that, with respect to European civilization, Catholicity can always claim the principal share, and, for many centuries, an exclusive one; since, during a very long period, she worked alone at the great work. People have not been willing to see that, when Protestantism appeared in Europe, the work was bordering on completion; with an ingratitude and injustice which I cannot describe, they have reproached Catholicity with the spirit of barbarism, ignorance, and oppression, while they were making an ostentatious display of the rich civilization, knowledge, and liberty for which they were principally indebted to her.'

"The chapters on Slavery, the Inquisition, Religion and Liberty, and Resistance to Civil Power, would afford new and important matter for reflection to most of our flippant Protestant preachers and editors, to whose careful consideration we cordially commend the whole work, as the best means of enlightening their darkness, and answering, once for all, their frivolous queries and petulant objections.

"This translation is made from the French edition, which was published simultaneously with the Spanish; it is executed excellently well. The translators are Messrs. Hanford and Kershaw, of England. The American edition is enriched with a biographical sketch of the illustrious author. The typographical execution of the work is excellent, and does great credit to the enterprising publishers."

4. — *The Banquet of Theodulus, or Reunion of the Different Christian Communions.* By the late BARON DE STARCK, Protestant Minister, and First Preacher to the Court of Hesse-Darmstadt. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1850. 18mo. pp. 204.

As we do not happen to know any thing of "the late Baron de Starck," we wish the American editor of this volume had condescended to give us some information concerning him, and not have taken it for granted that every body knew all about him. We are told in the title-page that he was a "Protestant minister," but we should like to be informed whether he was a Protestant minister when he wrote this book, and whether he died in or out of the communion of the Church. This, we presume, the editor could have told us, but this we have no means of knowing. Editors of Catholic works, in this country, are a little too apt to forget that we young Catholics are not masters of universal literary history.

The book as a literary production possesses great merits, and contains a great amount of useful information compressed within a small compass. The author shows the decadence of Protestantism, and urges the reunion of all Protestant communions with the Catholic Church, on the only practicable condition, that is, of their going to her, and not requiring her to come to them. In general the Catholic interlocutor, Odilon, formerly Abbot of St. Apollinaris, is made to talk like a good Catholic, with a very competent knowl-

edge of his religion, and of the history and tendencies of Protestantism; but we are sorry to see that sometimes his mildness gets the better of his orthodoxy, logic, and straightforwardness. His Lutheran and Calvinistic friends are greatly scandalized at the doctrine of exclusive salvation, at the dogma, "No salvation out of the Church," and he, poor man, tries to maintain that it is not a dogma of the Church, while he concedes that it is. No Protestant ever labored harder, or with greater sophistry, to prove that of contraries both are true, and he finds himself finally forced to give up his Church as the only religion by which a man can be saved, and to content himself with maintaining that it is in various respects the *best* religion. If the author was at the time of writing a Protestant minister, all this might pass; but if he was a Catholic, he deserves no slight censure either for his ignorance or his heterodoxy. If there is any thing we detest, it is the attempt on the part of Catholics to modify Catholic dogmas to suit the prejudices of their hearers or readers. Catholicity can bear being stated truly; if not, let us away with it at once, and have nothing more to say about it.

We know that the dogma, No salvation out of the Church, is offensive to all who refuse submission to the Church, but then we know, and so does every Catholic, that it is a Catholic dogma, and to deny it or attempt to explain it away is neither just to them, nor allowable in us. The Church does not propose herself as the best religion among a number of good religions, but as the *only* true religion, as the only religion whereby men can be saved. It is for this reason we urge upon all to become Catholics; it is this which fires our zeal for conversion, and makes us willing to suffer any torture, if we can but win one soul to Christ. If there is harshness or severity in the doctrine, it is not our fault, for we do not make the doctrine; but we confess we cannot understand by what right any man can call the doctrine of God harsh or severe.

One thing we know; God is just, and will condemn no one unjustly, or punish any one beyond his deserts. We therefore know that, if he saves none out of his Church, none out of his Church do or can merit salvation. But nobody need be so silly as to suppose that, in declaring with the Church the doctrine of exclusive salvation, we judge individuals. We judge nobody. It is you that object to us who judge, not we. You say, you will not embrace a religion which teaches that *your* ancestors are damned. Well, who asks you so to believe? Who says your ancestors died out of the Church? It is you, not we. We only say, *if* they died out of the Church they are damned, and we know not what mighty merit *you* have that God should not damn your ancestors as well as others, if they died his mortal enemies. But whether they did or did not so die, we pretend not to decide; we leave that to Him to whom all judgment belongs. We do not know what passed between them and God at the last moment before the soul left the

body. We do not say that all who are heretics, schismatics, and infidels will be damned; we only say, if they live and die such they will go to hell, and therefore we entreat you to return or be converted to the Church, that you may be saved. The chiefest of sinners may be saved, not as a sinner, not out of the Church, but by entering her communion, and doing what she commands. You who hear us say this have no excuse. *You* at least cannot plead invincible ignorance, for you at least have the opportunity of knowing the truth. No man, of course, will be damned for not knowing that of which he is invincibly ignorant, which he has never had it in his power to know. But how do you know that any one lives and dies *invincibly* ignorant of the Holy Catholic Church? You know you are not invincibly ignorant, and by what right do you say others are? Remember Pelagianism is a heresy, and that God gives sufficient grace unto every man to know and do his will, and that if any do not know and do it, it is their own fault. When he commands all to enter the communion of his Church, he makes it possible for all to enter, if they choose. Bring the question home, then, to yourselves, and do not attempt to be wiser than what is revealed, or presume to sit in judgment on Almighty God. His Church is near *you*, and, though no one will be condemned who has the Christian life, remember that out of her communion you cannot have that life.

5. — *The American Almanac and Repository of Useful Knowledge for 1851.* Boston: Little & Brown. 1850. 12mo. pp. 351.

THIS annual is so well known, and its reputation so well established, that there is no occasion on the appearance of a new number to do more than simply announce it. The number for this year falls behind none of its predecessors in interest and utility. Besides the calendar, it contains a great amount of useful and interesting information, and a learned and truly scientific paper on *Animal Electricity*, by Professor Lovering, of Harvard University. The work issues from a Protestant source, and unhappily Protestants cannot treat even pure mathematics without infusing more or less of heresy. Yet this is as unexceptionable as any thing we can expect at their hands, and we can, upon the whole, commend it to our readers, as a very desirable and valuable work.

6. — *Purgatory opened to the Piety of the Faithful; or the Month of November. To which is added a Perpetual Suffrage, a Daily Exercise, and a Novena.* From the Italian. Boston: J. A. Capes. 1850. 18mo. pp. 146.

THIS is one of Mr. Capes's excellent little devotional publications, which only needs to be known to be highly esteemed. The devotion which it recommends, and of which it is a manual, is one that cannot be too much encouraged. The souls in Purgatory can be helped by our suffrages, and never should we withhold them, or be remiss in offering them. There is no charity more sweet than that of praying for the repose of the faithful departed. The little work before us is published with the approbation of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of this Diocese.

7. — *Truth stranger than Fiction. A Narrative of Recent Transactions, involving Inquiries in Regard to the Principles of Honor, Truth, and Justice, which obtain in a distinguished American University.* By CATHERINE E. BEECHER. Boston : Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 296.

MISS BEECHER could hardly have been worse employed than in writing this book, which, as it seems to us, can answer no good purpose, and only serve to injure her friend, to whose imprudence it gives an uncalled for notoriety. There is no doubt the lady was scurvily treated, but we see nothing very strange in the conduct of the young minister, who appears to have been not unwilling to amuse himself at her expense. The lady was old enough to be his mother, and should not have suffered him to make a fool of himself by playing the lover. That he lacked principle Miss Beecher proves clearly enough, but at the same time she proves with equal clearness that the lady lacked discretion, and we think the less publicity given to the affair the better for all parties.

Miss Beecher, however, seems to have been willing to sacrifice her friend to her theological spite against the University in question. She wished to excite public indignation against it, and destroy its influence, for it does not happen to be precisely orthodox according to her standard of orthodoxy. But the whole matter is a private quarrel between Protestants, in which we take no sort of interest. Both parties are equally heretical to us, and we are not in the habit of expecting the Christian virtues in any very eminent degree from heretics. We do not feel called upon to engage with Miss Beecher in a war against Yale College, and we assure her that we find as much to censure in her and her movements as we do in its principles and conduct. We remember something about a book published some time since, said to be written by her, boldly advocating Tritheism, explaining the mystery of the Trinity to mean three Gods, equal in power, majesty, and glory, and we have heard something about her educational efforts at the West. If we have little sympathy with Yale, we have less with her and her

friends. So she will please excuse us for not taking up the cudgels against the Professors of Yale College, and the particular association of Protestant ministers she refers to, who are, for aught we know, as respectable as Protestant professors and ministers usually are, and certainly are as estimable, in our judgment, as the Popery-hating "brother" who so signally failed in getting a judgment in favor of his sister.

8. — *Sermons of REV. JOHN KING LORD, late Pastor of the First Orthodox Congregational Church in Cincinnati, Ohio. With an Introductory Notice, by NATHAN LORD, President of Dartmouth College.* Boston: Perkins & Whipple. 1850. 12mo. pp. 414.

THE author of these sermons, a son of the well-known President of Dartmouth College, was a very amiable and intelligent young man, as we can testify from the slight personal acquaintance we had with him, and well calculated to win the love and esteem of all with whom he came in relation, providing they were not repelled by his Puritanism. The Introductory Notice, written by his father, is an affectionate tribute to the memory of a well-beloved son, and is written with true feeling and manly dignity. Of the doctrines of the book we cannot be expected to speak; for they are of course such as we do not approve. But there is an air of earnestness and sincerity in the writings of both father and son that we respect, while the standard of thought is above what we usually look for in Puritan ministers.

9. — *Choice of a State of Life.* By Father C. G. ROSSIGNOLI, S. J. Translated from the French. Published with the Approbation of the Most Rev. Archbishop Eccleston. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1850. 24mo. pp. 232.

THE approbation of his Grace, the Archbishop of Baltimore, is a sufficient guaranty that this is an excellent little book, and we are sure that it will be so regarded by all good judges who read it. The choice of a state of life is a matter of great importance to the young, for it is in the state of life to which God calls us that we can feel the best assurance of our being truly useful, and of receiving the grace necessary to the salvation of our souls; and it is that state, whatever it be, we should always seek, and having found it, we should therewith study to be content. We commend most cordially this little work to the serious study of all our young friends, who are called upon to choose their state of life.

10. — *A New Treatise on the Duty of a Christian towards God. Being an enlarged and improved Version of the Original Treatise written by the Venerable J. B. DE LA SALLE, Founder of the Christian Schools. Translated from the French. By Mrs. J. SADLIER. First American, from the Eighteenth Paris Edition. New York : Sadlier. 1850. 12mo. pp. 324 and 48.*

THE publishers have added to this volume *Prayers at Mass*, and *Rules of Christian Politeness*, which will be found an acceptable addition. We have not seen the work in the original French, and cannot therefore speak of the fidelity of the translation, but from Mrs. Sadlier's reputation as a translator, we presume it to be no less faithful than spirited and tasteful. The work itself is used as a class-book in the Schools of the Christian Brothers in France and Canada, and has been translated at the request of the Christian Brothers for the use of those of their pupils who speak the English language. It is an admirable class-book for instruction in Christian doctrine, and equally admirable for parents who would refresh their own knowledge of their religion, and teach their children their duty to God. We wish it were adopted as a reading-book in all our schools.

The reviewer has no occasion to turn critic in announcing a work so well known and so highly approved as the one before us. We notice, however, some inaccuracies and a few inelegances of style and expression which we trust will be corrected in a second edition. The use of *would* for *should* we have noticed in a few instances. The following sentence, p. 9, is not happily turned: — "The better instructed you are, you will be the firmer in your faith, and the more you study your religion, you will become the more impressed with her divine beauty." This is not in accordance with the English idiom. We should write, — "The better instructed you are, the firmer will be your faith, *or* the more confirmed will you be in your faith, and the more you study your religion, the more will you be impressed with its divine beauty, *or* the more impressed will you become with its divine beauty." These are trifles, but in books intended for the young we always demand great purity, propriety, and elegance of style.

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11. — *The Christian Instructed; or Precepts for Living Christianly in the World.* From the Italian of QUADRIPANI. Boston: J. A. Capes. 1850. 32mo. pp. 154.

12. — *Cassigur of Accabee; a Tale of Ashley River, with other Pieces.* By WILLIAM GILMOUR SIMMS. New York: Putnam. 1849. Small 4to. pp. 112.

13. — *Eight Pieces of Sacred Music, for Four Voices, Soprano, Alto, Tenor, and Bass, with the Accompaniment of the Organ.* Composed and dedicated to the Right Reverend J. B. Fitzpatrick, Bishop of Boston. By A. WERNER, Organist at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross. New York and Boston: D. & J. Sadlier. 1850.
14. — *A Catholic Hymn-Book, designed principally for Catholic Youth.* Second Edition, revised and improved. Boston: J. A. Capes. 1850. 32mo. pp. 127.
15. — *The Little Catholic Hymn-Book; containing a Collection of Hymns, Anthems, &c., for Schools and Private Use, selected from Approved Sources.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 32mo. pp. 128.

* * * With this number we enter upon the eighth volume of this journal, the seventh since it has been devoted to the exposition and defence of the Catholic faith. We have now been in the Church over six years, and we trust that our former friends, who predicted that we should not remain in it six months, are now prepared to give us up as likely to live and die in its communion. We have almost forgotten that we were ever any thing but a Catholic, and find the doctrines and opinions once familiar to us now strange and scarcely recognizable. We find ourselves at home in the Church, and we have no wish or thought that strays beyond it.

We are deeply grateful to the Catholic public, especially to the venerable Bishops and their clergy, for the liberal and charitable support they have thus far rendered us. In reëxamining our journal during the last six years we have found many imperfections, which we would we had been able to avoid, and we are sure that we have by no means deserved the high commendations we have received. Nevertheless, we are conscious of having aimed well, and of having had no peculiar theories, hobbies, or crotchets of our own, and we trust that our short-comings will be, as they have been, charitably regarded. It has never been our intention to be severe or uncourteous in our language; what we have aimed at has been to be orthodox in our doctrine, and bold, manly, and independent in its statement. If we have erred in either respect, we hope we shall be forgiven.

During the greater part of the time we have been conducting this Review we have had to combat latitudinarian and revolutionary tendencies among Catholics, as well as error and heresy outside of the Church. Many *liberal* Catholics have been liberal in their abuse of us, and we have not had the rare fortune to escape being wounded in the house of our friends. But times have changed,

and events have brought about a change in the feelings and tendencies of the great body of those among us who were to some extent carried away by the spirit of the age and country. On all the points on which we gave offence to professed Catholics, the Catholic press of the country has come nobly to our aid, and all the Catholic journals in the country now appear to speak with one heart and one voice. We believe our most painful trials are over, and that in those matters commonly regarded as outside of faith there is now a very strict harmony of thought and feeling between us and our Catholic community generally. No credit is due us for this fact, for, if we understood better than some others the dangerous tendencies tolerated, we were enabled to do so only because we had ourselves more fully than others shared and followed those tendencies, and had at an earlier day been led to see and experience their danger. Moreover, the change has been effected, not by any thing we have said or done, but by the developments that have taken place in the Red Republican and revolutionary movements abroad. Events have verified our predictions, indeed, but they have opened the eyes of those Catholics who were carried away by their generous hatred of oppression and love of popular liberty. For the future we trust with the blessing of God that we shall be able to confine ourselves mainly to attacking the errors without, and to the great work of aiding Catholics to assume in this country that position that will command a respect for their rights, now, alas, too often trampled upon. The Catholic religion has every right to be here, and its right to be here, and to be freely professed, must be practically acknowledged, where we are few, as well as where we are many. The time has come, when we must be one not only in faith and worship, but as citizens; for the time has come when greater efforts than ever will be made by our enemies to crush us. The Catholic community must be consolidated, and regard itself as one community, and as such exert all its moral influence, and exercise all its constitutional and legal rights.

With deep gratitude to the Catholic public for the kindness and forbearance with which it has thus far received our humble efforts, we send forth this number of a new volume with renovated courage and hope, thankful to the Great Head of the Church, that he grants to one so unworthy the inappreciable boon of laboring in his cause. We beg the prayers of our Catholic friends that He not only continue to us the boon, but enable us to labor in his cause to his acceptance and their edification.

Nov 20 1851

Bushnell

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1851.

ART. I. — *God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.

ACCORDING to Dr. Bushnell, the distinction of three persons in the Trinity is not a distinction of persons in God himself, but in his process of revealing himself to us, and the relations which God assumes as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are simply media or instruments of his revelation to us of his own internal character. God is to be regarded as a great dramatist or actor, who assumes or impersonates three distinct characters, in order the better to give us a full and lively sense of his infinite power and resources. Regarded in himself, in his own internal being, or eternal nature, he is not triune, and is trinity only in his revelation. The Trinity, therefore, is not eternal, and depends on the fact that God has chosen to create us, and to make himself known to us.

We need not say how contrary this is to the Christian doctrine, but it is clear from it that the author does not and cannot hold the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, for he denies the Logos, or Word, the Eternal Son of God, the second person in the ever adorable Trinity, to be a Divine Hypostasis, who has assumed human nature, and become incarnate. The Logos, according to him, is not a Divine Hypostasis, but the capacity or faculty of God to express or produce himself outwardly, his generative power of form, his creative imagination, in which, or by aid of

which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite; and the Incarnation is nothing but his representation of himself by virtue of this power in the finite form of man.

“There is in God, taken as the Absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar, — a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite. In this respect, God is wholly unlike to us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colors, and types of words from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now, this Word, this Form of God, in which he sees himself, is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us. Conceive him now as creating the worlds, or creating worlds, if you please, from eternity. In so doing, he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation.

“And it is in this view that the Word, or Logos, elsewhere called Christ, or the Son of God, is represented as the Creator of the worlds. Or it is said, which is only another form of the same truth, that the worlds were made by or through him, and the Apostle John adds, that without him is not any thing made that was made. Now, as John also declares, there was light, the first revelation was made, God was expressed in the forms and relations of the finite. But the light shined in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. The Divine Word was here; he had come to his own, but his own received him not. One thing more is possible that will yield a still more effulgent light, viz. that, as God has produced himself in all the other finite forms of being, so now he should appear in the human.

“Indeed, he has appeared in the human before, in the same way as he has in all the created objects of the world. The human person, taken as a mere structure, adapted to the high uses of intelligence and moral action, is itself a noble illustration of his wisdom, and a token also of the exalted and good purposes cherished in our existence. But there was yet more of God to be exhibited in the Human Form of our race. As the spirit of man is made in the image of God, and his bodily form is prepared to be the fit vehicle and outward representative of his spirit, it follows that his bodily form has also some inherent, *a priori* relation to God's own nature; such probably as makes it the truest, most expressive finite type of

him. Continuing, therefore, in a pure, upright character, our whole race would have been a visible revelation of the truth and beauty of God. But having not thus continued, having come under the power of evil, that which was to be the expression or reflection of God became appropriated to the expression of evil. Truth has no longer any living, unblemished manifestation in the world; the beauty of goodness lives and smiles no more. Sin, prejudice, passion, — stains of every color, — so deface and mar the race, that the face of God, the real glory of the Divine, is visible no longer. Now, therefore, God will reclaim this last type of himself, possess it with his own life and feeling, and through that, live himself into the acquaintance and biographic history of the world. ‘And the word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.’ ‘The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.’ This is Christ whose proper deity or divinity we have proved.” — pp. 145 – 147.

Whatever may be the exact meaning of the author in this passage, it is clear to the veriest tyro in theology that it is not the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The union of the human and Divine asserted in the Christian doctrine is the union of human nature to the eternal Son of God, the second person or Hypostasis of the Trinity, and, of course, is impossible, if there be no such person or Hypostasis. Dr. Bushnell unequivocally denies such Divine person, and he avows that he is in doubt whether the Trinity results from the Incarnation or is merely implied in it. Moreover, he admits no proper Divine personality at all. He does not like to apply the word *person* to God, regarded as Absolute Being. The word for him expresses not an individual substance of rational nature with its last complement, in its last or supreme dignity, but the limitation or circumscription of such nature, and therefore has always a finite sense or signification. Hence God, since he is infinite, must be impersonal, and the term *person* can rightly be applied to him only in some production of himself outwardly in a finite form. Holding this he cannot hold the Christian doctrine; for the Christian doctrine is not that the Divine nature in the Incarnation is united to the human person, or to human nature, so as of the two natures to make but one nature, as the Eutychians falsely held; but the assumption of human nature by the Word or Divine Hypostasis, or the union of human nature to the Divine person, so that there remain two distinct natures in

one person or Divine Hypostasis. Hence the union is always termed by all theologians a hypostatic union, not a union of the human and Divine natures. The author, in denying the Divine Hypostasis, necessarily denies the hypostatic union, and also its very possibility.

The author, supposing him not to deny the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation outright, completely removes it. The Incarnation he contends for is the Divine nature entering into human nature, and becoming subject to all the accidents, limitations, and evils of the human person. The Divine nature lowers itself to the human, and, in fact, becomes human nature. Instead of taking human nature up to himself, and giving it the dignity of his own Divine person, God descends to its level, and becomes or makes himself a human person, and incorporates himself into "the biographic history of the world." This is the author's doctrine, and, unhappily, he does not stand alone. It is the dominant heresy of Protestant Germany, especially of the school founded in opposition to Paulus and Bretschneider by Schleiermacher and De Wette; we find it distinctly avowed in the publications of the Mercersburg School in Pennsylvania, and we are greatly mistaken if we do not detect some obscure traces of it in Moehler's *Symbolik* and Mr. Newman's *Essay on Development*. In its principle, that God produces himself outwardly in finite forms, it underlies the modern doctrines of progress and socialism, and may be regarded as, in fact, the grand heresy of the nineteenth century. It contains the seminal principle of the original heresy of the Gentiles, which resulted in the various forms of heathen idolatry, and its prevalence must pave the way for the restoration of ancient Gentilism, which it cost Christianity the blood of so many martyrs to supplant.

The belief in one God is older than polytheism, and the worship of the true God was known and observed ages before the fall of the nations into idolatry. Idolatry is of a far later birth than is commonly imagined, and it does not seem to have become general till about the call of Abraham, if indeed at so early a date. Idolatrous Gentilism, like every heresy, was a corruption of the true religion handed down by tradition, and evidently grew out of the particular corruption of the true doctrine of creation, which asserts that creation is God outwardly producing

himself, that he may and does produce himself outwardly in finite forms, and subject himself to the limitations of finite persons and objects, and that so produced he is still the proper object of worship, — the peculiar doctrine of Dr. Bushnell. Once admit this doctrine, and you admit the seminal principle of all polytheism and heathen idolatry. The doctrine is pure pantheism, and polytheism is always pantheism with the learned, as we may see in Xenophanes of Elea, in Plato, and in the philosophers of India, ancient and modern, and is the assertion of a real plurality of gods only with the vulgar; and pantheism can no more be asserted and maintained by the learned now, without becoming polytheism and idolatry with the vulgar, than it could in ancient times. It is a grave mistake to suppose that polytheism grew out of hero worship, or the deification of individual persons or objects. Hero worship, or the deification of individuals, is the consequence of the universal deification of nature, or of regarding universal nature as the self-production of God in finite forms, which is pantheism.

The fundamental error asserted by Dr. Bushnell assumes, in our day, two apparently opposite forms, but both lead to idolatry as their inevitable result. One form is that which he himself more especially insists upon; namely, that the Incarnation is simply God producing himself outwardly in a finite form, or in a human person. This he connects with the more general doctrine, that creation is nothing but God's production or expression of himself in finite forms. These forms, that is, what we call external things, being **nothing** but God outwardly produced, must be God, and the author cannot deny it, for God's supposed production of himself in the finite form of the human person he expressly calls God, and maintains, as such, to be a proper object of divine worship. Here, then, is the entire universe, taken collectively and distributively, deificated, and represented as worthy to be worshipped as God. This is all that Gentilism could ever ask, whether viewed from the point of view of pantheism or from that of polytheism. The other form in which the same heresy manifests itself is, that, in the Incarnation, the Son did not assume individual human nature, human nature *in individuo*, but human nature *in specie*, in the species, and thus entered into hypostatic union with all the individuals of the race, and

became the person or hypostasis of all men. Something like this appears to have been in the mind of the late editor of *The New York Churchman*, and which led him to reject baptismal regeneration, and maintain that infants dying without baptism can enjoy the beatific vision, and it is maintained, directly or indirectly, by the great body of those who call themselves Christian Socialists. Some, however, modify it, and hold that the assumption of human nature was actual only in the individual nature assumed by our Lord in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, and only potential *in specie*, becoming actual in each individual only as he becomes a believer. This appears to be the doctrine of Dr. Nevin of the *Mercersburg Review*, and we have met something resembling it in the writings of some recent converts. We do not assert positively that any of our recent converts, several of whom we find much commended for the new light they are supposed to have thrown on the mystery of the Incarnation and the proper mode of defending the worship of saints, and veneration of relics and images, do actually maintain this doctrine; but some of them certainly have not taken sufficient precautions against being understood to do so, as we could easily prove from an article on the veneration of images, contributed by one of them to a late number of our own *Review*, and which we find on reëxamination susceptible of a dangerous interpretation. If we assert the worship of saints, on the ground that human nature in the saints has been assumed by our Lord, we convert it into pure idolatry, because we then worship them, not as saints, but as gods; and if we venerate relics and images on the ground that God, in assuming human nature, assumed and deificated matter, we are evidently idolaters. To undertake to defend us from the charge of idolatry on such a ground would be only to confirm the charge itself. We worship the saints for what they are, that is, sanctified men and women, not as gods, nor with the worship due to God; and we venerate relics and images, not for any divinity, sanctity, or worth they possess in themselves, but for the divinity, sanctity, or worth to which they are related, and it is only as so related that we venerate them at all. To worship or venerate them or the saints themselves as deificated or really united hypostatistically to God, as we worship the humanity of our Lord, would be pure idolatry; for we should then pay them di-

vine worship. We worship, indeed, the Son as we do the Father, and in his humanity as well as in his Divinity, because in worshipping him we worship his person, which includes both, and because in him the two natures are united, not only in one person, but in one Divine person, who is truly and properly God as well as man. We can never worship any saint, not even the Blessed Mother of God, for the same reason or with the same worship, for human nature in all others, however closely it may be united to the person of Christ through his grace, is united by adoption, not hypostatically, and retains always its own proper human person.

The error we are considering in either of its forms is in our day exceedingly dangerous, because it chimes in with the spirit of the age, and seems to authorize the assertion of the favorite doctrines of progress or development, and the Divinity of humanity, justifying at once Dr. Channing and Pierre Leroux. But, be this as it may, the view it takes of the Incarnation is evidently not the Christian view. The Christian doctrine is, that the human nature assumed by our Lord was individual human nature, and that, in assuming it, he did not enter into it and become a human person, but took it up to himself and gave it his own Divine person as its suppositum or hypostasis. Christ was, indeed, in the form of man, for he was perfect man as well as perfect God, and the human nature he assumed had in the assumption its proper form, and must have had it, or it would have been only a possible, not a real, human nature. But he was not in the *person* of man, that is, was not a human person; for the human nature he assumed was no person, had no human personality. Otherwise there would have been no real assumption of human nature, but a simple adoption. The last complement, the supreme dignity of human nature, that which makes human nature a person, was supplied in the individual human nature assumed by the Divine person of the Son, so that the Divine Hypostasis, or Eternal Son of God, truly and properly God, became the person of the human, as he was, is, and always will be of the Divine nature. This is precisely what is meant by the assumption of human nature, or the Incarnation. Christ is not a human person; nor is he the union of two persons in one nature; but he is the union of two for ever distinct natures in one person, and

that one person, which is the supreme dignity of the Divine nature, and which takes, in regard to the human nature assumed, the place of the last complement or supreme dignity of that nature, is God. In the Incarnation it is not the Divine nature that loses its personality, but the human nature that gains, instead of its own, the Divine personality. God retains in the Incarnation his own Divine person as the one person of the two for ever distinct natures, and is no more under a finite form as incarnated than as not incarnated. He loses, he gains, nothing; it is the human nature assumed that gains. It is modified and singularly elevated by receiving a Divine instead of the human personality; but God, but the Divine person, remains unchanged, unaffected, immutable, in all the fulness, majesty, and glory of his own eternal and incommunicable Divinity.

Moreover, Dr. Bushnell, notwithstanding his reasonings against Unitarians, really asserts no Incarnation at all. He places in the same line the fact he calls the Incarnation and the fact he calls creation, and makes the two facts substantially identical. He understands by the Incarnation, God's production of himself outwardly in a human form or human person, and by creation he understands God's producing himself outwardly in finite forms. In creating, he says, "he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself." "One thing more is possible, that, as God has produced himself in all the other finite forms of being, so now he should appear in the human." His appearance in the human can then only mean, if the author admits creation at all, his creation of the human form of being, that is, creating or making a man, in like manner as he has made all the other finite forms of being, or created things. The Incarnation then means nothing but God's creation of the human person, which is manifestly no incarnation at all.

We do not misapprehend or misrepresent the author. He himself says, God "has appeared in the human before, in the same way as he has in all the created objects of the world." He establishes no difference in the kind or quality of his second appearance or reappearance in the human form, from that of his first appearance in, or simple creation of, the human form. It may have a different purpose, but it establishes no new relations between him and

human nature, and therefore only the relations of creator and creature. The Unitarian will find no difficulty in acknowledging all the Incarnation there is here, but his good sense will prevent him from calling such an appearance in the human form by the name of incarnation, and he will tell Dr. Bushnell that he would have done much better to have used plain and simple terms, and contented himself with calling things by their right names.

The passage extracted conclusively proves, however, that the author does not in reality admit even so much as creation, and that he is really, whether he knows it or not, a pantheist. This is evident from his defining the creative power of God to be simply the power of self-production, self-expression, or self-exhibition, in finite forms, which forms are his own eternal Logos. "But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God." These forms are eternally in God, therefore are God, for whatever is in God is God. Hence, in creating, God, as the author expressly states, "only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation." God expressed or produced in these finite forms is God, and it is precisely on the principle that God so expressed, that is, the finite expression of God, is God, that our author asserts that Christ is God, and undertakes to prove the proper Divinity of the Son against Unitarians. So creation is not God producing or creating external forms or things distinguishable from himself, but the mere exhibition of himself in the finite forms which he has in himself, that is to say, in the inherent forms of his own being. If this be not pantheism, we know not what is.

Dr. Bushnell is misled by his Platonism. That the essential forms of things, *ideas* in the language of Plato, are in God, and are God, is no doubt true; but as in him, as forms or ideas in the Divine mind, they are not things, but the eternal types, exemplars, or possibilities of things, which God may create, or not, as he chooses. The created thing or existence is not the idea, or God simply expressed in a finite form, as Plato seems to have held, but a thing created from nothing, after the idea as its original type or model, and requires between itself as an actual existence and its idea in the Divine mind the intervention of the

Divine creative act. No doubt God expresses his intelligence, wisdom, power, and goodness in creation, and no doubt all created things are an expression, manifestation, or revelation of the Divine Being and attributes, but only in the sense in which the cause expresses itself in the effect, or the effect manifests the cause. If the author means that what is called creation is a revelation of God only in this sense, he says what is very true, but what is little to his purpose; for then he must call our Lord a creature, and cannot maintain his proper Divinity as he professes to do. If he means that it is a revelation or outward production of God in any other sense, he cannot escape pantheism.

We regret the necessity of so frequently preferring this grave charge of pantheism against those whose doctrines we are obliged to controvert; but the fact is, that all modern philosophy is pantheistic, when not openly and avowedly atheistic. Pantheistic principles impregnate the whole atmosphere of the modern world, and are drawn in with our very breath; we adopt them as naturally as we breathe. In the great body of the people they are comparatively innocuous, for they remain without development, inoperative, and unsuspected. But in the cultivated few, in the scholars and theorizers, they are active, and produce the most fatal results. It is therefore necessary to expose and to do our best to expel them wherever and whenever we chance to meet them. We have no belief that Dr. Bushnell intends to be, or believes that he is, a pantheist; we fully believe him to be unaware of the dangerous tendency of the principles he adopts; but his writings are none the less dangerous on that account, and all his difficulties and perplexities, all his confusion and apparent contradictions of himself, his rejection of logic and appeal to feeling, his efforts to reason against reason, and to get a religion for the affections as distinguished from a religion for the intellect, grow out of the fact that he has adopted pantheistic principles, and is trying to explain in accordance with them the teachings of religion and the dictates of common sense. There is no possible way, humanly speaking, of setting him right, and enabling him to return to Christian orthodoxy, but by pointing out to him this fact, and making him aware that all his peculiar doctrines have a pantheistic basis.

But we proceed to consider the author's view of "the

difficulties created by the supposed relations of the Divine to the human in the person of Jesus."

"Under the relations of the Divine to the human, we meet the objection, first of all, that here is an incarnation asserted of the Divine nature ; that God, the infinite God, is represented as dwelling in a finite human person, subject to its limitations and even to its evils ; and this is incredible, — an insult to reason. It may be so, and if it is, we must reject the doctrine. But we notice, while revolving this objection, that several other religions have believed or expected an incarnation of their deity, or the divine principle of their worship ; and that these have been the most speculative and cultivated forms of false religion. If, then, whole nations of mankind, comprising thinkers, scholars, and philosophers, have been ready to expect, or have actually believed in, the incarnation of their god or highest divinity, it would not seem to be wholly cross to natural reason to believe in such an event. On the contrary, we are rather to suspect that some true instinct or conscious want of the race is here divining, so to speak, that blessed visitation, by which God shall some time vouchsafe to give himself to the world." — pp. 148, 149.

The reason here assigned why the author's view is not to be regarded as unreasonable, is a bad one. That several other religions have believed or expected an incarnation of their deity, is true enough ; but this no more proves that such an incarnation as the author asserts is not "cross to reason," than the fact that the whole gentile world in former times were, and that the greater part of mankind even in modern times are, idolaters, proves that idolatry is "not cross to reason." The fact that all, or nearly all, religions which have been, and are, assert the Incarnation in some sense, either as accomplished, or to be accomplished, is good evidence that the Incarnation, in some sense, is either a dictate of reason or a doctrine of primitive revelation preserved in universal tradition ; but it is no evidence as to the reasonableness of the Incarnation, either in the author's sense, or in the sense of the several religions he refers to. The universal prevalence or expectation of the Incarnation, we agree with the author, is an indication of some want of our nature that demands it, or at least of some promise made in the primitive age by our God, and preserved by tradition, that he would, at some time, give himself to the world, as he had not done in creating it.

The objection to the author's view of the Incarnation is

well put by himself. "Here is an incarnation asserted of the Divine nature; that God, the infinite God, is represented as dwelling in a finite human person, subject to its limitations, and even to its evils; and this is incredible, — an insult to reason." We say as much, and even more; we say, such an incarnation is absolutely impossible. The Divine nature is not, so to speak, incarnable, for it is Divine, and not human. God can create human nature, but he cannot with all his omnipotence make his own nature human, that is, make his own Divine and uncreated essence a creature. The infinite God, that is, the infinite Divine nature, cannot dwell in a finite human person, that is, be assumed by the human person, and be subject to its limitations and even its evils; for this would suppose that man assumes the Divine nature, and that the human person becomes person or hypostasis of God, which is absurd. Person is a term of higher dignity than nature. The nature wanting personality is below person, for it wants its last complement, its supreme dignity. The finite, then, can never be the person of the infinite; therefore the human person, confessedly finite, can never be the person of the Divine nature, which is infinite. The lower cannot be above the higher, and the infinite nature of God is certainly higher than the finite human person. Then the Divine nature cannot be under it, or be subject to its limitations. The infinite God in his Divinity cannot be subject to any limitations, because he cannot cease to be infinite, since he is necessary being, and cannot make himself other than he is, and it is of the very essence of the infinite to be free from all limitation.

In vain does the author with his view of the Incarnation attempt to defend it against Unitarians, for as he represents it, it is absolutely indefensible. But his view is not orthodox, as we have seen. He errs in asserting that the Divine *nature* is incarnated, and incarnated in a finite human person. The Divine nature is not incarnated, but the Divine *person*, that is, the Son, the second person of the Trinity; and the Incarnation is not in the Divine person's becoming subject to the limitations and evils of the human person, but in his taking human nature up to himself and giving it the dignity of his own infinite person. The human nature is raised to the dignity of the Divine person, not the Divine nature lowered to the abjectness of the human person. This is the Christian doctrine, and against

this doctrine, however much it may surpass all human comprehension, reason can frame no objection.

The author continues his defence against Unitarians.

“But the human person, it will be said, is limited, and God is not. Very true. But you have the same objection in reference to the first revelation, the Word in the world. This also is limited, — at least what you have known of it is limited; besides, you have a special delight in seeing God in the smallest things, the minutest specks of being. If, then, it be incredible that God should take the human to express himself, because the human is finite, can the finite in the world, or in a living atom, express him more worthily, or do it more accordantly with reason?

“But Christ, you will say, perhaps, is a living, intelligent person. Taking him, therefore, as a person, I must view him under the measures and limitations of a person. Very true, if you have a right to measure the contents of his person by his body; which, possibly, you have no more right to do than you have to measure God, as revealed in any object, by the object that reveals him. For it no more follows that a human body measures God, when revealed through it, than that a star, a tree, or an insect measures him, when he is revealed through that. As regards the interior nature of Christ, or the composition of his person, we perhaps know nothing; and if his outward nature represents an unknown quantity, it may, for aught that appears, represent an infinite quantity. A finite outward person, too, may as well be an organ or type of the Infinite, as a finite thing or object; and God may act a human personality, without being measured by it, as well as to shine through a finite thing or a world, without being measured by that.” — pp. 151, 152.

“The human person is limited, and God is not. Very true.” How then can you represent the Divinity as subject to the limitations of the human person, that is, as a human person, for this is your meaning, if you understand yourself? “But you have the same objection in reference to the first revelation, the Word in the world.” Conceded, and therefore we do not admit the Word to be in the world in the sense you contend. Your answer will not pass, for its principle is denied. God is no more incarnated in the world than in a human person, and you are not at liberty to contend that an objection to one of your doctrines is good for nothing, because it is equally an objection to some other doctrine you may hold; for it may be a valid objection to both. “A finite outward person may as well be an organ or type of the Infinite, as a finite thing or object.” Unquestionably.

But how can a finite thing or object be itself an organ or type of the infinite? Dr. Bushnell is a bad theologian, but unhappily a worse philosopher. He mistakes entirely the character of God's immanence in his works. No doubt God is intimately present to all created things, and immanent in them, but not present or immanent as the subject in which they inhere, or as their substance, so that they are to be regarded as phenomena of his own Divine substance or being, as Spinoza dreamed, which were pure pantheism. He is intimately present and immanent solely as their cause or creator, and is distinct from them as the cause is distinct from the effect. It is neglecting this distinction, and regarding God as the universal and only substance, and creatures simply as phenomenal, that is, simply as appearances, manifestations, exhibitions of the Divine substance or being, that causes our author to fall into his numerous and fatal errors. He entirely mistakes the fact of creation, and confounds it virtually with emanation, as do nearly all our American and German theologians.

"Taking" Christ "as a person, I must view him under the measures and limitations of a person." Certainly you must, if you take him as a *human* person; but what right have you to take him as a human person? You have no right to assume that *person* is always measured and limited; the word *person* does not express the limitation or circumscription of rational nature, as you strangely fancy, but that nature in its completeness and supreme dignity, as we never cease to remind you, and therefore may apply to God as well as to man, and, since God is infinite, unlimited, be infinite as well as finite. Dr. Bushnell seems to have no knowledge of the meaning of the word *person* as used by philosophers and theologians. He appears to understand by it outward appearance, as when it is said of some one, "He is a portly *person*," or "has an imposing *person*."

Several other difficulties the author objects to himself and attempts to dispose of, which we regard as real difficulties in his way; but as they bear solely against his false representation of the doctrine in question, we need not follow him in his efforts to remove them. His difficulties are not, he is aware, with Unitarians alone. He cannot accept the Orthodox doctrine of the two natures in Christ. Here we must allow him to speak for himself, at some length.

“ But the history of Christ, it will be said, compels us to go farther. We cannot look at the external person of Christ on the one hand, and the Absolute Jehovah on the other, and regard the former simply as a representative or expression of the other. Christ, says the Unitarian, obeys, worships, suffers, and in that manner shows most plainly that his internal nature is under a limitation; therefore he is human only. Then the common Trinitarian replies, Your argument is good; therefore we assert a human soul in the person of Jesus, which comes under these limitations, while the Divine soul escapes; and so we save the Divinity unharmed and unabridged.

“ Answering the latter first, I reply that, in holding such a theory of Christ’s obedience and sufferings, he does an affront to the plain language of Scripture. For the Scripture does not say that a certain human soul called Jesus, born as such of Mary, obeyed and suffered; but it says in the boldest manner, that he who was in the form of God humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. A declaration, the very point of which is, not that the man Jesus was a being under human limitations, but that he who was in the Form of God, the real Divinity, came into the finite, and was subject to human conditions. Then, again, Christ himself declared, not that a human soul, hid in his person, was placed under limitations, but more; — that the Son, that is, the Divine person, — for the word *Son* is used as relative to the Father, — the Son can do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father do; for the Father loveth the Son and sheweth him all things that himself doeth. He also prays, — ‘ O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory that I had with thee before the world was,’ — a prayer which cannot be referred to the human soul, even if there was a human soul hid in his person; for that soul could speak of no glory it once had with the Father. Hence the supposition of a human soul existing distinctly, and acting by itself, clears no difficulty; for the Son, the Divine part, or, I should rather say, the whole Christ, is still represented as humbled, as weak, as divested of glory, and existing under limitations or conditions that do not belong to Deity.

“ Besides, this theory of two distinct subsistences, still maintaining their several kinds of action in Christ, — one growing, learning, obeying, suffering; the other infinite and impassible, — only creates difficulties a hundredfold greater than any that it solves. It virtually denies any real unity between the human and the Divine, and substitutes collocation or copartnership for unity. If the Divine part were residing in Saturn, he would be as truly united with the human race as now. Instead of a person whose nature is the real unity of the Divine and the human, we have two distinct persons, between whom our thoughts are continually alternating; referring

this to one, that to the other, and imagining, all the while, not a union of the two, in which our possible union with God is signified and sealed for ever, but a practical, historical assertion rather of his incommunicableness, thrust upon our notice, in a form more oppressive and chilling than it has to abstract thought. Meantime the whole work of Christ, as a subject, suffering Redeemer, is thrown upon the human side of his nature, and the Divine side, standing thus aloof, incommunicably distant, has nothing, in fact, to do with the transaction, other than to be a spectator of it. And then, while we are moved to ask of what so great consequence to us, or to the government of God, can be the obedience and suffering of this particular man Jesus, more than of any other, it is also represented, as part of the same general scheme, that he is, after all, scarcely more than a mere nominal man, — that he is so removed from the fortunes and the proper trial of a man, by the proximity of the Divine, as not even to unfold a human character! And thus, while the redemption even of the world is hung upon his human possibilities, he is shown, as a man, to have probably less of human significance than any other; to be a man whose character is not in himself, but in the custody that keeps him from being himself!

“There is, then, I conclude, no solid foundation for the common Trinitarian theory of two distinct or distinctly active subsistences in the person of Christ. It is not Scriptural. It accounts for nothing. It only creates even greater difficulties. Indeed, it is a virtual denial, we should say, of that which is, in one view, the summit or highest glory of the Incarnation, viz. the union signified, and historically begun, between God and man.” — pp. 153 – 156.

Dr. Bushnell is very much in error if he supposes that, in denying two subsistences in Christ, he denies any thing Christian theology asserts in asserting that the two natures, the human and the Divine, are hypostatically united in him. The assertion of two subsistences in Christ is to assert two suppositums or persons, a human and a Divine hypostasis, which is not the Catholic dogma, but the Nestorian heresy. The Catholic dogma is that Christ is one person, one suppositum, hypostasis, or subsistence, and that in this one person subsist, for ever distinct, but inseparable, the two natures, the human and the Divine; so that he is not two persons or two subsistences, but two natures subsisting in one person. The author confounds nature with suppositum, or subsistence, and we are inclined to suspect that his Protestant Trinitarian friends generally do the same, and by the two natures really understand two subsistences, that is, two persons, for they nearly all shrink from calling

the Blessed Virgin the Mother of God. If so, they have lapsed into the Nestorian heresy, and Dr. Bushnell is pardonable, so far as they are concerned, for attempting to refute the doctrine of two subsistences in Christ; but he is not pardonable for undertaking to refute it as the "common Trinitarian" doctrine, or for confounding it with the doctrine of two natures in one Christ.

As against two subsistences in Christ, in our sense of the word *subsistence*, what the author says in the passage cited is conclusive and unanswerable; but as against the doctrine of two distinct natures subsisting in one person, what we suppose he really means to deny, it has no force, no bearing at all. To suppose in Christ two subsistences or persons, and we must suppose two persons if we suppose two subsistences, is not only to disregard the whole language of the New Testament bearing on the subject, but to deny the Incarnation itself, and all real union of the human and Divine; for person is incommunicable. The person of the Father is not the person of the Son, the person of the Son is not that of the Father. The Divine nature is common to each of the three persons, all and entire, undivided, indivisible, indistinguished, and indistinguishable under each one of them; but the three persons in their personality are distinct from one another, and one can never be another. There is and can be no assumption of one person by another. If we suppose two persons, one human and the other Divine, in Christ, we dissolve him, we deny all hypostatic union, and can at best say, not that the Word assumed flesh, but that the Son of God adopted the man Jesus, in which case the relation between the human and the Divine, between the Son of God and the son of Mary, would be only that which is between God and believers or sanctified persons in general. Such a supposition, the author says truly, virtually "denies any real unity between the human and the Divine, and substitutes collocation or copartnership for unity." It, as he also very properly maintains, solves no difficulty, and in fact creates new and greater difficulties. But it is a gross error to suppose that the doctrine of two distinct natures subsisting in the one person of Christ necessarily implies that of two subsistences; for two natures may without implying any contradiction have only one subsistence.

The Scripture does not say that a certain human soul

called Jesus, born as such of Mary, obeyed and suffered, but, in the boldest manner, that "he who was in the form of God humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." Certainly; and so do we. But the Scripture in saying this does not say, that the Divinity, or Christ *secundum divinitatem suam*, thus obeyed and suffered. The Son of God humbled himself in assuming into union with himself so abject a thing as human nature; but in his Divine nature he could not obey or suffer, because the Divine nature is supreme and impassible. Certain it is that the Scriptures represent uniformly Christ as one person, subsistence, or suppositum; but they also affirm things of him which are affirmable only of God, and others which are affirmable only of man, and not at all affirmable of the Divine nature. Here is the fact. But how is it possible that this should be the fact, if it be not true, that in the unity of his person subsist the two natures, the Divine and the human, and that some things he does *secundum divinitatem suam*, and others he does or suffers *secundum humanitatem suam*?

The Scriptures certainly predicate of Christ as one person or suppositum indifferently divine things and human things. Christ calls himself at one time the Son of God, and at another, the Son of man. He is in heaven and on the earth, in the form of God and the form of a servant; he is in the bosom of the Father, — who hath seen him hath seen the Father; is the Son of God, — whatever he seeth the Father do he doeth; is the Word that was in the beginning, that was with God, and that was God, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made; and yet he was born of woman, was an infant, grew in stature, eat and drank, was exposed to cold and heat, to hunger and thirst, subject to all the infirmities of the flesh, sin excepted, — was of the seed of Abraham, tempted, a man of sorrows and stricken with grief, obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Here are two classes of things predicated alike of Christ, but which cannot be both predicated either of the Divine nature or of the human. The author himself professes to maintain the proper Divinity of Christ, and to defend it against Unitarians, and his proper Divinity is as clearly asserted by the sacred Scriptures as any thing can be. St. John represents him as saying, "For as the Father hath life in himself, so

hath he given to the Son also to have life in himself." * None but God, the eternal and ever-living God, hath or can have life in himself; for all except God that exists is creature, and the characteristic of creature is not to have life in itself, but to depend for it on its creator. Christ, then, since he hath life in himself, as the Father hath life in himself, must be truly and properly God, and consubstantial to the Father, and in his Divine essence indistinguishable from him. On the other hand, the Scriptures with equal clearness declare that this same Christ is truly and properly man. "The Word was made flesh," — *Verbum caro factum est.*† "Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that dissolveth Jesus is not of God," or, as the Protestant version has it, "every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God."‡ And, again, "Many seducers are gone out into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh; this is a seducer and an Antichrist."§ There is no cavilling here on the word *flesh*; it means, as all Unitarians contend, that Jesus Christ was truly and properly *man*, as is otherwise proved by the fact that he was born of woman, lived, suffered, and died as a man.

Now how can Christ be true God and true man, unless there is in his own subsisting person the distinction of two natures? The two are predicated alike in Scripture of him as one subsisting person; but it is impossible, in the very nature of things, that Christ should be God in the respect that he is man, or man in the respect that he is God. It will not do here to allege a miracle or a mystery, as our author seems inclined to do, though both miracle and mystery there are. Neither miracle nor mystery is admissible against reason, and the miracle or mystery here, if we deny the two natures, would be *against* reason, not merely *above* it. We must either deny the Divinity or humanity of Christ, or else admit the two natures, the human and Divine, in him, without admitting two subsistences. The author himself seems to be aware of this, for he says farther on, — "I only deny that his human soul or nature is to be spoken of or looked upon as having a *distinct* sub-

* St. John v. 26.

† 1 St. John v. 2, 3.

‡ Ibid. i. 14.

§ 2 St. John 7.

sistence, so as to live, think, learn, worship, suffer, by itself. Disclaiming all thought of denying or affirming any thing as regards the interior composition or construction of his person, I insist that he stands before us in simple unity, one person, the Divine-human, representing the qualities of his double parentage as the Son of God and the son of Mary." (p. 163.)

If the author had or could be supposed to have any clear and well-defined system of his own to which he could be logically held, we should say that, in order to escape Nestorianism, or two subsistences in Christ, he falls into Eutychianism, that asserts the two natures after the Incarnation became fused into one nature. But he is so confused in his own views, so loose and inaccurate in his expressions, that there is no use in attempting to hold him strictly to any thing. He disdains consistency, and sneers at logic. He begins by affirming or denying, and ends by saying that he neither affirms nor denies. He confounds in the outset nature and subsistence, and concludes, because there cannot be two subsistences in Christ, there cannot be two natures. But finding that, if he denies the two natures, he must say that Christ is either God alone or man alone, and thus lose the Incarnation, he adds that he only means to deny that the human nature in Christ is a distinct subsistence. Well, this looks like something; but if he stops here he will be obliged to agree with orthodox theologians. So he starts off anew, and says, "Without a thought of denying or affirming any thing of the interior composition or construction of his person, I insist that he stands before us in simple unity, one person, the Divine-human, representing the qualities of his double parentage as Son of God and as son of Mary." That is, I will not affirm or deny that two and two are four, but I insist that they are more than three and less than five! If the author really means to deny the two subsistences, and to assert Christ as at once Divine and human, he must either concede the two natures in the sense of orthodox theologians, or else fall into the Monophysite heresy; for these are the only alternatives left him. Which one does he take? As he protests against the two natures under the name of two subsistences, he must be supposed to take the latter, and to hold that Christ is one Divine-human nature in one Divine-human person. But this latter is not maintainable, as the author would perceive

if he did not confound in his own mind person and nature. It is not the orthodox doctrine, for that declares, as may be learned from the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, that the two natures, *post incarnationem*, did not become one nature, but remained and for ever remain two distinct natures subsisting in one suppositum, hypostasis, or person. Then, as we have seen, the human and Divine are naturally distinct, and therefore cannot be united in one nature; because such union would demand the destruction of the form of each, and therefore the annihilation of both. The formation of a new nature out of the two which shall be neither, and yet retain the characteristic qualities of both, is metaphysically impossible, for nature, as such, is always incommunicable. Quality implies a subject. What sort of subject is that nature in which inhere both Divine and human qualities? Is it created? Then it has no properly Divine qualities. Is it uncreated? Then it can have no proper human qualities. Is it neither? But what is neither uncreated nor created is nothing, for nothing is or exists but Uncreated Creator and Creature. Is it both created and uncreated? That is impossible, for nothing can be and not be at the same time. The author would do well to consult the categories or predicaments at which he sneers, apparently because ignorant of their importance.

It is impossible to conceive a subject which is neither created nor uncreated, which is neither God nor man, and which, nevertheless, is at once, and in one and the same sense, both. Nothing, then, remains but the assertion of two distinct natures subsisting in one suppositum or person, as does Christian theology. According to Christian theology, Christ is true God and true man, because he is the one suppositum, hypostasis, or person of both the Divine nature and of the human nature subsisting in him. We may, therefore, predicate alike of him, as the Scriptures uniformly do, things which pertain properly to the Divine nature and things which pertain properly to human nature, though we must predicate them in diverse respects. Divine things are predicable of him in the respect that he is Son of God, the second person of the ever-blessed Trinity, and human things in the respect that he is the suppositum or person of the human nature he assumed. As Son of God, or Divine Hypostasis, he includes under him, as we have seen,

the whole Divine nature, which, since it is most simple, indivisible, and indistinguishable, is common to each of the three Divine persons: and, as he himself undergoes no change in assuming human nature, or becoming incarnate, — for the *becoming* or change is on the part of the nature assumed, not on the part of the person assuming, — there is not and cannot be the least impropriety in predicating of him all that is predicable of God or the Divine nature. Being at the same time the suppositum of the human nature assumed, and as that nature loses nothing, but gains in perfection, by being assumed, or having a Divine instead of a human suppositum, there can be just as little impropriety in predicating of him all that belongs to perfect man.

Human and Divine things are predicable of Christ, not in a figurative or representative sense, as the author vainly labors to persuade us, but really, truly, and in the strictest and most literal sense; because he is, in the strictest sense of the words, both God and man, not in the blending, intermixing, or confusion of the two natures, but in their distinctiveness, as the one simple suppositum of the two. We say *one simple suppositum*; it is true, that, considered as the suppositum of both natures, he is composite person, but regarded intrinsically in himself he is simple, not the union of two persons, but strictly and indistinguishably one. As the one suppositum of the two natures, whatsoever Christ does, whether by virtue of the one nature or the other, it is he himself in the unity and simplicity of his person, not *it*, that does it. Nature as abstracted from its suppositum is and can be the subject of no predicates, for so abstracted it does not and cannot exist. Nothing lives, moves, acts, or suffers in the abstract. Nature to do, or to suffer, must be concrete, have its suppositum, and the doing or suffering, though impossible without nature, is predicable solely of the nature in its suppositum. As the suppositum in Christ is the same for both natures, whatever is done or suffered by him is done or suffered by one and the same suppositum. He is God, because he is a Divine person or suppositum, and in God the suppositum or person is not separable from the Divine nature; he is man, because he has perfect human nature, and is in his one suppositum its suppositum. The whole mystery of the Incarnation is precisely here, in the Divine person so assuming to himself human nature as to be its suppositum, its person, its last

complement, and supreme dignity. How this can be, we do not know; that it is we do know; and it being so, we can and do understand that Christ is man as well as God, and being God and man, we do and can understand that Divine and human things are strictly and literally predicable of him.

We predicate Divine and human things alike of Christ, but not alike of him as the suppositum of either nature. Yet here we do not dissolve Christ, lose the unity of his person, and suppose a Divine Christ, who is the Creator of the worlds, who is God of God, true God of true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial to the Father, who became incarnate for our sakes, and a human Christ who was assumed, who was born of Mary, who increased in stature, who was obedient, and who suffered, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, was dead and buried, descended into hell, and the third day rose again from the dead, ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of the Father, and thence shall come again. Christ is one Christ, one person, and there is no Divine Christ distinguishable from the human, and no human Christ distinguishable from the Divine. The humanity of Christ has no suppositum, never had any suppositum, separate or distinct from the one Divine suppositum of the Word made flesh. It never existed, and never could exist, save as assumed by the Word, for the Word did not assume a human person, or a previously subsisting human nature, but a human nature, so to speak, created *ad hoc*, expressly to be assumed by the Word; otherwise there would have been no assumption, but, as we have said, simply adoption. What we say is, not that the Divine nature of Christ did this, the human nature of Christ suffered that, but that Christ did this in his Divine nature included under his Divine suppositum, and Christ suffered that in his human nature included under the same suppositum.

The pretence of the author, that this dissolves the person of Christ and implies that there were two subsistences in him, is unfounded. It no more does this, than to say that I perform some acts through my material nature and others through my rational nature dissolves my personality, and implies that I have two subsisting natures, or, in the barbarous language of modern philosophy, two *mes*. Certainly there is an essential distinction between purely rational

nature and *concupiscentia*, or sensitive nature. And there are existences, such as angels, who have the former without the latter, because they are spirits without body ; but still, as the one rational soul is in me the one suppositum or person of the two natures, the acts I perform through either are alike my acts in the unity of my rational soul, and what I suffer through concupiscence, it is I that suffer it. We do not propose this as an exact parallel throughout, but it is sufficiently analogous to show that what we affirm of Christ does not necessarily imply a dissolution of the unity of his person, or that there are in him two subsistences, the one Divine, the other human, because there are two natures.

Let it be understood, then, that Christ in his Divinity and in his humanity is one Christ, one person, and that whatever is affirmed of him is and should be affirmed of him as one. There is, then, no boldness in the Scripture's saying that he who was in the form of God humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross ; for it does but express the plain, simple fact. He who was in the form of God was born of woman, and therefore the Council of Ephesus defines the Blessed Virgin Mary to be *Θεοτόκος*, or Mother of God, and therefore we say, and say truly, that he who was in the form of God, that is, God himself, suffered and died for us on the cross. Not that he was born in his Divinity, not that he died in his Divine nature, for in that he was before all worlds, from all eternity, immortal and impassible ; but in his human nature, which was from the moment of Incarnation as truly his nature as was the Divine nature, and therefore what he became, did, or suffered in that nature, it was as truly he, therefore as truly God, who became, did, or suffered it, as it would have been had he become, did, or suffered it in his Divine nature.

The very prayer of our Lord, which the author cites as a proof against the doctrine of two natures in Christ, implies it, and is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the unity of his nature as well as of his person. " O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory I had with thee before the world was." This prayer, the author says, " cannot be referred to the human soul, even if there was a human soul hid in his person ; for that soul could speak of no glory it once had with the Father." Be it so ; then for the

same reason it could not be referred to a human person, which the author asserts our Lord was; then not to our Lord at all, unless our Lord was other than a human person. It cannot be referred to our Lord as a Divine person, if he is not also the person of human nature, because as such he was eternal, and always had had and still had the glory prayed for, and therefore, even if he could pray at all, could not pray to be glorified with it. Nor, finally, could it be referred to any created person, for no person could have had a glory with the Father before the world was, before being created. The same person prays to be glorified that had had glory with the Father before the world was. As Son of God in his Divine nature, our Lord had never lost this glory, and never could lose it, any more than he could cease to be the Eternal Son of God; as son of man he had never had it, and could not pray to be glorified with it as a glory he had once had. The only explication possible is on the principle of the two natures in one person. Christ, as the Divine suppositum of the Divine nature, did not and could not pray; but Christ who is the one suppositum of the two natures, as the suppositum or person of the human nature assumed could pray, and did pray to be glorified in his human nature with the glory he in his Divine nature had with the Father before the world was, and with which in his humanity he was not yet glorified.

As we are not writing a treatise on the Incarnation, we have said all that is necessary on this sublime mystery, for we have said enough to vindicate it from the objections which the author urges against it, and to convict him of objecting to what he does not understand, and of writing — to use a mild term — nonsense. Dr. Bushnell evidently writes in the dark, and strikes hither and thither, he knows not at what. He caricatures the orthodox doctrine, and then finds himself unable to accept it; yet unwilling to deny it outright and take refuge in open Unitarianism, the shallowest system that can be easily imagined, he tries to get something which shall be neither orthodoxy nor Unitarianism, but somewhere between the two, — which shall take what he supposes to be the truths, and avoid the errors, of both. Unhappily, he gets all the error of the Unitarian without the Unitarian's consistency, and involves himself in even greater difficulties than any he imagines in the way of orthodoxy.

After doing his best to convict orthodoxy of self-contradiction, of absurdity, after bringing against it the most subtle objections he can devise or pick up, he turns round and condemns reasoning, and reads us a grave lecture on the temerity of attempting to inquire into such questions as he himself has raised. He may bring objections, but we must not presume to answer them. He may “logic” as much as he pleases against others, but will have no *logicking* against himself. He is at liberty to deny that Christ is true God and true man, and to assert that he merely expresses, represents, without being, the Divine and human; but if we venture to insist that Christ is what he appears, what he represents, a real, not a mere tragedy king, enacted on the stage it may be by some very plebeian actor, he grows grave, and talks to us after this fashion:—

“Therefore, to insist on going beyond expression, investigating the mystery of the person of Jesus, when it is given us only to communicate God and his love, is, in fact, to puzzle ourselves with the vehicle, and rob ourselves of the grace it brings. It is killing the animal, that we may find where the life is hid in him, and detect the mode of its union with his body. It is taking the medicine that would cure us, and using it, not as a cure, but as a subject of investigation. God certainly is able to assume the human, to become incarnate in it so far as to express his union to it, and set himself as Eternal Life in historic and real connection with it. He tells us plainly that he has done it. That we may know by what law to receive and interpret his proceedings, his object is declared; viz., to express or manifest himself in the world, and thus to redeem the world.

“We see at once, if it be so, that here is a matter presented, which is not psychologically or physiologically investigable, because it does not lie within the categories of ordinary, natural humanity. And yet, instead of turning to receive simply what is expressed of the Divine, we immediately begin to try our science on the interior person of Jesus, to ascertain its contents or elements, and the mode of its composition! Nay, we must know who suffers, what worships, and all the hidden chemistries of the person must be understood! Then, as to what is expressed, why, that is a matter of so little moment that many overlook it wholly.

“It is as if Abraham, after he had entertained as a guest the Jehovah angel, or angel of the Lord, instead of receiving his message, had fallen to inquiring into the digestive process of the angel; or, since he came in human form and spoke with a human voice, whether he had a human soul or not; and, if so, how the two na-

tures were put together ! Let alone thy folly and thy shallow curiosity, O Abraham ! we should say, hear the Lord speak to thee ; what he commands thee, do, what he promises, believe ! Suspend thy raw guesses at his nature, and take his message !

“ Or, it is as if Moses, when he saw the burning bush, had fallen at once to speculating about the fire : Is this real fire ? No, if it was it would burn the wood. Well, if it is not fire, then there is nothing very wonderful in it ; for it is nothing wonderful that that which is not fire should not burn ! Nay, is it not a very dishonest fire ? he might have said ; for it is not what it pretends to be, — it is no real fire at all. And yet it was better, methinks, to take the bush as it was meant, to see God in it, and let the chemists look after the fire !

“ It is very difficult, I know, for a certain class of men, whose nature it is to live in their logic, and not in simple insight, to stay content with any thing which has not been verified by some word-process. Instead of putting off their shoes before the burning bush, they would put out the fire rather, — by such kind of constructive wisdom as I have just now given. A poem is ill to such, if it does not stand well in the predicaments. Receiving nothing by their imagination or by their heart, the verities they embrace are all dead verities. And as dead verities cannot impregnate, they live as being dead themselves, — a sterile class of souls, whom not even the life-giving mysteries of the Incarnation are able to fructify. See, they say, Christ obeys and suffers, how can the subject be the supreme ; the suffering man, the impassible God ! Probably they toss off their discovery with an air of superior sagacity, as if by some peculiar depth of argument they had reached a conclusion so profound. They cannot imagine that even the babes of true knowledge, the simple children of Christian faith, who open their hearts to the reconciling grace of God in Christ Jesus, are really wiser and deeper than they. As if it were some special wisdom to judge that the Lord Jesus came into the world, not simply to express God, and offer him to the embrace of our love, but to submit a new riddle to the speculative chemistry and constructive logic of the race ! Indeed, you may figure this whole tribe of sophisters as a man standing before that most beautiful and wondrous work of art, the ‘ Beatified Spirit ’ of Guido, and there commencing a quarrel with the artist, that he should be so absurd as to think of making a beatified spirit out of mere linseed, ochres, and oxides ! Would it not be more dignified to let the pigments go and take the expression of the canvas ? Just so are the human personality, the obedient, subject, suffering state of Jesus, all to be taken as colors of the Divine, and we are not to fool ourselves in practising our logic on the colors, but to seize at once upon the divine import and significance thereof ; ascending thus to the heart of God, there to rest, in the vision of his beatific glory.” — pp. 157 – 160.

We make no reply to these remarks, some of which would be worthy our attention, if they were not misapplied. The mystery of the Incarnation is a mystery, and therefore not explicable by natural reason, and it is the author, not we, who undertakes so to explain it. But though it is a mystery, it is a mystery announced to us as reasonable beings, and to be believed without our renouncing the exercise of reason. If any body chooses to state it so that it contradicts reason, insults common sense, and then tell us we must believe it because it is a mystery, we shall not consider that we are wanting reverence for the mystery if we attempt to show him that he misstates it, and to give the orthodox statement of it in return.

ART. II.—1. *The Village Notary; a Romance of Hungarian Life.* Translated from the Hungarian of BARON EÖTVÖS, by OTTO WENCKSTERN. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1850. 12mo. 3 volumes.

2. *Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady.* By THERESA PULSZKY. With an Historical Introduction, by FRANCIS PULSZKY. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1850. 8vo. pp. 375.

3. *The Hungarian Revolution.* By JOHANN PRAGAY. New York: George P. Putnam. 1850. 8vo. pp. 176.

4. *Parallels between the Hungarian and British Constitutions.* By J. TOULMIN SMITH, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. From the Second English Edition. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 8vo. pp. 64.

5. *The Christian Examiner*, for May, 1850. Art. VIII. Boston: Crosby & Nichols.

GREAT stress has been laid by our Magyarized writers upon the alleged double-dealing of the Emperor of Austria, in his having proclaimed Jellachich a traitor, and made several important concessions to the Magyars, while he was secretly disposed to favor the Slaves, as, in fact, he did favor them, when it became safe to do so. The Magyars are not so clearly in the right here as is commonly thought. If they had wrung those concessions from a

strong government, such as was that of Metternich in 1840, they might have expected that they would become the law of the land. But the circumstances under which they were obtained made any attention to the pretensions of the Magyars almost a work of supererogation. The Emperor Ferdinand was hopelessly diseased, and his bodily ailments had affected his mind withal. While he was in this state, the revolution broke out in Vienna, Metternich was forced to fly, and democracy was uppermost. The Magyars, seeing that the Emperor was physically and morally unable to refuse any thing they might ask, sent a deputation to him, demanding, among other things, an Hungarian ministry, and the right to control the treasury and the army of Hungary. The terrified Emperor granted every thing. The Magyars returned, quite satisfied, as was very natural. Such concessions had never before been granted; they amounted to a separation of Hungary from Austria, while they secured to Hungary all the advantages which could accrue from a union with the empire. But an honorable man, when he sees a dozen swords ready to pierce the heart of his enemy, will not then volunteer to tie his hands so that he cannot defend himself. Neither will he say to him, — “Sir, I have been trying for years to obtain from you a favor; I never expected to get it, for I acknowledge that I am not entitled to it. But now that you are in peril I will have it, or I will help these fellows to murder you.” So thought the court of Vienna. Austria had a constitution before, as well as after, 1849. One of its articles was, that no decree or concession of the Emperor could become binding, unless it was approved and signed by the proper ministers. The Emperor was theoretically absolute, but no expression of his will could become law until it had passed through the proper forms. This was a very reasonable rule. It was especially adapted to the case of Ferdinand, who had not a sound mind in a sound body. He had annoyed his ministers several times, says Pulszky, by suddenly adopting measures without consulting them. Now this rule covered the concessions made by the Emperor to the Magyars. Hence, when they were submitted to the Aulic Council, ministers refused to sign them. “The Emperor,” says Pulszky (p. 153), “sent to Hungary a long official document of the Austrian ministers, in which they tried to prove that his

Majesty *had not the right* to grant to the Magyars a ministry of their own, and at last had arrived at the conclusion that the finances of Hungary, its army, and the administration of the military frontier, must be committed to the Austrian Ministries of Finance and of War." Pulszky very comically complains, that "the Austrian ministers had availed themselves of the Emperor's condition of mind to persuade him to sign the document." As if the Magyar deputation had not done the same thing! As if it had not extorted from him, in his agony of terror, the concessions which he calmly reconsidered in council! As if it had not illegally wrung from him what his ministers legally, as well as rightfully, refused to sanction! Yea, illegally. Pulszky states the principle (p. 153): — "The king, being *personally irresponsible*, certainly cannot send to the Diet a message not countersigned by a responsible minister." The same rule is binding upon the Emperor of Austria. It is of no use to say that Hungary was an independent kingdom; for it was not. It had, it is true, a diet of its own, and independent local institutions; but its ministry, the control of its finances and of its army, and the power of appointing its highest officers, were at Vienna, where also resided its king. Pulszky (p. 86) testifies that the Hungarian Diet itself held under Joseph the First, in 1708, formally recognized the establishment of the Hungarian Board of Chancery at Vienna. During this and three succeeding reigns, the direction of the finances and the army of Hungary was repeatedly recognized as legally proceeding from Vienna. When the Magyar deputation of 1848 asked the king to concede to them the abrogation of what had hitherto been a part of the law of the land, they should have reflected that not only was it Ferdinand, king of Hungary, but that he was at the head of the Austrian empire, of which Hungary formed a part; that *as Emperor*, as well as king of Hungary, he had rights and duties to maintain and to perform in Hungary, and that changes such as were demanded by the Magyars, and which affected not only Hungary, but the whole empire, could not possibly have their effect unless they were approved by the ministers of the empire. In fact, upon this last ground, perhaps, was based the refusal of the ministers to sign the coveted documents. At that time, the concessions could not have been approved by ministers without ruining the empire. It is curious that

Batthyani, who was at the head of the new and illegal Hungarian ministry, stiffly insisted upon this very point. His ministry had no legal existence, and yet he told Count Latour that the Emperor should communicate his will to Hungary through the new officials, or not at all. If the *only* tie of Hungary to Austria were the fact, that the same person was king of the former and emperor of the latter, the Magyars would have an excuse for their conduct. But the Diet of Hungary had repeatedly sanctioned other ties, which the concessions rudely and illegally snapped, — an important consideration, fatal to the reasonings of the Magyars, and which our Magyarized friends entirely overlook.

The charge of treachery preferred by the Magyars against Austria comes from them with a bad grace. It appears certain that, shortly after the insurrection of March, 1848, at Vienna, there was an understanding between a portion of the insurgents and certain Magyar leaders. Pulszky says (p. 176) that about September “the newspapers took up the question carefully, and some of them declared themselves for Hungary.” It was confidently stated that the Magyars had distributed money in Vienna as early as September, and there is little doubt that the money expended there had a direct influence upon the opinions of the Viennese mob, which was unfriendly to the Magyars in August, and allied to them in October. In fact, letters were intercepted from Batthyani to Pulszky, offering funds for the purpose of “gaining the sympathies of the Viennese for the Hungarian nation.” Moreover, it was proved at the trial of Batthyani, that Pulszky had received and distributed money. Pulszky says (p. 200), that it was impossible to *prove* that Hungarian money was used to stir up the Viennese on the 6th of October. But he confesses that four thousand florins were expended on a Viennese paper in the Magyar interest, and in publishing documents and pamphlets on Magyar concerns, *for the information of the Viennese people*; ten thousand more were spent, he says, in recruiting soldiers to march against Jellachich. It is also certain that the Viennese insurgents of October counted largely upon the support of the Magyars. After the insurrection, when Windischgrätz was preparing to bombard the city, the Viennese Diet sent a message to the Magyars, asking them to march immediately. Kos-

suth despatched an answer to the rebels, and then he crossed the frontier, and attacked the Austrian army within sight of the walls of Vienna. He met with the success his treachery deserved ; he was routed, and forced to retire beyond the frontier. His intentions are partly unmasked in his speech to the soldiers before crossing the border. Kossuth said (Pulszky, p. 204), — “It is a duty of honor to hasten to the aid of the Viennese, as they have risen in opposition to the war against Hungary. If we win a battle, it will *decide the fate of the Austrian monarchy*, and of all Germany.” When he declared his intention of marching to Vienna, “about a *hundred* officers, most of them foreigners, but likewise several Hungarians, declared that, under existing circumstances, they could no longer serve Hungary.” (*Ibid.* p. 202.) They were honorable men. For the war was, even as late as October, a civil war between the Slaves and Magyars. The Diet, convened by royal authority, was in session ; Ferdinand was yet the acknowledged king of Hungary ; even in December, when he abdicated, the Magyars were willing to obey the young Emperor, if he would comply with their demands ; and yet Kossuth, under these circumstances, led the Magyars into the country of the man whom he and they acknowledged to be their rightful sovereign. Had a declaration of independence preceded the act, it might have been rebellion, but it would not have been treachery. His only enemies in the field were the Croats ; he should have met them. So said the more honorable portion of the Magyar army. (Pulszky, p. 201.) Admitting that the court of Vienna was disposed, in September, to aid the Croats, it was no longer able to do so in October, when Vienna was in the hands of the mob, and all the imperial troops were needed in Austria, to save it from anarchy. It was one of Kossuth’s worst acts, and it is the more reprehensible, as he did not, at this time, have any overt act of Austria as an excuse for entering her territory, to hasten, as he expressed it, the downfall of the empire. He had nothing but the supposed intentions of the imperial court whereon to found his suicidal resolution to march against his sovereign, not only without having issued a declaration of independence, but without even having published a declaration of war.

The proclamation denouncing Jellachich as a traitor apparently does not well accord with subsequent acts, ap-

proving his doings. The Emperor certainly appeared in this proclamation to side with the Magyars against the Croats, yet a glance at his condition will explain the difficulty. If that document had emanated from the court of Vienna, or rather of Innspruck, for the Emperor had fled thither after the March insurrection, when the same court were secretly resolved to crush, not Jellachich, but the Magyars, it would have been a dishonest act. But no such intention appears at that time to have been conceived. The proclamation is dated June 10, 1848, and "it was issued at the *request* of the Archduke Stephen, and of the whole Hungarian ministry." The feeble monarch was frightened into the measure, as he had been into the famous concessions of the March previous. It is probable, however, that it may have appeared at that moment sound and just policy to befriend the Magyars. The whole of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was in arms against the Emperor, and one of his best generals, Marshal Radetsky, had been driven from Milan, and had suffered other severe losses. It was pretty well understood that the fate of Austria depended upon her success in Italy. Now there were Magyar soldiers serving under Radetsky, and they were numerous enough to make their services of importance to the empire. Any movement tending to make these Magyars disgusted with the service would have been highly impolitic. On the other hand, the Croats in the army of Italy could be more easily managed. The importance of the Italian campaign was evident to every one. Even Pulszky says (p. 147), that "Radetsky, at Custozza, gained the victory, not over Carlo Alberto only, and Italian independence, but also over the unity of Germany, over constitutionalism in Austria, and over its tranquil growth in Hungary."

Moreover, the principles involved in the Magyar contest suddenly assumed a new character and increased importance, on account of the changes which had taken place in European affairs. Before the first bells of Red Republicanism sounded at Paris, when the states of Europe were content to be ruled by kings, when the sovereign found it far more difficult to curb his nobles than to content the masses, it was easy, proper, and safe to legislate for the amelioration of the state of the common people, even when such legislation was bitterly opposed by the higher

ranks. Legislation of this sort meets our eye at every page of the history of Europe before the rebellion of Luther against God, and against the salvation of millions. But this work nearly ceased after that event. "The Reformation," says Guizot, "and despotism triumphed simultaneously in Europe." Yet we have in Catholic countries many examples of this legislation for the people. We have indicated several in the foregoing part of this article. Thus the court of Vienna forced the *Urbarium* upon the unwilling Magyars, and, after it had repeatedly called their attention to the subject, the Magyars at last consented to do something, and they made the *Urbarium* the basis of the ameliorative measures proposed and carried at the Diet of 1836.

But in 1848 matters were in a different position. The people were everywhere in arms, and kings were at a fearful discount. It was no longer a question of how much was to be conceded to the people, but how much could be saved to the throne. *Nientissimo*, answered the Italians; *Rien*, echoed the French; *Nichts*, responded the Germans; while from the shores of America came a wild hurrah, in which the Red Republicans distinctly heard us exhorting them to take every thing, and grant nothing. It was unpleasant music to royal ears. The Emperor Ferdinand saw himself defeated in Italy; he saw his capital in the hands of the radical mob; and Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, were the sounds to which he awoke, and to which he went to sleep. The only accents he heard, which were at all in consonance with his notions, fell from Magyar lips. The Magyars numbered radicals within their ranks, but these were few. Amid the levelling storm, this singular people remained as intensely aristocratic as ever. While the people of other countries were intent upon abolishing all distinctions of rank and blood, the Magyars were engaged in a war with the Croats for the very purpose of maintaining their "historical rights" and "legal privileges." They would have none but a king to rule over them. Shortly after the fall of Metternich, in March, 1848, the Magyar radicals, says Pulszky (p. 265), began to agitate for a republic. Pulszky and the others immediately put it to vote at a public meeting, "and the republicans remained in an insignificant minority." Under all these circumstances, the Emperor pursued what appeared to be the

most politic and reasonable course, in siding with the Magyars, and in denouncing Jellachich on the 10th of June.

Other events transpired, which were well calculated to make him suspect Jellachich, and fear the Slaves. The northern Slavonians held a congress at Prague, and the result was a tempest which was hardly silenced by Austrian cannon. Yet Jellachich summoned a southern congress to meet at Agram; and, in defiance of the Emperor's prohibition, held it. In fact, what the Emperor had greatly to fear from this people was the establishment of a grand Pan-Slavonic empire, of which Russia would inevitably be the head. This empire was openly talked of, even at Vienna. "When the old Austrian system fell to pieces," says Pulszky (p. 149), "all the Slavonians, Croats as well as Bohemians, trusted that Austria could be reconstructed only as a Slavonic power." The crazy Diet of Vienna, held after the revolution of March, allowed the matter to be thoroughly discussed. "But forms of government were with them secondary to questions of race. Their first aim was to turn Austria into a Slavonic empire, in which the ruling majorities and ruling characters would be Slavonic." (Pulszky, p. 150.)

Now this Pan-Slavonic dream was nearly as hideous to Austria, as it was to Magyardom. To the Magyars it imported the utter extinction of their "historical rights," their social equality with the hitherto oppressed Slavonic races, and their utter political extinction, ingulfed, as they would be, in the great Slavonic tide, for their geographical position would not allow them to be independent at once of Austria and of Slavism. To Austria the project could not fail to be alarming. It is true that her Slavonic subjects talked of loyalty, but fettered with conditions which would make her simply a Slavonic power. On the other hand, this very union of the Austrian Slaves was looked upon by Russia as a gigantic step really taken in her behalf, because it would bring her far nearer to the accomplishment of her designs upon Europe, and she was fully aware that the Slaves of Austria, once united, would not long remain content with a German head.

These considerations seem to prove that the Emperor was sincere when he sided with the Magyars, in June. But how came he to cast them off in September? Why did he change his views so completely? And how came

he to favor the man whom he had denounced as a traitor? His armies in Italy were victorious. Charles Albert was defeated, and Lombardy was at his mercy. Hence he was relieved from any further apprehension in that quarter. It was no longer necessary to conciliate Magyardom lest he should lose his Italian states. This rendered a rupture with the Magyars not so highly impolitic as it was in June. But apart from this motive, which is based upon mere worldly policy, there were other circumstances which materially altered the complexion of affairs, and made it not only imprudent to sympathize with the Magyars, but suicidal withal. Pan-Slavism was not so terrible in September as in June. If Lombardy were lost to the empire, Sclavic majorities would swamp, not only Magyardom, but his German states; but with Lombardy, a balance between Germans, Italians, and Slaves was secured. Moreover, it was evident that the Kossuth party did not include all the Magyars. It simply embraced the untitled nobility, and it scarcely numbered a single magnate, if we except Esterhazy. The higher nobility despised Kossuth, and looked coldly upon his plans. Many of them favored Austria, and they who did not could be regarded as neutral, being nobles who loved, not Austria much, but Kossuth still less. The almost entire alienation of the magnates from the Kossuth party, which became painfully evident after the events of June, made it quite possible to ask three questions. Which party best represents the *real* interests of Hungary? It is not difficult to conceive that Kossuth and the court of Vienna would give contradictory answers to this question. Then, which party holds principles most in accordance with the interests and necessities of the empire? Kossuth, the magnates, and the Emperor would agree in their answer. Finally, suppose that the Magyars were left to themselves, without interference from any quarter, which party would be likely to obtain the mastery in the long run? It is true that, at first sight, the odds seemed to be wholly in favor of Kossuth, as he represented the untitled nobility of Hungary, before whom the magnates were as nothing, in point of numbers. But, after all, the rules of Verbötzi have always been practically enforced in Hungary. He was a lawyer, and leader of the opposition under Uladislav the Second, about the beginning of the sixteenth century. He published a code of Hungarian

law, the first systematic code that had yet appeared, and his work, the *Tripartitum*, as it was called, became "the highest authority of Hungarian jurisprudence, and the standard of common law." (Eötvös, Vol. III. note iv.) Votes, says Verböczi, are *non numeranda, sed ponderanda*. They are to be weighed, not counted. "Verum si populus in duas divideretur partes, tunc constitutio sanioris et potioris partis valet. Sanior et potior pars autem dicitur illa, in qua dignitate et scientia fuerint praestantiores atque nobiliores." When the people are divided into two parties, preference is to be given to the sounder and better party. But that is the sounder and better party in which are to be found the more worthy and noble for knowledge and standing in society. This sounder and better party always practically meant the body of magnates. In their contests with the untitled nobility, although they were often checked, especially when the king declared against them, yet in the long run they commonly succeeded. The rule of Verböczi is practically acknowledged everywhere. It is enforced even in republican America, why not in fanatically aristocratic Magyarland? The Emperor Ferdinand, after the magnates of the kingdom turned their backs upon Kossuth, had Magyar wisdom and experience to teach him that Kossuth would go the way of all demagogues. Certainly, the magnates were a small body of men. But their influence over a great number of the lesser nobles and of the untitled crowd was direct, efficient, and unquestioned. Verböczi's rule applied to Magyarland of 1848-49, as to that of 1512. The opponents of Kossuth and of his measures grew into a formidable party. The army began to join it, and then Kossuth was doomed. "Many of Görgey's friends, who had formerly served in the Austrian army, nourished the hope of peace. They still considered the Austrian officers as brethren in arms." (Pulszky, p. 310.) "Görgey was averse to joining the Hungarian corps; he chose to be at the head of a smaller army, of which he knew that almost every officer thoroughly trusted him, even in case of his opposition to the government." (*Ibid.* p. 311.) At last the Kossuth party tried its strength with the "pars sanior et potior," and it was signally defeated. Kossuth deposed Görgey, and appointed Mezős in his stead. "A council of war was held on the 4th of July, 1849, in which the friends of Görgey

proposed a declaration on the part of the officers, that they would serve under no chief command but that of Görgey." (*Ibid.* p. 313.) Kossuth was obliged to give way, and from this moment the sceptre passed to the *pars potior*, and Görgey was the real dictator of Magyarland. Kossuth did all that he could to retain his power, and, as a last resource, he turned to the Russians, thinking that negotiations might be opened with them. His friends have severely blamed Görgey for parleying with the Russians, without reflecting that their hero was also disposed to treat with the enemy. "At that time reports were spread that the Russians were disposed to guaranty to the Magyars the Constitution of 1848, and to raise the Grand Duke Constantine to the throne of Hungary. Even Kossuth had sent the ministers Szemere and Casimir Batthyani to the Russian camp, but these gentlemen were soon convinced of the emptiness of these assertions." (Pulszky, p. 315.) So much is admitted even by the friends of Kossuth. Görgey soon ordered him to resign. Kossuth assembled his ministers, and the majority voted for Görgey. Then the new dictator, on the principle that votes were to be weighed, not counted, "sent away the general levy, assembled the superior officers, and declared that the position of Hungary was desperate, that nothing but speedy submission could save the country. . . . *Every one in the army* of Görgey knew that negotiations had been going on for a long time between the general and the Russians, yet so firm was the trust the officers placed in him, and so artfully had he known how to secure their confidence, that there *was not one* amongst them who insisted upon learning the conditions upon which they were to surrender." (*Ibid.* p. 316.) Görgey surrendered, with his army of 24,000 men. The men were of the same mind with their officers, or they were not. If they were, they had been converted from Kossuth to the *pars sanior*. If they were not, which is improbable, for they knew what was going on, and agreed to it, then their submission shows how powerful in Magyarland was the *pars potior*. In either case, the rule of Verbötzi holds good.

The Kossuth party, furious at the surrender, have stigmatized the general as a traitor. There is no reason for disputing the soundness of the opinion given by Görgey at the council of war, and adopted by all the officers, that

the position of Hungary was desperate. A little more than a month before his surrender, while the rapidly diminishing war party were denouncing him as a traitor, and some days *after* Kossuth had actually sent the order for his removal from office, he won the most brilliant day of the campaign. He himself behaved like a hero. Pulszky says (p. 312), — “In his red Hungarian coat, a white feather on his hat, he threw himself into the very midst of the combat. He was wounded in the fray by the cut of a sabre, but the balls seemed to avoid the general, while they decimated those around him. The Austrians and Russians vainly attempted to storm the intrenchments.” This is not the conduct of a traitor. Pulszky (p. 318) insinuates treachery, of course, but observes, — “It appears that he alternately entertained hope and apprehension, and that, in spite of his iron mind, he sometimes shuddered at himself, and then again imagined that his deed might have blessed consequences for Hungary.”

These savage outcries of the Magyars against Görgey are similar to those which we are in the habit of hearing from men who lose battles when they expected to gain them. The Magyars were very prone to suspect almost every general they had of treachery or of irresolution. Pragay, in the book cited at the head of this article, is very lavish of his accusations against the generals, and he very plainly shows, that, if he had been chosen commander, Austria and Russia would have been driven from Magyar-land! Thus, (p. 20,) he gives General Moga his choice between ignorance, carelessness, or treachery. Perczel lost an army through his vanity and carelessness (p. 25); Dembinski's errors had nearly ruined the Hungarian cause (p. 30 *et seq.*); Meszaros always contrived to be unfortunate in the field. Now it is probable that Görgey deserves the name of traitor no more than these generals do. He labored and fought for the Kossuth party with a devotion worthy of a better cause, and when he saw clearly that there was no hope whatever, he yielded, and in so doing saved Hungary.

But the conduct of the other Hungarian officers and leaders clearly acquits Görgey of any other desire than that of saving Hungary. His own officers supported him, as we have seen. It is difficult to believe that they were all traitors. If the body of the army had not been with

him, and his treachery had been really suspected, he would have been hung to the nearest tree. The other generals, who held separate commands, concurred with him in his opinion, and followed his example. Damianics surrendered at Arad, and Necsey, Kazinczy, and the Transylvanian army successively laid down their arms. Many of the Hungarian representatives and commissaries went to the Russian camp, and gave themselves up. Dessewfy surrendered to Lichtenstein. Kiss wrote from the Russian camp to the fortresses of Pétervárad and Komorn, advising the commanders to surrender. Pétervárad consented, Komorn shortly after followed suit, and thus the long agony was over. All this proves, either that Görgey really pursued the only policy calculated to save Hungary, or that the officers of the different Magyar armies were traitors, to a man. The fact is, Hungary was in a hopeless position, as Görgey averred. The Kossuth party are never tired of saying, that, if *this* thing had been done, *that* omitted, and the *other* done differently, Hungary *might* have been saved. Men who have lost battles are wont to console their wounded vanity in the same way. Napoleon, at St. Helena, fought the battle of Waterloo over again almost daily, and always won it.

It is pretty evident, then, that if the Emperor Ferdinand, after the month of July, 1848, adopted Verböczi's rule, and gave his adhesion to the party opposed to Kossuth, he really leaned upon the *pars sanior* of the Magyars, who best represented the *real* interests of Hungary, and who eventually silenced their opponents. So he did not lean upon a broken reed. Other events happened which were quite enough to convince the court of Vienna that a great mistake had been made when the Emperor granted the famous concessions, and issued the proclamation against Jellachich. When Kossuth, in October, without any declaration of war, marched into Austria, and attacked the imperial army that lay before Vienna, he not only ruined himself and his party, but he furnished tangible proof that he and his clique had been for some time in league with the domestic enemies of the Emperor in Austria. The Magyar agents in London, Paris, and Vienna pursued a course calculated to bring about the designs of Kossuth, who, when he led his army across the frontier, said that he intended to hasten the ruin of the Austrian monarchy.

These intentions of his party began to be apparent soon after the proclamation against Jellachich was issued, and it is not to be wondered at if the Emperor began to reconsider what he had done when he found that the men to whom he had conceded every thing, while they pretended to acknowledge his authority, incessantly labored to annul it, not only in Hungary, but in his hereditary dominions. It is of no use to attempt to clear the Magyars from the charge of having entered into a perfect understanding with the mob at Vienna, after the discovery of the papers implicating Batthyani and Pulszky in the intrigues which were carried on in that city as early as August, 1848, and after the hostile march of Kossuth, in pursuance of a previous arrangement with the radicals of Vienna. In short, the Emperor probably discovered that he had been frightened into a league with his deadly enemies, whose only claim upon him was, that they conspired to destroy him in his own name, and no one can blame him for seeking better company at the earliest opportunity. When Jellachich was summoned by proclamation to appear at court, he obeyed, and he found it not very difficult to persuade the Emperor that the safety of the empire demanded a change of measures.

There were three courses open to the Magyars. One was, to make terms with Russia, as Kossuth tried to do, and as Görgey actually did, but with a result which was not anticipated by either. The next was, to ally themselves with the Slave population against Austria. This was a delicate and difficult undertaking, because the Magyars would not acknowledge the Slaves as equals, and were everywhere in arms against them. The last was to submit, for a time, to the court of Vienna; to renounce the privileges wrung by them from the Emperor in March; and to be content, for a while, with the condition of things as they were before the privileges were extorted. This course would probably have extricated them from their Croatian difficulties. But they would adopt none of these plans, each of which had its advocates. The first was followed when it was too late, the Russians were in the field, and victory was certain. Jellachich convinced the Emperor that policy, as well as justice, required him to protect the Slaves; that the Magyars, with hopelessly divided

councils, were engaged in an unjust struggle; and that the Slaves in arms would not consent to retire to their homes until Magyar oppression was effectually rendered thereafter impossible. He was reinstated in his dignities, when he returned to Croatia, and towards the middle of September crossed the Drave. Kossuth signed the death-warrant of his party shortly after, when he invaded Austria. After Windischgrätz had quieted the Viennese, he turned to Hungary, and then the Magyars were attacked from nine sides at once, — Windischgrätz from the west, and the Slaves from every other quarter. Thirty thousand of these marched from the Moravian and Galician frontiers. From Transylvania, the forces under Urban, Wardener, and Puchner were ready to move. The Croatian army and the Slaves of the Banat were in motion. Three of the principal fortresses in Hungary were in the hands of the enemy, and, to make matters worse, the peasants of the interior armed themselves, and ravaged the country, dividing themselves for this purpose into numerous bands. The cruelties perpetrated by the Slaves, who were maddened by the remembrance of ages of suffering, are doubtless exaggerated by our Magyar authorities; but after making every allowance, they must have been fearful. The universal insurrection of the Slave population, and the terrible vengeance they exacted everywhere from the unfortunate Magyars, show what the promises of the Kossuth party made to them concerning unfettered emancipation were worth in their eyes, and they afford some evidence of the wretched state to which they had been doomed for so many ages. Kossuth made the best use of his opportunities, and he prepared for a desperate defence, — for the struggle of despair, as Pulszky observes. They who blame Görgey for believing that the cause of Hungary was hopeless, when, in addition to all these enemies, the immense Russian army had commenced offensive operations, should remember that Kossuth experienced the same feelings before the intervention of Russia. “Well aware,” says Pulszky (p. 235), “that the war could only end with the fall of Hungary or of the dynasty, he entreated Mr. Stiles, United States envoy, to obtain from Windischgrätz an armistice with the Magyars.” The Prince required an unconditional surrender, and Kossuth was too proud to make it. It was decreed that he should ruin Magyardom, and he did.

A word or two will not be out of place concerning the claims which Austria had, and has, upon Hungary. Peter, the successor of St. Stephen, was restored to the throne by the forces of Henry the Third, Emperor of Germany, when Peter did homage to him for the Hungarian crown. King Solomon did the same thing in 1023. These acts of the Hungarian kings gave the German emperors a ready pretext for interfering in the affairs of the nation when it was possible to do so. Frederic Barbarossa remembered it when he led his crusaders through Hungary, and he demeaned himself as its actual sovereign. When the house of Arpad became extinct, Rudolph of Hapsburg claimed Hungary as a fief of the empire. Frederic the Third again put forth the claim, towards the middle of the fifteenth century. In the year 1526, the whole matter was decided, and in a way that serves to illustrate the rule of *Verbötni* about the *pars sanior et potior* of the community. After the death of Louis at the battle of Mohacs, the untitled nobility assembled a Diet, and gave the crown to John Zapolya. The magnates despised this man, and they intimated to the Emperor Ferdinand, that, if he chose to accept the crown, he might have it. He came, and was crowned, after he had sworn to maintain the constitution of Hungary. The emperors of Austria have been kings of Hungary from that day.

In fact, it was necessary that Austria, or some other first-rate power, should also rule Hungary, because she could not take care of herself, and her preservation was at that time essential to the safety of Europe. The Mahometans, since the seventh century, had overrun Asia and Africa, they had finally come into possession of Constantinople, and they retained possession of a part of Spain, until the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. They had frequently ravaged Italy and France, and they made no secret of their intention of reducing Europe to a level with ruined Asia. The expedient of marching immense armies into Asia proved successful, and it procured for Europe, not peace indeed, but a truce. The enemy was forced to expend a great part of his resources in the defence of his own country. If no new Mahometan power had appeared in the world, it is probable that Europe would not have had any great danger from that source to apprehend after the crusade of St. Louis; but a race of Tartars, allied by blood to the

Magyars of Hungary, had gradually attained to a degree of strength which enabled them to grasp the sceptre of the Omniades, and to take the lead in the Mahometan world. These Turks made themselves masters of Constantinople, and from that time they incessantly harassed Europe from the south and southeast. The lower Danubian principalities, comprising a great part of Turkey in Europe, offered an easy prey to the invaders, and thus Hungary became the hope of Europe in the southeast. Whoever wishes to know what Europe would have become, how wretchedly low she would have fallen, had the Turks accomplished their avowed purpose, needs but look at that portion of Southeastern Europe which has fallen beneath the yoke of the "true believers." It was of the last importance, then, that Hungary should keep the Turks at bay. Her safety was the safety of Austria, and in a great measure the safety of Europe. Austria, therefore, and all Europe, had a clear right to demand of Hungary that she should prevent the enemy from entering Christian Europe by Hungarian gateways, and to make the fulfilment of this duty the price of her political independence. If Hungary, with all her strength, could not keep the Turks, not only from invading her own territory, but also from passing through her fields to harass the territories of others, then her neighbors had an undoubted right to do the work themselves, and the consequences would be that Hungary would no longer rank as an independent kingdom. This result would be as just as it was inevitable. Hungary, then, had a glorious part to play, and for a short time she played it well.

In 1437 John Hunyady defeated the Turks at Belgrade. In 1440 he marched again with 40,000 men against the enemy, who had broken into Transylvania. In five months, he routed five armies, took five fortresses, and thus liberated the Danubian principalities. King Ladislas accompanied the hero in the campaign of 1444, but the Hungarians were beaten, the king was killed, and Hunyady was taken prisoner, but he was shortly after released. He was elected regent, and he held the post ten years, during which he gained several victories over the Turks, and only lost one great battle. In 1456, Mahomet the Second led an overwhelming force against Hungary. Hunyady and the friar of Capistrano met him with an inferior and undisciplined crowd, and utterly destroyed his army. Hunyady

died twenty days after the victory, and his son, Matthias, was elected king after the death of Ladislas without issue. He routed the Turks in several battles, and made a great part of what is now Turkey in Europe acknowledge the suzerainty of St. Stephen. In the action of Kenyérmerö, one of the last of his long reign, 30,000 Turks were left upon the field. Here ends the brilliant chapter of Hungarian warfare with the Turks. Matthias, and his father, Hunyady, were dead, and Hungary had no son who could stand in their stead. During the reign of Uladislav, who died in 1516, the Turks recovered from their fright, and they ravaged the country with impunity. They were, for a while, repulsed by John Corvin, and Zinizsy, but when these died, observes Pulszky (p. 62), "there was no man left to uphold the ancient martial glories of Hungary." The Turks, after having harassed the country for many years, resolved to strike a great blow at last. Solyman entered Hungary, in 1526, with a great army. The Pope had repeatedly warned King Louis of the coming danger, and had granted him leave to alienate the church property, if necessary, for the common defence. The king was powerless, for the untitled nobility were at war with the magnates, and it was with the utmost difficulty that Louis could gather 25,000 men. Solyman met him at Mohacs. The result was the extinction of Hungary as an independent nation. The king, six hundred magnates, and 22,000 soldiers lost their lives. Hungary lay prostrate at the feet of Solyman; the road to Vienna and to Italy was open; but the Sultan contented himself with the sack of Buda, and he returned to Constantinople, carrying with him 70,000 prisoners. This affair secured Hungary to the house of Austria. Solyman had opened a road to Vienna, he had sworn to return, and that road must be closed. The quarrel between the untitled nobility and the magnates continued. It was a dispute as to which was the *pars sanior* of the community, and the controversy ended as it *must* always end in the long run. The untitled nobility elected John Zapolya king. The magnates elected Ferdinand of Austria, and Ferdinand was king of course.

He was crowned on the 3d of November, and his coronation furnished a pretext for the commission of a notable act of treason on the part of the Kossuth party of those days. "Zapolya," says Pulszky (p. 68), "*applied for aid to*

the SULTAN,” — to the Turk who had just ruined Hungary. “In doing so he sacrificed the honor of his country, by declaring his willingness to receive the Hungarian crown in fief from the Sultan.” Solyman entered Hungary, overran the country, placed John Zapolya upon the throne, and then marched to Vienna, from whence he was driven by Salm. The Turk was called into the country a third time by Zapolya, who was sorely pressed by the Christian army under Ferdinand. Solyman relieved him, and made another attempt upon Austria; but he was again forced to retire. The successes of the Turk were mainly owing to the unparalleled meanness and treachery of Zapolya and his party, which included a great portion of the untitled nobility, in seeking to obtain their ends by the aid of the common enemy, whose sword was yet red with the blood shed at Mohacs. The Emperor Ferdinand saw that he could not defend Hungary from the allied forces of the Turks and of the Magyars who obeyed Zapolya; so he concluded a treaty, leaving him in possession of Transylvania during his life, and providing for its reversion to the crown after the death of Zapolya.

The Magyars were severely punished for their treason against Hungary, Austria, and Europe. John died. His ministers sent to the Turk to own his supremacy over that part of Hungary, and to ask his protection for the infant son of John. Solyman visited Hungary, seized the greater part of the country which he had given to Zapolya, and annexed it to his own states. This was the commencement of Turkish rule in Hungary. It was an important step taken towards the subjugation of Europe, and Christendom owed this new danger to the dissensions of the Magyars, and to the baseness of the beaten faction in calling in the Turks. The Emperor Maximilian endeavored to oppose the last descent of Solyman upon Hungary, but in vain; for the Magyars disliked him, partly because he appointed Austrians to military posts in Hungary, partly because he would not, or could not, learn the Magyar language. Pulszky (p. 71) owns, with great simplicity, that “he was only feebly supported by the country”; he “could not, or would not, unite the forces that were in Hungary.” (*Ibid.*) The consequence of this treachery was, that Transylvania was for many years lost to the Hungarian crown, and it became little
er than a Turkish province.

While a party of the Magyars slunk into the mean condition of Turkish vassals, the Emperor Rudolph fought with the invader, who never gave Hungary rest. The war lasted fifteen years, and, although Rudolph gained a few victories, yet he barely succeeded in saving Hungary proper to the empire and to Christendom. He had, as we have seen, Magyar subjects in the East of Hungary, who had called in the Turks to oppose him. In the Diet, a large party sympathized with the Eastern traitors, and about this time a new cause of trouble became apparent. The Emperor was anxious to check the progress of the so-called Reformation in Hungary. This was enough to induce the Magyars who had invoked the aid of the Turk to become good Protestants, and they did. A Protestant rebellion succeeded, which was encouraged by the Sultan, and Rudolph was obliged to make peace, when Hungary was divided between him, the Prince of Transylvania, and the Sultan. (Pulzsky, p. 74.) The Turks now obtained what might be called a permanent and legal footing in Hungary, thanks to the rebellion of the Protestant Magyars. The Sultan was grateful to them, and when the Magyars of Transylvania rebelled against their prince, the Turk placed Gabriel Bethlen, whom Pulzsky (p. 75) calls the most distinguished defender of the Hungarian Protestants, upon the throne of Transylvania. It has been often said that a Protestant and a rebel were synonymous terms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This truth was nowhere illustrated more forcibly than in Hungary. The Protestants kept the kingdom in an uproar during the reign of Ferdinand the Second. They not only wished for liberty to hate the Pope, but liberty to oppress Catholics. They flew to arms in Austria and in Bohemia, but the Emperor suppressed the rebellion. The Protestant Magyars turned to the Sultan and to Bethlen, the lord of Transylvania. Bethlen's campaigns were generally successful; he relied greatly upon the aid of the Turks. When he died, it was found that his widow had abjured heresy, whereupon Rakoczy was elected prince. He sought the alliance of the Turks, and of Gustavus Adolphus, when he invaded Hungary at the call of the Protestant Magyars; and Ferdinand the Third, who was then engaged in the Protestant war in Germany, found it prudent to conclude a peace. "Up to this period," says Pulzsky (p. 78), "the Catholic party had always

been in the minority in the Diet, but now they began to obtain a majority." The tyranny which characterized the Protestant ascendancy in Hungary provoked a reaction against them. Besides, all honorable Magyars were alarmed and disgusted with the Protestant policy of calling in the Turks, and other enemies of the nation, and even offering them the crown of St. Stephen, as the Protestant Diet of 1620 did Bethlen Gabor. It was plain enough that this course, which had already torn from the nation the principality of Transylvania, brought upon it upwards of twenty Turkish invasions, secured to the Sultan nearly a third of Hungary, and kept Magyarland in a continual ferment, would end in the seizure of the whole of Hungary by the Turks, and thus open a road to Vienna, Rome, and Paris, — a road which the Sultan had sworn to travel. As much the enemy of Hungary as of Austria, he had watched these Protestant rebellions, taking good care to fan them well, and he was always rewarded for his pains with a new slice of Hungarian territory, or with a new influence acquired within it.* Protestantism had made the Magyars nearly as dangerous to Europe as the Turks. It was necessary for the safety of Europe to deprive them of the means of ruining Hungary and the adjacent nations, and it was done. They not only failed to resist the enemy of the Church and of civilization, but their traitorous conduct threatened to bring upon Europe another barbarian deluge.

Leopold the First ruled the empire nearly half a century, and he employed to suppress treason in Hungary the only means that the Magyars could understand. His just and vigorous measures soon deprived them of the "sacred right of rebellion," and of oppressing their Catholic countrymen, whereupon, says Pulszky (p. 82), "the Protestants fled in crowds to the Turks, who granted them protection." It is probable that they also became Turks, as many of them did in 1849. Having quieted them in Hungary, he began to consider how the treasonable work in which they had been engaged for fifty years, and more, might be undone. His first movement was for the recovery of Transylvania, which the Magyars had so basely given away. The Sultan

* Luther declared that it was against the will of God to make war against the Turk.

began to think that it was time to annex that country to his states; so he marched thither and routed Rakoczy, who was killed. His pretext was, that the prince, being his vassal, had interfered in Polish affairs without his leave. Leopold lost no time in taking advantage of this state of things. He elected a new prince, and sent an army to sustain him. The rival prince set up by the Sultan was taken prisoner, and executed. The war in Transylvania lasted more than forty years, and it ended before the death of Leopold with the complete deliverance of the country, and its re-annexation to the Austrian empire.

The next step was to humble the Turks. To do this, he knew that he wanted able and faithful generals, and he wisely judged that Magyarland, which had so many times thrown open the gates of Europe to the Turks, would not answer his purpose. Zrinyi had won a battle against the enemy, but he was dead. Leopold assembled a great army, which was successively commanded by Charles of Lorraine, the Margrave of Baden, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, three good soldiers. "Every one," says Pulszky (p. 80), "felt that the decisive struggle between the Cross and the Crescent was at hand." In 1683, the Turks led an immense army to Vienna, but Charles of Lorraine and Sobieski forced them to retire. Then Leopold commenced offensive operations. Charles of Lorraine stormed Buda, defeated the enemy at Mohacs, and drove him beyond the frontiers of Hungary. The Margrave of Baden advanced as far as Albania, within the Turkish states, and Prince Eugene cut the hostile army to pieces at Zentha, in 1697. The war lasted sixteen years, and Leopold had accomplished his purpose. The Turks sued for peace, renouncing all dominion in Hungary and Transylvania.

Nothing remained but to keep the Magyars from compassing treason against Hungary. But "the hated Turkish yoke," says Pulszky (p. 81), "seemed to be more endurable than the oppression of the Germans." The measures of Leopold against the Protestant rebels, and the appointment of generals who were not Magyars to the armies, afforded pretexts for revolt. The conspiracy of Zrinyi was defeated, and the leaders were executed. An insurrection of the Protestants in Upper Hungary was easily suppressed. Tökölyi failed also in stirring up a rebellion, and he sought the Turks; but they had begun to suffer reverses, and they

could do nothing for him. He sent proposals to Leopold, which contained matters not likely to please the Sultan, for when Leopold sent the letters to the Turks, they thrust Tökölyi in prison, and kept him there. (Pulszky, p. 83.)

Under Leopold, Hungary enjoyed greater prosperity than had fallen to her lot since the first battle of Mohacs. He had quieted or driven out of the kingdom the men who were always ready to plunge the country into the miseries inseparable from civil war. He deprived the Protestant ascendancy of the power of oppressing the Catholics, or of deluging the land with blood. He found nearly a third of Hungary in the hands of the Turks, and he drove them beyond its borders. He reunited Transylvania to the empire. Accordingly, he was hated by the Kossuth party of his day. "The curse of the Hungarian," says Pulszky (p. 85), "followed him to his grave." Well, he *did* spoil a great deal of Magyar fun.

Rakoczy stirred up a rebellion after the death of Leopold, hoping that Joseph the First would not be as successful as his father; but he was defeated, and driven out of the country. He declined the proffered pardon, and fled to Turkey, where he lived many years. Joseph completed the pacification of Hungary, and when the Turks, in the reign of his successor Charles, sought to renew the war, they were broken by Prince Eugene, who forced them to sue for peace after a succession of great victories. The Turkish name now ceased to be a terror to Europe; the spirit of the nation was broken, and the Sultan was obliged to confine himself within his own states. The operations of the Turks against Christendom have been few and unimportant since the death of Charles the Third. Their heroic age is gone, and they have since bent all their energies to the task of preserving their own national existence. Russia began to rise about the time that the Turks were finally driven from the Austrian empire, and the "true believers" soon became aware that a new enemy was in the field. Hungary then ceased to be the bulwark of Austria, of Europe, and of Christendom in the Southeast.

Whoever has attentively considered these facts will see that it was of the last importance, not only to Hungary, but also to Europe, that the common enemy should be kept beyond the Hungarian frontiers; that the Magyars utterly failed to do this great duty which Europe had a

right to claim at their hands; that they not only failed to do it, but, by their incessant civil dissensions, they rendered Hungary an easy conquest; that their error was deeper and more damning, inasmuch as they *invited* the Turks to enter Hungary several times, and consented that the Sultan should hold a great part of the land, and that one of their princes should rule as a vassal of the Turk; that Hungary was finally delivered by Austria, and that the victorious generals were *not* Magyars. Hungary, then, is a country delivered from the common enemy by Austrian arms, when the Magyars neither could nor would deliver themselves. Transylvania is a country conquered by Austrian arms. The right of Austria to rule Hungary comes from these titles as well as from the free election of the Hungarian Diet. And it is clear that Austrian rule in Hungary was not only justifiable, but that the good of Hungary herself, of Austria, and of all Europe, required the annexation of Magyarland to the empire.

The same good requires that Hungary shall not be an independent nation now. A glance at the map of Europe will suffice to show that the Magyars cannot maintain their independence, and their nationality with it. The instant that Magyarland makes Austria her enemy, she will have to solve a dilemma with destruction hanging from either horn. She is completely surrounded by the Slavonic tribes. In the regions claimed by Hungary, the Magyars are to the other races as one to three, and centuries of oppression have taught the Slave to regard the Magyar as his hereditary enemy. Then countless hordes of the Slavonic family, paying allegiance to Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, encompass her on every side. Suppose that the Magyars, after making Austria their enemy, resolve to maintain their "historical privileges" and legal "rights" with reference to the Slave population in Hungary? We have shown that they must do it, in order to save the political existence of the untitled nobility, who form the great body of the Magyar population. We have shown, moreover, that the promises of the Kossuth party were, and must have been, illusory, — were tricks to gain time, and to deceive the world that was looking on. Whatever ameliorations may be adopted in a genuine Magyar Diet will never make the peasant a freeman. They find him a slave, and, substantially, a slave they will leave him. The Slavonic

masses will remain, as they are, the bitter enemies of Magyardom. The Magyars will always stand upon a mine, ready to be sprung. Without Austrian assistance, they would be continually exposed to the perils of 1848, when Magyarland was attacked from nine sides at once. And what would render their cause utterly hopeless would be the dissensions which have always subsisted between the magnates and the untitled nobles, and which never raged more fiercely than when the country was in danger. It was so in 1848, it was always so. Divided at home, and attacked from every quarter, Magyardom would give up the ghost.

Suppose, then, that they grant full, free, and unfettered emancipation to the peasantry, — suppose that they make the Slave, in every respect, equal to the Magyar; it would be political suicide. To prevent it, they have always resisted the reforms proposed by Austria; to prevent it, they declared themselves absolved from all allegiance to the house of Hapsburg. They would not only lose their “historical rights,” but their political existence. The Slaves would be for ever the majority in Hungary. Nearly everywhere, the Magyars would be outvoted. This circumstance would by no means extinguish national animosities, and it is easy to conceive what the Magyar condition would be, left to the mercies of Slavonic legislation. The interests of the Magyars require the union of Hungary with Austria. She has protected them when they could not protect themselves. She alone can protect them now from the excited millions of Slavonic blood, who would engulf them if they were left to their own guidance.

It is needless to show that the interests of Austria require such a union, as it is apparent to every one. In the multitude of races which own her sovereignty, the Magyar element forms an important item in the balance. But the well-being of Europe is more nearly interested in this union of Hungary with Austria than is commonly thought.

The events of the last few years, and especially the descent of the Russian armies into Hungary, in 1849, have caused many persons to ask what part Russia is to play in Europe during the next hundred years. The entrance of the Russian armies into Hungary has given rise to several ridiculous notions, which have been gravely palmed upon the public as undoubted facts. Not the least silly of the

statements which are current in the newspapers, with reference to Continental affairs, is the one which makes Austria the tool or the half vassal of Russia, in consequence of the aid afforded by the latter in suppressing the rebellion. If no reasons could be alleged to disprove this assertion, still it would not logically follow from the premises given. The man who runs to the assistance of a neighbor who is attacked by robbers, and who helps to beat the fellows off, does a friendly act, which gives him a title to the gratitude of his neighbor; but it gives him no right to claim over him a superiority which the relieved man cannot in honor concede. Nations have often extended to one another such friendly offices, without dreaming of asking privileges, in return for the aid, which could not be granted. We could not have vindicated our declaration of independence without French intervention, without French money, arms, and men; but what Frenchman ever dreamed of asking therefor the homage of America? and what American sword would not leap from its scabbard at the first mention of such a thing?

Setting all this aside, we remark that after the dissensions between the magnates and the untitled nobles became so apparent, in 1848, it was evident enough that Austria, after she quieted Lombardy and rusticated Charles Albert, could without assistance settle the Magyar question. The entrance of Russia only hastened an event that was already certain. The threatening posture of the Slave population, and, above all, the difference between the magnates and the Kossuth party, were fatal to the cause of Magyardom. "King Solomon," says Pulszky (p. 103), "when he was imprisoned by Ladislas, cursed the people that had forsaken him, and gave them up to eternal discord."

The entrance of Russia was a friendly act, prompted by selfish motives. The cause of Austria was the cause of Russia. If Austria were defeated in Hungary, the Poles would set Southwestern Russia on fire. *Self-preservation* impelled her to pour her armies into Hungary. It was well understood that the Hungarian movement had more meaning than appeared upon its face. It was also a masked battle for the independence of Poland. The success of the Magyars was supposed to be, not only a condition of that independence, but also a very important step

taken for its accomplishment. Of course, the suppression of the rebellion in Hungary imported the extinction of Polish hopes, and the more thorough and speedy the suppression, the more complete the extinction. Hence the presence of Russian troops in Hungary. Russia more than shared in the benefits accruing from the quietus given to the Magyars; her own interests were deeply concerned in the matter, and hence Austria is not under such weighty obligations to her, after all. It was better for all parties, cheaper and far more convenient to Russia, to defeat Poland in Hungary than to do it in her own territory. When Hungary lay prostrate, quiet was secured to the adjacent states of Russia, and the Emperor Nicholas tranquilly went his way, knowing that peace was preserved in his own house by helping to put down a scuffle in his neighbor's. Moreover, the bearing of Austria before, during, and since the struggle has indicated any thing but a consciousness on her part that she is under great obligations to Russia for the help afforded her in the war.

Moreover, the Magyars are surrounded by tribes which belong with Russia to the great Slavonic family. Russia cares much for them, and little for the Magyars. The Croats, and the other tribes in and near Hungary, were in arms against the Magyars, and any movement of Russia against their enemies was sure to be gratefully remembered, and, at the proper time, to be repaid. Setting aside the motive just stated, which dragged Russia into Hungary, this consideration would have immense weight, and the favor which Russia would win in the sight of the Slavonic races, in consequence of her demonstration against the Magyars, would more than repay her for all the blood and treasure expended in Hungary. "See!" she could say to them, as her agents have already said, "I have fought and beaten your enemies, not because I love Austria, but because I love you!" No immediate and visible benefit followed the act of Russia which challenged the good will of the Slavonic races, but that very good will is valuable in the Russian treasury, for it may hereafter be coined into something better than gold. The Slavonic tribes lie between her and the lower Danubian principalities, — between her and Greece, — between her and the Mediterranean, through the Adriatic Sea. The little port of Fiume would repay her the cost of twenty Hungarian interventions. To

be sure, the good will of the Slavonic tribes is only one move on the great chessboard, but why not make it? Moreover, it has ever been the policy of Russia, — a policy which has largely contributed to make her what she is, — *Amicumve, inimicumve, ne minimum quidem despexisse*.

There is a dream which is troubling many now, — the great Pan-Slavonic dream. Perhaps something corresponding to it will come to pass in the fulness of time, and if it does, it will not be passing strange. The attention of the Slavonians has been called to this matter since 1820, and now the idea is pretty general among them. They are almost a tenth of the inhabitants of the globe. In Europe they number upwards of seventy million souls. It is probable that they never had any other than the primitive civilization, which they lost ages ago, and only a few tribes recovered it, as Poland did. Russia is regaining it now. The rest were enslaved when Christianity brought civilization into Central Europe, and their condition has prevented them from receiving a full share of the light that was thrown by the cross upon the Celts, the Germans, and the Goths. Now the great nations of Europe are growing old, and they already betray unmistakable symptoms of a relapse into barbarism. Red Republicanism will probably play out its play during the latter half of the present century, and leave the twentieth century clear for the Slavonic tide, and only God knows whether that tide will wash Europe, or engulf it utterly. If the Slaves recover their civilization, or rather, if they bring it to a tolerable degree of perfection, it will be new, and the older nations will be unable to withstand them; their influence will be irresistible for good or for evil. The danger to Europe, if there is danger, comes from a new quarter; it is very different from the danger threatened to Europe by the Turks, but as the well-being of Austria, from her geographical position, was the well-being of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so will her safety be the safety of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth. And the union of Magyar-dom to the empire is as important to Europe now as it was then.

At present, the Slavonic movement seems to be drawn towards three different centres, Austria, Poland, and Russia. Poland may be left out of the account, for she can do nothing while Austria and Russia are living, and neither

of them is likely to die in our time.* Russia is a young giant who has not yet attained his prime. Austria, in 1848-49, has shown a recuperative energy which has surprised her friends, and confounded her enemies. Austria has more than sixteen million Slavonic subjects. After the revolution in March, 1848, when the diet of Vienna met, the Austrian Slaves behaved in a manner that astonished and alarmed every body. They held a northern congress at Prague, and a southern at Agram. The union of the Austro-Slavonic tribes was openly agitated, not only at these formidable assemblies, but, what was more to the purpose, at Vienna. The Diet was for a time almost entirely at their mercy. Austria, said they, shall arise again, but as a Slavonic power. At that moment there was a little foundation for the promise. The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom seemed to be lost to the empire, and, of course, the Italian check was wanting in the Viennese Diet. The Magyar influence was not legitimately exerted there, because they were engaged in their quarrels with the Croats and with the supreme council. So the Slaves had only to dispose of the German element, which was not very strong, and their first aim — which was, says Pulszky (p. 151), to turn Austria into a Slavonic empire, in which the ruling majorities and ruling characters should be Slavonic — appeared in May to be of easy accomplishment.

* We have known many intelligent and amiable Poles, but we have yet to see one who is not subject to fits of insanity when Polish affairs are the subject of conversation. The Poles will do little, either for their own country or for the Slavonic race, until they are thoroughly changed. Their conduct during the last three years reminds one of the mediæval Brabançons and Cotereaux, and their readiness to fight anywhere at an instant's warning will long be remembered against them in Europe. Then their plans are too wild, too fantastical, to deserve much attention. Trentowsky, a writer noticed in the Massachusetts Review for June, is a fine specimen of a mad Polish philosopher. He wishes to have a Pan-Slavonic empire, with Poland for its soul. There are three successive states of our world; — the real, which is the Roman; the ideal, which is the German; and the divine, which is the Slavonic world now beginning. The Romans founded the kingdom of Satan; the Germans, the kingdom of the Angels; the Slavonians will found the kingdom of God! The Pole must be for Slavonia what Jesus was for the world. The Roman formula gives the animal world; it is, *Sentio, ergo res est, atque res sum.* The German formula gives the spiritual world, — *Cogito, ergo cogitatio est, atque cogitatio sum.* The Slavonic formula gives the universe, — *Vivo, ergo vita, libertas, mundus, numen est, ergo vita, libertas, mundus, numen sum!* So much for Trentowsky.

Their designs were frustrated by three events; the subjugation of Lombardy, the insurrection of October at Vienna, and the pacification of Hungary. It is easy to conceive that, if Austria were a Slavonic state, the result would shake all Europe. Russia, which is the only Slave power in the Old World, is also a first-rate power. Alone, she is bold enough to assume a dictatorial tone to England, as she did the other day. An Austro-Slavonic empire would instantly toss Europe into the hands of this overgrown family, and, in any event, Russia would be the mistress of the Old World. The chances of a union, federal or otherwise, of the Austro-Slavonic states with Russia, and by this means the fulfilment of the Pan-Slavonic dream, would not be very great, but they would be worth considering. It is well known that such a union was talked of in 1848 at Agram, Prague, and Vienna. Even many leading Poles, as Prince Lubomirsky and Count Potocky, were favorably disposed towards the plan, and their influence in the Viennese Diet was considerable. But if Austria, in the event of her becoming a Slavonic empire, chose to remain an independent state, the preponderance of Russia in European affairs, great as it is now, would be immeasurably increased. She has already the resources and strength of a young first-rate power. She is of Slavonic blood, and she is the only branch of the family that can interfere in the concerns of Europe. Then a large and constantly increasing portion of the Austro-Slaves are devoted to her interests, and very few are of an unfriendly disposition. These, and other circumstances which we forbear to mention, would make the proposed Austro-Slavonic empire, if not the vassal of Russia, her obsequious follower, or, at the very least, her very faithful ally. This was the prospect in May, 1848.

Now, if one were to opine that the overwhelming ascendancy of Russia would be a blessing to Europe, we have nothing to say, unless it may be to put in the proviso that she become converted to the Church. We admit that her interference, as evinced in Hungary, and, latterly, in England, has been of a healthy nature. So far as she has turned her forces against Magyardom and Red Republicanism, she has rendered great service to Europe. But we are not prepared to see her become, just now, any thing more than a first-rate power. Neither should we be glad to see all

Europe sitting in her shadow. We argue on the supposition that an irresistible Slavonic, and therefore partially Asiatic influence, such as would be wielded by Russia and an Austro-Slavonic empire, would not just at this time be a blessing to Europe, whatever it may be hereafter. We are now prepared to see how important it is to Europe that Austria shall continue to hold Hungary, as well as Lombardy, with a firm grasp. Her Slave population would make the German element insignificant, but if the Italians and the Magyars be added to the Germans, a strong balance appears, and the Slaves can wield in the empire only that influence which is justly theirs. The Magyars, being nearly interested in lessening the Slavonic preponderance, on account of their position in the midst of the Slaves, would be the best possible check upon the Slavonic element, because they would be impelled by the mere love of life. And the Germans, the Slaves, the Italians, and the Magyars have interests sufficiently opposed to one another to enable a skilful minister to play off any one of them, at any time, against the rest. And the union of Magyardom with Austria is the only means of securing to the Magyars any thing like independence and national life. Independent of Austria, they would be swallowed up in a Slavonic ocean. A constituent portion of the empire, they would get all the privileges they deserve, perhaps more, for it would be the obvious interest of the supreme government to encourage their national tendencies to a reasonable extent, in order to be enabled to use them, at any emergency, as a check upon the other nationalities of the empire.

The union of Magyardom to the empire, while it is required for the well-being of Hungary herself and of Austria, is also essential to the welfare of Europe. It was precisely so in the seventeenth century, only the danger then came from the Southeast, while now it comes from the Northeast. Then Europe feared the Sultan, now she fears the Czar. The Protestants did their utmost then to throw Europe into the hands of the enemy. The favor shown by the Red Republicans to the aristocratic Magyars, which made many persons wonder not a little, is hence explained. The downfall of the empire would make the confusion of 1848 worse confounded, — just what the Reds desired. "After us the deluge," said they; "if Europe is to become Cossack, it will not be until we have done our work."

It is time to close this article, but before we do, it will be well to sum up the theses which we have proved by our Magyar authorities. 1. The Magyar struggle was essentially aristocratic in all its parts. 2. The war in Hungary was a war, not of classes only, but mainly of races. 3. The Magyar war party was made up almost entirely of the untitled nobles, who did not, in fact, express the sense of the nation. 4. The Magyars had steadily resisted, from the beginning, nearly every measure designed for the amelioration of the condition of the Slaves. 5. Nearly every beneficial measure of this class was forced upon the Diet by Austria, in the teeth of the Magyars. 6. The measure proposed by Kossuth was illusory. 7. The Magyars rebelled, finally, against the Emperor, not because they had lost any thing, but because the Slaves gained every thing, — because the Emperor did actually adopt efficient measures for the emancipation of the peasants, thereby merging the untitled nobles in the Slavonic crowd. 8. After the pacification of Lombardy the Magyar cause was wellnigh hopeless, and after the entrance of Russia, utterly desperate. 9. This arose from two causes, besides the hostility of the Slave population. From the fact that the *pars sanior et potior*, the magnates, many of the officers, and the soldiers and common people that followed these, were averse to the war from the beginning. From the treachery and the imprudence of Kossuth, who invaded the territories of the man whom he acknowledged to be his emperor and king, and who sent the cruel Bem to torture the Saxons and Wallachs, until they had no other resource than to implore the neighboring Russian troops to save them. 10. It is probable that Görgey was not a traitor. Else the whole body of Magyar officers must have been traitors. 11. The well-being of Europe required the union of Magyardom to Austria in the seventeenth century. 12. The same well-being requires it in the nineteenth. 13. The good of Austria became, *per accidens*, at both epochs, the good of Europe. 14. The salvation of Magyardom itself imperiously demanded and demands the same union, firstly, that it might be delivered from the Turks; lastly, that it may be delivered from the Slaves.

All the above propositions are fully proved by the citations we have made from the authors named at the head

of this article. We have quoted them *verbatim*, excepting that we have substituted the word *Magyar* for the term *Hungarian*, where the real meaning of the passage required it. These Magyars have no exclusive right to the name of Hungarian, and their method of using it is calculated to deceive the unwary. Of course, our inferences from their facts will not please them, but that is no fault of ours.

We do not wish this article to be regarded as an apology for Austria, for it is not. She understands her own business better than any one else, we suppose, and she has always been singularly indifferent to the praise or to the censure of outsiders. As an American, we had few sympathies with her previous to 1849, and as a Catholic, fewer still. No Magyar can have a greater horror of Josephism than we have. We have simply attempted to write a chapter of the history of events that have been strangely misrepresented and misunderstood. For the rest, we suppose that the Austrian government is little better, and little worse, than the common run of Christian governments. She has probably ruled Hungary as wisely and as justly as any other power could have done, and certainly better than the Magyars ever did. It is true that the Magyars, in their manifesto, take a strange delight in repeating, that "the history of the government of Austria in Hungary presents but an unbroken series of perjured deeds from generation to generation"; but that is a figure of speech. The stories we heard about the astonishing battles which the Magyars fought and won, against overwhelming odds, were got up upon a similar principle. Every little skirmish was dignified with a high-sounding name. Since the despatches of Kossuth, every body knows how to estimate Magyar rhetoric. Pulszky tells a somewhat different story about the Hapsburgs, and so does history. The severe punishments inflicted by Austria upon the rebels have provoked much censure, but we cannot call them illegal or unjust. All governments do the same under similar circumstances, and England was far more severe after the battle of Culloden, than Austria after the Hungarian campaign. High-treason is everywhere punishable with death, even in America. The number of the persons implicated does not affect the principle; if they are tried, found guilty, and hanged, you may call the proceeding severe or impolitic, but you cannot call it unjust. If a man who murders another is justly

deprived of life, we cannot see why he does not at least deserve as much who is guilty of the blood of thousands slain in an insurrection which he has needlessly and criminally provoked. If our Magyarized authors weep over Batthyani, why cannot they drop a tear for Lambert? If they lament the fate of Dessewfy, why not regret the murder of Zichy? If they mourn for the officers executed on the 6th of October, why not commemorate the hundreds of Saxons, Wallachs, and Slaves shot in cold blood? Is every murder done by a revolutionist an act of just vengeance, and is every execution of a rebel a wanton murder? So it would seem, if Red Republican innovations upon language are to be accepted as standard authority. For the rest, the conduct of so many of the persons who were the subjects of the mercy of Pius the Ninth, and who pledged their *honor* that they would never again molest his government, shows that mercy to the ringleaders of a rebellion may be cruelty to the people, who, after all, are the real sufferers in these risings. The instigators generally contrive to fill their pockets, and escape.

We have said little in praise of the Magyars, because enough has been said in their favor already, so that we were not obliged to step out of our way to load them with pleasant epithets. The people have been shamefully deceived concerning the merits of the late war, and about the relations which have always subsisted between the Magyars and Austria on the one hand, and the Slaves on the other. But the notion entertained here touching the Magyar character is substantially correct. That strange people have nearly all the vices and the virtues which belong to the epoch of chivalry. The Magyar is brave, hospitable, and frank. His love of country is intense; so is his jealous regard for his "historical privileges," which make up the freedom he covets. The views which we have given of the Magyars necessarily follow from the peculiar investigation which we proposed to ourselves when we began this paper. We might select another stand-point, which would give us occasion to say much in their favor, and little in their dispraise. Our purpose has been to characterize events, not to discuss nationalities, either favorably or unfavorably, and we have endeavored to write as a Christian American, not as a Slave, an Austrian, or a Magyar.

ART. III. — *Correspondence of the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Webster, Secretary of State. Communicated to the Senate by the President, December 30, 1850. The Daily Globe. Washington, D. C. Jan. 1, 1851.*

WE have devoted in the preceding and present numbers of this journal considerable space to the discussion of the late Hungarian rebellion, and have shown, what an able contemporary* has also shown, that the American sympathy with it, on the ground that it was a movement in favor of popular institutions similar to our own, was wholly misplaced, for it was not, in the American sense, either democratic or republican. But, after all, this is only an *argumentum ad hominem*, and only proves that the sympathizers are inconsistent with themselves. We are disposed to take higher ground, and to maintain that if the Magyar rebellion had been in favor of democracy, or republican institutions like our own, the sympathy expressed with it would equally have been misplaced. A rebellion for democracy or republicanism is as unjustifiable as a rebellion for aristocracy or monarchy. The end does not justify the means, and whether a given rebellion is stirred up for the purpose of establishing one form of government or another has nothing to do with its justice or injustice.

The Magyar movement was a rebellion, — a rebellion against the Emperor of Austria, both as Emperor of Austria and as King of Hungary. It is not true, either in fact or in law, as some would persuade us, that Hungary was an independent nation, having no connection with the Austrian empire but the mere accidental union of the crowns of each in the same person. Hungary was an integral part of the empire, and owed allegiance to the Emperor as Emperor of Austria, as well as King of Hungary. She had, it is true, a national Diet or parliament under her king, for purely civil administration; but the administration of her finances and the command of her military were vested in the Emperor, not merely in the King, and pertained to the imperial chancery at Vienna. Whether, then, the Magyars attempted to subvert the authority of the Emperor of Austria, or of the King of Hungary, they were alike rebels, and, as they attempted to subvert both,

* *The North American Review.*

they were undeniably rebels, and their movement a rebellion, in the strictest sense of the word.

We do not say that a rebellion is never in any case or under any circumstances justifiable; but we do say that a rebellion for the purpose of changing the form of government, whether from a monarchy to a republic or from an aristocracy to a democracy, whether from a democracy to an aristocracy or from a republic to a monarchy, is always unjustifiable, and the highest crime known to the law; for all these several forms of government may be legitimate and also illegitimate, and no one of them is *per se* more legitimate or illegitimate than another. There is no one form of government that has the right to establish itself everywhere, or that is universally obligatory. The popular or republican form in certain times and places may be legitimate, and most certainly is so in this country; but it is not the only legitimate form of government possible. Monarchical forms are as legitimate in Great Britain, Spain, and Austria, as republican forms are with us. None of the recognized forms of government are *per se* in contravention of the Divine law or of the natural rights of men, or *per se* tyrannical and oppressive, and therefore resistance to any one of them on the part of its subjects can never *per se* be lawful, or otherwise than criminal. Monarchy is *per se* no more in contravention of natural right or of natural freedom than is democracy, and hence it is as criminal to rebel against monarchy for the sake of instituting democracy, as it is to rebel against democracy for the sake of instituting monarchy.

If rebellion is ever justifiable, it is only for reasons independent of the form of the government. Undoubtedly, the people of a given country, when the previous authority has been subverted, and there is no longer either in fact or in law any existing political order, may reconstitute government in such form as they judge best; but they can never lawfully overthrow an established government for the sake of adopting another political form, even though fully persuaded of its superiority. The right, if such right there be, to subvert an existing government, never grows out of its form, but out of the fact that by tyranny and oppression the historical authority has lost its legitimacy. The American Congress of 1776 did not set forth that George the Third was a king, and they wanted a republican government; they did not declare the Colonies absolved from

their allegiance to the crown of Great Britain, on the ground that republicanism is the natural right of every people, and no people can ever owe allegiance to a monarchy. The moral sense of the Colonies and of the whole world would have been outraged by such a declaration. Even Mr. Jefferson adopted for his motto, not "Resistance to kings," but "Resistance to tyrants, is obedience to God." The Congress, in setting forth to the world their reasons for dissolving the connection of the Colonies with the mother country, did not draw up a list of facts which go to prove that George the Third was a king, but a list of grievances which, in their judgment, proved him a tyrant; and it is not on the ground that he is a king, but that he is a tyrant, that they conclude the Colonies are absolved from their allegiance to him, and are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, on the principle, as they imply, but do not expressly state, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance.

Even on genuine American principles, the fact that the Magyars were rebels, or even rebels against monarchy in favor of democracy, was not enough to render them worthy of American sympathy. The defence of the American Revolution is not that it resisted the king, but that it resisted the tyrant; not that it was a struggle for republicanism, but a struggle for liberty. Its glory is not that it resisted authority, but that it resisted tyranny, or an authority which had by its own conduct forfeited its rights; and that glory is neither enhanced nor diminished by the fact that it eventuated in the establishment of a republican form of government. The Magyars, therefore, whether they proposed to establish a popular form of government or not, before they could, on American principles, have any claim to the sympathy of Americans, or of any body except rebels, cutthroats, and assassins, must prove that they were not resisting legitimate authority, received as such by the laws and historical rights of the empire, but simply tyranny and oppression; that the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary had by his long-continued misrule forfeited the allegiance of his subjects, and that only by casting him off, and taking up arms against him, could they shelter themselves from grievous oppression, and secure the enjoyment of the inalienable or natural rights of man. This they did not do, and this they, it is well known, could not do; for they were themselves the aggressors, the party that

oppressed, or sought to oppress, both their sovereign and their Sclavic dependents.

It is precisely in its overlooking the doctrine we have here asserted, and in assuming the lawfulness of any rebellion against monarchy in favor of popular government, that we are obliged to except to Mr. Secretary Webster's defence of the sympathy manifested by the American government and people with the Magyar rebellion, in answer to Mr. Hulsemann's protest against it in the name of the Austrian government. We are not competent to enter into the intrinsic merits of the controversy between Austria and the United States. It may be that Austria had no just cause of complaint, but we may say, that Mr. Webster, in attempting to prove it, takes a stand which strikes us as extraordinary, indefensible, and extremely dangerous.

The facts in the case, as we understand them, are, that our government, sympathizing itself with the Magyar rebellion, and importuned by Magyar agents and a portion of our own people, pending the struggle of Austria to reduce the rebellious Magyars to their allegiance, sent a Mr. Dudley Mann as an agent, authorized, if after inquiry he judged it proper, to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary, and to conclude a commercial treaty with it. Mr. Mann's instructions, drawn up in terms highly complimentary to the Magyar rebels, and any thing, to say the least, but respectful to Austria and her Russian ally, were subsequently communicated by the President to the Senate, printed by its order, and as a matter of course published to the world. On their being published, Austria complains that sending such an agent with such instructions, drawn up in terms offensive to the Imperial Cabinet, was a violation of the policy of non-intervention, which our government professed; that the explanation given by Mr. Clayton, Mr. Webster's predecessor, that the agent was sent merely for the purpose of making inquiries, did not accord with the fact, for he was sent, as appears from the instructions themselves, with authority to recognize, if he saw proper, the Hungarian republic, and conclude with it a commercial treaty; and that even if it were so, it does not sufficiently explain the cause of the anxiety that was felt to ascertain the chances of the revolutionists.

Mr. Webster replies, that, admitting the facts to be as alleged, they are no just ground of complaint, and says,

that he "asserts to Mr. Hulsemann and the Imperial Cabinet, in presence of the world, that the steps taken by President Taylor, now protested against by the Austrian government, were warranted by the law of nations, and agreeable to the usages of civilized states." It must be so, we suppose, or Mr. Webster would not so solemnly assert it; but he must pardon us for telling him, that, if we take it to be so, it is on his authority, and not on his reasoning. We do not claim to be very familiar with the law of nations or the usages of civilized states; but it strikes us that Mr. Webster argues, instead of the case before him, another somewhat analogous to it. He speaks of our *neutral* duties, and contends that we did nothing not permitted to *neutral* nations. This may be so, but he cannot be unaware, it is presumed, that the law of neutrals does not strictly apply to the case of a struggle on the part of a sovereign to put down a rebellion against his authority. A nation is regarded as *neutral* when it does not intervene in a war between two belligerents, each of whom has the right of war and peace. It is neutral, because it sides with neither party in the war; but though not free as a neutral nation to side with either party in the war, it is free to recognize both parties in all other respects, and to maintain amicable relations with both, without giving offence to either. But in the case of a sovereign engaged in putting down a rebellion, there is for the non-intervening nation only one party, and neutrality requires at least two parties besides the neutral party. Independent nations are known, and in fact exist to each other, only through their respective governments. The nation is only in its sovereign authority, and relation can be had with its provinces or departments only in and through that authority. The fact that these provinces or departments are in a state of rebellion does not at all relax this rule, but, so far as it affects it at all, renders it more stringent and violations of it less pardonable. The presumption in all cases is, that the authority is in the right, and its rights are as sacred and inviolable when engaged in putting down a rebellion as at any other time, and it is for us the entire nation then, as much as when all its subjects are faithful to their allegiance. The nation, in view of the non-intervening power, is still one nation, however rent by internal divisions, and is still in the sovereign authority. There is then no neu-

trality in the case, because the nation presents to the recognition of the non-intervening state only one party, and as long as this state chooses to abide by the policy of non-intervention, it must *ignore* the rebels, and maintain no sort of relations with them, because the recognition of them would be itself an act of intervention. There is, then, an obvious difference between the law of neutrals, and the law applicable to the conduct of non-intervening states towards a friendly power engaged in suppressing a rebellion among its subjects. Neutral nations may recognize and hold friendly intercourse with both belligerents, save in what directly relates to the war raging between them; but non-intervening states in a civil war can know and hold intercourse only with one party, the authority engaged in suppressing the rebellion. Even if we did nothing in the late Hungarian rebellion not permitted to neutrals in a war between two independent sovereigns, it does not therefore necessarily follow that we did nothing not permitted to a non-intervening state in a war waged by a sovereign to suppress a rebellion, or reduce his subjects to their allegiance.

The fallacy in the reasoning of many on this subject arises from their allowing themselves to consider the war only from the point of view of the rebels, and to look upon it as a resistance to aggression, in defence of acknowledged rights. Even conceding that there may be cases where this is so, the presumption always is that it is not so; for the presumption is always in favor of authority. The non-intervening state must always look at the war as a war legitimately waged by the sovereign to suppress rebellion, to assert his rights, and maintain peace and good order in his dominions. To go beyond this, to judge the sovereign, and to decide against him, and in favor of his revolted subjects, is itself an act of intervention, of which he has the right to complain, even though it is followed by no other act of intervention. Doubtless one nation may form and express a judgment on the conduct of another nation, and may even go so far as to acknowledge the right and the independence of the rebel government, but not if it professes to remain on friendly terms with the authority rebelled against, and to take no part in its disputes with its subjects.

Mr. Webster says, — “ If the United States had gone so

far as formally to acknowledge the independence of Hungary, although, as the event has proved, it would have been a precipitate step, and from which no good could have resulted to either party, it would not, nevertheless, have been an act against the law of nations, provided they took no part in her contest with Austria." But such recognition is itself a taking part in the contest, and a very grave part; for often the bare recognition by a powerful state of the independence of a revolutionary government may be decisive of the contest, the weight thrown into the revolutionary scale that causes it to preponderate, and without which it would not have preponderated. "It is not required of neutral powers," Mr. Webster adds, "that they await the recognition of the new government by the parent state. No principle of public law has been more frequently acted upon within the last thirty years by the great powers of the world than this. Within that period eight or ten new states have established independent governments within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain, and in Europe the same thing has been done by Belgium and Greece. The existence of these states was recognized by some of the leading powers of Europe, as well as by the United States, before it was acknowledged by the states from which they had separated themselves." Conceding the facts here alleged, Mr. Webster's conclusion is not inevitable. The facts he cites hardly sustain him. What the United States may have done, as they are the party accused, must for the present be put out of the question, for no nation can say, when accused of violating the law of nations, I did formerly an act of the same nature as that of which I am now accused, therefore the act for which you arraign me is lawful. No one nation makes the law of nations, and the fact that one, two, or three nations, even though leading nations, have done this or that, is not sufficient to establish a precedent. No usage can be cited as a precedent, unless it has in its favor the general consent of Christian nations.

The instances Mr. Webster cites are either not in point, or at best doubtful as precedents. Belgium and Greece are not to his purpose. Belgium, for certain public considerations, was attached to the dominions of the king of the Netherlands by the allied sovereigns on the general pacification of Europe, after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo,

and her independence, after her revolution, excited by that of France, in 1830, was acknowledged by the joint action of these same allied sovereigns, who were as competent to separate her, when they judged proper, from the dominions of the king of the Netherlands, as they were to annex her to them. All the right the Dutch king ever had to Belgium was derived from them, and they of course were competent to unmake the right they had created, when the reasons which had led them to create it no longer existed, or paramount reasons required them to unmake it. Greece, again, is no case in point. She was a Christian nation, held in subjection by a Mahometan, that is, an infidel power, and the right of an infidel power to hold a Christian nation in subjection was never recognized by the public law of Christendom. The Turk never had any legitimate authority over Greece, and Christian nations were always free, if they chose, to intervene for her restoration to freedom and independence, and therefore, assuredly, to acknowledge and guaranty her independence when she herself asserted it. There has, in fact, never been peace between Christendom and the Mahometan world; there has hitherto been only an occasional truce, and if there are now some indications of peace, it is because Islamism has relaxed somewhat of its intolerance, or become too weak to be aggressive.

The case of the Spanish American states is doubtful as a precedent. Mr. Canning on the part of England, we grant, did acknowledge their independence before Spain had done so, and even before she had abandoned all efforts to reduce them to their allegiance; but this he did in furtherance of a policy hostile to Spain, and avowedly to create an interest in the New World against her in the Old. We have never heard that Spain did not feel herself aggrieved by his act, and we have seen both its justice and wisdom denied by able and influential English writers. Instances in which powerful nations have taken advantage of the weakness or embarrassment of a power with whom they profess to be at peace, and acquiesced in by that power because she could not obtain redress by appeals to their sense of justice or honor, and was not in a condition to enforce it, are hardly to be cited as precedents, or regarded as warranted by the law of nations.

We, however, willingly concede that neutral powers

are not obliged in all cases to wait till the new government is recognized by the parent state, because such state may be unreasonably obstinate in refusing to acknowledge it, may persist in her claims long after there ceases to be any moral possibility of her enforcing them, and the interests of the civilized world, as well as of the new states themselves, may imperatively demand that the new state be admitted into the family of independent states. But they are bound to wait till the revolutionary state is independent in fact, — till the parent state has virtually abandoned the struggle, and there is no longer any probability of her renewing it with an issue favorable to her sovereignty. This is all we ask, but thus much we do ask, and we had always understood that so much was conceded even by our own government to be necessary to authorize it formally to recognize a revolutionary state. That such was the case with the Spanish American revolutionary governments, when they were formally acknowledged by England and the United States, we do not pretend, and therefore we should cite the act of these powers as a precedent to be shunned, not followed. But whatever may have been the case with these, such certainly was not the case with the Magyars. The Magyar revolutionary government, as the government of Hungary, was not at any time independent, or a government in fact. It was acknowledged by only a minority of the Hungarian population, and did not combine in its support the whole even of the Magyar race. It was even as to Hungary only a faction. It was opposed or looked upon coldly by the majority of the magnates of the land, to whom the principal authority in the local government belonged, and was opposed by a majority of the population of the territory over which it pretended to authority, and in arms against it. At the moment when Mr. Mann was accredited to it, it was attacked on the south and southeast by powerful armies of Hungarians, while Austria and Russia were entering it from the east, northeast, northwest, and west, with an overwhelming force. It was attacked on nine sides at once, and it is well known that the allied forces crushed it without a serious blow being struck. To say that Kossuth's government, supported only by a faction of the Hungarian people, always unable to make it assume a national character, and thus assailed on all quarters by powerful forces under brave and experienced

officers, — some of whom are unrivalled in modern times, save by Napoleon and Wellington, — was independent *in fact*, is simply ridiculous ; and to pretend that Austria had virtually abandoned the contest, and had no reasonable prospect of renewing it with an issue favorable to her sovereignty, is still more ridiculous. To have formally recognized its independence would have been an act sustained by none of the instances Mr. Webster cites, even giving them an interpretation the most favorable to his position they can possibly bear, and, it strikes us, manifestly unwarranted by the law of nations or the usages of civilized states. With all deference, then, to Mr. Webster, we must think that he goes farther than he is warranted in saying that, if the United States had formally acknowledged the independence of Hungary, it would not have been an act against the law of nations.

The well-known fact is, that our government was importuned by the Magyar agents and sympathizers to acknowledge the independence of the Magyar revolutionary government, not because it was independent in fact, but because they hoped such acknowledgment would aid it in becoming so, — not because Austria had abandoned the struggle, nor because her success was doubtful, but that it might become doubtful. They knew and felt that the Magyar cause, unless it could obtain direct or indirect foreign aid, was utterly hopeless. Direct aid, except from Red Republican volunteers, they could not at the moment expect ; but they hoped that, if they could, through the prospect of commercial advantages, induce this country together with Great Britain to acknowledge Hungarian independence, and form commercial treaties with Kossuth's government, it would enable the rebels to make the contest a national one, and prolong it till they might have a chance to obtain direct foreign intervention, in the shape of diplomacy, if not of subsidies ; and looking to the state of Europe at the time, we cannot doubt, if Kossuth could have contrived to continue the struggle some six or eight months longer, he would have had some chance of obtaining it. Through his Red Republican coadjutors in every country, he would not unlikely have succeeded in kindling a general war throughout Europe, and at its termination, she having been previously recognized by several of the belligerents, he might possibly have obtained the separation of Hungary from the

empire, as one of the conditions of a general pacification. Such undoubtedly was the hope of Kossuth and his friends, and to such a result looked expressly their policy of getting this country and Great Britain to acknowledge Hungarian independence; and it is not unlikely that it was foreseeing the possibility of such a result, that induced Austria to call in the aid of Russia to suppress the rebellion before the rebels could consummate any portion of their diplomatic policy, instead of relying on her own resources alone, which were amply sufficient against the Magyars, so long as she had only them to contend with. For us under the circumstances to have acknowledged Hungarian independence would have been to second the policy of Kossuth, to contribute to his chances of prolonging the contest, of kindling a general war, and robbing the Austrian empire of one of her richest provinces. It would not, in the first instance, indeed, have been an armed intervention, but it would nevertheless have been an intervention, a comforting and consorting with rebels, which, it strikes us, the law of nations does not warrant, and which are by no means agreeable to the usages of civilized states.

It is very true, our agent did not formally recognize the independence of the revolutionary government, and that he never even entered Hungary. The contest was decided by the time he reached Vienna, in reality before he left home, and it was too late to aid the rebels, or to form any arrangements with them advantageous to ourselves. His mission had failed in its main purpose, and nothing would have come of it, if President Taylor's Cabinet could have kept their own secret. But we must dissent from Mr. Clayton and Mr. Webster in the assertion that the mission was only, or even principally, a mission of inquiry. It was no more a mission of inquiry than is that of any agent sent abroad to recognize a foreign power, and, if practicable and advantageous, to form with it a commercial treaty. This is evident from the very language of Mr. Mann's instructions, as cited by Mr. Webster to prove the contrary. "The principal object the President has in view," say the instructions, as cited by Mr. Webster, "is to obtain minute and reliable information in regard to Hungary in connection with the affairs of surrounding countries, the probable issue of the present revolutionary movements, *and the chances we may have of forming commercial arrangements*

with that power favorable to the United States." And again, "The object of the President is to obtain information with regard to Hungary, and her resources and prospects, *with a view to an early recognition of her independence and the formation of commercial relations with her.*" It is clear from this, that the object of the government was the early recognition of the independence of Hungary, and the formation of commercial relations with her favorable to the United States. The information sought was sought merely as subsidiary to this end. If to obtain this information was the only object, or the principal object, of sending the agent, why was he accredited to Kossuth's government, and authorized, if he saw proper, to recognize it and conclude a commercial treaty with it? Why were his instructions drawn up in terms highly complimentary to the rebels, and reproachful to the Imperial government, — in terms which indicated a foregone conclusion? Information was no doubt wanted, — few cabinets have wanted information more than President Taylor's, — but the particular information it wanted in this case was whether it was too late to serve the revolutionary government, in its contest with the Imperial authority, and whether commercial advantages could be secured to ourselves by formally recognizing it and concluding a commercial treaty with it.

Mr. Webster contends that President Taylor's Cabinet was justified in the steps it took, by an example which he cites of the Imperial court. In the early part of our Revolutionary struggle, and while England was putting forth all her power to subdue us, an agent of the American Congress, he says, "was not only received with great respect by the ambassador of the Empress Queen at Paris, and by the minister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who afterwards mounted the Imperial throne, but resided in Vienna for a considerable time; *not, indeed, officially acknowledged*, but treated with courtesy and respect; and the Emperor suffered himself to be persuaded by that agent to exert himself to prevent the German powers from furnishing troops to England to enable her to suppress the rebellion in America. Neither Mr. Hulsemann nor the Cabinet of Vienna, it is presumed, will undertake to say that any thing said or done by this government, in regard to the recent war between Austria and Hungary, is not borne out, and more than borne out, by this example of the Imperial

court." The example of Joseph the Second, the Emperor here referred to, has little weight with us, and can have little weight with an Austrian, for he is well known through the greater part of his life, to have departed widely from the traditions of the house of Hapsburg. He was a half French philosopher, a bold innovator, a revolutionist on the throne, whose authority in founding precedents we hardly expected such a man as Mr. Webster to recognize. But there is, it strikes us, a wide difference between treating with courtesy and respect, as a private gentleman, a person who happens to be, but who is not officially recognized to be, an agent from a revolutionary government, and appointing and sending out an agent to such a government, with instructions drawn up in terms highly complimentary to it and reproachful to the government against which it is in arms, and authorized, in a certain contingency, to recognize its independence, and conclude a commercial treaty with it. The Emperor, moreover, at the instance of the agent, performed no act that was not *required* by his position as a neutral power; for all he is said to have done was simply to exert himself to prevent the German princes, that is, the princes that acknowledged him as Emperor, from intervening in favor of England. He was not bound to intervene in the quarrel between England and her Colonies, and to advise, as Emperor, the princes of his empire not to intervene against us by furnishing troops to England to aid her in subduing us, was simply not intervening, and England had no more cause to complain than Austria would have had to complain of the Federal government in case it had exerted itself, if they had been so disposed, and had had the power to do so, to prevent the several States of this Union from furnishing her troops to enable her to put down the rebellion in Hungary. The example of the Imperial court does not, therefore, appear to us to bear out, or indeed to have any bearing on, the conduct of President Taylor's Cabinet.

Mr. Webster expresses great indignation at Mr. Hulsemann's suggestion, that they who took the responsibility of sending out Mr. Mann exposed him to be treated as a spy. He denies that Mr. Mann was a spy, and says, — "To give this odious name and character to a confidential agent of a neutral power, bearing the commission of his country, and sent for a purpose fully warranted by the law of

nations, is not only to abuse language, but also to confound all just ideas, and to announce the wildest and most extravagant notions." Certainly, if "sent for a purpose fully warranted by the law of nations," but not so certainly, if sent to tamper with rebels contrary to the law of nations. "Had the Imperial government of Austria subjected Mr. Mann to the treatment of a spy," Mr. Webster adds, "it would have placed itself out of the pale of civilized nations; and the Cabinet of Vienna may be assured, that if it had carried, or attempted to carry, any such lawless purpose into effect, in the case of an authorized agent of this government, the spirit of the people of this country would have demanded immediate hostilities to be waged by the utmost exertion of the power of the republic, military and naval." Perhaps so. But if Mr. Mann at Vienna, with instructions hostile to Austria, and his credentials to her rebellious subjects in his pocket, and seeking information as to her policy and movements with a view of using it against her to the advantage of her rebellious subjects in arms against her, was not a spy, what was he? We are far from certain that he was not a spy in the full legal sense of the term, for a spy, we take it, is a secret emissary in the camp or dominions of one belligerent, communicating with traitors, or seeking information of its resources, intentions, plans, and operations, with a view to the interests of its enemies, or the other belligerent, all of which was true of Mr. Mann, as is evident from the very face of his instructions. He was sent especially to collect information in the dominions of Austria, with a view of using it against her and in favor of her rebellious subjects, as is undeniable; what was he, then, but a spy? The fact that he was a confidential agent of our government, acting under its authority, could not alter the nature of his errand, and only implicated our government itself in his unlawful doings. But be this as it may, if, as Austria contends, and Mr. Webster, in our judgment, fails to disprove, the agent or emissary despatched was despatched on an unlawful mission, that is, a mission not warranted by the law of nations, the commission of his government could not protect him. If, then, Austria had apprehended him within her jurisdiction, she could have punished him according to the nature of his offence, without his government having either the right to protect him or to complain; for it could

claim no right in virtue of its own wrong. Mr. Webster's indignation seems to us, therefore, unwarranted, and his threat, which would have been more dignified if the dominions of Austria were contiguous to our own, or she were more formidable as a naval power, wholly uncalled for.

Finally, Mr. Webster takes the ground that Austria has no right to complain of the instructions to Mr. Mann, however reproachful to her, because they were instructions of the government to its own agent. This is undoubtedly tenable ground, so long as they remained confined to the government and its agent, and were unknown beyond; but not at all since they are published to the world. Austria complains of the instructions only inasmuch as they have received publicity. They were communicated by the President to the Senate, and by the Senate printed and published. They are, when published, addressed to the world, and Austria has now a perfect right to question the government concerning them. Mr. Webster says, "With respect to the communication of Mr. Mann's instructions to the Senate, and the language in which they were couched, it has already been said, and Mr. Hulsemann must feel the justice of the remark, that there are domestic affairs in reference to which the government of the United States cannot admit the slightest responsibility to the government of his Imperial Majesty." Very true, so long as they remain purely domestic affairs; but Mr. Webster forgets that, when published to the world, they cease to be purely domestic affairs, and become public, and as public the government is of course responsible for them. This is only common sense and common justice, and Mr. Webster himself maintained the same, some years since, when the doctrine he now opposes to Mr. Hulsemann was put forth by General Jackson in one of his messages to Congress.

We are pleased to find Mr. Clay taking in the Senate the same ground that we do. "It is true," he says, on the motion for printing an extra number of copies of the correspondence, "it is true that in some sense a communication between the President of the United States and Congress, or either branch of it, is a domestic document, but the moment it is published it is transmitted to every quarter of the globe; and I think, if we look into the history of our diplomacy, we shall find unquestionable precedents where foreign governments have been called to an account for acts which

were somewhat, if not wholly, of a domestic character. Even occurrences of the day, as seen in the periodicals of the country, have been the subject of diplomatic action. Sir, does the fact that it is of a domestic character limit its publicity? It is published throughout the world; if you say any thing in that document which another government must feel as a reproach, is it any consolation to reflect that, while the whole world knows what you have said disparagingly of her, the whole world knows that it was a domestic matter?" The fact is, the moment the document is published, it ceases to be domestic, and becomes a public document, and is to be treated as such.

We do not, therefore, think Mr. Webster's reply *proves* that Austria had no cause of complaint, or that "the steps taken by President Taylor's Cabinet, which she now protests against, were warranted by the law of nations and agreeable to the usages of civilized states." Whether they did in fact violate the law of nations and lawful usages or not, it is not within our province to decide, but we may, we trust, without rashness or indecorum, be permitted to suggest, that, if those steps were not absolutely unlawful, or more than other powers have sometimes suffered themselves to take, they are such as no high-minded or honorable government would ever take against a power to whom it professed to be friendly, who had never given it the slightest cause of complaint, and whose friendship it wished to retain. They show that all the sympathies of the government were with the rebellious Magyars, and that it was willing to aid them all it could without an open rupture with their rightful sovereign. They show that the government had no sincere friendship for Austria, no esteem for her character, no respect for her rights, no sympathy with her noble efforts to maintain the cause of authority and law against rebellion and anarchy,—in a word, they show that it cared nothing for her, the only party it had, as a non-intervening power, any right to know in the contest, and was solicitous only for the success of her rebellious subjects. An astute lawyer may, perhaps, show that we technically violated, in our ungenerous and dishonorable conduct, no law of nations; but sure are we, that if the cases had been reversed, and we had been in the place of Austria and she in ours, Mr. Secretary Webster would have taken a different view of the question, and addressed

a protest against her doings in terms not more courteous, and far more energetic, than Austria has seen proper to adopt. "Sir," said Mr. Clay, in his remarks in the Senate on Mr. Webster's answer, "any interference, no matter how cautious, how *legitimate*, it may be, in the affairs of a great government which is engaged in a contest with any of its departments, is one of great delicacy. We have only to reverse the positions in which we are relatively placed to appreciate it. Suppose any one of the States of this Union were in revolt against the general government, and any European power should send an agent here for the purpose of obtaining information, even such as that which our agent was sent to Hungary to procure, certainly it would create a great deal of feeling throughout the United States." Most assuredly it would, and if Austria had sent such an agent, accredited to the revolted State, with instructions, drawn up in a tone of decided hostility to the general government, to recognize, in a certain contingency, the independence of the rebels, and to form commercial arrangements with them, and had afterwards published the fact, together with these instructions, to the world, we cannot doubt that Mr. Webster would have found little difficulty in maintaining that her conduct was by no means "warranted by the law of nations," or "agreeable to the usages of civilized states"; and if, during the struggle, we had found her emissary lurking about our court or camp, there is just as little doubt that we should have hung him, as General Jackson hung Arbuthnot and Ambrister.

But all this by the way. Our purpose was not to prove the insufficiency of Mr. Webster's reply to the Chevalier Hulsemann, to inculcate our own government, or to vindicate the justice of the Austrian protest. It was for a far different purpose that we introduced the correspondence between the two governments. It was to point out a far graver fault on the part of Mr. Webster than that of inconclusive reasoning, namely, that of attempting to defend the sympathy of the American government and people with European rebels in general, and the Magyar rebels in particular, on a ground fatal to all political right and social order. Mr. Webster, as representing the government, might feel himself called upon to make the best defence in his power of the steps taken by President Taylor's Cabinet, even if he did not personally approve them; but we cannot excuse him for

attempting to do it on principles, which must not only be an aggravation of the offence complained of by Austria, but absolutely ruinous to his own government, and which it cannot accept without placing itself out of the pale of civilized nations.

The policy of our government under Washington, and which was commended to us by the father of his country in his "Farewell Address," was that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations. In those purer days of the Republic, to which President Taylor proposed to restore the administration of the government, and the history of which it is rumored Mr. Webster is engaged in writing, we proceeded on the principle of adopting and maintaining for ourselves such political forms and institutions as we judged most appropriate to our peculiar position, and best adapted to our national character and interests, and of leaving to other nations to do the same for themselves, each in its own individual case. We were sturdy republicans for ourselves; but we recognized, in themselves considered, the equal legitimacy of all forms of government, and claimed only that the republican was the legal and best form for us. We were republicans for ourselves, without proposing or claiming to be republicans for the whole world. We recognized in every independent people, what, indeed, is the essence of independence, the right of self-government, that is, the right of determining its own form of political constitution, undictated to by any other people; and we also recognized the rights of authority, and the duty of the people to obey it in the legal discharge of its legal functions, that is, we recognized the allegiance of every people to the sovereign authority of the state, however constituted, or their strict obligation to obey the laws. We defended our own act of separation from the crown of Great Britain, not on modern revolutionary principles, but on legal principles, — on the ground that George the Third had by his tyranny broken the compact between him and the Colonies; that is, had by his own act, against our repeated remonstrances and protests, himself absolved us from our allegiance. Whether our defence was successful or not is nothing to the present question; certain it is, the principle we asserted is a sound one, and if we erred in its application to facts, whatever defect in our title that error occasioned was supplied the moment that the British crown acknowledged

our independence. From that moment, at least, our government was legal, and we asserted it on legal principles, and no more asserted or conceded the misnamed right of insurrection or rebellion than do monarchical governments themselves. Like all governments, we asserted the principle of legitimacy, of authority, for ourselves, and recognized it in all independent governments. We thus placed ourselves in harmony with the civilized world, and could recognize and treat with governments, and be recognized and treated with by them, on terms of mutual esteem and respect, although their constitution of the sovereign power was different from our own.

Unhappily, of late years we have shown a disposition to depart from this sound principle and wholesome policy, and have come in some measure to regard ourselves as the representatives of a political system, and the political system we represent as the only system which, here or anywhere else, is or can be legitimate. Rebellion of the people against other systems in favor of ours, we assume to be everywhere lawful, and to be discountenanced, if discountenanced at all, only where it is imprudent, that is, where it has not a reasonable prospect of succeeding. On this principle we encouraged, indirectly, at least, the Spanish American colonies to revolt from the mother country, and prematurely acknowledged their independence; wrested Texas from Mexico and annexed it to the Union; and have intrigued with the democrats of Cuba, and sought to do the same with the Queen of the Antilles. On this principle we invaded Mexico, for if there had been no movement in Mexico to reëstablish monarchy, it cannot be doubted that we should have had no war with that republic; and it is remarkable, that the first thing we did after crossing the Rio Grande was to displace the monarchical party, and restore the republican party to power. And on this same principle, also, we sympathize, both government and people, with the rebels of all countries, and rejoice at their victories over legitimate authority, historical rights, and the brave defenders of law, of order, of liberty, and of society.

Mr. Webster, considering his antecedents, is the last man in the country that we should have suspected of a disposition to indorse this most dangerous principle, so utterly repugnant to justice and civilization. Yet, unless we have

wholly mistaken his answer to the protest of the Austrian government, he has fully indorsed it, and supported it in the clear and forcible language which belongs to his character. This is the principal fault we lay to his charge. Speaking of the deep interest taken by this country in the recent European revolutionary movements, he says,—“The undersigned goes farther, and freely admits, that in proportion as these extraordinary events appeared to have their origin in those great ideas of responsible and popular governments, on which the American constitutions themselves are wholly founded, they could not but command the warm sympathy of the people of this country. Well-known circumstances in their history, indeed their whole history, have made them the representatives of purely popular principles of government. In this light they stand before the world. They could not, if they would, conceal their character, their condition, or their destiny.” This will bear but one interpretation, for Mr. Webster is not merely stating a fact; he is assuming a postulate, from which he infers the justice of that sympathy of our government and people, as we have said, with European rebels in general, and Magyar rebels in particular, which had induced the steps against which Mr. Hulsemann, in the name of Austria, had protested. It could be no justification of that sympathy, except on the principle of the exclusive legality everywhere of purely popular principles of government. Not otherwise could sympathy with rebellious movements be defensible on the ground of their appearing to originate “in those great ideas of responsible and popular governments, on which the American constitutions themselves are wholly founded.” Moreover, on no other principle could it be maintained that such sympathy is justifiable, because the American people are “the representatives of purely popular principles of government.” If they are representatives of such principles only for their own country, without questioning the legality of other forms of government for other countries, this would be no reason why they should sympathize with rebellions in other countries in favor of popular principles of government, or why they should not hold the overthrow of monarchy in France, Italy, Germany, and Austria to be as great a crime, and as great a calamity, as would be the overthrow of democracy or republicanism in the United States. If they must sympathize with re-

bellions against monarchy in favor of democracy, because they are representatives of purely popular principles of government, it can be so only because they represent such principles not for themselves only, but for the world, that is, assert the exclusive legality of such principles, and deny the legality of all others, or, in plain words, maintain that every government except the democratic is *per se* a tyranny, and may lawfully be subverted by its subjects, wherever they are able to do so.

That this is no forced interpretation of Mr. Webster's language would seem to be evinced by his contrasting the position of the United States, as the representative of one system, with that of the European sovereigns supposed to represent another, and by his concluding from the fact that, as he alleges, they have denounced the popular principles on which the rights of our government are founded without remonstrance from us or disturbing our equanimity, so they should not remonstrate, or suffer their equanimity to be disturbed, when we denounce the principles on which they rest their rights. Thus he says:—

“ The position thus belonging to the United States is a fact as inseparable from their history, their constitutional organization, and their character, as the opposite position of the powers composing the European Alliance is from the history and constitutional organization of the governments of those powers. The sovereigns who form that alliance have not unfrequently felt it their right to interfere with the political movements of foreign states; and have in their manifestoes and declarations denounced the popular ideas of the age, in terms so comprehensive as of necessity to include the United States and their forms of government. It is well known that one of the leading principles announced by the allied sovereigns after the restoration of the Bourbons is, that all popular or constitutional rights are holden no otherwise than as grants and indulgences from crowned heads. ‘ Useful and necessary changes in legislation and administration,’ says the Laybach Circular of May, 1841, ‘ ought only to emanate from the free will and intelligent conviction of those whom God has rendered responsible for power; all that deviates from this line necessarily leads to disorder, commotions, and evils far more insufferable than those which they pretend to remedy.’ And his late Austrian Majesty, Francis the First, is reported to have declared in an address to the Hungarian Diet, in 1826, that ‘ the whole world had become foolish, and, leaving their ancient laws, was in search of imaginary constitutions.’ *These declarations amount to nothing less than a denial of the lawfulness*

of the origin of the American government, since it is certain that the government was established in consequence of a change which did not proceed from thrones, or the permission of crowned heads. But the government heard these denunciations of *its fundamental principles* without remonstrance, or disturbance of its equanimity."

This fully confirms all that we have said, and proves that Mr. Webster regards the two systems of government as fundamentally antagonistic, so that the legitimacy of the one cannot be proclaimed anywhere without denying the legitimacy of the other. But this cannot be the case, unless each is exclusive, and asserts itself as the only legitimate form of government throughout the world, not only where it has the historical right, but equally where it has not, and its opponent has. Consequently he must hold, that, according to the principles of our government, all political systems but our own have no rights, are unlawful, and may be lawfully subverted by rebellion. This must be his doctrine, for he defends sympathy with rebellion against monarchy in behalf of popular government without any limitation, and solely on the ground that it is in behalf of popular government, and he is too good a moralist to hold that sympathy with wrong is ever defensible, and too distinguished a lawyer and a statesman to maintain that a rebellion against legitimate authority, that is, *rightful* authority, is ever right.

It is only on the ground that our government is founded, not merely on the right of a popular form of government here where there was no historical right against it, but on its right to found itself everywhere in opposition to the existing government differently constituted, that Mr. Webster can establish any fundamental antagonism between the principles of our government and the declarations of the allied sovereigns of Europe. He says it is certain that our government "was established in consequence of a change which did not proceed from thrones, or the permission of crowned heads." This is not precisely true, if we believe the Revolutionary Congress of 1776; for that declares the Colonies were absolved from their allegiance to the crown of Great Britain by the act or acts of George the Third, who was a crowned head, and he would be a bold man who, on any recognized principles of public or constitutional law, would undertake to maintain the strict legality of the American government prior to the acknowl-

edgment of its independence by the king of Great Britain. But waiving this, conceding all that Mr. Webster asserts as to the origin of our own government, his conclusion does not follow; for the allied sovereigns do not say, and never have said, that none but monarchical forms of government can be legal, and that no legislative or administrative changes are lawful unless they "proceed from thrones, or the permission of crowned heads." Even as Mr. Webster himself cites them, they only say that such changes "ought only to emanate from the free will and intelligent conviction of *those whom God has rendered responsible for power*," that is, from the sovereign or the supreme authority of the state. Does Mr. Webster himself deny this? Did he, when formerly Secretary of State, deny it, and recognize the legitimacy of Mr. Dorr's rebellion in Rhode Island? Did he deny it before the Supreme Court of the United States, when employed as counsel in a case which turned on this very principle? Was it not, and did not he, with ourselves and all other friends of law and order in the country who expressed their views on that rebellion, maintain that it was, precisely the vice of Mr. Dorr's constitution, that it did *not* emanate from the free will and intelligent conviction of the sovereign authority of Rhode Island, but from a band of real, though not very sanguinary, rebels, who formed it without historical right, and undertook to enforce it against the will of the government already existing? Is it necessary for us at this day, even after the decision of the highest tribunals known to our laws, to defend Rhode Island, and to prove that, in suppressing the Dorr rebellion, she did not violate the fundamental principles of the American *state*, and that too against such a lawyer and statesman as Mr. Secretary Webster?

Mr. Webster cannot be ignorant that the leading principle which he says was announced by the allied sovereigns after the restoration of the Bourbons, that "popular or constitutional rights are holden no otherwise than as grants and indulgences from crowned heads," was not announced as a universal principle, but as a special principle applicable only to the monarchical states of Europe, and was the simple statement of an historical fact, known to every decently-read man on the subject to be an historical fact, rather than the announcement of a principle at all. If we

recollect aright, it was not even then stated as a reason against such rights, but as a reason for granting or confirming them. At least such is the fact with regard to the charter granted by Louis the Eighteenth of France, one of those sovereigns, to his subjects, after his restoration to the throne of his ancestors, in the preamble to which it is set forth. At any rate, it had, it could have, and was intended to have, no application to this country, where monarchy had no historical rights. Mr. Webster should not have confounded the statement of a fact with the announcement of a principle, nor the announcement of a special with the announcement of a universal principle. The allied sovereigns have on no occasion announced any principle that denies the lawfulness of our government, unless we so assert our government as to deny the lawfulness of every other not constituted like it. They have denounced the popular ideas of the age, we grant, but not "in terms so comprehensive as of necessity to include the United States, and their forms of government," for they have never denied the legality of popular government as such. They have denied its legality only when it attempts to assert itself in opposition to established law and historical right, and we, who yield to no man in our republicanism, or in our loyalty to our government, have done and still do as much, and so must every American citizen who knows the distinction between a sovereign state and a mob, or a legal convention and an electioneering caucus. That they have denounced, in denouncing the popular ideas of the age, doctrines which many of our people have imbibed, and in accordance with which there is a strong tendency among us at present to interpret our constitutions, is no doubt true, but those doctrines are not the foundation of our forms of government; they are irreconcilably hostile to them, as no man knows better, or on occasions feels more deeply, than Mr. Webster himself, as it would be easy to collect from his support of the Fugitive Slave Law, and his denunciations of resistance to it.

Mr. Webster says that the allied sovereigns "have not unfrequently felt it their right to interfere with the political movements of foreign states," and he appears to wish to leave the impression, that they have interfered to put down popular government, and that, as they have done this, they ought not to complain when we only express our sym-

pathy with the various movements to establish such governments. We are not the apologists of the sovereigns of Europe, but we have no right to misrepresent them, and we must say that this statement, in the sense it appears to be made, is far from being correct. The allied sovereigns have, undoubtedly, interfered occasionally in the political movements of foreign states, but rarely, if ever, in the political movements of any foreign state without the invitation or consent of its sovereign, and never to put down popular government as such, nor at all where it could pretend even to a shadow of political or historical right. They have interfered against usurpers and rebels in defence of legal constitutions and historical rights, but never to put down a government merely because it was founded on popular principles. It is against illegality, against revolutionism, against the disrespect for undeniable historical and political rights, against disorder and anarchy, that they have interfered. If they have interfered with republicanism as such, why have they not interfered to suppress republicanism in Switzerland, in San Marino, and the Free Towns of Germany? No, the principle of intervention asserted by the allied sovereigns has been misunderstood, and often maliciously misrepresented. We in this country, instead of looking at the facts, and ascertaining the principle on which the sovereigns profess to act, have generally relied, without any critical examination, on the statements of European liberals, a class of men to whom truth is for the most part a stranger, and whose passions, prejudices, and purposes very naturally lead them to calumniate their sovereigns, against whom they are everywhere and continually conspiring, and who have so often thwarted their criminal attempts. The principle on which the sovereigns have interfered is respect for historical rights, and the preservation of liberty and social order in Europe. Where republicanism existed, and had an historical right to exist, they have respected republicanism; where monarchy survived, and had an historical right to reign, they have respected monarchy, and exerted themselves to put down its enemies. It does not therefore follow, because in defence of national constitutions and historical rights the allied sovereigns have frequently claimed the right to interfere to suppress usurpers and rebels, that they have no right to complain of us for everywhere sympathizing with usurpers

and rebels, with the party in arms against national constitutions and the historical rights of sovereignties, which we, as a government, are as much interested in maintaining as are the allied sovereigns themselves.

It may be asked, why these sovereigns have not left to each state the settlement of its own domestic affairs. It might as well be asked, why our government interfered to prevent the reëstablishment of monarchy in Mexico, and why the press has called upon it to interfere and put down monarchy in Cuba and in Hayti. The answer to the question is, that the intervention was necessary for the common good of all the states, and the preservation of social order in Europe. The several states were so connected one with another, that a convulsion could not occur in one without shaking another, and often the individual sovereign was too weak to suppress the revolutionists in his own dominions, aided as they were by their sympathizers in other states. If your children fire your house, and you will not or cannot extinguish its flames, I am not obliged to stand quiet and see it burn down, when it is so situated that it cannot burn down without burning down mine with it. I have the right to interfere and extinguish the flames, and if not able to do it alone, I have a right to call in my neighbors to help me. The principles and proceedings of the popular party in Europe were incompatible with civilization, inasmuch as they respected no public law, and attacked all political rights, and even social order itself. The European sovereigns entered into an alliance and intervened against them, because they asserted democracy as the only form of government that is or can anywhere be lawful; because they denied the lawfulness of kingly governments as such, and asserted the right of the people, and exerted themselves to induce the people to exercise the right, everywhere to rebel against monarchical governments, and overthrow them simply because monarchical; because they assumed the position and character of armed propagandists, and formed among themselves, as they do at this moment, a league or confederation in every country for the express purpose of revolutionizing all monarchical states. The sovereigns of Europe were bound, as the heirs of the historical rights of the European nations, and by their position and coronation oaths, to interfere, and, if possible, save the civilized world from its most

deadly enemies; and if they had not interfered, they would have been false to God and to society, and would have deserved the utter reprobation of every friend of civilization.

Now it is precisely sympathy with these banded European conspirators, these Jacobins, Red Republicans, Socialists, Carbonari, Freemasons, Illuminati, Friends of Light, or by whatever other name they may call themselves or be called by their opponents, and with their detestable principles and criminal movements, that Mr. Webster defends, and undeniably defends, on the ground that their principles are ours, and cannot be denounced without of necessity including the United States and their forms of government. That is, our institutions are founded on the denial of the lawfulness of all forms of government but the democratic, the assertion of the legality of the popular form of government universally, and the indefeasible right of the people everywhere to conspire, to rebel, against monarchy, in utter disregard of public law, or of historical rights, for the sake of establishing it! And this pernicious doctrine is put forth, not by some foreign refugee from the dungeon or the halter, not by some obscure radical desirous of attracting notoriety by the extravagancy of his paradoxes, but by the distinguished lawyer and statesman, Daniel Webster, and by him not as a private citizen, but as Secretary of State, by authority of the President of the United States, in a grave official document addressed to a foreign court in defence of the American government and people!

“Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.”

Here is our well-founded objection to Mr. Webster's reply to the Chevalier Hulsemann, — a reply which, though not so intended, really calumniates this country, and insults every loyal American citizen. It is in striking contrast with the principles and policy of Washington, the father of his country; and it adopts principles, and paves the way for a policy, to which we have been accustomed to regard Mr. Webster as the most strenuous and distinguished opponent among American statesmen. His intended defence, but real charge, we need not say, is unfounded, and we evidently cannot identify the principles of the American constitution and government with the

principles of the European rebels and revolutionists, without placing ourselves as a people out of the pale of civilized nations. We are, no doubt, a great people, in our way, but it behooves us to remember that we do not give law to the civilized world. The civilized world existed, civilized nations were constituted, public law was settled, and the principles and usages of civilization were determined, some centuries before we as an independent government were born. The fact of our existence has made no alteration in public law, or in the principles and usages of the civilized world; and we, in order to be a member of the civilized family, must not undertake to create anew public law and civilized usages, but conform to them as they existed before us. If we choose to arraign them, or to place ourselves in opposition to them, it is not other nations we uncivilize, but ourselves. The principles and movements of the European liberalists, or revolutionists, are, undeniably, in direct and systematic opposition to all law, — to the principles and usages of the whole civilized world, — and we cannot indorse them, and maintain that our government cannot be defended without defending them, and not maintain that our government stands opposed to the whole civilized world, and therefore is not itself a civilized government.

As an American citizen we protest against this foul dishonor to our government and principles. There is no occasion to appeal to those popular ideas of the age, denounced by the allied sovereigns of Europe, in order to vindicate the lawfulness of our government, and here no more than in Austria or Russia are the sacredness and inviolability of national constitutions or historical rights of authority denied. If, as a fact, the people intervened in forming our constitution, it was because there was here, after the acknowledgment of our independence, no other power that had a right to do it, and they violated no historical or already existing rights in doing it. As a matter of fact, however, their actual intervention was in accordance with, if not indeed in virtue of, all the historical rights subsisting in the nation at the time, and was less to found or institute government, than to supply the defects in the already existing government occasioned by the lapse of the crown of Great Britain. But be this as it may, nobody questions, not even the allied sovereigns of Europe them-

selves question, the natural right of a people who find themselves without government, since government is a prime necessity of society, as society is of man, to assemble in convention and institute a government. This right is universally conceded. But the moment the government is instituted, the moment it can be said to exist, its historical right commences, and the right of the people to found or institute government ceases. This, whatever may be the theory of our unfledged politicians, is the principle of our institutions, sustained by all our laws, as no man knows better than the eminent lawyer now Secretary of State. The people here have not one particle of power, except by virtue of historical right. The law admits them to a large share in the administration through the elective franchise, it is true, but that franchise is a trust, not a natural right, and is possessed only by those to whom the law grants it, and can be exercised only in the form and manner the law prescribes. The people may be legally assembled in convention, to amend the constitution, but they can assemble only by virtue of the law, and when so assembled are as much a legal assembly holding under law as any one of our ordinary legislatures. Is it not so? Try the experiment; let the people assemble without being legally convened, let them, on the simple ground of popular sovereignty, form a new constitution, and institute a new government, as they did in Rhode Island, and will it be held to have the right to govern? Not at all, and any act of it to supplant forcibly historical right, or to compel itself to be obeyed as the government, will be by the laws of every State in the Union an act of treason, and punishable as such. The case is not an imaginary one; it has already occurred in our brief history, has been fully argued on both sides, and finally settled by the highest tribunals known to our laws, and settled in favor of the old government, on the ground that it has the historical right, and is the only government historically known. The fact, then, of the intervention of the people here in the formation of the government, of their large share through the elective franchise in its administration, and of their right, when legally convened, to amend the constitution or the fundamental law, makes no difference, in so far as government, between our governments and the governments of Europe. It has the same rights and duties that they have, and holds

its powers under the same Divine law under which they hold theirs. It has the same historical rights that they have, the same right that they have, and no other than they have, to protect itself, and to suppress all rebellions against it. Without asserting the sacredness and inviolability of historical rights, of its right to be and to govern because it has been and is the government, and no other has been or is the government, it could not sustain itself a single moment, for it could not rightfully put down a single rebellion against it, or attempt to enforce a single one of its laws. If we must assume historical rights to be sacred and inviolable, as the only condition of sustaining our government, what is more absurd than to maintain, that to assert these rights against the rebels in arms, madmen conspiring everywhere against them, is to deny the lawfulness of our own constitution and forms of government? No government is more interested in sustaining those rights than our own, and it is with no little regret we hear the government itself renouncing its own legality, and every principle on which its lawfulness can be defended, telling us that our sympathy is due, not to those who labor to protect those rights, but to those who scorn them, trample them under their feet, and are everywhere confederated, and about again to take up arms, to render them of no avail.

It is true, Mr. Webster tells us that the American people, though they everywhere sympathize with rebels and the sworn enemies of all historical rights, do not propose to take up arms to assist them. "The United States have abstained at all times from acts of interference with the political changes of Europe. They cannot, however, fail to cherish always a lively interest in the fortunes of nations struggling for institutions like our own. But this sympathy, so far from being necessarily a hostile feeling towards any of these parties, is quite consistent with amicable relations with both." Will Mr. Webster explain how we can maintain amicable relations with the sovereign, while we have amicable relations with his rebellious subjects? But this is not the point now under consideration. We do not believe that as long as Mr. Webster is in the Cabinet our government will take any very active measures of interference in behalf of rebels in Europe or elsewhere, but he defends principles which permit such interference whenever we choose. In assuming that our government by its

origin and principles denies, with the European rebels, all historical rights, and authorizes and sympathizes with their movements, he denies that so to interfere would be any violation of public right. The rights of nations are all historical, and if we deny them, there is nothing to hinder us from accepting the doctrine of FRATERNITY preached by Mr. Webster's European friends, and then we should have the same right to engage in a struggle for democracy anywhere that the revolutionists themselves have. Nay, Mr. Webster's own assertion, by authority of the President of the United States, of our sympathy with these revolutionists, and his identification of their principles and cause with our own, can be vindicated only on a principle that would allow interference in their behalf to any extent we chose, or thought it prudent for our own sake, to carry it.

Mr. Webster asserts the prosperity of his own country as superinduced by her peculiar institutions, in the true spirit of a propagandist. "The power of this republic is at the present moment spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the house of Hapsburg are but as a patch on the earth's surface." This probably was written with a view to the pit. Suppose this to be a fact, what relevancy has it to the matter in controversy? Does it prove us in the right by proving our dominions are larger than those of Austria, or her in the wrong, because her farm is less than ours? Even supposing it proved the superiority of republican institutions over monarchical, what has that to do with the question? Austria has not protested against our republicanism, or asserted the superiority of monarchy, and what right has Mr. Webster, if he recognizes the independence of Austria, and proposes to treat with her as a sovereign state, to bring in question the relative superiority or inferiority of the respective forms of the two governments? Why does he travel out of the record, and give vent to a very silly boast? Do his best, he cannot claim for his country any superiority over Austria, except in vain and undignified boasting. But how, in fact, stands the question with regard to this vast extent of territory of the Union. Of the territory of the old thirteen States, we say nothing; but of the rest, which far exceeds it, will Mr. Webster seriously set its acquisition down to the credit of our political principles and institu-

tions? The Louisiana purchase he cannot, for Mr. Jefferson, who purchased the territory from France, confessed that he did it in violation of the Constitution he had sworn to observe and defend. The acquisition of Texas he cannot; for he maintained in the Senate that it could not be constitutionally annexed to the Union, and he opposed its annexation with all his energy, ability, and eloquence. The acquisition of New Mexico and California he cannot; for he opposed as unjust the war which led to their conquest, and also opposed to the last moment the treaty by which they were acquired, and even voted against its ratification. As to Oregon, we know not under what title we hold it, unless it be that one Captain Gray happened to approach very near to, perhaps entered, the mouth of the Columbia River, before any one else was known to have done so. Now, we submit to Mr. Webster himself, if he has any right to consider this vast acquisition of territory, effected for the most part by open violation of the Constitution, or by a war which he held at the time to be aggressive and uncalled for, — a war, as he pronounced it, “of pretexts,” — as any thing honorable to the republic or republican institutions in general.

But we have extended our remarks much farther than we intended, and we hasten to dismiss this painful subject, although we leave several points of some importance untouched. We need not add, that for Mr. Webster, both in consideration of his public services and of what we have seen of him in social intercourse, we have entertained a very great, indeed, a very profound respect; and we have looked to him as the leader of that true American party which, we trusted, would be formed out of the conservative elements of the two great parties which have hitherto divided the country. We have particularly approved his course in regard to the so-called “Compromise measures,” and we were exceedingly gratified when we heard that he had consented to accept the Department of State in Mr. Fillmore’s Cabinet. It has therefore been with great disappointment, as well as unfeigned sorrow, that we have read the document on which we have commented. As a diplomatic document we shall not trust ourselves to characterize it, any farther than to say that it is singularly irrelevant in several of its topics, inconclusive in its reasonings, and undignified in its tone. As a political docu-

ment embodying the views of the government and announcing American principles, it is in a high degree objectionable. In it Mr. Webster leaves the statesman for the demagogue, the conservative for the radical, and instead of availing himself of his position and the occasion to announce sound and salutary principles, he has assumed the *bonnet rouge* of the Jacobin, and descended to pander to the worst principles, the basest passions, and the most dangerous tendencies of his countrymen. Little did we think that he who some years since applauded, and induced not a few others to applaud, our own indignant denunciation of these principles, passions, and tendencies, would himself one day need to be remonstrated with for proclaiming them, and proclaiming them as American, and inseparable from the American character, condition, and destiny. We hope his lapse will prove but momentary, that he will hasten to take back his defence of rebels everywhere, and assume his rightful and natural position once more on the side of authority, in defence of historical rights, and of liberty through law. This, with disunion preached throughout the land, and the laws openly resisted in our cities, is no time to proclaim sympathy with rebels and rebellion.

ART. IV. — *Savonarola: his Contest with Paganism.*

THE principles and measures of Savonarola, after the lapse of three centuries and a half, since he was burnt at Florence and his ashes thrown into the Arno, have of late been subjected anew to historical criticism. Biographies have appeared, in England and in Germany, as well as lighter essays in the Reviews, reviving the claims of Protestants upon him as a precursor of Luther, while Catholics have vindicated him as a faithful son of the Church, and as having perished while fighting strenuously in her cause against that Paganism which for a time seemed about to overwhelm all Christendom. Amongst such Catholic apologies, the most remarkable is that which we present in the following article, which is the translation

of a chapter in M. Rio's unique work, *De la Poésie Chrétienne*, of which the only part as yet given to the public is that portion of the section on *Art* which traces the history of Christian *Painting* in Italy, from its origin in the Catacombs to its disappearance before the combined powers of *Naturalism* and *Paganism*.

With the little opportunity we have had of consulting either the original documents or the more recent works, we are far from being prepared to decide whether M. Rio has made out his case or not; yet such weight attaches to his own character and to his qualifications for historical criticism, and so favorable has been the reception which his views have met with from high Catholic authorities, that we feel safe in presenting them to our readers as at least deserving consideration. M. Rio is a Catholic of unquestionable orthodoxy and piety. The son of a sufferer in the cause supported by the "Catholic army" of his native La Vendée, he himself, at the age of fifteen, became the acknowledged hero of an uprising in the same cause, and has given us, in the history of that daring movement, one of the most beautiful works in all literature.* Subsequently he filled, with great distinction, the chair of History in the Collège Royal le Louis de Grand, and gave evidence of eminent historical genius, as well as of great learning, in his *Essay on the History of the Human Mind in Antiquity*. Later in life he visited Italy, in some official connection with the pious M. de la Ferronaye, and there made those investigations into the history of the Christian painting of that country which he published in the work *De la Poésie Chrétienne*, which contains his apology for Savonarola.

With respect to the reception which this part of his work has met with, it will be enough to say, that Count Montalembert, no mean authority, in an elaborate review of the whole work,† indorsed the views of Rio with characteristic heartiness, while having the most elaborate Protestant effort on the other side before his eyes, and prayed God to bless our pious author for having "reconquered for the Church the glory and genius of Savonarola."

* *La Petite Chouannerie, ou Histoire d'un Collège Breton sous l'Empire*. Paris, 1842.

† In his volume, *Du Vandalisme et du Catholicisme dans l'Art : — Fragments*. Paris, 1839.

THE name of Savonarola has become popular with the partisans of republican opinions and the adversaries of the Catholic hierarchy; and so often as that name is pronounced at the present day, it seems to recall exclusively the recollection of an ignominious death inflicted on one of the most energetic defenders of civil liberty and liberty of conscience. That which has, more than any thing else, contributed to this error, is the perseverance with which the eyes of posterity have been required to contemplate two facts, which are claimed to exhibit the sum and spirit of Savonarola's public life, namely, his having refused absolution to Lorenzo de' Medici at the point of death, unless he should first restore to his country its liberty, and the boldness with which he is said to have shaken off the authority of the Holy See. Without inquiring to what extent this twofold assertion is confirmed or disproved by the most authentic contemporary authorities, let us put ourselves at once at the point of view with which we are immediately concerned, and let us become spectators of that struggle—at once so close, so dramatic, and so imposing—which was maintained, in the presence of all Italy, by a simple monk against the spirit of his age. The object for which he strives is the restoration of the kingdom of Christ in the hearts, the intellect, and the imagination of the people, and to extend the advantages of the Redemption to all the faculties of man, and to all the works which they produce. The enemy which he combats is that *Paganism*, the mark of whose influence he finds impressed upon every thing,—upon art as well as upon morals, upon opinions as well as upon conduct, upon the cloisters as well as upon the secular schools.

When he had resolved, at the age of twenty-two, to embrace the monastic life, his predilection for St. Thomas Aquinas led him to prefer joining the order of the Dominicans, to which the Angelic Doctor had himself belonged; but he joined it with the fixed intention of remaining all his life a simple lay-brother, in order by that means to escape from the medley of profane and scholastic studies, by which so dangerous a diversion was making towards an end altogether foreign from that which had been contemplated by the founder. Nevertheless, he made his vows in a convent at Bologna, and he even overcame his repugnance to teaching the philosophy of Aristotle the moment

his superiors had positively required him to give lectures upon it, taking care, however, to pass over in his instruction the idler speculations, and to bring out, as often as he found opportunity, the superiority of the Holy Scriptures to all philosophical authority.

The study of the word of God, as contained in the Old and New Testaments, became from that time the ruling passion of his whole life; and after the lapse of a few years his elocution, which had hitherto been slow and feeble, acquired a penetrative and triumphant power, as well in the pulpit as in the most familiar discourse.* In a provincial chapter held at Reggio, the celebrated Pico Mirandola was so enraptured by his eloquence, and so attracted by the beauty and sanctity of his spirit and character, that it seemed to him he could no longer live away from him;† and it was in consequence of the enthusiasm with which he immediately afterwards spoke of him to Lorenzo de' Medici, that Savonarola was recalled to Florence and placed in the convent of St. Mark as Lector.

It was in this retreat, under a large Damascus rose-tree, which was the chief ornament of the garden, that he began his course of sermons before an audience at first by no means numerous, but which soon increased so considerably, that it became necessary to remove into the church of the convent. But the church itself was soon found too small to hold the ever-increasing influx of hearers from abroad; in consequence of which Fra Girolamo, now become Prior of St. Marks, was permitted, during the next year (1490), to assemble a far larger number within the spacious inclosure of the cathedral of Florence.

The subject of his first sermons was the exposition of certain passages of the Apocalypse in such a sense as to excite terror and anxiety; for from those passages he inferred — announcing his conclusions with the tone and authority of a prophet — that a great crisis was approaching for the Church of God, and unheard of tribulations for

* Savonarola's first attempt as a preacher was so unfortunate, that at the close of his Lent discourses the number of his hearers did not exceed twenty-five. He announced to them himself, that he should thenceforward, instead of preaching, devote himself exclusively to the study of the Holy Scriptures.

† “Che non gli pareva poi poter vivere senza lui.” — Burlamachi, *Vita di Fra Girolamo Savonarola*, Venice edition, p. 39.

such as should not seek a refuge from his wrath in penance. The invasion of Italy by the French and the occupation of Florence by a foreign monarch having verified the predictions that related to the Florentines in particular, and having likewise given Savonarola the opportunity to act as their liberator, gratitude and veneration for the messenger of God were added to the enthusiasm already felt for the preacher; and the effect of all these sentiments combined was so powerful and so contagious, that the fairest ages of the primitive Church seemed to be restored.* In order to have their share in the miraculous manna which was thus falling so abundantly from heaven, the inhabitants of the neighboring towns and hamlets abandoned their homes, and the rustic mountaineers came down the slopes of the Apennines, setting their faces towards Florence, into which crowds of pilgrims hurried every morning, as soon as the gates were opened at the earliest dawn of day, and where they were retained as guests by the truly fraternal charity of which they became the object; for the question was only, who should have the privilege of showing them Christian hospitality. They were embraced in the street as brothers, even before knowing their names; and there were some pious citizens, who collected as many as forty of them at a time in their houses.†

When we consider that this enthusiasm was sustained for seven successive years, — that it was necessary to preach separately to the men, to the women, and to the children, because it was impossible to admit them all together into the cathedral, — that such unheard of success was gained in the midst of cries of rage uttered by the faction of the Palleschi,‡ who denounced him every day to the court of Rome, and threatened him loudly with the gibbet, — we hardly know which most to admire in Savonarola, whether his inexhaustible fecundity as a preacher of the Gospel, or the facility with which his spirit soared aloft

* “Talchè pareva proprio una primitiva Chiesa.” — Burlamachi, p. 39.

† Burlamachi, p. 39.

‡ *Palleschi* was the name assumed by the partisans of the Medici, from the three *palle* or balls on the family escutcheon. To the friends of Savonarola they gave the nickname of *piagnoni*, the *whiners*; and they retorted by designating their adversaries as the *lukewarm* ones, the term actually used in the original, for which we have ventured to substitute the more manageable and historical party name. — Tr.

above the region of popular tempests, or his truly super-human confidence in help from above that could not fail him.*

Nothing less than such supernatural assistance was required to purify all that Paganism had defiled ; for there was not a single branch of the sciences or of the arts, not a single faculty of the human mind, that had escaped this contagion. By dint of prostrating themselves before this ancient idol, men had come at last to be ashamed of the ignominy of the cross ; and Burlamachi tells us, that Savonarola found Florence full of those who, while adorned by noble birth and genius, and rich in the treasures of human wisdom, had not only lost their faith, but even made a mock of such as kept it, and still more of such as defended it.† There were artists of the highest grade, who declared boldly that they had never had the faith ; and amongst those who kept more within bounds to avoid scandal, the profession of Christianity was confined most frequently to some external observances. The teachers who had the charge of public education fed the minds of the youth, for the most part, only with a poisoned aliment, turning their admiration systematically towards the fables of the Greek mythology, or towards the heroes of the ancient republics, and not permitting them even to suspect that Christianity had *her* heroes too, who had surpassed them all. What was far worse, they selected from amongst the works of profane literature precisely such as were the best calculated to corrupt their minds and their morals ; and, in spite of all that contemporary historians have told us of the corruption of the age, we are still astonished to find amongst the books, the banishment of which from the schools was loudly called for by Savonarola, the licentious poems of Tibullus and Catullus, and even Ovid's *Art of Love*,‡ which, however, might pass for a book of edification in comparison with another *collection*, the very title whereof reveals its utter infamy, and against which the

* There were priests and monks who refused absolution to any penitents that attended upon the preaching of Savonarola. See the Sermon for Easter Tuesday, 1495, in the collection printed at Florence during the subsequent year, in one volume, 4to.

† Burlamachi, *Vita di Fra Girolamo Savonarola*, p. 87.

‡ See the conclusion of the Sermon for the Third Sunday in Advent, 1495, in the collection already quoted.

holy preacher called for an edict of prescription in terms.* Such was the extent to which the perversity of classical teachers and the blindness of parents had gone.

This system of profane education was continued, under another form, in the advanced instruction of the universities and of the cloisters, without excepting even those of the Dominicans, notwithstanding the study of the scholastic philosophy was interdicted by the Constitutions of St. Dominic, except under dispensation.† The logic of Aristotle, overloaded as it was with novel subtilties, was subjecting to its dry and coldly regular processes even the science of theology itself, — the science which by its nature is the most independent of such kind of fetters; and the authority of the Holy Scriptures was not fully recognized, except so far as it had the good fortune to accord with that of the Peripatetic philosophy. What do I say? The study of the Sacred Writings, that of the Old Testament in particular, was so shamefully neglected, that the small number of such as gave attention to it were asked, with entire simplicity, what could be the use of such a study, and what good they could get from the knowledge of events which had come to pass and had been accomplished so many centuries ago, — a question so grossly stupid, that it would be impossible to believe it could ever have been asked, if it had not been addressed to Savonarola himself, during his novitiate, by a monk who was in other respects entirely exemplary and actuated by the best intentions.‡

The eloquence of the pulpit also had degenerated into a system of bandying scholastic arguments; and the fashionable preachers, making a shapeless mixture of Scripture and of logic, came forward, with their heads stuffed with all the subtilties of the schools, for the purpose of throwing this dry dust into the eyes of their hearers, caring nothing for the things of faith and of God.§

* See the conclusion of the Sermon for the Monday after the Third Sunday of Lent, *ibid.*

† Sermon for the Monday after the Third Sunday of Lent.

‡ See the Sermon for the Fifth Sunday of Lent.

§ “Sono le suttilità dei filosofi come polvere. . . . Fanno di questa filosofia e della Scrittura santa e logica un mescuglio, e questo vendono sopra li pergami, e le cose di Dio e della fede lasciano stare.” — Sermon for the Fourth Sunday of Lent.

But blessed still were the poor in spirit; for when Savonarola appeared with the abundance and happy selection of his Scriptural quotations, it was in these simple hearts that they echoed like the repeated bursts of thunder never heard before; and it seemed as if the same burning coal had purified his lips and set on fire their hearts. It was no longer in his own name that he threatened the people with near and terrible chastisements, and that he sought to exorcise science and the arts possessed with the demon of Paganism, — it was in the name of the prophets who had cried woe to whomsoever should bow the knee to idols. Amos was for him the type of that rude and energetic simplicity, which God delights to make use of to confound the knowledge of the wise;* and the prophecies of the shepherd of Thecua seemed, by the application which Savonarola made of them, to have been aimed especially at the intellectual idolatry in which Florence was at that time sunk. When the prophet, speaking of the unpardonable sin of the people of Israel,† reproaches them with having drunk of the wine of the condemned, *vinum damnatorum biberunt*, his expounder declares to the Florentines, that this accursed wine is nothing else but Paganism, with its ancient recollections, its voluptuousness, and its profane ceremonies.‡ Those who swear by the sin of Samaria, *qui jurant in delicto Samariæ*, are, on the one hand, the young men of Florence, who are led on by pride to run after logic and philosophy, and, on the other hand, the professors of theology, who can study nothing but those vain subtilties which for ever nourish the disputes of the schools.§ In like manner, they who cry out, The way of Bersabee liveth! *Vivit via Bersabe!* are the men of learning, who make an idol of science, and refuse to go back to a First Cause with the help of other lights than those of human reason. The prohibition given by Isaac to his son Jacob, to take a wife from amongst the daughters of Canaan, was a prophetic warning to Christians, to hinder them from searching for the truth in the books of the philosophers.|| Of the

* “Dio non elesse un filosofo, ma uno pastore e semplice uomo e voleva che a lui fosse creduto.” — Sermon for the Second Sunday of Advent.

† Amos ii. 8.

‡ Sermon for Tuesday after the First Sunday of Lent.

§ Sermon for Tuesday after the Fourth Sunday of Lent.

|| Sermon for Good Friday.

seven plagues of Egypt, there were at least three to which the imagination of Savonarola contrived to give an analogous signification;* the Israelites who grew weary of the manna in the desert, and longed for the flesh-pots of Egypt, were the type of those Christians who, while having in their hands the very Word of God, disregarded it to give themselves up to profane studies;† and when, in the story of the miraculous draught of fishes, the Apostle St. Peter complained that he and his companions had toiled all night and had caught nothing,‡ this complaint, being applied to the unfruitfulness of modern preaching, signified that, by dint of preaching rhetoric and philosophy, the light of faith had become obscured, and that a night of fearful darkness had come on, during which the fishers had cast their nets without taking any thing, that is to say, without saving any souls, because, in the midst of all this extraordinary abundance of sermons, the Spirit of God had ceased to be the vivifying principle of eloquence, and the speakers had become more than ever strangers to the knowledge of the faith.§ It is easy to see how Savonarola, with a mind so entirely possessed with these ideas, and with such fervor of zeal, should become so attractive and so moving, whenever he recommended to his hearers the reading of the Sacred Scriptures, or spoke of the consolations which he had drawn from them himself.

“Believe,” he said to them, “believe in the sufficiency of the Word, and in the wisdom of Christ, who has left his teaching expressed in such a way, that it may well dispense with the help of the wisdom of this world. They say, that logic and philosophy are able to confirm minds in the faith, as if a higher light had need to be strengthened by a lower one. Call to mind that philosopher of the Council of Nice, whom over-learned bishops attempted in vain to convince by syllogisms, and who, after he had been con-

* See the very remarkable Sermon for the Tuesday of Holy Week, in which will be found a decisive passage on Indulgences, and on the right of the Pope to grant them. Assuredly Protestants would not have so much admired Savonarola if they had read this sermon, and several others in the same collection.

† Sermon for Wednesday (of Holy Week). This is one of his most beautiful sermons, and is devoted almost entirely to the Sacrament of the Eucharist; its orthodoxy has never been contested by the fiercest enemies of Savonarola.

‡ St. Luke v. 5.

§ Sermon for Easter Tuesday.

vinced by some unlearned and simple believer, addressed these remarkable words to the former:—‘*Vobis pro verbis verba dedi*,—To you I gave words for words.’ Go into all the schools of Florence, you will find doctors paid for teaching logic and philosophy; you will find masters for all the sciences and all the arts; but not a single teacher that is charged with giving instruction in the Holy Scriptures. Seest thou not, foolish doctor, that when thou wouldst rest the faith on profane sciences, thou dost abuse and degrade, instead of elevating and ennobling it? Recollect the story of David going forth against the giant Goliath; let alone that clumsy armor of logic and philosophy, and arm thyself with a lively and simple faith, after the example of the apostles and the martyrs.* What ineffable sweetness does the Christian heart find in the reading of the Holy Scriptures! The man who is wearied by the long pilgrimage of life sometimes sits down upon his way and rests himself, in order to seek refreshment and strength in this *viaticum*, and then he enjoys, so to speak, the presence of his well-beloved one,—of Christ himself,—and he solaces himself with the sweet tears which he sheds as he contemplates the mercies of God.† O Florence, do with me what thou wilt; I have ascended the pulpit to-day to warn thee that thou destroy not my work, for it is the work of Christ. Whether I live, or whether I die, the seed which I have sown in the hearts of men will none the less bear its fruit. Yea, if my enemies should be strong enough to drive me forth from thy walls, I shall not thereby be cast down; for somewhere I can find a solitude into which I can fly for refuge with my Bible, and enjoy a peace and rest which it will be beyond the power of thy citizens to disturb.” ‡

All of this, for certain minds that rejoice in a superficial philosophy, is nothing but a momentary contest between an ignorant and fanatical monk, on the one hand, and the irresistible progress of human intelligence, on the other. Nevertheless, this monk was at least as well read as the most learned of his adversaries in those profane studies which

* Sermon for Monday after the Third Sunday of Lent. The translation is literal. I have merely allowed myself some transpositions of phrases.

† Sermon for Tuesday after the Fourth Sunday of Lent.

‡ Sermon for Tuesday after the Third Sunday of Lent.

he wished, not to abrogate entirely, but merely to make subordinate to Christian studies. He knew as well as they the annals of Greece and Rome, but he found them neither more glorious nor more instructive than those of such nations as had since come upon the stage of the world, displaying the banner of the cross. In antiquity itself he refused the preëminence to those who, like Livy and Thucydides, had written only the history of the past, but claimed it for the Jewish historians, who alone had recorded in the same book the annals of the past along with the figurative history of the future.* It must be allowed that there is something sublime and most profoundly Christian in this repugnance for that which is no longer and is no more to be. The instinct of perpetuity is inseparable from that of immortality; and the instinct of immortality has been to such a degree developed by Christianity, that the point of view in historic studies has been entirely changed for all such as have entirely kept pace with the plenitude of this development. This is what may be observed already in the imperfect sketches of universal history attempted by the ecclesiastical writers of the earlier periods of the Middle Ages; it is what may be seen, with all the marks of perfection and of unity, in the incomparable *Discours* of Bossuet; and it is what can be found, as a germ, in several passages of the Sermons of Savonarola. In order to disconcert the enthusiasm of the learned, whose eyes were always fixed upon classical antiquity, he pointed out to them in the East the wretched remains of the same Grecian race, consumed by that intellectual leprosy which its schism had rendered incurable, and equally powerless to shake off the yoke of the barbarians and the yoke of error.† In the West, far from seeking to withdraw the eyes of his hearers from the spectacle of Roman greatness, he delighted, on the contrary, to unroll before them the magnificent picture which it presented; but he did this only that he might bring out in bolder relief the conquest of the Eternal City by Christ, who had laid all these things at the feet of a simple fisherman; and thereupon he seemed as if intoning a chant of triumph as he paraphrased these words of the

* Sermon for the Third Sunday of Advent.

† “Che nacque per l’ heresie e li peccati dell’ oriente e dei Greci? Sono andati tutti in vastità e sotto gli infedeli.” — Sermon for Friday after the Second Sunday of Lent.

prophet Isaiah:—“*Civitatem sublimem humiliabit, conculcabit eam pes pauperis, gressus egenorum,**—The high city he shall lay low; the foot shall tread it down, the feet of the poor, the steps of the needy.”

In order to give a more Christian direction to public education, no calculation could be made upon the generation that had lived in the habit of considering the discovery of a Greek or Latin manuscript as one of the greatest blessings of heaven; it was necessary to wait until all these classical old men, whose hearts Savonarola complained he had found as hard as stone, should have gone down, one after another, to the tomb,† and, by means of institutions worthy of a Christian people, to prepare a new generation for coming on the stage, upon whom he more especially invoked the benediction of God.

A truly magnificent collection might be composed out of the touching appeals addressed by him to the children that made a part of his audience. Never did the heart of the preacher yearn more tenderly, than when he spoke to this innocent and most cherished portion of his flock; he appealed to them to gather by and by the fruit of his labors, and to watch over the future destiny of their country;‡ but meanwhile he prepared the way for this happy time to come, by bringing within the reach of their understandings the great dogmas of the Faith, and by pressing salutary reforms in domestic education. He told mothers that they failed in the most sacred of their duties, when they transferred the care of nursing their children to mercenary women, who imparted to them their own vices, and thus corrupted them from the very cradle.§ He told fathers that they were bound to give to their sons, while yet in

* Sermon for Tuesday after the Fourth Sunday of Lent.

† “Guarda tutti coloro che oggi seguitan la dottrina di quelli filosofi, gli troverai tutti duri come pietre.”—Sermon for Saturday after the Fourth Sunday of Lent.

“I tiepidi e maximè i vecchi che hanno il vizio nella parte intelletiva, non si possono convertire.”—Sermon for the Fifth Sunday of Lent.

‡ Sermon for the Third Sunday of Lent.

§ “Voi fate male, perchè voi gli fate allattare da gente grossa, e diventano poi spiriti grossi, e chi diventa libidinoso, chi iracondo, chi stizzoso, perchè gli fate allattare ancora dalle schiave, e quel primo latte da grande inclinazione al fanciullo,” etc.—Sermon for Holy Saturday.

The priority does not, therefore, belong to the author of *Émile*, nor to the school of the philanthropists.

tender years, that amount and kind of instruction, without which their natural abilities could not attain their proper development later in life;* and it was to this elementary instruction, in particular, in which was comprised the study of the dead languages, that Savonarola strove to give a character and a direction that should be more in harmony with the chief end of Christian society.

Too enlightened to contemplate the proscription of those master-works which the ancient nations had left behind, as so many luminous traces of their passage through the ancient world, he willingly admitted them as auxiliaries of modern civilization, and as instruments of culture for the imagination and the taste; but the license to appropriate these foreign decorations ought to be no hindrance to taking the foundation and the key-stone of the structure from Christianity alone. He entirely approved that the professors of Florence should prepare their pupils to comprehend the genius of Homer, Virgil, and Cicero, without the interposition of translations, like opaque media, between these great luminaries and themselves; but forasmuch as, from his point of view, the genius of certain fathers of the Church was still more profound and sublime, and at least counterbalanced, by this advantage, their inferiority in mere external form, he required that the best works of St. Jerome and of St. Augustine, and in particular the treatise *De Civitate Dei*, should be admitted to an equal share of attention with the profane authors, "in order," says he, "that the youth may not receive a lesson of Paganism without at the same time receiving a lesson of Christianity, and that eloquence and truth may be taught simultaneously." † For the same reason, he wished that the memories of children should be sanctified by engraving upon them, from their tenderest years, the story of the saints and martyrs, who had honored the Church by virtues which were heroic in a far higher sense than were those of Plutarch's great men. ‡

* Sermon for Monday after the Third Sunday of Lent. This is perhaps the most remarkable sermon of the whole collection, for its views in reference to Christian education.

† See the Sermon for the Tuesday after the Third Sunday of Lent.

‡ This is one of the recommendations to which he returns the most frequently. (See the Sermon for the Fourth Sunday of Lent.) Burlamachi says (p. 93), a beginning had been made by teaching children grammar in the works of St. Leo and St. Jerome, and by explaining St. Ambrose's

The evils caused by the abuses which had been introduced into public education were aggravated and reproduced under still more dangerous forms by artists, who were devoted to working out the profane suggestions that came to them from their patrons or from other sources. The monuments of Pagan art, which in the gardens of the Medici had become the objects of a kind of worship, had insensibly produced conceptions of the beautiful far different from those entertained by Christian painters and sculptors until then. From another quarter, *Naturalism*, encouraged by the growing corruption of manners, had openly taken possession of the sacred places, and the profanation committed by the monk Sippi was every day renewed, that is to say, for a Madonna, a Magdalen, and even for a St. John, it was often the portait of some young female — unfortunately too well known — that was represented in an altarpicture, around which crowded throngs of the curious and profane, without reverence or regard for the Holy Sacrifice.*

In the pictures of this class, every thing was calculated with a view to deprave the imagination of the beholders: seductive nudities were displayed in them without stint or shame; and not only was the traditional costume of the Blessed Virgin and of other female saints disregarded, but that which was actually given to them gave them the appearance of courtesans. For such a mode of treatment Savonarola reproached the painters in terms of the most vehement indignation, demanding of them by what right they thus displayed their own sinful vanities in the churches, and never wearied of repeating to them, that the Blessed Virgin always went about dressed with simplicity and modesty like a maiden of the poorer class, and that the celestial beauty of her countenance was a reflection of the sanctity of her spirit, which caused St. Thomas to declare, that no man had ever looked upon her with the eye of concupiscence. †

treatise *De Officiis*. He adds, that Savonarola had composed an essay to divert young men from reading licentious poets. In the defensive memorial addressed by the magistrates of Florence to the court of Rome, it was stated to be Savonarola's wish, that youth should be taught the history of the Redeemer and the lives of the Saints. — Bartoli, *Apol. di Savonarola*, p. 331. Firenze, 1782, 4to.

* Sermon for Saturday after the Second Sunday of Lent.

† “Io vi dico ch' ella andava vestita come poverella semplicemente e

It would seem that this kind of license had already produced the most serious ravages, since Savonarola affirmed, that if the artists knew, as he did, the scandal that had been given by this means to simple believers, they would look on their own productions with horror. Nevertheless, their pencils were still more licentious when they worked for the decoration of palaces or private dwellings. There Paganism had free course, and introduced into the minds of the young by the eye what from another quarter was also communicated through the ear. The Madonnas which were placed in the domestic oratories, so far from edifying the families that assembled in them to pray, often produced the most contrary effect; and if a pious citizen, out of paternal solicitude, expressed his dissatisfaction with these lascivious representations, and asked for a Virgin whose expression and age and character should be a preservative against every thought of impurity, then the perverse artist painted him one with a long beard.*

The sacrifice of all such nudities as offered a wound to modesty in its most sacred asylum — the precinct, namely, of the mother's eye — was the first pledge that Savonarola required a converted parent to give, setting against their relaxed practice in so serious a matter the strictness of Aristotle, who, with no other light than his heathen philosophy, still had been sufficiently enlightened to point out the danger of placing immodest representations before the eyes of children.†

But of what use would be the destruction of all profane monuments, if the principle which had given them birth should not be attacked at its very root, and if the imaginative faculties should not be definitively delivered from the Antichristian influence which had held them in subjection? To attempt such a work — one of the boldest undertakings ever mentioned in the history of the human mind — required nothing short of the genius of Savonarola, and his unshaken faith in the divinity of his mission.

appena segli vedeva il viso. . . . Voi fate parer la Vergine Marie vestita come una meretrice," etc. — Sermon for Saturday after the Second Sunday. On the beauty of the Blessed Virgin, see the Sermon for Friday after the Third Sunday.

* The artist who played this trick was named Nunziata; he excelled in making ornaments for the Feast of St. John. The piece of conduct here alluded to is related by Vasari in the Life of Ridolfo Ghirlandajo.

† Sermon for the First Sunday of Lent.

He had seen, without having recourse to the long circuits of the analytic method, that the decline which the fine arts had suffered was closely connected with a corresponding declension in all that pertained to Christian worship, and had accordingly concluded that a regeneration of the latter would necessarily produce a regeneration of the former. He set himself to work, therefore, to inculcate as earnestly as possible upon his hearers the necessity of interior worship in its relation to the wants of the soul, and to explain to them the profound significance of the ceremonies practised in the Catholic Church, and the sublime part which art was called upon to play in connection with them.* While thus bringing out, in their full and proper light, the true sense — whether allegorical or mystical — of so many usages and ordinances admirably adapted to the comprehension of the simplest minds, he reopened for artists a mine as pure as it was rich, which their predecessors had been far from exhausting.

But upon this point the old men did not show themselves less hard and intractable than upon that of profane literature; and their example was almost universally followed by those who came immediately after them. It was therefore exclusively upon the generation that came between mere childhood and mature age† that Savonarola rested his brightest hopes for the future, — hopes which he cherished for eight successive years with an affectionate interest without a parallel, and which sustained him in the trials — trials often most difficult and severe — which the implacable hatred of his enemies raised up against him.

To prepare and insure the triumph of Christian art, poetry, and faith for a new era which was to open gloriously with the sixteenth century, and at Florence earlier than elsewhere on account of her spiritual wealth,‡ — this was the object in view of which Savonarola labored to impregnate the hearts and imaginations of the young with

* “Tu vedi quel santo là in quella chiesa e di : io voglio far buona vita ed essere simile a lui.” — Sermon for Saturday after the First Sunday of Lent.

† He forbade bringing children under ten years of age.

‡ “Firenze è la città di Dio. . . . Qui si fa più bene che nell’ altre.” — Sermon for the First Sunday of Lent.

“Vien quà, Firenze, tu di che sei povera ; io dico quanto alle ricchezze spirituali, tu sei la più ricca città d’ Italia.” — Sermon for the Eve of Palm Sunday.

that exquisite perfume of tender and infantile piety, whose sweetness is ordinarily carried far onward in the career of life.

His success so much surpassed his expectations, that he himself thought he could ascribe it only to a miraculous intervention of the Divine goodness, and never was he more eloquent than while pouring out his gratitude to the Author of this mercy.* It was for his heart a delight so sweet, as to be a kind of anticipation of his heavenly recompense. We see from many passages in his discourses, that the innocence of early years awakened in his heart an indefinitely exalted state of feeling that was not unlike adoration. He used to say, that a child keeping clear from sin, after having attained to the use of his free will, acquires such purity of mind and heart, that the angels of heaven often come to visit him.† It was, moreover, through this cherished portion of his flock that he had prayers addressed to God, whether to obtain strength for himself when he felt exhausted, or virtuous magistrates for Florence when new elections were to be held. ‡

It was a very extraordinary spectacle for the Florentines to see this body of children and youth, before so noisy, so undisciplined, so rebellious against the restraint of the laws, now submit willingly to a rule of life so contrary to their habits and to their natural impetuosity, and to give themselves up with such interest and enthusiasm to exercises of piety, as hardly to think of any thing else for seven consecutive years. At home, they recited the Rosary or read the Office of the Blessed Virgin, according to the difference of ages, and especially they conformed, according to the measure of their individual capacities, to the plan of Christian education recommended by Savonarola. Abroad, they were listeners at all his sermons, and upon the eve of the greater festivals they went together to make garlands of olive-leaves; they sat upon the turf, divided into groups, which formed so many choirs; they sung Lauds to the praise of God or of Mary; and those who had passed near

* See, at the conclusion of the Sermon for Tuesday after the First Sunday, the beautiful paraphrase of this verse of the Psalm: — “*Ex ore infantium et lactantium perfecisti laudem.*” The whole sermon is admirable, from beginning to end.

† Sermon for Palm Sunday. It was addressed expressly to children.

‡ Sermon for Thursday after the First Sunday of Lent.

the spot used to say, that they seemed to have been gazing upon a scene of paradise.*

These Lauds, composed for the most part by respectable poets, and sung to well-known tunes, were one of the most powerful means employed by Savonarola for effecting the scheme of regeneration which he had in view. He was aware, that the practice of assembling every Saturday evening after Nones, in the principal churches of Florence, for the purpose of singing spiritual songs in alternate choirs before a picture of the Madonna, which was afterwards covered up again in the midst of a concert formed by the organ, the voices, and the bells, could be traced back, without interruption, to the thirteenth century, and was considered of so much importance, that there was regularly appointed a captain *de' Laudesi*. He was aware, that, throughout the whole duration of the Interdict of 1376, men, women, and children every evening crowded into the churches to console themselves, by means of these songs, for the temporary suppression of public worship; and he himself constantly saw a company of *trombiste*, organized long since, at the cost of the state, to accompany the *Carroccio* in time of war, the *Priori* and the *Gonfalonieri* in time of peace, come every Saturday into the *Piazza* of the Old Palace to play national airs in honor of the justice that had been rendered to the people during the week that had just passed.† On the other hand, he was not ignorant of the daily increasing currency and favor which those licentious songs had gained, which were composed for the orgies and dances of the Carnival; and from his own personal observation, combined with historical traditions, he inferred most legitimately, that music exerted a most controlling influence over the imagination of the Florentines, and had power to increase tenfold the evil caused by the Satanic inspirations of a certain class of poets. He therefore resolved to extend his reformation to this branch of art also.

Here, again, the problem admitted of no solution so far as concerned the old men, from whose memories it was impossible to root out all those obscenities which they had treasured up like precious ornaments;—it had been an

* Sermon for Palm Sunday.

† The *Osservatore Fiorentino*, Vol. I. p. 139 *et seq.*

easier task to cleanse the stables of Augeas. The plan of the reformer could therefore be made applicable only to childhood and youth ; and, within these limits, his triumph over profane music was the more complete by its being celebrated during the days of the Carnival, in the midst of the pious songs and the benedictions of the immense majority of the people.

In his musical reform he had two principal objects in view, — First, to bring back into favor the simple, expressive, and majestic music of the hymns received in the Church from time immemorial, such as the *Ave maris Stella* or the *Veni Creator*, which were so happily appropriate to the wants of that crisis.* Secondly, he wished to substitute more becoming tunes for those to which Lorenzo de' Medici and his court were accustomed to sing the Lauds composed by him in a purity of style not to have been expected from the author of those drinking and dancing songs, the cynic grossness of which vitiates the collection of his works.† That the people might not be thrown out by these new compositions, Lorenzo had taken care to have them adapted to the most popular airs, such as the tune of the *Peasant*, the tune of the *Grasshopper*, &c.; and this condescension had spared the poets the trouble of training choruses expressly for their own pieces. Savonarola did not directly proscribe either the words or the tunes of these Lauds ; but by dint of causing the voices of children to repeat the sweet melodies which had exhaled like a perfume from the hearts of their pious ancestors, he led the Florentines to prize them at their real worth, and this important branch of Christian art had its share in the ameliorations introduced into the rest.

Not to recognize in Savonarola the powerful dialectician, the accomplished orator, the profound theologian, the bold and far-reaching genius, the universal philosopher, or rather

* “ Vorrei ancora che voi cantaste qualche volta dei canti della Chiesa come *Ave maris Stella* o *Veni Creator*,” etc. Sermon for Monday after the Third Sunday of Lent.

In the Sermon for Saturday after the Second Sunday, he expresses himself still more distinctly : — “ Lasciate andare i canti figurati, e cantate i canti fermi ordinata dalla Chiesa.”

† The Lauds composed by Lorenzo de' Medici amount to six. His mother, Lucrezia Tornabuoni, to whom he was indebted for all his sentiments of piety, composed several more.

the competent judge of all the schools and systems of philosophy, would be giving the lie with too much effrontery to history and to his contemporaries. It might be supposed, undoubtedly, that there would be better ground for denying him that exquisite sense of the *beautiful*, in the imaginative arts, which is not always the prerogative of even the greatest geniuses, and which supposes a sensibility of feeling and a delicacy of organization, both difficult to meet with in a solitary, devoted to the mortifications of the cloister; and yet it is no exaggeration to say, that all this is found united, to a very high degree, in Savonarola.

From the moment of his entrance upon the monastic life, he had imposed upon himself the obligation of sacrificing every thing that became the object of too warm an affection, and this sacrifice was never more painful than when he had to give up some picture of a saint, or some pious book ornamented with miniatures.* In the model-convent, which it was a plan of his to found at Florence, and which was a Utopia as dear to his heart as to his imagination,† the lay-brothers were to busy themselves especially in works of painting and sculpture, and being thus placed in the closest proximity to the sanctuary, at the very source of the purest inspirations, they were to be there like vestals put in charge of the sacred fire. He knew by his own experience how much the pencil of truly Christian artists could help the soul to shake off its languor and to facilitate its aspirations towards God; for often he might be seen on his knees, for long hours together, in prayer before a picture of the Crucifixion in the church of *Orsanmichele*.‡ And still farther, it may be affirmed without fear of contradiction, that his theory of the *Beautiful*, as it is expressed in scattered fragments in some of his sermons, surpasses in originality, as it does in profundity, all that the writers of the same age have said on this subject, repeating as they did, with more or less servility, the trivialities of Aristotle or Quintilian. Without pausing to consider his ingenious developments with respect to the

* Burlamachi, pp. 58, 59.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 71. The project is also alluded to in the conclusion of his Sermon for Low Sunday. The convent was to contain two hundred chosen monks, who were to be placed in Florence as a centre of light for the illumination of all Italy.

‡ Bartoli, *Apol. di Savonarola*, p. 7.

True, the Beautiful, and the Good, considered in their relation to Christian preaching,* I will content myself with quoting one of his most remarkable digressions, addressed more particularly to artists :—

“Your notions,” he said to them, “are stamped with the grossest materialism. . . . Beauty, in things which are composite, results from the proportion between the component parts, or from the harmony between the colors; but in that which is simple, Beauty is transfiguration, — it is light; essential beauty in its perfection must therefore be looked for beyond the sphere of visible objects. . . . The more creatures approach and participate in the beauty of God, the more are they themselves beautiful, just as the beauty of the body is in proportion to the beauty of the soul; for if you were to take two women of this audience, equally beautiful in body, it would be the holier one that would excite the most admiration amongst the beholders, and the palm would assuredly be given to her even by worldly men.” †

He was not less alive to the beauties of nature, and he comprehended better than any other the sense of those sublime words of St. Paul :—“*Tam multa genera linguarum sunt in hoc mundo et nihil sine voce est.*” ‡ During a short residence in Lombardy, Fra Giacomo, of Sicily, who had the happiness to accompany him in almost all his excursions, was often carried away by the enthusiasm which seized upon Savonarola at the sight of the grand and diversified scene which was opened before their eyes; they would then choose some sweet and solitary spot, and having seated themselves on the turf, they would open the Book of Psalms to look for a text appropriate to all these wonders of mountain and level plain, which in their own way were telling of the glory and the greatness of God.§

Savonarola had left more than one recollection of this

* *Illuminare, delectare, inclinare.* These are, perhaps, Platonic notions; but they prove, at least, that Savonarola knew where best to bestow his affections, even amongst the ancients. See the Sermon for Saturday after the Third Sunday in Lent.

† Friday after the Third Sunday in Lent. — Sermon on the Discourse of Jesus with the Woman of Samaria.

‡ “There are so many kinds of tongues in the world, and none is without a voice.” 1 Cor. xiv. 10.

§ Burlamachi, p. 65.

kind amongst the monks of St. Dominic at Fiesole, with whom he had many a time roamed about the surrounding hills, giving vent to the heavenly poetry that was working in his soul, and making those around him feel something analogous to what was felt by the two disciples at Emmaus, when they asked each other if their hearts had not burned within them while Jesus was discoursing with them.* One day, in particular, remained most sweetly impressed upon their memories. It was one on which Savonarola, moulding the pith which he had taken from several branches of the fig-tree, made of it some small white doves, which he distributed amongst the monks, explaining to them the while, with the eloquence of a poet and of a prophet, the twofold intervention of this mystic bird, in the covenant which God made with Noah when he came out of the ark, and in that which he afterwards sealed with the blood of his Son.†

We need not, therefore, be astonished to find artists and poets among the most devoted partisans of Savonarola, for it was in their ranks the most lively sympathy burst forth, not only because his words struck out sparks that set their hearts on fire, but also because he caused them to regain the lofty position from which they had been insensibly descending. I do not think there has ever been a hero in history, whose name has been transmitted to posterity with a more imposing escort of men illustrious in every department; and we can hardly persuade ourselves that we are dealing with nothing but a simple monk, when we read the enumeration of the philosophers, the poets, and the artists of every kind, — architects, sculptors, painters, and even engravers, — who offered themselves to him, almost in a body, with enthusiasm, in order to serve, each one in his proper sphere, as the docile instruments of his great social reformation.

At their head must be placed the famous John Pico de Mirandola, that universal genius, who had already understood and wondered at many things before he met with Savonarola, but who was struck dumb with amazement, as at some new prodigy, the first time he listened to the words of this extraordinary man. Since he was the friend of Lorenzo de' Medici, no suspicion can attach itself to his

* St. Luke xxiv. 13–35.

† Burlamachi, p. 65:

admiration; and the same circumstance gives equal weight to the testimony of Angelo Politian, who, in spite of his predilection for that profane literature which was the object of the invectives of Savonarola, could not help representing him as one equally remarkable for his sanctity and for his learning, who preached a celestial doctrine with rare eloquence.*

The Canon Benivieni, a Platonic poet, still more closely attached to the court and to the opinions of the Medici, nevertheless published, at the moment when the storm began to mutter over the head of the preacher, a most energetic defence of his doctrines and of his prophecies.†

But of all classes of citizens, that which furnished the largest number of champions, religiously devoted to his cause, was certainly the artists: amongst them he found not merely friends, — he found apostles and martyrs; some aspired to the glory of dying in his company; others, looking on the light of art as extinguished with him, determined, in the excess of their grief, to silence their genius in a perpetual mourning. All persevered in their enthusiasm even unto the end, bringing honor thereby both on their profession and on human nature itself by a fidelity which the triumph of their adversaries rendered difficult, and even dangerous.

If we go through with the different branches of art, from its less ambitious regions to its loftiest heights, we discover, not only that Savonarola had made conquests in all of them, but still more, that his conquests amongst artists had always been of the most distinguished. The most beautiful work of the first famous engraver of gems which Italy has produced is a bust of Savonarola, which is still to be seen at Florence.‡ The most distinguished successors of Maso Finiguerra, who invented engraving about the

* “*Insignis et doctrinâ et sanctimoniâ vir cœlestisque doctrinæ prædicator egregius.*” *Epistolar. Lib. IV. ep. 2.*

John Pico de Mirandola and Politian both died in 1494, before the catastrophe which terminated the mission of Savonarola with his life.

† This work was printed in 1496.

‡ He was called Giovanni delle Corniole. The first school of this kind was founded in 1458, by Lorenzo de' Medici, afterwards continued under the protection of Piero de' Medici, and then transferred to Rome, where flourished, under Leo the Tenth, Piero de Pescia, the rival of the ancient Greek artists.

middle of the fifteenth century, were Baldini and Botticelli, of whom the former never defiled his brain with any licentious or profane work, and the other, who was besides celebrated as a painter and as a commentator of Dante, engraved *Savonarola's Triumph of Faith*, with a perfection to which he had never approached in his other works; and so far did he carry his enthusiasm for his hero, that upon the death of Savonarola he renounced painting for ever, under the steadfast resolution to die of hunger rather than to resume his pencil.*

Lorenzo di Credi, without making himself remarkable by any such violent resolution, presented the tribute of a talent always kept pure and fed exclusively by religious inspirations; and his name is the more important amongst the reformers of art, in that it represents the vigorous and original school of Andrea del Verocchio, from which had already sprung Lionardo da Vinci.†

In the convent of St. Mark there was a miniature-painter of the name of Fra Benedetto, who inherited the traditions which had been left behind, in the same convent, by the blessed Fra Angelico da Fiesole. This painter carried his courage and devotion beyond all the rest. On the day when the party of the Palleschi besieged the church, calling with cries of rage for the death of Savonarola, Fra Benedetto armed himself to the teeth to defend him, and would not desist from his warlike purpose until his master had told him, that one consecrated to religion had no right to resort to other than spiritual arms; and at the moment when the assailants, after having forced their way to the cloisters, were dragging away their victim into the presence of the judges, Savonarola was obliged to exert, for the last time, all his authority as Prior, to prevent this generous monk from going on to die with him.‡

Baccia della Porta was also, on that day, in the convent

* Vasari, *Vita di Sandro Botticelli*.

† The resolution which he formed of passing the remainder of his days in the asylum of Santa Maria Nuova, in which he died in 1530, at the age of eighty-eight, was probably the result of the deep impression which must have been made upon him by the death of Savonarola.

‡ “Fra Benedetto fece grande istanza di voler andar seco; e ributtandolo i ministri, egli pur importunava per voler andare; ma il padre Girolamo gli si voltò dicendogli, Fra Benedetto, per obediienza non venite, perciocchè io ho a morire per amore di Cristo.” — Burlamachi, p. 169.

of St. Mark, in the number of the five hundred citizens who had come thither for the purpose of repelling with arms the attack of the assailants. He had been an assiduous attendant upon the discourses of Savonarola, and no artist had entered more fully into his views with respect to the reformation of painting. His depression was accordingly extreme, when he saw this extraordinary movement terminate in the ignominious execution of him that had given it being and impulse; neither art nor glory had any longer charms for him, and he buried that imagination, which had been blighted by pain and grief, in a convent of Prato, in which he received the habit of a monk in the year 1500, and on this account he is better known in the history of art under the name of Fra Bartolomeo.*

Luca della Robbia, the inventor of a new process for preserving the freshness of bass-reliefs, had founded in his own family a school of religious art, original in its character, and so productive, that all Tuscany may be said to have been filled with its works. His two brothers, Augustine and Octavian, were his first pupils; but they brought far less credit to him than his nephew, Andrea della Robbia, who, in his representations of angels, of the Blessed Virgin, and of saints, seemed always to be inspired by the traditions of the great mystic school of Umbria; and hence he was more accessible than any other Florentine sculptor to the impressions which Savonarola aimed to produce upon all Christian artists. His success was immense in the house of Andrea;—two of the sons embraced the monastic life in the convent of St. Mark, in which they received the habit from the hands of the prior himself; and the three others, remaining in the studio of their father, assisted him in modelling for medallions the profile of the monk who was to them a new prophet.†

The stranger who traverses the streets of Florence, to admire its edifices of every description, will not be slow to distinguish from the rest a palace of the most imposing style of architecture, the entablature of which, still more imposing in its character, is justly regarded as one of the wonders of the world of art. This remarkable building is

* Vasari, *Vita di Bartolomeo*. The retainer of the Medici is seen in all that Vasari says of Savonarola.

† Vasari, *Vita di Luca della Robbia*.

the Palazzo Strozzi, and he who gave it this magnificent crowning decoration was the architect Cronaca, the bosom friend of the monk Savonarola, whose doctrines and whose fate he took so much to heart, that in his old age he could talk of nothing else, — which gave Vasari the occasion of saying, that he had got into his head a kind of frenzy.*

A multitude of conversions, not less important, were made amongst the other classes of citizens. Amongst the men of war, especial attention was attracted to that of Marco Salviati, who, during the days of peril, marched always at the side of Savonarola, outbraving with a look the fiercest of his enemies, and who dared to trace with his lance, in the public square, a line, which he forbade the popular fury to cross.† Amongst the Florentine nobles there were also evidences of devotedness full as chivalrous. The brave and pious Valori, in particular, may be mentioned, who, at the very moment when he was calling the people to arms, to defend him whom he always called the *Pastor of Florence*, was basely murdered by assassins, along with his wife and child.‡

With the energetic coöperation of so many men, illustrious either for genius, or noble birth, or public services, Savonarola concluded, after the unheard of success of his preaching during the Lent of 1496, that he might at length venture to strike a bolder stroke, and to exhibit before the Florentines a spectacle to which their eyes had never been accustomed. On Palm Sunday there was seen defiling through the streets a long procession, representing the entry of our Lord into Jerusalem; the children alone numbered eight thousand. In one hand they held a small red cross, and in the other an olive-branch, — except such as had the duty of receiving alms for the *Monte di Pietà*. After them came the different religious orders, with the clergy, and then an innumerable multitude of men of every

* “Gli era entrato nel capo tanta frenesia delle cose di Savonarola, che altro che di quelle sue cose non voleva ragionare.”—Vasari, *Vita del Cronaca*.

It must not be forgotten that the biographer had his motive for speaking in this strain.

† “Fece un segno in piazza con un’ arme in asta, dicendo: chi passerà questo segno proverà quanto possono le armi di Marco Salviati.”—Burlamachi, p. 155.

‡ Burlamachi, p. 160.

age and condition. Last came young girls clothed in white, with garlands on their heads, followed by their mothers, who closed the procession. Never in the memory of man had such a scene been witnessed in Florence; the collectedness of this immense throng of people, the baptismal robe worn by children of both sexes while singing responsively Psalms and Lauds composed for the occasion by the poet Benvieni,* these notes of children's voices harmoniously blended with the ringing of all the bells, — all this, says the monk Burlamachi, produced the impression of being transported to the New Jerusalem, and of the descent upon earth of the glories of paradise. Tears of emotion trickled from every eye, and many of the Palleschi, who had come to murmur or to curse, were so carried away by sympathy with the feelings of the rest, that they could find it in their hearts to do nothing but bless. It was the triumph of innocence and charity that was celebrated on this first day.†

The following year, Savonarola, emboldened by success, organized a still more solemn procession, which was to represent the principal object of his long apostolic labors, namely, the triumph of the spirit of Christianity over Paganism. In this celebration, again the most interesting part was committed to the children. They first went from house to house, begging, in the name of Jesus and of the Blessed Virgin, that the *anathema* might be given up to them, — the word by which they designated all those articles of luxury or productions of the fine arts, which the preacher had condemned as profane. The produce of all these voluntary sacrifices was laid upon a pile, which had been constructed in the public square, and was thus exposed to the gaze of the citizens as spoils that they had won from the infernal powers. Upon that pile might be seen collections of licentious songs, with the musical instruments used to accompany them when sung, — heaps of in-

* One of these Lauds was a kind of patriotic song, and began with these words : —

“ Viva nei nostri cuori, viva Fiorenza.”

† The alms collected during this procession, partly in ornaments and partly in money, were abundant enough to furnish capital for four *Monti di Pietà*, one in each quarter of the city, thus giving the last provocation to the wrath of the usurers and bankers.

decent prints and of portraits, the drapery of which was inconsistent with modesty, — the tales of Boccaccio, and other works of the same character, — the *Morgante* of Pulci, and all those other mock epics in which libertine adventurers were substituted for the heroes of the old romances of chivalry, — the erotic poems of classical antiquity, and such as had been composed in imitation of them or otherwise, whether in Latin or in the vulgar tongue, — and, lastly, a multitude of the costliest pictures and statues, which were offered upon this altar of purification, either by the artists or by the owners; and although it might have seemed impossible to add any thing to the imposing pomp of the first procession, nevertheless the second produced a still greater effect upon the people, — first, because it took place upon the very day of the Carnival, and thus bore witness loudly to the extraordinary control which Savonarola had gained over the most inveterate habits, and secondly, because even the arrangement of the celebration had been more skilfully contrived. A call had been made upon every branch of Christian art to increase its magnificence, and amongst other master-works particular attention was attracted to an Infant Jesus, done in marble by Donatello, and placed upon a golden pedestal, from which he gave his blessing with one hand, while with the other he pointed to his cross with the nails and crown of thorns. After having gone through the whole city, gathering alms and singing alternately psalms, hymns, and lauds, the children raised their voices in a pious invective, composed for the purpose, against the Carnival, a monstrous image of which, emblematic of the basest propensities, had been set up on the summit of the pile, and which was presently given up as a prey to the flames, in the midst of popular acclamations that drowned the ringing of the palace-bells and the braying brass of the company of *trombiste*.

We should be tempted to believe that this progressive excitement must at last have reached its utmost height, and that the springs which had been bent so long and so forcibly must now begin to relax. But it turned out quite otherwise; for the next year's Carnival was celebrated by the destruction of a still more considerable number of profane or licentious works, amongst which might be distinguished several antique statues, the soft lines of which expressed admirably that charm of pagan voluptuousness,

which the sensual artists of Greece and Rome were so well skilled to convey.*

Fra Bartolomeo brought scrupulously all the drawings which he had made as studies of the nude figure; and his example was followed by Lorenzo da Credi and many other painters, who had come fully to comprehend the necessity of a speedy regeneration for their art. This time the alms were still more abundant; the statues of saints and the painted banners exhibited in the procession gave a higher idea of what Christian sculpture and painting might attain to; the pile was constructed on a larger scale, and surmounted by emblems of greater significance; and instead of raising shouts of joy, as fire was set to it, the whole people intoned with majestic solemnity the *Te Deum*.†

These imposing ceremonies, combined with the almost daily preaching of Savonarola, produced the deeper impression upon all classes of citizens, that each one of them had been most skilfully prepared beforehand. The impression produced was not the enthusiasm of a day, such as might have been excited by a fanatic or a demoniac; it was an enthusiasm that had its root in the most secret depths of the soul, — the explosion, as it were, of all those emotions and sentiments which this missionary-philosopher had therein stirred up and set into fermentation throughout eight whole years. He had contrived so to graduate his eloquence as never to appear retrograde, or even stationary, in the long career which he undertook to run. Hence it was, that at the outset complaints were made, very generally, of his excessive simplicity;‡ but in proportion as they saw unrolling before their eyes his vast scheme of reformation, which embraced, at one view, every faculty of the human mind that had been corrupted by inveterate pagan habits, such spirits as could still endure the brightness of so strong a light began to open themselves insensibly to more Christian convictions; and it was not until after he had laboriously strengthened those convictions by all the resources which theological, philosophical, and his-

* These statues had been named after the most celebrated beauties of the day, *La Bella Bencina*, *La Lena Morella*, *La Bella Bina*, etc.

† Burlamachi, pp. 128 – 136.

‡ He himself allows the justice of the complaint in his Sermon for Low Sunday.

torical science put at his disposal, that Savonarola, now become absolute master of their minds and hearts, judged it to be time to strike their imaginations with all that apparatus of half religious, half dramatic ceremonies, which were reproduced with ever-increasing pomp during three consecutive years.

It does not appear that these triumphal processions were disturbed by the faction of the Pallese, which had become powerless in presence of the immense majority of their fellow-citizens; but their rage, by being concentrated, became only the more envenomed and the deeper in its schemes; and their zeal in raising up enemies against Savonarola, wherever corrupted hearts and polluted imaginations could be found, was so indefatigable, that, when the fatal day had arrived, nothing was wanting for the execution of their plans of vengeance.

The keenest instigators of this hatred were not the old men, angry as they were at seeing the daily diminution in the number of victims who had served as food for their licentious appetites;* neither were they the professors of profane literature, whose occupation was falling in esteem to the level of the mechanic arts; nor were they even the bad priests and the bad monks, although anathematized and blasted with all the might which could be given to human language by the eloquence of a preacher without fear and without reproach; — the most mortal enemies of Savonarola were the bankers and the moneyed men of all descriptions.

In their view he had committed a crime never to be forgiven, — that of having encouraged, with all his influence, the depositing of funds in the *Monti di Pietà*, which had been founded for the purpose of rescuing the poorer citizens from the ruinous exactions of usurers. From this there had resulted a momentary disturbance in financial speculations, and serious apprehensions for the reaction which this branch of business was likely to experience for the future. In another direction, inasmuch as the reform, which had extended successively to a very great number of articles of luxury, threatened to injure, and even to bring to

* See the Sermon for Wednesday of Holy Week. In another place he reproaches them with being like the elders that played the spy upon the chaste Susanna. Sermon for the First Sunday of Advent.

utter ruin, all these dealers, who required a certain amount of corruption in the age to sustain their business, a formidable league was struck between these men and the bankers, the ramifications of which stretched as far as Rome, where the Borgia family, of such unhappy celebrity, were producing still greater terror by the impunity with which their crimes were committed, than by their enormity. In the view of such bold transgressors of all laws, human and divine, the sermons of Savonarola could be nothing but the seditious declamations of a sectary. Hence the bankers, the usurers, and the merchants, who multiplied their informations and calumnies against him,* were secretly encouraged in all the machinations which they devised for his ruin; and at the end of eight years of intrigues and meanesses, their measures, combined for so long a time beforehand with an art truly infernal, brought about that tragic catastrophe which is known to all.

Besides this paltry interest of money-changing, usury, and traffic, there was another which Savonarola had compromised and wounded, — the interest of ambition and self-conceit, over which this respectable class of citizens watched with not less solicitude than the other. Now had not the insolent preacher been audacious enough to say to the heads of families, that an education which consisted in making their sons study a few profane poems, and then sending them to a banking-house to take lessons in money-changing and usury, was as prejudicial to their souls as to their understandings? † And had he not heaped the measure of his insolence by patronizing a political constitution which deprived the great capitalists of the enormous influence which they had hitherto exercised in public affairs?

The secret of Savonarola's predilection for popular government, and his unconquerable repugnance to the administration of the Medici, was this. As a man of intel-

* With this he charges the usurers, in express terms, in his Sermon for the Wednesday after Easter, and the establishment of the Monti di Pietà would create the presumption that they did so, even if he had said nothing on the subject. In another place he says: — “Voi, ô mercatanti che state là, uditeme, voi siete quelli che scrivete lettere, che non si lasci parlare ai profeti,” etc. — Sermon for Tuesday after the First Sunday of Lent.

† “La prima cosa li padri gli ponghono ad imparar poesie, e dipoi alli banchi ad imparare cambj ed usure e cosi gli mandano a casa del diavolo.” — Sermon for Monday after the Second Sunday of Lent.

lect, and still more as a man of God, he had conceived a horror of the government of bankers; and the idea of putting the emblems of supreme magistracy in hands that might have been defiled by unlawful gain, was to him the subversion of every social principle. This was precisely the reason why he preached so much to the Florentines the love of their democratic constitution,* never wearying of repeating to them, that it was the only constitution appropriate to their wants, and that God in his mercy had sent it to them as a remedy for their civil discords,—which, looking to the intention of the preacher, by no means signified that this form was the most desirable of all; for Savonarola was never the champion of republican institutions in the sense which modern political writers have attached to the term, and some of them have been in too great haste to inscribe this great name upon the list of their glorious precursors. In his view, monarchical government was really the best of all, and he boldly declared himself accordingly to his hearers, all of whom were citizens of a republic.† In his favorite Utopia, where he placed the realization of his dearest hopes, all the honors were for royalty; and when making the application of the passage of Zacharias, in which the prophet asks of the angel of the Lord, “What are these two olive-trees upon the right side of the candlestick, and upon the left side thereof?”‡ Savonarola answered, that the one represented

* He wished that a patriotic song should be composed, and that it should be learned by all the citizens. “Dovete fare una canzona che ognuna la sappia.” But he did not ask for a song suited to the orgies of a revolution. So far from inviting the people to take part in the government, he dissuaded them from it as much as possible. “Lassate governare da chi governa e non voler ingerirti alle dignità, ma lascia fare a Dio,” etc. (Sermon for the Third Sunday of Advent.) In that for the Tuesday after the Third Sunday of Lent he uses these beautiful expressions:—“Cittadini miei, quandò voi andate sù nei vostri consigli, se voi foste umili, Iddio vi illuminaria; se voi non foste ambiziosi e tanto superbi, voi avreste fatto ora mille cose che non avete fatte.” Assuredly this spirit of humility is not the spirit of modern republicanism. On the other hand, it is easy to see, from Savonarola’s political views taken together, that he would have preferred the worst of republics to a certain kind of monarchies.

† “Dove è un buon capo, è buono governo, e questo è l’ottimo dei governi.” Next after this he put an aristocratic government, like that of the Venetians.—Sermon for the Second Sunday in Advent. In the Sermon for the Third Sunday he again expresses his preference for monarchy.

‡ Zacharias, chap. iv.

the Pope and the prelates who should govern Christendom in the days of its regeneration, and the other the temporal princes, who should all labor, at that time, for the defence of the Church and the propagation of the Christian faith.* And if he used another language as often as the government of Florence was concerned, it was solely because he did not find there the elements which were necessary for establishing a monarchy on its true foundation, and because he believed that the power of a single individual, whether placed in the hands of the Medici or of any other banker deriving the same influence from his wealth, would turn, as it had already done, to the benefit of those profane and pagan views which had held such sway during the century which was then drawing to a close.

The recital of the catastrophe which terminated the life of this great man does not belong to my subject; but the authority which I claim for him as a reformer of art and of Christian poetry does not permit me to pass over in silence what has been done since his death to vindicate his memory, which his persecutors and executioners have vainly exerted themselves to blast. The mourning which was worn for him by the most illustrious Florentine artists was already a glorious vindication; but there were others, who were not satisfied with thus rendering a silent homage, and who, almost before the ashes of their hero had had time to grow cold, published in the face of his enemies apologetic writings, paintings not less significant, and medals on which the most glorious ascriptions were bestowed upon him.†

At Rome, it was the pencil of Raphael which took upon itself his apotheosis, by placing him amongst the most illustrious doctors of the Church in the *Dispute upon the Blessed Sacrament*. Ten years had at that time passed away since the death of Savonarola; Julius the Second, a man capable of appreciating such a genius, had succeeded Alexander Borgia on the pontifical throne, and had put an end to the scandals which that family had occasioned in all Italy. The severe and despotic

* Sermon for Saturday after the Fifth Sunday in Lent.

† “Si vedono uscire dei publici scritti, delle significanti pitture, delle medaglie che lo van decorando dei titoli più gloriosi.”—Bartoli, *Apologia di Savonarola*, p. 177.

character of Julius will not allow us to suppose that Raphaël would have ventured to take upon himself to introduce the portrait of Savonarola into one of the halls of the Vatican, if the thought had not been suggested to him by the Pope himself, who doubtless preferred this mode of reparation, as better securing publicity at the moment and perpetuity for the future.

In the course of the sixteenth century, men were not satisfied with believing him to be innocent,—they also believed him to be a saint; and this belief gained so strong a footing amongst the faithful, that it was thought necessary at Rome to make a thorough examination into the case of Savonarola, and into the part which Alexander the Sixth had taken in his condemnation. This investigation was made in connection with the process for the beatification of St. Catharine of Ricci, against whom it had been urged, that she had often implored his intercession as a saint; and throughout the whole time during which this trial was pending, St. Philip Neri, who kept in his room a portrait of Savonarola, represented with a *glory* around his head, prayed to God, with a fervor that rose even to an agony, that this immortal champion of the Christian faith might not be dishonored by a second condemnation. We are told, that, having learned beforehand, by a special revelation, that the memory of his hero would come forth pure and spotless from this last ordeal, it was impossible for him to control the transports of an exultation, which was shared by a large number of the faithful, in whose eyes this result was equivalent to a formal canonization; and on this point the authorities at Rome carried their indulgence of the popular opinion so far, as to allow medals and portraits in bronze, bearing inscriptions in which the *Blessed* Fra Girolamo Savonarola was styled *Doctor and Martyr*, to be exposed for sale, and to circulate without restraint amongst pious families.*

At Florence his name has never ceased to be popular; and if the torrent of Paganism broke through the barrier which he had for ten years opposed to it, and inundated anew every branch of the national literature, it was not so with painting, wherein that spiritualism which he had restored and made operative was preserved and prolonged

far into the sixteenth century, by a small number of Christian artists, in whose hearts enthusiasm for their art remained thenceforward inseparable from veneration for the memory of him whom they had regarded not less as their master than as their spiritual father.

WE add here to what we have said by way of preface to the translation of this chapter of M. Rio on Savonarola, that we have introduced it, not so much for the purpose of offering a vindication of the character of that extraordinary monk, as for the earnest and eloquent protest it contains against Paganism, and its excellent views in regard to Christian art. A critical reader of M. Rio's account may be inclined to think that Savonarola, after all, was something of an enthusiast, and in his zeal against Paganism forgot the tender charity of the Gospel, and the filial respect due to the Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth. According to M. Rio's eloquent apology, it would seem that he had studied the prophetic writings of the Old Testament till he fancied himself, as it were, one of the old prophets, supernaturally sent on an extraordinary mission, and by that fact raised above all ordinary authority established by Christ in his Church. Whether this persuasion was the effect of pride, or of partial insanity, it is not easy to say; but although he does not appear to have fallen into any particular heresy, it is clear that practically he exhibited an innovating and arrogant spirit, and said and did things which he could do lawfully only on the condition of having received from God, not merely the ordinary mission of a priest, but the extraordinary mission of a prophet or an apostle, which cannot be assumed, as is evident from his want of respect for the ordinary authority of the Church. The saints, no doubt, often are moved by the extraordinary inspirations of the Holy Ghost, but never to set themselves above the ordinary authority of the Church, or to act in opposition to it. They are never arrogant, but always humble and docile, and exceedingly modest in claiming to act by supernatural authority.

But aside from his claims to supernatural authority, and the acts which resulted as a necessary consequence from them, Savonarola's principles and doctrines appear to have been sound. His protest against Paganism, which was in the latter half of the fifteenth century reappearing in litera-

ture and art, was not misplaced nor uncalled for. That he exaggerated the danger is possible; that he carried his invectives farther than was necessary is also possible; but that he was right in opposing the paganizing tendency of his time, as well as correct in his literary and artistic principles, M. Rio seems to us to have established beyond all doubt. Certainly we are not among those who object to the study of the ancient classics or the ancient models of art, and if that study were wrong, or even hazardous to the scholar or the artist, the highest authority in the Church would long since have officially condemned it; but that in the time of Savonarola it had become excessive, and led to the depreciation of the labors of Christian scholars and artists, there can be little doubt, as there is little doubt that just now there is, in some quarters, an undue appreciation of mediæval art. Not all that is classic is Antichristian, nor all that is Gothic Christian. It is as lawful to offer up the Holy Sacrifice in a temple constructed on Grecian, as in one constructed on Gothic principles of architecture, and in writing it is as lawful to copy the style, though not the thought, of Cicero or Horace, as of St. Augustine or St. Prosper. Nevertheless, the passion for heathen literature and art in the time of Savonarola involved in no slight degree the introduction of heathen morals and manners. It exalted Gentile antiquity above Christian antiquity, and threatened through literature and art, and the licentiousness of manners, to corrupt the faith of Christians. In rising against it in his day, as M. Rio in ours, Savonarola deserved the honor and gratitude of every Catholic. M. Rio, in the chapter translated, has, in stating the principles the monk opposed to the paganizing tendency of his times, done us a real service, and given us a chapter that we may read with great pleasure and profit, independently of its bearing on the character of Savonarola. It was under this relation that we read and admired the chapter, and under this same relation we lay it before our readers. We honor and esteem M. Rio, but he has a theory, in general a true theory, of art, to which he is enthusiastically attached, and it is possible, after all, that the pleasure of finding his own views clearly and eloquently set forth by the Florentine monk has been so great as to blind him in some respects to the real bearings of certain things objected to by others in Savonarola's conduct, — made him, in fact, regard as more

venial than they were the reformer's severity to Lorenzo de' Medici, and his disrespect to the Vicar of our Lord. But we are not qualified, with our present information on the subject, to discuss it, and we have made these remarks only for the purpose of not committing ourselves to a view that may turn out to be not wholly correct.

ART. V.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Castle of Roussillon : or Quercy in the Sixteenth Century. A Tale.* Translated from the French of MADAME EUGENIE DE LA ROCHERE. By MRS. J. SADLIER. New York : D. & J. Sadlier. 1851. 18mo. pp. 316.

WE always welcome Mrs. Sadlier's stories, whether original or translated, as she is one of the very few authoresses whose works we can read with pleasure. We are not, perhaps, remarkably ungallant, and we protest against being thought unable or unwilling to recognize the true worth of woman ; possibly we have a higher appreciation of her worth than they who are far more profuse in their compliments to her, and who never speak to or of her without smoothing down their face, and softening their tones ; but we are no great admirers of female literature in general, and have no disposition to see the number of authoresses multiplied. Woman's sphere is domestic, not public, — to receive and apply instruction, not to instruct. We do not underrate her intellect, as adapted to her proper mission, but her talents are executive rather than legislative or judicial, and fit her for administering the affairs of her household, rather than for teaching the nation. The effeminacy, and, we will add, pruriency, of our modern literature, its miserable sentimentalism, and want of deep, discriminating, and masculine thought, are in some measure owing to the great influence of women in creating it. Nevertheless, to all general rules there are exceptions, and there are women who are not unfitted to write books, and among these few we rank with pleasure Mrs. Sadlier, now that she has got the better of the false romance and sentimentalism of her early productions. Her *Willy Burke* is a work of true genius, and animated by a spirit of sweet and genuine piety.

The little work before us is the production of an estimable French lady, and, as far as we can judge without having the original before us, is admirably translated. It is an interesting story, and contains some scenes and descriptions marked by great power. Yet we do

not in all respects exactly like it. It is by no means equal to *The Orphan of Moscow*. Madame de la Rochere belongs to that class of authors who are the most eloquent when joining with heretics in denouncing the alleged cruelties and barbarities of Catholics. We know perfectly well that persons *in* the Church, but not *of* her, have committed great crimes, and crimes which we have no disposition to conceal or to palliate; but it is very possible to condemn them on Catholic principles, and there is no necessity, in order to show our horror of them, of lapsing into heresy, or of expressing or implying principles which arraign the practice of the Church. There is no necessity in our times of laboring to diminish the horror of heresy, and to diffuse under a maudlin sentimentalism the most destructive indifferentism. Madame de la Rochere has in the course of her work to speak of the religious wars in France during the sixteenth century, and she seems to cast the principal blame of these wars on the Catholics who persisted in defending their faith, their altars, and their own firesides. We do not like this. We are no defenders of the massacres of St. Bartholomew's eve; but we are not called upon to exaggerate them, or even to denounce them; and if we were called upon to denounce them, we see no necessity of doing it as a Huguenot. These massacres were mainly political, were ordered by the court of France; the Church, and even Catholics as such, are in no way responsible for them. They are, no doubt, to be condemned, but not to be so condemned as to excite our compassion for the Huguenots who were conspiring against God and man, and were preparing to murder the whole royal family, and the chiefs of the Catholic party. We find no fault with Madame de la Rochere for condemning the massacres, but we do find fault with her for the principles on which, as well as the tone in which, she condemns them. Catholics have the right, if need be, to fight in defence of their altars and their hearths; they have the right, and in certain times and places are bound, to defend their religion against the armed forces of its enemies, though they have no right to make war to compel unbelievers to embrace it. In the wars concerning religion in the sixteenth century, the Catholics only acted on the defensive, — only fought to save religion and civilization from the destruction threatened to both by the new swarms of Northern barbarians who invaded them. Protestantism was nothing but a new barbarian invasion of the Roman empire; and while we applaud the Roman resistance it met, we only regret that in too many instances the resistance was not more firm and effectual.

Bating a little sentimental whimpering about persecution, — as if for a Catholic to defend his church and castle, the honor as well as the life of his wife and daughters, his own life and that of all dear to him, against the infuriated bands of armed ruffians were persecution! — we find much in the work to approve. It illustrates and enforces in a felicitous manner the highest of all virtues, Catholic

charity. The moral of the story is good, and if the grand evil of our times were not religious indifferency, the whole story would be most admirable. The charity that forgives enemies, and does good to those who persecute us, is never mistimed or misplaced ; but we may ask if there is not, in our times especially, great danger that, in accustoming our children to dwell almost altogether on the charity that seeks to relieve merely physical suffering, we shall cause them to overlook the importance of faith, without which there is no Christian virtue, — any more than there is an act of life without a living subject, — and to confound Christian charity with the popular philanthropy of the day, that is, confound a supernatural virtue with a merely human sentiment. Faith without works is dead, being alone ; but, at the same time, we must remember that without faith there are no works, that is, no meritorious works. The great want of our times is faith ; the evil is not, that men have faith and not works, as it was in some past ages, but that they have not faith itself ; and if we insist mainly on those works which can be, as to their matter, performed by those who have not faith, we are only aggravating the reigning evil. The infidel can give his fortune to feed the poor, as well as the Christian. These pretty books, written by our most amiable ladies for our children, will be found, perhaps, to exert an influence, in the long run, unfavorable to religion, by inducing the persuasion, even among Catholic youth, that the essence of religion consists in acts which can be performed by an unbeliever as well as by a believer, out of the Church as well as in it. There is, in our judgment, danger even in dwelling much upon the tenderness of the Church to those suffering under physical privations, for it may tend to introduce a false test of religion, and to make it believed that a religion is to be tried by its relation to physical suffering, which would be, in fact, to fall into the error of the carnal Jews. It is necessary always to hold up the moral as superior to the physical, the soul as infinitely more important than the body, heaven as infinitely more to be desired and sought after than the earth. Is it not a pregnant sign of the times, that even amongst Catholics the active orders are thought more of than the contemplative, and those who devote themselves chiefly to corporal, more than those who devote themselves chiefly to the spiritual works of mercy ?

2. — *MARY, THE STAR OF THE SEA ; or a Garland of Living Flowers, culled from the Divine Scriptures, and woven to the Honor of THE HOLY MOTHER OF GOD. A Story of Catholic Devotion.* Boston : Donahoe. 1851. 32mo. pp. 416.

THIS is an American reprint of an English work, and though it has no remarkable merit as a mere story, it possesses a high degree

of merit as a devotional work. It is well adapted to enlighten and deepen our devotion to Mary, our sweet Mother in heaven, and may be warmly recommended to all who would understand and engage in that devotion, so natural to every Catholic heart. We hope to be able to recur to this little volume, and to notice it more at length. We can only add now, that we hail it as one among the numerous proofs we are receiving daily, that our cousins over the water, formerly rather languid and timid in their devotion to the Mother of God, are now yielding to it with fervor and Christian courage. This is a good sign for England. We cannot pay too much honor to Our Dear Lady, for in honoring her we do but honor the Incarnation, on which all our hopes of salvation depend.

3. — *The Youth's Director ; or Familiar Instructions for Young People, which will be found useful also to every Sex, Age, and Condition in Life. With a Number of Historical Traits and Edifying Examples.* From the French. New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 32mo. pp. 320.

WE are very glad to see this admirable little work in an English dress. The work itself is well known in France and Canada, and is too highly esteemed by those to whose judgment we should in all cases bow, to stand in need of any recommendation from us. It is full of the most useful instruction, and peculiarly adapted to the wants of our young people, and worth for them a thousand modern stories, however happily conceived or pleasantly told they may be. Light literature, even when unexceptionable in doctrine and sentiment, tends rather to weaken the mind. We should never feed our children on mere mental pap any longer than we can help it.

4. — *Outlines of a System of Mechanical Philosophy ; being a Research into the Laws of Force.* By S. E. COUES. Boston : Little & Brown. 1851. 8vo. pp. 330.

WE have not had time, since receiving this volume, to examine it with sufficient care to make any judgment we could express concerning it of any value. It is a work not merely to be read, but to be studied, and we confess to not being sufficiently posted up in the theories of force, or motion, to be able to say how far the author has departed from those now in vogue. We have read far enough, however, to discover that the author is a profound and original thinker, and that he does not swear by Sir Isaac Newton, two facts that lead us to regard his work with great favor. We hardly know why it is so, but we have never been able to get up any great

respect for Newton, and we have always said to ourselves, though never to the public, that he was a humbug. Two Englishmen, Bacon and Newton, we have been accustomed from our childhood to hear praised as the two great lights of the modern world, but we have always felt that they were both in reality humbugs. Bacon we have no hesitation in calling a humbug, that is, as understood by his disciples, for we have studied ourselves the matters of which he treats; but Newton we have not been willing to call so, for we have made no great proficiency in the study of the physical sciences, save so far as they are intimately connected with metaphysics. We began studying them when young, — had even a sort of passion for them, but found them so unsettled, so uncertain, and changing so often, that we gave them up in despair, and returned for ourselves pretty much to the physics of Aristotle. In sober earnest, while we admit the moderns have extended their observations, and have collected a mass of facts which *may* have been unknown to the ancients, we do not believe that in *science* proper we are a single step in advance of Aristotle. We hold the heliocentric in preference to the geocentric theory, because it is the prevalent theory of our times, and because it seems to us a very probable hypothesis, but we regard it only as an hypothesis, as it was in the time of Galileo. The only progress we moderns make is in returning to forgotten, or in rediscovering lost truths. But all this by the way. Mr. Coues's book is a serious one, and we intend to do our best to master it, and shall take the earliest opportunity to discuss its doctrines. In the mean time we commend it to our readers as one of the most noteworthy publications that has recently appeared.

5. — *The Scripture Doctrine of Miracles displayed; in which their Nature, etc., are impartially examined and explained according to the Light of Revelation and the Principles of Sound Reason.* By the Right Rev. GEORGE HAY, D. D. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 2 vols. 16mo.

No work by that eminent prelate and divine, Dr. Hay, needs any other recommendation than a bare announcement. We are acquainted with no Catholic writer in our language who surpasses him. He was not only a pious and devoted priest, a wise and eminent prelate, but he was a learned scholar, a profound thinker, a close and rigid reasoner, and a clear, forcible, and energetic writer. He was a man of tender piety, a mortified life, and masculine mind, as remarkable for his strong common sense as for his thorough scholarship. His work on Miracles, now before us, is, we may say without any hesitation, the best work on the subject in the English language, and is, in fact, the only complete treatise on the subject in

that language. We recommend not only Catholics, but Protestants generally, and Rationalists particularly, to read and study it. It infinitely surpasses any thing ever written by Farmer, Paley, or Campbell. We are glad to see it republished in our country, and in a neat, convenient, and cheap form.

6. — *The Movable Feasts, Fasts, and other Annual Observances of the Catholic Church.* By the Rev. ALBAN BUTLER. *To which is added, A Continuation of the Feasts and Fasts, by a Catholic Priest.* First complete American, from the last Dublin Edition. New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 8vo. pp. 516.

THIS is a work of learning and piety, a standard work on the subject of which it treats, too well known and esteemed to need any commendation from us, and which should be in the possession of every Catholic family.

7. — *A Christian Directory, guiding Men to their Eternal Salvation. In Two Parts. The First Part whereof appertains to Resolution ; the Second treats of the Obstacles and Impediments which hinder it, and how they may be removed. Now set forth with many Corrections and Additions. To this Edition is prefixed the Life of the Author, and A Method for the Use of All. With Two Tables.* By the Rev. ROBERT PARSONS, Priest of the Society of Jesus. New York : Murphy & Son. 1851. 12mo. pp. 342 and 260.

FATHER PARSONS, or rather Persons, was born in 1541 ; he was educated at Oxford, and was one of the earliest Jesuits on the mission in England. He appears to have been a learned, active, and holy man. The work before us, none the worse for its partaking of the now a little antiquated English of Queen Elizabeth's time, is a standard work in English Catholic literature, and is generally known and esteemed.

8. — *The General History of the Christian Church, from her Birth to her final Triumphant State in Heaven ; Chiefly deduced from the Apocalypse of St. John the Apostle and Evangelist.* By SIGNOR PASTORINI. Fifth American Edition. New York : D. & J. Sadlier. 1851. 12mo. pp. 396.

THIS is a well known and very popular work, and we are glad to see a new American edition of it issued. The author was the

Venerable and Right Reverend Charles Walmsley, Vicar Apostolic of the Western District, England. Works so well known as this *History of the Church* need no other notice from the Reviewer than a simple announcement.

9. — *First Communion ; a Series of Letters to the Young.* Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 18mo. pp. 231.

AN excellent little book, and tastefully written and printed.

10. — *The Satisfying Influence of Catholicity on the Intellect and Senses. A Lecture delivered before the Catholic Institute of New York, on Friday Evening, January 24, 1851.* By Rev. J. BOYCE, Worcester, Mass. New York : Coddington. 1851. 8vo. pp. 26.

THIS Lecture is by no means worthy of the ability of its author, and contains some opinions which may be questioned.

11. — *Lyra Catholica. Containing all the Hymns of the Roman Breviary and Missal, with others from various Sources. Arranged for every Day in the Week, and the Festivals and Saints' Days throughout the Year. With a Selection of Hymns, Anthems, and Sacred Poetry, from approved Sources.* New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 32mo. pp. 576.

12. — 1. *The Catholic Hymn-Book ; a Collection of Hymns, Anthems, etc., for all Holidays of Obligation and Devotion throughout the Year. Selected from approved Sources and adapted to general Use.* — 2. The Same, with *The Catholic Choralist, containing a Selection of Hymn-tunes, adapted to Latin and English Words.* New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 32mo. pp. 256, and 256 and 128.

13. — *The Chapel Choir-Book. A Collection of Catholic Music. Consisting of Masses, Anthems, Chants, and Hymns, to which is prefixed a short Treatise on the Art of Singing. Designed for Public Worship, and Sunday and Singing Schools.* Edited by GEORGE W. LLOYD. Boston : Donahoe. 1851. pp. 128.

14. — *The Pagan and Christian Families ; a Lecture delivered before the Members of the Mercantile Library Association, December 23, 1850.* By the Rev. C. F. SMARIUS, S. J., of the St. Louis University. St. Louis : Skillman. 1851. 12mo. pp. 56.

Rev. Daniel Moore

Arncliffe

BROWNSON'S
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ART. I.—*The Ways of the Hour; a Tale.* By the Author of "The Spy," "The Red Rover," &c., &c. New York: Putnam. 1850. 12mo. pp. 512.

WE cannot characterize our government and institutions by a single term, without misleading some as to their true nature. They are not strictly democratic, for they include monarchical and aristocratic elements; they are not strictly monarchical or strictly aristocratic, for they evidently include democratic elements. It is always an error to denominate them from any one of the simple or absolute forms of government, that is, from pure democracy, pure aristocracy, or pure monarchy, the only simple and absolute forms of government there are, or can be. Our government, whether State or national, is properly speaking a *mixed* government, and its characteristic is not in any one of the simple forms of government, but in its original and peculiar combination of them all in one harmonious and complex system.

Our government is republican as opposed to hereditary monarchy; it is democratic as opposed to hereditary aristocracy, and in that it recognizes equality before the laws, makes its various officers elective by the people at large, and acknowledges general eligibility; but it is monarchical, in that it establishes the unity of the executive, invests the President with the command of the army and navy, and gives him a conditional veto on the acts of the legislature; and it is aristocratic, in that it vests the legislative power, not in the people at large, but in the *optimates*, or

those legally presumed to be such, and recognizes in these, during their term of office and within the limits of the Constitution, the legislative power in its plenitude, to be exercised according to their own discretion, unfettered by any instructions from their constituents, and with no other responsibility than that which every man owes to God, the King of kings, and Lord of lords. It therefore includes essentially, as essential principles of its constitution, the elementary principles of all the simple forms of government, and its aim is, by tempering them one with another, to secure what is good and to guard against what is evil or hurtful in each.

The great political danger in this country arises from forgetfulness or neglect of this mixed or complex character of our government and institutions, and the constant tendency to interpret them according to the principles of a simple and absolute form of government. Simplicity is more easily understood than complexity; the former is within the reach of every body, the latter is within the reach of none but the few who make it a special study. The human understanding also loves simplicity, and naturally tends in all the matters on which it operates to reduce all as far as possible to a single principle, and to eliminate whatever is opposed to it, or does not logically proceed from it. It craves unity and simplicity, and looks upon multiplicity and complexity as defects. The constitution of the Continental governments of Europe is far more simple, and follows far more strictly the law of unity, than that of Great Britain, and hence, while a cultivated Englishman readily comprehends a Continental government, a Frenchman or a German cannot, without a long and special study, speak for five minutes of the English constitution without committing some egregious blunder. Foreigners always blunder, for the same reason, when they speak of our complicated government, and so do the great body of our own people, whenever they attempt to go beyond the mere routine of practice to which they are accustomed from childhood. They do not take in the government as a complex whole, but seize it merely in one of its elements, and seek to understand and explain the whole by virtue of that as its exclusive principle. Whatever does not proceed from that as its principle, or is not logically reconcilable with it, they regard as an

anomaly to be cleared away. The single element seized upon is regarded as the *norma* of the government, and whatever would oppose, limit, restrain, or modify its practical operation, as repugnant to the government itself, and therefore not to be suffered to remain. Consequently, the tendency is always to reduce the government as far as possible to a simple and absolute form of government, and therefore to pave the way for tyranny, since every simple and absolute form of government, untempered by some admixture of the elements of the other forms, is always tyrannical.

The monarchical and aristocratic elements, though essential to our Constitution, do not hold in it the most prominent place. They are there, but they are there without *éclat* and without development, and their real character and importance in our system are the very last that strike the student of our peculiar civil polity. The democratic element has apparently a much larger sphere than either of them, is the most prominent, and that which first strikes the attention. It accordingly is the element first apprehended, and the one the majority take to be the exclusive principle, the *norma* of the government. Hence the government is generally taken to be in its principle and intention a purely democratic government, to be interpreted and administered on the democratic principle alone. This is a great mistake, and involves the gravest consequences, — consequences, perhaps, no less grave, in the long run, than the total destruction of our government as a mixed government.

This mistake is perfectly natural. The democratic element has in our institutions too large a sphere, as Washington and the more eminent statesmen of his time contended. Let us not be misunderstood. When we say that the democratic element has too large a sphere, we do not mean that the sphere actually assigned it in the Constitution is too large, providing it practically remains within that sphere. It is too large in the sense that it has the power to make itself larger, and to gain the absolute ascendancy over the other elements intended to restrain or temper it. If democracy would be contented to remain and operate only within the bounds prescribed, it would not have too large a sphere; but as these bounds are to a great extent prescribed only on the parchment constitu-

tion, and as they are not sufficiently defended by the power given to the other elements, it is able to transcend them, and to operate beyond its constitutional sphere. The original defect of the American constitutions was not so much in the too great power given to the democratic element as in the weakness of the defences provided against its usurpation. The framers of those constitutions gave a just proportion to the several elements so long as each remained within its constitutional limits, and in the exercise of its legitimate power; but they did not guard sufficiently against democratic ascendancy. They were familiar with the abuses of monarchy and aristocracy, and effectually guarded against them; but they were not so familiar with the abuses of democracy, and did not fully anticipate and guard against them. They did not take into the account the fact that every people, by a sort of instinctive logic, labors incessantly to simplify its institutions, and that in the process of simplification the stronger element gains the ascendancy, and tends to render itself exclusive by eliminating or absorbing the others. They did not take sufficiently into the account the influence of popular theories, or foresee the consequences which would be drawn from certain maxims which passed current with them, and certain principles which they laid down as the basis of their own proceedings. They had had no experience of the Jacobinical revolutions which followed the establishment of our republic, and consequently could not anticipate the facility with which their own principles could be perverted to serve as the basis of a system with which they had no affinity. They did not see that the *Contrât Sociale* was already in Locke's Essays on Government, that the French Revolution and all its horrors were in the *Contrât Sociale*, and that all modern Red Republicanism, Socialism, and Communism were in the French Revolution. They had no suspicion of the poison concealed in the phrase *sovereignty of the people*, — a phrase in their sense so innocent and so just. Hence they did not take all the precautions which were requisite against the perversion of the institutions they founded to a pure democracy, or which they would have taken if they had had our experience.

The whole history of the formation of our governments, and the maxims we adopted, when seen in the light of

Jacobinical interpretation, were well calculated to induce the half-learned, the *semidotti*, as are always the majority where education is general, whose little learning is more dangerous than none, to regard our institutions as purely democratic in theory. The sovereignty of the people was loudly and unequivocally asserted. This meant at the time, save in the minds of a few speculators, whose designs were not suspected, simply the right of the people in any given locality, when finding themselves without legitimate government, and thrown back into a state of nature, to assemble in convention and institute government for themselves, and in such form as they believed, under the circumstances, best adapted to the public good. This was all that was really meant by this phrase. But when Jacobinism arose, the phrase assumed a new and a terrible meaning. It then came to mean that the sovereignty resides permanently in the people regarded as prior to government, — after the institution of government, and during its existence, as before its institution, and where there is no civil polity. The people were thus, instead of being in certain exceptional cases the medial origin, or rightful institutors of the government, the persisting ground of its authority. They were then the real persisting sovereign, and the so-called government was nothing but an agency created by them, holding to them the relation of an agent to his principal, and bound to obey its instructions, which they could alter or revoke at will. This is pure democracy. As our institutions plainly recognize the sovereignty of the people, the conclusion that they are purely democratic became inevitable as soon as the sovereignty of the people came to be understood in this sense. The fallacy arises from the ambiguity, as the logician would say, of the middle term, that is, the sovereignty of the people. Where there is no government the people have the right to institute government. This is all the sovereignty our institutions recognize in the people; for as soon as the government is instituted, their sovereignty or right to institute government no longer exists.

Precisely here lies the difference between the theory of our institutions and Jacobinism. The theory of our institutions is, that as soon as the government was instituted, it became vested with the sovereignty, with full authority,

according to its constitution, to govern,—an authority derived, not from the people, save as they were the medium of its institution, but from the Divine Law under which all legitimate governments hold; the Jacobinical theory agrees with ours as to the origin of the government, but goes farther, and maintains that the popular sovereignty does not cease with the institution of government, but survives it, and persists through all its acts as the permanent and indestructible ground of its authority,—that the government not only is indebted to the intervention of the people as its medial origin, or instrument of its institution, but actually holds its powers from them, and is in all respects simply their agent, bound by their instructions, alterable or revocable at their will. This Jacobinical theory of popular sovereignty is much the most natural and simple, and is far the most easily apprehended; it demands very little practical wisdom or strength and acuteness of thought to be understood and applied, and places the wise and simple, the learned and unlearned, on the same level. It is, therefore, the very theory that the multitude, washed or unwashed, must find the best adapted to their powers and attainments, and the one we may be sure they will accept and insist on.

Having once entertained the Jacobinical doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, it was easy to find it confirmed by our own institutions, both State and national. As a matter of fact, our political constitutions had been framed by conventions of the people, and most of these constitutions contain provisions for convening the people anew to alter or amend them. These facts, rightly interpreted, afford no countenance to Jacobinism. The rule for interpreting facts is to draw from them no principle broader than is requisite to account for them, and to interpret them as strictly as possible in accordance with the principles generally received on the subject to which they relate. The first of these two facts merely implies the right of the people, when destitute of government, and thrown back into a state of nature, to institute government,—a right derived from the necessity of the case. The second fact does not necessarily warrant any thing more; for the people can come together in convention, and alter or amend the constitution, only by virtue of a legal provision, and as legally convened. Some of the constitutions provide

for their amendment through ordinary legislative bodies, without an extraordinary convention, and all might have done so, if it had been deemed expedient by the framers of the law. Conventions called for amending the constitution are, then, only a part of the legal machinery of the government, and rest for their authority, not on the will of the people regarded as antecedent to government, not on a supposed reservation of popular sovereignty, but on the law, as do the several other parts of the governmental machinery. But hardly had our government been instituted before the Jacobinical doctrine was broached. Contemplated in its light, the convention was no longer a part of the machinery of government, brought into play only on extraordinary occasions, but a resumption by the people of the power they had previously delegated. It was an appeal of the agent to his principal for additional instructions, or it was the principal calling his agent to an account of his agency, and modifying or revoking his instructions. This interpretation is more easy and less complicated than the other; it demands no acquaintance with law or political science to be understood; and therefore was held to be the true theory of the convention in our political system, making that system pure Jacobinism.

The frequency of elections and constant recurrence to the people in the practical operations of the government tend to produce the general impression, that our government is theoretically a pure democracy. The people are constantly called upon, in consequence of general suffrage, and the short term of all elective offices, to give their votes in reference to all important measures, and are seen everywhere acting, and deciding by their votes the most important questions of the country. The fact is, that the part they act is solely by virtue of positive law, which intrusts them with a share in the administration of government, for suffrage is a trust conferred by law on whom the will of the legislator chooses, not a natural right. But the people and their action are visible, while the law by virtue of which they act, and to which they are responsible, is invisible, save to the lawyer and statesman. Demagogues do not generally themselves perceive it, and when they do, it is for their interest to keep others from seeing it. They are in popular states what courtiers are in monarchical

states, and flatter the people as these flatter the king. In order to be in favor with the people, they flatter them, exaggerate their power, as well as their wisdom and honesty, and tell them that they are sovereign, that they have the right to do as they will, and that government and all institutions are but the work of their hands and the instruments of their pleasure. The elections being almost daily, at least following each other with such frequency that one is hardly over before the politicians begin to prepare for another, and the flatteries and adulations of the people being so unremitting and so gross, the limitations or restrictions originally imposed on the democratic element are lost sight of, and the general conviction is naturally and almost inevitably produced, that our government is intended, and should be interpreted, to be a pure democracy, a simple and absolute government of the democratic form.

These facts and considerations show that the democratic element had too many facilities for escaping its constitutional limits, and of making itself recognized as the exclusive principle of the American government. Certain it is, that it is now so recognized, and democracy, pure, simple, unlimited democracy, is now the general political doctrine of the country. No man who seeks power or place dares question the soundness of democracy, and all parties profess to be democratic, and only vie with each other as to which shall be the most thoroughly democratic. Whigs, Democrats, and Free Soilers all alike profess to be democrats, and to bow alike to the majesty of the people. All consent to regard democracy as the law, and to be tried under it. The consequence is, that there has come to be a wide discrepancy between the political theories and the political institutions of the country. In reality a democrat, in the proper sense of the term, is false to our institutions, as much so as is an aristocrat or a monarchist, and yet the man who opposes exclusively what is called *ultra*-democracy or radicalism is sure to be denounced, when not ignored, as one who opposes the form of government our fathers established. We ourselves are so denounced, and ninety-nine out of every hundred of our political readers will hold us to be no loyal American citizen because we will not advocate exclusive democracy. They will accuse us of going to extremes, simply because we protest against all extremes. They will pronounce the distinctions we

have made vain subtilties, the over-refinements of a metaphysical mind, and look upon us as at heart the friend of tyrants and aristocrats, so little do they appreciate our motives, and so far are they from comprehending and being loyal to the mixed and complex character of the American government and institutions.

This discrepancy is not only wide, but exceedingly dangerous. When the people have the part they really and constitutionally have here, one of two things is necessary, either that popular political theories conform to the political institutions of the country, or that the political institutions conform to the popular political theories. In the long run the institutions must correct the theories, or the theories will undermine and revolutionize, by force or otherwise, the institutions. Our own experience proves this. The popular political theory of the country is purely democratic, that is, Jacobinical, although practically there are and must be by every party, when in power, many departures from it. The struggle is really to carry out this theory, and to reduce every thing to it as the *norma*, or rule, — to eliminate from our institutions every thing repugnant to it, or that interposes any obstacle to the immediate and sovereign action of the popular will. No man can have observed with any care the course of events amongst us without having perceived that there has been, and that there is, a constant tendency to bring every thing in our institutions into strict logical consistency with the democratic principle as the exclusive principle of the government. This is seen in the constitutions of the new States, and more especially in the changes introduced into the constitutions of the old States by the conventions assembled from time to time to amend them. The grand aim in all appears to be to remove all the provisions which give to the government a mixed character and restrict the action of the democratic element, and to provide for the free, full, and immediate action of the popular will, that is, the will of the majority for the time, in determining every measure of the government. A revolution has been silently going on. Even Mr. Jefferson, the father of American radicalism, to say nothing of Washington, Adams, Hamilton, or Madison, were he to come back among us, would no longer recognize the institutions he helped found, and which he so ardently loved. Even he would now be re-

garded as a conservative, as one of those men who are afraid of progress, who dare not trust the people, and have their faces on the backside of their heads, or, as Mr. Emerson expresses it, "have their eyes in their hindhead, not in their forehead." In several of the individual States this revolution has gone so far as to convert them very nearly into pure democracies, where the will of the multitude, or the will of what the demagogues make pass for the majority, reigns without a rival, unrestrained, as absolutely as reigns the Grand Turk in Stamboul.

The revolution affected by popular theories touches the more important and vital interest of the community. The great body of our people, with their half-learned leaders, mistake the liberty of the multitude to govern for the liberty of the people under government and through its protection. With them the great questions regard the elections of presidents, congress-men, governors, assembly-men, the institution of government, the installation of its officers, and special enactments relating chiefly to industrial and financial matters. They do not reflect that government with us is already instituted, and that the chief concern is now as to its administration, and especially the administration of justice. The state with us is constituted, and as originally constituted well constituted, and nothing can be more foolish or more mischievous than to proceed as if we had no state, and were called upon to constitute it, — as if the inquiry were not how to govern, but how to get a governor. The great business of a state is not to be ever constituting itself, but to administer the laws. The very idea of a state (*status*) is of something established, fixed, and immovable; and a nation by the very fact that it is a nation has already a body of laws, written or unwritten, and is not called upon to make the laws. In no civilized state are the laws to be made, or is any other legislation requisite than the few enactments which relate to administration, or which are demanded to adapt the existing laws to the altered circumstances which time and events may have introduced. To suppose that the laws are still to be framed in any nation, is to suppose that it is either in the infancy or in the decrepitude of its civilization. It must be a nation just born, or a nation passed into its dotage, that has every thing to learn and do, or that has forgotten all that it has ever done or known, that

has inherited nothing or that has dissipated its patrimony, and in either case the attempt to make for itself a body of laws must always prove no less unsuccessful than ridiculous. The glory of a generation is in having inherited a noble patrimony, not in having every thing to create anew for itself.

The glory of our country is not in its own enactments, with which it is seldom satisfied, and which it seeks to repeal or modify as soon as made ; but in the common law, which we have inherited from our English ancestors. What is of most vital importance to us is an able and independent judiciary for its administration. We enter not here into the controversy between the common lawyers and the civil lawyers as to the relative merits of their respective systems. Some might, perhaps, prefer the civil law, but the common law, the law inherited from our English ancestors, is a good system of law, and if the civil law practice renders it less difficult for the guilty to escape detection, the practice of the common law courts, we are inclined to believe, affords the best protection to the innocent. The main principles of the two systems are substantially the same, and it is easy by statute to adopt those provisions of the civil law which are thought to be superior to the common law, if any such there are. The common law is the law of the land ; it is interwoven with all our habits as a people ; it is the life-blood of all our institutions, the conscience of the American state, the common sense of the American community. There is no good reason for rejecting it, and every lawyer, if worthy of the name, knows that the various modifications that have in late years been introduced into it by statute have only marred its beauty, broken its symmetry, and detracted from its efficiency. What is wanted is not a change of the law, or a modification of the law, but courts independently constituted for its administration.

But, unhappily, the independence of the courts of law, or the judiciary, is precisely the thing to which the popular theories of the country are the most directly and inveterately opposed, because an independent judiciary opposes the most effectual barrier to popular tyranny and oppression. The radical movement of the country exerts all its force to destroy the independence of the courts, and to make them, like every thing else, mere agencies for executing whatever may be the popular will, caprice, or prejudice for

the moment. It seeks to deprive the judiciary of every member competent to discharge the duties of a judge, and to render the courts weak and contemptible. Under the pretext of economy it cuts down the salaries of judges to a point so low, that none but third or fourth rate men, men who could not gain a competence at the bar, can afford to accept a seat on the bench. Having got a weak judiciary that will yield to every popular breeze, the movement seeks to secure the fruits of its victory by making the judges elective by the people for a short term of years, and reëligible. The independent tenure by which the judges originally held their office is now destroyed in most of the States, and soon will be in all. The popular theory declares the multitude to be sovereign, and the multitude can tolerate no institution not flexible to their will. So the judges, on whose competency, independence, and impartiality depend the vital interests of both the community and the individual, must be selected from the class of inferior men, be made elective by the people for a short term of office and reëligible, so that they will be impotent to resist popular opinion or prejudice, and have every inducement to bow in all obsequiousness to the majesty of the multitude. *Vive la multitude!*

But this is not enough. The same popular tendency, which distrusts whatever is supposed to rise above the common level, attacks the prerogatives of the court, and claims them for the jury. The court having, or being supposed to have, some knowledge of the law, may still have some regard to its legal reputation, and insist on abiding by the law, instead of yielding to popular clamor. So the office of the judge must be reduced to that of a mere presiding officer, and the jury, innocent of any legal attainments, must be made judges both of the law and the fact. Being taken immediately from the multitude, sharing all their prejudices and passions in the given locality, the jury will be pretty sure to gratify them, and render a verdict in accordance with the decision arrived at out of court.

Yet even this is too little to satisfy the democratic tendency. Law is both a science and an art, and can therefore be understood and practised only by those who have made it the subject of special study and preparation. These by virtue of this special study and preparation constitute a distinct class or profession, and have the exclusive

privilege of practising law. Hence they, the lawyers, are a privileged class, and exclusive democracy can tolerate no privileged classes. Every man should be free to make hats or coats without ever having served an apprenticeship, or learned the mysteries of the craft; and if he cannot do it, then you have no business to have hats or coats, and you must either dispense with them, or else consent to have such as any one can make without any previous apprenticeship. Such handicrafts as cannot without apprenticeship be pursued by all are undemocratic, strike at the fundamental idea of equality, and can never be tolerated by a free and enlightened people. So the law must be codified and simplified, so that every blockhead in the country can understand and practise it without previous study or preparation, and the courts must be thrown open to every miserable pettifogger whose impudence gets the better of his sense. Democracy cannot tolerate any thing that is not on a level with every understanding, or that demands preparatory discipline, that would give science an advantage over ignorance, wisdom over folly, intellect over stupidity. New York, the Empire State, has taken the lead in this democratic warfare against science and skill, in favor of ignorance and ineptness. She has codified her laws, altered the procedure of her courts, and thrown open the practice of the law to every man who can obtain a client, and such thorough work has she made that her learned judges no longer know how to proceed, and are obliged to confess that in her courts the erudite lawyer has no longer any advantage over the ignorant ploughman. Long life to the New York law reformers and codifiers!

These proceedings, in which all our States are following at a greater or less distance, would be simply ridiculous, if they did not involve the most vital interests of every man, woman, and child in the community,—if they did not sweep away every guaranty of personal liberty, poison the very fountain of justice, and place life, liberty, property, and character at the mercy of the mob. We may boast of our free institutions as much as we please, but let us at least have the modesty not to boast of our freedom as individuals, so long as the administration of justice is subjected to popular opinion, prejudice, or caprice, and a man must be acquitted or condemned, not according to the law and evidence, but according to the ignorant and prejudiced

clamors of the multitude outside. There is not a monarchical state in Christian Europe that would tolerate the direct and personal intervention of the sovereign in the administration of justice. It was one of the gravest complaints of our ancestors against several of the kings of England, that, instead of remitting the decision of causes to independent and impartial judges, they usurped it to themselves. And yet this is precisely what we in our *enlightened* love of liberty are laboring to do. We are laboring to secure the direct intervention of the people, said to be sovereign here, in the decision of causes. We have not yet wholly succeeded in doing it; the judiciary, in some localities, still retains its former character; but the tide is setting in strongly and rapidly against it everywhere. Yet few take the alarm; the majority clap their hands and exult, and if one ventures to utter a warning, the mob exclaims, "What, you distrust the people, do you? You are afraid to trust your cause to the wisdom and justice of the people, are you? Do not be frightened. *Vox populi, vox Dei*. You are safe in the hands of the people." If he remonstrates, he is denounced as no democrat, and nobody will venture henceforth to furnish him wood or water. Every man who wants office, or wants popular influence, must join in the cry of retrenchment, low salaries, open courts, responsible judges, a popular judiciary, and urge on the destructive movement with all his might. It may be death to liberty, but it is sport to the demagogues, and so no man must dare raise his voice against it.

We have been drawn into this train of remark at the present time by Mr. Fenimore Cooper's late work, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article. Our readers are aware of our estimation of our distinguished countryman as an author. He undeniably stands at the head of American authors of his class, and has done as much as any other man, if not more, for the literary character of our country. As works of mere amusement his earlier works are superior to his later productions, but for depth of thought, solidity of principles, and high moral aims and tendency, they are far inferior. To our judgment, and even to our taste, his later works, in which he attempts to correct the foibles, errors, and dangerous tendencies of his countrymen, are far preferable to those of his

earlier works in which his principal moral aim was to defend our character and institutions against the aspersions and prejudices of Europeans. We will not say that he has performed the delicate task he undertook with as much adroitness, amiableness, and tenderness as was possible, but he has labored at it in a free, noble, and manly spirit, and deserves the warm gratitude of his fellow-citizens. The press, as was to be expected, since it could not ignore, has assailed him with a spite, bitterness, and meanness worthy of itself and of him. To fall under the condemnation of the American press, as it now is, with a very few exceptions, is a high honor, for it has no appreciation of manliness or nobleness of character, and no real knowledge of the various subjects on which it pronounces its judgments. Its conductors have just that smattering of knowledge which makes a man conceited, and fancy that beyond what he knows there is nothing to be known, and when they commend any one we may always presume that he has said or done some very foolish or very wicked thing. Happy is the literary man in this country whose character is established, and whose reputation can neither be enhanced nor diminished by the newspaper rabble. The editorial rabble have done their best to make Mr. Cooper unpopular, and to drive him from the place he originally held in the hearts of his countrymen; but, unless it be for a brief moment, they have labored in vain. No sensible man heeds the newspapers in this country, — hardly enough to feel contempt for their flippancy, conceit, and impudence, — and Mr. Cooper will live in the hearts of his countrymen when his newspaper assailants and their sheets are as if they had not been.

The work before us, the last of Mr. Cooper's that we have seen, may not be precisely to the taste of the young, the giddy, the thoughtless, the sentimental, and the romantic, — although it is by no means void of interest simply as a novel, and contains scenes and incidents of great beauty and power; but the grave and thoughtful, the cultivated and refined, the Christian and the patriot, the moralist and the statesman, will read it with pleasure and instruction. We do not by any means claim perfection for it. It has some slight defects; it appears to have been hastily written, and not to have received so high a finish as the author was capable of giving it. It contains some

views with which we do not wholly agree, and some exaggerations which will impair its efficiency. Lawyer Timms, one of the characters introduced, is hardly a faithful representative of the class of lawyers intended. Mr. Dunscombe, his model lawyer, is a noble character. We love and honor him as a man, but one of our legal friends tells us that his management of the case of Mary Monson does not justify the high praise awarded him as a counsellor; and the author seems to have sacrificed his legal reputation to the exigencies of the story. The author has also exaggerated the feeling of the people towards what they call the aristocracy. With all our democracy, we are the most aristocratic people on earth, and we do not think that, in any part of our widely-extended country, a lady would find the fact of her being young, beautiful, accomplished, and very rich, likely to tell to her disadvantage on a trial for murder. The difficulty, as far as we know the temper of our countrymen, would not be to obtain a verdict acquitting such a person as Mary Monson is described to be, in case of her innocence, but in obtaining a verdict against her in case of her guilt. We are a gallant people; and, though we are chary of hanging a man for murdering a woman, especially if she was his wife or his paramour, we have, as a people, too devout a worship for the sex to hang a lady, especially if young, brilliant, accomplished, beautiful, and rich. All the young men would swear to her innocence because they are young men, and all the old men would do the same because they would be thought young. Aristocracy as such, that is, wealth and breeding, the only aristocracy we have among us, does not generally excite hostility in our society, if modest and unassuming. Even according to Mr. Cooper's showing, the hostility to his heroine grew out of her isolation, and apparent contempt for public opinion in Biberry, rather than out of her supposed connection with the aristocratic classes. Had she been known in the outset to be connected as she was with those classes, she would never, under the circumstances alleged, have been put upon her trial.

There is no doubt a feeling of envy towards those who have wealth and breeding very widely diffused through the community, but this does not operate, except in the case of the Antirenters, unfavorably towards them in the courts of justice. We have nothing to say in favor of the Anti-

renters, nor in favor of New York justice so far as the rights of the Van Rensselaers and other landlords in that State are concerned, and in the countenance New York has shown and still shows to Antirentism, she has incurred a disgrace that twenty generations will not wipe out. But the tenants have votes, and no party can do without them, and they must be permitted to refuse to pay their rents, and encouraged to murder the officers sent to enforce payment. In cases like these, aristocracy is in the way of one's getting his honest dues, and when justice is on one side, and the majority of voters on the other, justice, of course, must be allowed to kick the beam. What mighty advantage would there be in votes, if they must be controlled by a sense of justice, or if one man, because he has law and justice on his side, can withstand a whole community? No; democracy goes for the greatest good of the greatest number, and when one man has rights that conflict with the interests of numbers, the rights must yield to the interests. This is the beauty of a popular government, under which the interests of *the people* are to be consulted before the interests of the Patroon, and the law is not to be enforced when it does not accord with public sentiment. In the State of New York they have carried out the principle of popular government to its fullest extent, and possess it in all its beauty. We shall have it so in all the other States soon, and then the administration of justice will be wonderfully simplified, and the courts have nothing to do but to collect and register the sentences pronounced by public opinion,—perhaps not so much, for Judge Lynch may be then the only administrator of justice retained. Woe then to the man who has not the local press, the demagogues, the old women, and boys of the neighborhood, on his side. A short shrift and a hempen tippet will be all the justice he can expect. We live in an age of progress, and we make rapid progress, for our road is down hill. We shall be at the bottom soon, unless bottom there proves to be none.

Nevertheless, Mr. Cooper's work is sound and healthy, and contains much matter that every American citizen ought to read and meditate daily. The purpose of the author is, by means of an ingeniously devised and in general felicitously managed story, to draw the public attention to the administration of justice as affected by the

popular theories of the country and the recent legislation and attempts at law reform especially in the State of New York, and to point out the dangers to which we are exposed from the extraneous influences brought to bear upon both court and jury. His arrows are pointed more particularly against this outside influence, the want of independence in the court and jury, and the recent law of the State of New York with regard to the property of married women, — what he calls “the Cup-and-Saucer Law.”

This outside influence is so strong, that the author thinks the trial by jury has become very nearly a mockery, and he would go so far as to abolish it altogether. With much that he says on this point we cordially agree, and it is certain that the jury in a popular government has a very different signification from what it has under a monarchy, or even an aristocracy. The jury was originally intended to operate to the protection of the accused, by introducing a popular element to temper the authority of the crown, represented by the court; and where the crown had an undue influence, it was, no doubt, a wise and salutary institution, especially in England, after the Norman conquest had introduced a distinction of race between the governing class and the people. But precisely for the reason that the jury was needed in monarchical England, it is objectionable in this country; for here the element to be guarded against is the popular element, which is too strong, not the element of authority, represented by the judge, which is too weak. As in England the influence of the crown might defeat the ends of justice, so here the popular influence is liable to do the same. This danger is increased, not guarded against, by the institution of the jury. Moreover, the jury here often fails of its end, in consequence of the little care or judgment employed in the selection of jurors. Men utterly incompetent, morally and intellectually, often make up the panel, and serve on our juries, — men who cannot be made to understand a single element of the cause they have to try, and who are utterly unscrupulous as to the verdict they render, — who even consent to decide important causes by tossing up a copper. These and various other objections can easily be urged against the institution; but, nevertheless, we are not prepared to go so far with Mr. Cooper as to abolish it. It is an old institution, dear from old associations to our people: it is a part of our general system

for the administration of justice, and we are unwilling, especially in these times of change and innovation, to disturb it. We do not see what we could substitute for it, that would be an improvement; and after all, we are far from being convinced that it does not even here serve a useful purpose, at least the purpose of taking off a portion of the odium of unpopular judgments from the judge, — in these times a matter of vital importance. Without it the people would lose their confidence in the courts, and would attack still more vehemently the independence of the judiciary. Let more care be bestowed in determining the qualifications of jurors, and let the jury more distinctly understand that it is the province of the court to declare the law, and that their province is simply to judge of the fact, and there will be little occasion to find fault with the jury. Certain we are, that it would, upon the whole, be beneficial, and equally certain we are, that, if it should in the present temper of the people be abolished, its place would be supplied by some institution that would be little less than unmixed evil. The age and country should go to school for some time before attempting innovations, unless it be in the purely material world. Because the age has invented lucifer matches, it does not follow that it can invent a useful substitute for the jury.

The author shows also this outside influence as it affects the judges, in rendering them impatient, and afraid of wasting time. Not only our courts of law, but our legislative assemblies generally, are afraid of consuming time, and seem to fancy that their merit is in proportion to the celerity with which they despatch the business before them. This is a great mistake, and it, no doubt, arises from the everlasting cry of "retrenchment," and constant reference to public opinion. Nothing is lost by taking full time to deliberate. The great defect of our people is to be always in a hurry, to do every thing in a hurry, and consequently to do nothing well. It would be better to increase the number of judges, and to have smaller judicial districts, than to have our courts always in a hurry, and always reminding the counsel, "Time is precious," often to the confusion of their brains, and to the great detriment of their clients. Multiplying the judicial districts and appointing more judges would remedy the evil, and be a great economy of time and money in the end, even if the judges were

paid, as they should be, a liberal salary. High salaries, for all important offices, are always commended by a wise economy. Offices which do not demand much learning or talent, which any body that is honest and has common sense can fill, should have only a low salary attached to them, — too low to make it much of an object to aspire to them. Higher offices, which demand a high order of intellect and attainments, should always have liberal salaries attached to them. Unhappily, fancying ourselves wiser than all the past, and called upon to open a new era for the world, we in this country reverse this rule, — give a liberal salary to a tide-waiter, and a meagre one to the Chief Justice and his associates, to the President, heads of departments, Congress-men, and members of State legislatures. The consequence is, no man fit to fill the higher offices can accept one of them without a great personal sacrifice, and half the country is scrambling for the lower ones. But this comes from claiming to be wiser than our fathers.

The "Cup-and-Saucer Law" deserves all the severity with which Mr. Cooper treats it. We have no wish to see revived the old pagan doctrine, which includes a man's wife and children among his goods and chattels; we thank God for our holy religion, which has emancipated woman, and elevated her to be the companion, though not the head, of man. We yield to no one in our respect for the dignity of woman, or in our appreciation of her appropriate sphere. But we have no sympathy with the almost universal pruriency of our age and country, and have long since ceased to be a follower of Frances Wright, or a disciple of Mary Wolstonecroft. Woman often suffers much from man, and man often suffers, too, from woman, and the woman as often ruins the man as the man does the woman. Neither is, ordinarily, an angel nor a demon, though both are sometimes the latter. In families where there is misery the fault is not always that of the husband, and not unfrequently a man flies to the club or to the dram-shop solely because his "angel" wife cannot make his own fireside pleasant to him. We are willing that the property a wife has before marriage should be settled on her, or at least a portion of it; but we cannot endure a law which not only vests her with it after marriage, but allows her the management of it during coverture independently of her husband, and to make and receive devises and bequests, pre-

cisely as if single. This separation of the interests of the husband and wife, this distinction of the unity of the married pair, making them two, and permitting them in hardly any respect to be one, effected by the recent law of the State of New York, and which all the other States are aspiring to imitate, is incompatible with the true nature and meaning of marriage, and is the most odious and immoral in principle of any measure we remember ever to have seen deliberately adopted by a civilized state. It is simply the first step towards realizing the doctrines preached by Frances Wright. Under this law, the wife may, if we understand it, as freely buy and sell, sue and be sued, as if she were single. She is during coverture, as before or after, in the fullest sense, a *person* in law. She may dispose of her property to enrich her paramour, if disposed; or she may receive from him the gift of a farm in a distant part of the country, and, under pretence of managing it, leave her husband's house, and reside on it, to her husband's dishonor, and to the neglect of all her duties as a wife. She may even charge her husband with every cent she lets him have, and bring a suit against him to recover pay for any cup and saucer of hers he may have accidentally broken when taking his tea. If she is not pleased with his society, she can leave him, if she has property of her own, and reside where she pleases, return when it suits her convenience, and go away when she is tired of her spouse. Such is the legislation of a free and enlightened people. The full effects of this legislation will not be immediately seen, for as yet our men and our women retain, to some extent, the views and habits formed under a less unchristian system, and our wives will not at once avail themselves of all the license the law gives them. But our daughters, at farthest our granddaughters, will, and then the beautiful effects of the Antichristian and immoral legislation now insisted on will be seen and felt; but then it will be too late.

It is not our design to enlarge, at present, on this topic, for we confess that we have not ourselves thoroughly examined all the bearings of the law in question. It seems to us to have been the work of ignorant, but well-meaning persons, who, seeing certain evils accrue under the old law, undertook, without any just conceptions of their cause, to remedy them, and adopted the first remedy that presented itself, without ever once stopping to inquire whether the

application of that remedy would not produce a thousand other evils, each a hundredfold worse. In this way most of our legislative innovations are introduced. Their authors have no bad intention, nay, they have good intentions; but they are ordinary men, from the ordinary walks of life, with nothing but a superficial knowledge of the subjects on which they attempt to legislate. A legislator was once thought to be a rare character, and it was supposed no man, unless divinely assisted, could be a competent legislator; but now every ploughman, blacksmith, shoemaker, tinker, or shopkeeper has only to be chosen a member of a legislature to be a Moses, a Minos, a Lycurgus, a Solon, or a Numa. No previous study or discipline is regarded as necessary; learning, science, art, are superfluous, and we attempt to make ignorance and folly answer the purposes of knowledge and wisdom, and with what ample success — is it not written in our statute-books?

In the legislation that affects financial matters and purely business interests, we respect public opinion, and the intervention of the people. In reference to this legislation, we are as good a democrat as any of our countrymen, and in this legislation we think our country compares favorably with any other country. In this legislation the people are at home, and we have always great confidence in the wisdom and utility of those measures which command the general assent of the people. Here we believe the judgment of the people is a safer guide than the judgment of individuals, however learned, able, and distinguished. It is, indeed, only on matters of this sort that we need legislation, and it is probable that legislation on other matters was not contemplated by our fathers; for all other matters, with a few trifling exceptions, were already covered by the common law, which contained the condensed wisdom of ages. The error of the country lies in claiming for the people a legislative capacity beyond these, in regarding statute law as the most important portion of the law, and in attempting to amend the common law, or the *lex non scripta*. We set out with the false assumption that we are a new people, bound by nothing that was before us, and under the necessity of creating every thing anew for ourselves. Hence, instead of confining ourselves to such alterations in statute law, the *lex scripta*, as our separation from the mother country and our peculiar circumstances rendered

necessary, we have undertaken to revise the whole law of the land, as it affects both the rights of persons and things. We have unsettled every thing, and in our ineptness have vitiated the administration of justice, and rendered life, liberty, and property insecure, by making them, as in Turkey, wholly dependent on the will or caprice of the sovereign, — there on the will or caprice of the Sultan, here on the will or caprice of the multitude.

In purely economical matters the people are the best judges, and in regard to those matters we would have the democratic element felt; but in matters of justice, in the respect in which law is ethical, and deals with ethics, we want no popular legislation. In regard to rights, whether of persons or of things, and the administration of justice, the people can intervene only to do injury. In regard to these, save as to the organization of the courts, we needed no further legislation, and no further intervention of the legislator. The law had been settled from time immemorial, and only needed to be executed, and for its execution the executive and judiciary branches of the government sufficed. Least of all did we need the intervention of the popular element in the judgment of causes, especially in the shape of public opinion outside of the courts of law. The habit of appealing to the public on all occasions is so universal amongst us, and the practice of discussing all questions in public, and deciding them by a plurality of voices, has become so general, that nearly all manliness and independence of character have been lost amongst us. There is no country on earth where public opinion is so powerful and so intolerant as in these United States, or where men's souls are really so enslaved. It is not that dungeons and racks are prepared for the body, which were, after all, but a trifle, for it matters little what is done to the body if the soul be free; but it is that the mind itself, the very soul, is fettered and bound by the intangible tyrant called public sentiment. We do not dare act from principle, to follow the right from our own personal conviction, whether we go alone or with the crowd, but we are as a people continually asking, What will people say? We are so habituated to this, it has become so much a part of our American nature, that we regard it as the normal order of things, and are utterly blinded to the evils which spring from it, and the gross injustice it operates, and we little suspect its full influence in the administration of justice.

Whether there is any probability of correcting the evil, and excluding from our courts this outside influence, is more than we know. Certain it is that matters are growing worse and worse every day. The rage for innovation is so strong, and the tendency to sweep away all the guaranties of individual rights is so irresistible, we have gone so far, and are going with such an ever-increasing celerity, in a wrong direction, that we see little prospect of things becoming better. As long as radicalism confined itself to the constitution of power and the financial concerns of the country, and let the law, the courts, and the administration of justice alone, we could suffer it to go on, without any vital injury to personal liberty; but now that it makes these the especial objects of its care and solicitude, we see no hope for the country but in its conversion, which depends on God, not on man. The whole tendency we deplore results inevitably from Protestantism, which destroys the conservative influence of religion, by subjecting it to popular control. Protestantism, instead of being able to resist the evil tendency, and recall the people to a just public sentiment, must itself yield to that tendency, and be, as we every day see it, carried away with it. In fact, there is no human help for us, and if God does not in his providence specially intervene to save us from our own madness, the country will ere long lapse into barbarism.

Our political parties might do something if they would, but they can do nothing so long as they all profess to be democratic. *Democracy* is a stronger word here than *Constitution*, and the term cannot now be generally adopted except in its Jacobinical sense. If all parties accept it, then all parties will only conspire to strengthen the destructive tendency we have pointed out. Properly there are but two parties in the country, Conservatives or Constitutionals, and Destructives or Radicals. The Free Soil party is an organization of the latter; and those not incorporated into that party should lay aside the name of *Whig* and *Democrat*, two names which refer to the constitution of government, and inappropriate here, because here government is already constituted, and rally around the Constitution, as a true conservative party, both in regard to the general government and the State governments. Were they to do so, the evil could be arrested. But they will not do so; old

party animosities, personal rivalries, and petty jealousies will prevent them from doing so. Things will go on as they have been going, and those of us who sound the note of warning will be unheeded, laughed at, or denounced, while the multitude will continue to boast of the wisdom and progress of the age and country. Be it so. We have done our duty as a loyal American citizen in pointing out the evil, and the great body of our Catholic brethren will do theirs, we trust, and the responsibility must rest, where it belongs, on those who have the power, and only abuse it.

ART. II. — *Essays (Third Series) on the Errors of Romanism having their Origin in Human Nature.* By RICHARD WHATELY, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Third Edition, revised. London. 1845.

THE fruitful pen of the Protestant metropolitan of Dublin, during several years, has entertained the public with many learned and attractive essays, which, however they may fail to produce conviction in the minds of the discerning reader, must interest by the beauty of the style as well as the liberality of the views which they embody. The persuasion generally prevailing, even among the adherents of the English Establishment, that the author does not hold the Christian faith in regard to the Trinity, must necessarily awaken distrust in his teaching on other points, so that his testimony for or against us can carry but little weight. Several passages in the *Essays* now before us strengthen the suspicion of his unsound views on this great mystery, since he virtually charges its defenders with Tritheism, and simply styles it "God's threefold manifestation of himself." "On rising," he remarks, "from the disquisitions of many scholastic divines on the inherent distinctions of the three Divine Persons, a candid reader cannot but feel that they have made the Unity of God the great and difficult mystery." (Essay II. p. 36.) Borrowing from unbelievers the trite objection, that revelation and mystery are contradictory, since the latter supposes the incomprehensible character of the truth which the former manifests, he says, "The doctrine of the Trinity, and the

rest of the mysteries of the Gospel, as far as they relate to us, since He has thought fit to reveal these to us in the Gospel, every Christian is allowed, and is bound, to learn from that Revelation ‘of the mystery which was secret from the beginning of the world, but now is *made manifest*.’” The manifestation of which the Apostle speaks is plainly the accomplishment in time of the Divine counsel for the salvation of men by the Incarnation of the Son of God. The revelation of this fact takes away nothing of its mysterious character. It must ever fill men and angels with wonder, that God should become man, in order to redeem man from eternal death.

We fear that the views of the author on the Atonement are as unsound as on the Trinity, since in a former work he denied the preëxistence of the Son, and in the present he complains, that “the doctrine of the Atonement has often been made the basis of abstruse metaphysical disquisitions respecting the mode in which Divine justice was satisfied by the sacrifice of Christ, considering that act more as to what it was to God, than what it was to man.” Must not the Christian know whether to regard the death of Christ as an act of propitiation to the Divine Majesty, or the tragic end of a career of benevolence? It is surely by recognizing it as the ransom offered to God for our redemption, the price of our purchase, the atonement for our sins, that we can best estimate the benefits which flow thence to us, and conceive corresponding gratitude and love for such unbounded mercy. But Dr. Whately considers the idea of “vicarious religion” as a superstition having its source in the corruption of nature, and he consequently must repudiate the idea of atonement offered by Christ for men, whereby they are cleansed, justified, and sanctified through the sprinkling of his blood. How much more philosophical and consistent is the view presented by De Maistre, who in the expiatory sacrifices of the heathens themselves traces the vestiges of the primitive tradition of an atonement to be offered by the effusion of blood!

It were indeed a gross superstition to believe that men may be saved, notwithstanding the wilful perversity of their dispositions, through the efforts and merits of others, — even through the atonement of the Redeemer, which, according to his own wise ordinance, cannot be available to those who persist in resisting his saving grace. But it

is consonant with reason that God should accept a victim of propitiation, voluntarily offered for the sins of men, and in virtue of it grant graces impelling to repentance, and pardon the sincere penitent. All that the Church teaches regarding her ministers is in strict harmony with this view. They plead with God through Christ for the people, and in union with them cry, "Spare, O Lord, spare thy people!" They flatter no one that he can be saved independently of his own free coöperation with Divine grace, saying rather to each one, with St. Augustine, "God, who created thee without thy concurrence, will not save thee without thy coöperation." They teach none to rely on the merits of others, although, like the Psalmist, they put forward the fidelity of the patriarchs and saints, that God may be moved to pardon the frailty of sinners; but they warn all to repent in time before the Lord come to judgment, when it may be too late to prepare. They ascribe no magical virtue to any external rite, although they proclaim the sacraments to be unfailing rivulets flowing from the side of the crucified Redeemer, and fertilizing the well-disposed soil, whilst they glide over the obdurate heart without improving it.

The leading idea of these Essays is, that the source of Roman errors is to be sought in the corrupt tendencies of human nature. "No one," says accordingly the learned writer, "can point out any precise period at which this 'mystery of iniquity' — the system of Romish and Grecian corruptions — first began, or specify any person who introduced it. No one in fact ever did introduce any such system. The corruptions crept in one by one, originating for the most part with an ignorant and depraved people, but connived at, cherished, consecrated, and successively established, by a debased and worldly-minded ministry." The charge of innovation has been often met by a challenge on the part of Catholic apologists to point to the innovator, and to the circumstances that marked the rise and progress of the novelty. Dr. Whately gives up the matter in despair, and asserts that the new doctrines stealthily crept in from a corrupt tendency of the human heart. Unfortunately for his theory, he has not succeeded in sustaining it by facts, which rather militate against it. We are not disposed to question the harmony of Catholic doctrine with natural instinct: on the contrary, we believe

that nature, in its purest condition, is the foundation on which the structure of revelation reposes, because God, the author of both, has planted in the human breast sentiments and affections which prepare us for his supernatural communications. The moral principles, which are designated by the name of Natural Law, are the basis on which the Divine Architect has planted revelation. Nature, chastened and directed by it, is worthy of its Divine Parent, who has wisely provided for himself a testimony in its instincts. When the human mind, dazzled by the splendor of the Deity, turns towards created objects, and, charmed by their seductive features, concentrates its affections in them, the natural sense of the power and greatness of the Creator, although for a time obscured and deadened, is not altogether extinct, so that in sudden emergencies even the votary of idolatry gives spontaneous expression to Nature's voice, recognizing her Author, as Tertullian long since observed. Not to the Capitol does he turn, nor is it Jupiter whom he invokes; but with eyes uplifted towards the heavens he cries out, O God! Well does the great apologist of Christianity exclaim on this occasion, "O testimony of the soul, which is naturally Christian!"

When pride and passion have combined to shake off the yoke of Divine religion, and the evidences of revelation are rejected as insufficient to render credible incomprehensible doctrines, man feels himself ready to deny all moral law, and the controlling power of a Supreme Ruler; but he finds that law written in his heart, his conscience bearing witness to it, and his thoughts either accusing him, if he transgress its dictates, or approving his acts as far as they harmonize with its suggestions. Here the contest between faith and atheism is ultimately fought. The discrimination between vice and virtue being maintained, even after the abandonment of all supernatural teaching, the mind is forced to acknowledge a Being the essential criterion of right and wrong; and is prepared to submit, as of necessity, to any manifestation of his power. Thus the natural law proves the safeguard, as well as the introduction to revelation.

It may be thought that the gifted writer has pointed in great detail to the many corrupt tendencies of human nature, which led to the devising of our tenets and the introduction

of our practices; and that with nice discrimination he has distinguished between the direct consequences of some natural instinct, and the perverse results occasioned by human depravity; but no such work has been accomplished. It costs no labor to assert that the worship of images sprang from a natural tendency of the heart, and to give in evidence the pagan superstitions; but it is not so easy to prove that a crucifix is an object equally to be abhorred as the shrines of Diana, and that relative reverence paid to the symbol of redemption involves the guilt of pagan worship. "One of the most prevailing characteristics of superstition," according to our author, "is the attributing of some sacred efficacy to the performance of *an outward act*, or the presence of some *material object*, without any inward devotion of the heart being required to accompany it." Had he proved that Catholics are taught to confide in external acts independently of inward devotion, he might have traced this feeling to that source. He alleges, indeed, as a matter of fact, that they ascribe such efficacy to pilgrimages, sprinklings with holy water, veneration of relics, and the like, and refers to some local ceremonies in Spanish countries on Good Friday; but were the facts such as he states, they would not establish the principle. Individuals might entertain exaggerated views, or a superstitious confidence in external observances, although the rites themselves did not foster this false feeling. It is much more consistent to trace the veneration of relics to the miracles which were performed through the cloths which had touched the body of St. Paul, than to any natural tendency to confide in outward performances or material objects. How much safer it is to look to facts than to construct theories!

"It is not really," says Dr. Whately, "the doctrine of Purgatory which led to prayers for the dead; on the contrary, it is doubtless the practice of praying for the dead that gave rise to that doctrine." He does not say how the practice itself arose, but in accordance with his theory he must ascribe it to an instinct of nature prompting us to wish the happiness of our departed friends, and to give expression to this desire, even without hoping any result from it. Had we no evidence of a different and higher origin of this usage, we might suffer such a supposition to pass without contradiction, since at all events it would not

indicate any corrupt feeling, but rather a generous affection. We ourselves were witness of such an expression as could not be accounted for by the religious convictions of the individual, and seemed the voice of nature itself. An aged Protestant lady being apprised that a young man, whom she had cherished as a son, was in his last agony, rushed into his chamber, and, on learning that his spirit had just departed, exclaimed almost unconsciously, "O God, have mercy on his soul!" But we are not left to speculate on the origin of the ecclesiastical usage, which Calvin acknowledges to be most ancient; "*mos vetustissimus est.*"* He found it necessary to apologize for resisting it, harmonizing as it does with the best feelings of nature, and, to defend himself, alleged that it necessarily implies the doctrine of Purgatory. "For if we admit," he says, "that prayers should be offered for the dead, we must all acknowledge that they now suffer punishment by the judgment of God, for not having satisfied for their sins whilst living." The connection of the usage with the doctrine is thus established by the consent of Calvin and Whately, whilst its origin is traced to the Apostles by the unexceptionable testimonies of St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, and Tertullian. It was not, however, by reasoning on the practice that the doctrine was discovered, for both were delivered simultaneously. It was well suggested by the Tractarians, that it should be considered "whether this dictate of human nature, warranted as it is by the early Church, may not be implanted by the God of nature, — may not be the voice of God within us." †

Confession is undoubtedly referrible to natural instinct, for all men feel that the humble and sorrowful acknowledgment of an offence is a title to forgiveness, or at least to a mitigation of punishment. Each sinner feels that by disclosing his sin his heart is somewhat relieved, not only by the sympathy he excites, but also by the atonement which he makes to offended virtue. The public at large accord merit to the avowal made by a culprit on the eve of paying the awful penalty of his crime. Nevertheless, it is not to this natural sense and feeling, much less to Divine institution, that Dr. Whately ascribes the practice of confession; but to the proneness of men to vicarious re-

* In *Acta Ap.* Cap. XV.

† Tract 77.

ligion, by which the priest is regarded "as a mediator between them and God." "Hence," he says, "sprung the doctrine of the necessity of confession to a priest, and of the efficacy of the penance he may enjoin and the absolution he bestows." The facility with which the author adapts facts and doctrines to his private theory is truly admirable. Others might be at a loss to understand the necessary connection of these ideas, and might choose rather to account for the belief of this power by the plain force of the commission to forgive or retain sins. Olshausen traces it to the command of the Apostle, that each one should try himself before partaking of the Eucharist, and says that the Church instituted it in perfect accordance with that injunction: but the apostolic mandate was but the promulgation of the law of Christ himself, requiring sinners to show themselves to the priest, in order to be cleansed from spiritual leprosy. Well may the German pietist lament that the practice has disappeared from his communion. It subsists in the Church in its original vigor, because it is not a matter of ecclesiastical discipline, which might be overwhelmed by contrary usage, but it is an essential part of the institutions of Christ, which must continue to the consummation of ages.

Superstition, according to Dr. Whately, is a natural tendency of man. With greater justice he might have said that religion is his natural tendency; and superstition is an abuse of this natural inclination. Man is formed with a sense of dependence on his Creator, whom he feels bound to worship. If from mistaken piety he perform acts ill suited to the Divine honor, he is deemed superstitious. Idolatry is a distinct crime, of far greater enormity, since it implies a transfer of divine honors to images. We cannot agree with the essayist that this is impossible, for profane writers, as well as the Sacred Scriptures, bear indubitable testimony to the sad degradation of men, worshipping the works of their own hands. It may not be easy to conceive how they could imagine these objects to be divine, — whether inhabited by a deity, or invested with a divine virtue; but certain it is, that they did not worship the true God through them, nor did they use them as occasions to remind them of his presence. The prohibition of image-worship contained in the Decalogue was manifestly intended to proscribe the pagan usage of idols, and

to take away all occasion of it. The breaking of the brazen serpent by Ezechias proves that the Israelites themselves, in burning incense to it, had made it an object of worship, contrary to the commandment. It does not, however, follow, that all use of images is unlawful, since the brazen serpent had originally been formed by the order of God to excite the confidence of the people in the Divine goodness, and had been instrumental in their recovery from the bite of the fiery serpents. The fact proves, what all Catholics admit, that, if images become an occasion of idolatry or superstition, their use may be abrogated, notwithstanding the previous sanction which they had received, or the favors which God may have imparted to those who with faith had employed them. Dr. Whately clearly perceives the distinction between their use as memorials of illustrious servants of God, or exhibitions of Scriptural facts, and the pagan worship of stocks and stones, or images; yet does he apply the prohibition of the Decalogue to all alike, and become partially the apologist of idolatry, in order to involve the Catholic in the condemnation which should fall on the heathen. He applies this censure to the Greek Christians, as well as the Latins, between whom he admits there is scarcely any discrepancy in worship or doctrine; and fears not thus to arraign as idolaters three fourths of those who glory in the name of Christ. Yet even he admits that "pictures and images are not in themselves superstitious"; and accordingly he adds, "We do not now exclude them from our houses of worship." The Council of Trent instructs us, that images are not to be venerated as if any divine virtue or divinity were in them, so that there is no room for the hypothesis of Dr. Whately: — "If, in worshipping before a crucifix, he [the Catholic] attributes a certain sanctity to the image, as if some divine virtue were actually present in it, he is clearly as much guilty of idolatry as the Israelites in worshipping the golden calf and the brazen serpent." The proof which he alleges is the preference sometimes shown of one image to another; but this only supposes that God may have manifested his power and favor on some special occasion, which, unquestionably, he may do. Every Catholic knows and feels that the image is but a memorial of the sufferings of Christ, in whom alone our homage must centre. We may repeat the words

of St. Gregory the Great:—"We prostrate ourselves before the cross, not worshipping the wood, but Him who died on it for our redemption."

Dr. Whately has failed to show what principle of nature has led to what he brands as superstition in the use of images. We are indeed prone to form the likeness of those whom we love; we almost naturally impress on the image the kiss of affection; we prize the memorial; we preserve it with respect; but no instinct of nature prompts us to confound the symbol with the original. If nations sunk into idolatry, it was because their passions obscured their understanding, and led them to seek in material objects Him whom their mind could not contemplate in his spiritual nature. Christians who are taught that God is a spirit, and that he must be adored in spirit and in truth, are not likely to confound him with the painted memorial of his merciful manifestation. This compendious and affecting exhibition of the Mystery of Redemption directs the mind to Calvary, and to the great work there consummated.

The adoration of Christ in the Eucharist is termed idolatry by the learned writer, who rejects the reasons offered by Jeremy Taylor and others for removing so grave a censure from the countless millions who believe this mystery. According to his favorite theory, this worship was not originally grounded on any text of Scripture, but it sprang imperceptibly from the corrupt tendency of human nature, to defend which the Scriptural passages were made subservient. We willingly acknowledge that it was not a fruit of hermeneutics, because the mystery was celebrated long before a word of the New Testament was written; but the words of our Lord, revealed to St. Paul the Apostle, were appealed to by him in confirmation of that which he had orally delivered to the Corinthians, when he first communicated to them the knowledge of Christianity. Dr. Whately admits that the doctrine of Transubstantiation does not contradict the testimony of the senses, because the accidents, which he designates attributes, of bread and wine remain after consecration, and the testimony of the senses goes no farther. "That whatever has the appearance and other sensible qualities of bread is bread, is not attested by the senses." He labors to show that according to our belief Christ is transformed

into bread ; but he does not reflect that the change of the bread into the body of Christ is the direct object of the rite of consecration, and consequently no transformation can be attributed to him, although it be true that his body becomes present under the external appearance of bread. The acknowledgment of Dr. Whately that our doctrine is not in contradiction with the testimony of the senses, added to the avowal of George Stanley Faber, that it should not be prejudged by an appeal to reason, which cannot judge of supernatural objects, ought to remove many of the difficulties which lie in the way of the sincere inquirer. If the evidence of its Divine revelation be examined, it will be found to be more copious and satisfactory on this point than on any other mystery.

The assertion that the passage, "This is my body," was before the eyes of the whole Christian world for ten centuries before the doctrine of Transubstantiation was ever thought of, is one of those bold allegations which could be pardoned only to a disputant in the excitement of controversy. How a learned man, penning an essay in the calm retreat of his study, could venture on it, is to us inexplicable. Mark, he does not speak of the term, but of the doctrine ; so that, according to him, for ten centuries after Christ, no one ever thought that the bread and wine in the Eucharist were changed into the body and blood of Christ. Yet, according to the testimony of Mr. Palmer, "all the ancient liturgies now existing, or which can be proved ever to have existed, contain a prayer of consecration that God will make the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ." * What the whole Church prayed for, at the most solemn moment of the mysteries, was surely thought of and believed to be the object of the Divine institution. The Greeks designated this change by terms equivalent to transubstantiation, μεταβάλλον, μετασκευάζων, μεταρρυθμίζων. Their illustrious writers in the fourth century expressed it in language the most unambiguous. "Since Christ himself," observes St. Cyril of Jerusalem, "pronounced and said of the bread, 'This is my body,' who will dare doubt? And since he affirmed and said, 'This is my blood,' who will ever doubt, and say that it is not his blood? He once, at Cana of Galilee, changed

* Oxford Tracts, No. III.

water into wine, which resembles blood, and do we think him unworthy of belief that he changed wine into blood?"* The passages of St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Chrysostom, and other Greek fathers, which affirm the change, are no less striking; but we cannot hope that they would convince a writer who has had the hardihood to assert, that for ten centuries after Christ the doctrine was not thought of!

With great candor, Dr. Whately exposes some superstitious ideas entertained by some members of his communion in regard to the sacramental elements, which they hold to be an infallible cure for some diseases of children, and carry home to their houses for this purpose. Another superstition, still stranger, is their eagerness to obtain sacrament-money, the collection made at the celebration of the Eucharist, "to be made into a ring, as an infallible cure for fits." This surprises us the more, as they are said to offer other money of the same value in exchange. Here certainly is manifest superstition, since such confidence is utterly groundless. The eagerness of the sick to obtain the sacramental bread and wine, without caring in what state of mind they receive them, is justly charged with the same vice, whilst their impatience under examination and instruction is almost amusing. "Do pray, dear Sir," said a patient to the minister who strove to prepare him, "give me the sacrament first, and then talk as much as you please."

The discipline of the Church in early times, as all the learned know, required a certain reserve in the communication of the higher mysteries, lest pearls should be thrown to swine, and that which is holy should be trampled under foot by dogs. This has been shown, especially in regard to the Eucharist, by the late Bishop of Strasburg, in his learned treatise styled "The Amicable Discussion." The phrases "the initiated understand me," "I speak to the initiated," occur frequently in the writings of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Augustine, and other fathers; so that Dr. Whately had no need to seek among the priests of Eleusinus for examples of secrecy; but even those most deeply imbued with sacred learning — the dispensers of the mysteries of God — are unable to comprehend those sublime

truths in which they are instructed. In the very act of consecrating the chalice the priest says, with a deep feeling of reverence and awe, "O mystery of faith!" When the *disciplina arcani*, as it was called, prevailed, it was confined to those who were catechumens, not yet fully prepared for the higher doctrines which were communicated to all baptized believers. There never have been two classes of tenets, as Dr. Whately would insinuate, one for the clergy, the other for the laity, although the distinction of teachers and people, as established by our Lord, has been maintained, and a higher degree of knowledge has been looked for from those who by their office are bound to instruct others.

The idea of any superior knowledge in the clergy to that which the faithful generally must have of Divine things, is rejected by Dr. Whately; and justly, indeed, if it were pretended that some articles are to be believed by one class which are concealed from the other; but in the Catholic Church one faith is common to all, and no doctrine is withheld from any of her members, however humble. Still, the great and primary truths of the Trinity and of Redemption by an Incarnate God are necessarily more prominent, and more explicitly professed by the multitude of believers, than doctrines less directly connected with the Divine counsels for human salvation. It has never been maintained that men could be saved through the faith of others; although the people are not expected to have the learning of doctors in theology, and the general assent to the doctrine of the Church, as the pillar and ground of truth, is deemed sufficient for those whose condition of life or dulness of intellect does not permit them to attain to more than a knowledge of the leading truths of Christianity. These humble believers have true and full faith, conceived under Divine inspiration; for even they are taught of God. The evidences of revelation present themselves to their mind in a way to win their assent, so that they know why they believe, and their imperfect knowledge can be no obstacle to their salvation. No one is precluded by the Church from aspiring after the fullest knowledge, although the circumstances of life in which one is placed may prevent his attaining to it.

However common the persuasion may be that the multitude of our poor are ignorant, because many may be unable to read or write, we believe that in regard to Chris-

tian doctrines they will advantageously compare, not only with Protestants of the same class, but with others of superior intelligence and acquirements. They will be found generally to know the substance of the Catechism, — the great mysteries of faith, and the moral duties, — and it will be difficult to find one so plunged into ignorance as those whom Dr. Whately describes, who regard baptism chiefly as the rite of *naming*, one adult female having actually presented herself to be baptized a second time, in order to change her name into one more agreeable to her fancy!

The means which God has appointed for communicating revealed truth must necessarily be adapted to the ordinary condition of mankind, since he wishes all men to be saved through the knowledge of the truth. If, then, it be evident that it is impracticable for men generally, even under the most favorable circumstances, to attain to the certain knowledge of the revealed doctrines by personal examination and the exercise of private judgment, it is clear that this method is not such as we may reasonably suppose God to have established. We doubt whether any man could attain to certainty by such method, since his strongest convictions must be disturbed by a knowledge of the contrary results of investigations made by men equally learned and conscientious; but at all events, the slaves, whom it is treason to instruct in the rudiments of letters, the peasantry, and the working classes generally, are under the impossibility of making the necessary studies. Their belief, whatever it may be, must rest on authority, and the only question is, whether that authority shall be an unerring one, to which they submit in the consciousness of their own incapacity, or one avowedly subject to err, which, by flattering their self-sufficiency, persuades them that they are exercising an independent judgment, at the moment that they blindly follow a deceiver. “Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,” said the tempter.

The principle of reliance on authority, by which the faithful are governed in regard to Divine things, is not the result of indolence, or of a disposition to leave to others the labor of inquiry; it is in conformity with the plan laid down by Christ, that those who hear should believe the Gospel preached by his authorized messengers, since faith comes by hearing. Dr. Whately does not deny that this was their office, although, strange to say, he adds, “not ex-

clusively indeed, but principally and especially," as if others, not sent by Christ, might teach with authority. He even maintains that the Eucharist may be celebrated by men not sharing the privileges of their order: — "Those who pretend that *there is necessarily* no celebration of this ordinance without a regularly ordained minister, are proceeding entirely without any shadow of Scriptural authority." It seems to be his object to lower as much as possible the idea of the sacred ministry, and accordingly he ascribes to superstition the "priesthood" which is recognized by the ancients as subsisting in the Church, and for which he would substitute the office of elder, because the Greek term employed by the sacred writers is *πρεσβύτερος*, not *ιερεύς*. Did it never occur to him that this latter term, although simply implying a sacred officer, was by long use determined to signify one who immolated animals, and consequently that it was proper to avoid its use in the commencement of the Church, in order to distinguish her ministers from Jewish or Pagan priests? As soon as the danger of mistake was removed by the diffusion of Christianity, we find the terms promiscuously employed. How will our Puseyite and High-Church friends, who vaunt their priestly name and office, relish the declaration of the Dublin metropolitan, that Christianity has no priest on earth?

We must interrupt our observations, to thank the liberal writer, who, notwithstanding his many severe censures on us, blames those who refuse our children the benefit of education, unless purchased at the price of conscience, by reading the Protestant version of the Scriptures. "To refuse," he says, "to teach them to read except on condition of their consenting to read the Bible in our authorized version, when they have a conscientious, though ill-founded, scruple against it, is in reality to withhold the Scriptures, under the pretext of distributing them." He also observes, most justly, — "Some are accustomed, inadvertently, to speak of the practice of keeping the Scriptures in an unknown tongue, as if it had been introduced by, or had arisen in, some church; forgetting that the *Latin Bible* of the Romish Church, (like the old Slavonian of the Russians,) is a *translation* into the then vernacular tongue, which subsequently *became* a dead language. The case is manifestly one of those in which 'Time, the greatest innovator, has insensibly insinuated alterations.'" Again, he

remarks, — “A language, be it remembered, which gradually became obsolete ; for the Church did not *introduce* the use of an unknown tongue in its prayers, or recital of Scripture.”

The whole tendency of the Essays is to undermine Divine faith, and leave men, if not in actual doubt, in a state of uncertainty, so as to be ready to change their present convictions on further investigation. This may be very philosophical, but it is plainly repugnant to the idea of revelation. If God has revealed any truths, he must have provided certain means for communicating them to sincere inquirers ; and to doubt of his truth, once ascertained with certainty, is to sin against his attributes. They who are “ever ready to listen to argument, ever open to conviction,” show that they are not certain of possessing the truth, and that their belief is no more than opinion. He who has not attained to certainty should be ready to weigh every proof that may be presented to him ; but he who believes with Divine faith is in the condition described by St. Augustine : — “ We who are well grounded in the Divine authority of our religion do not hesitate to say, that whatever is opposed to it is utterly false.”

Reliance on authority may be considered as a natural instinct, since the child is thus guided by his parents, and all men are more or less disposed to place confidence in the testimony or judgment of other men ; but pride is so congenial to our fallen nature, that we are most likely to prefer our own views to those of others. Certainly nature does not lead us to believe any infallible authority in our fellow-men. Enlightened reason may dispose us to recognize it in those who are avowedly the messengers of God, and faith may embrace their teaching ; but this cannot be accounted for by any natural tendency.

Dr. Whately calls attention to the fact, that the Apostles left no summary of doctrine, no catechism, or creed, or articles of belief, which would have been an easy and certain mode of directing the Christian mind, but contented themselves with writing, as occasion demanded, books or letters, from which the revealed doctrine might be gathered by the diligent inquirer. He makes evidently no account of the creed called of the Apostles, which, although most probably it was not written, possibly not composed, by them, cannot be fairly doubted to contain the chief articles

of Christian faith as believed in the various churches from the highest antiquity. The omission of the Apostles to compose a doctrinal summary is easily understood by those who reflect that the wisdom of Christ chose oral teaching, — the preaching of the word, — as the means of transmitting to the end of time the truths which he had delivered, and that he promised his presence at all times to guaranty its integrity. He instituted a ministry, to whom he gave an unrestricted power to teach, whether by word or in writing, and he left them to devise such formularies as might be necessary to distinguish truth from the ever-changing phases of error. The learned author claims for the Church, in qualified terms, something of the kind, with a view to account for the enactment of the thirty-nine articles: — “A church is authorized to draw up creeds as a test or *symbol* to preserve uniformity of faith in her members.” Yet he deprecates all idea of admitting it as a standard of orthodoxy: — “Never should we appeal to creeds, liturgies, or catechisms for the proof of any doctrine, or the refutation of any error.” Consistency would have obliged him to discard altogether creeds and symbols, “for no church is empowered to do that which God, for wise reasons, evidently designed should not be done”; but this did not suit his position as a prelate of a church furnished with three symbols and thirty-nine articles; so he chose rather to qualify his radical view, and to claim for each church a power to make articles, or compose creeds, as criterions of communion, but of no value whatever to determine the truth of doctrine. We need no longer wonder that these should be regarded as mere “articles of peace,” designed only to obtain external uniformity, without regulating the sentiments of their professors. Dr. Whately, indeed, thinks that none should claim church-membership who do not hold them, but he maintains that, if they be applied to control private judgment, “the grand principle of Protestantism — the only one that could justify the Reformation — is abandoned; and our Reformers must stand condemned as schismatical heretics” (p. 221).

The necessity of some exercise of private judgment in every system, even when the principle of church authority is admitted, is strongly insisted upon by the learned essayist, who, however, confounds the assent to authority with the independent exercise of judgment. By private judg-

ment we commonly understand the right claimed for each individual to judge for himself what God has revealed, so that, by examining in detail the evidences of each particular tenet, he may ascertain what he must believe. The act by which the individual recognizes the Church as alone competent to decide the truth or falsehood of doctrine, is plainly opposed to this claim. It is, indeed, an exercise of the mind and will, — it presupposes evidence presented and accepted, as well as grace by which the mind is enlightened, — it may be preceded by long and diligent examination, — but it is not an act of private judgment in the sense which we have explained. A man may select a lawyer or physician from public fame, or personal knowledge of his skill or success, although he may not be competent to pronounce on the various cases incidental to law or medicine; and it would be strange to assert his competency, because, by the fact of selecting the practitioner, he manifested a power of discrimination. Those who saw the miracles of Christ might recognize him as the Son of God, and believe his teaching unreservedly, because his words were words of eternal life. The act by which they became his disciples was an exercise of free will, under the influence of supernatural revelation; but by it they parted with their mental independence, so far as to bind themselves to receive with unqualified docility whatsoever he delivered. Faith can only be conceived where this entire assent is given to revealed truth, to the exclusion of all liability to err; for if error be supposed possible, the strongest conviction amounts to no more than an opinion of high probability; whereas the true believer says with St. Augustine, "I should rather doubt of my own existence, than of the truth of the things wherein I have been instructed."

Our author is not willing to admit that the Catholic belief of the prerogatives of the See of Peter, and the infallibility of the Church in connection with it, is derived from those passages of St. Matthew which are commonly appealed to. We are most ready to concede, as we before remarked, that no Catholic tenet is the result of mere Scriptural interpretation, the revealed doctrine having been first preached, and the living faith and testimony of the Church being taken as guides to the meaning of the word when committed to writing; but we maintain that such interpretation is in strict accordance with the context,

and not a forced meaning devised to subserve a doctrine emanating from corrupt nature. Every one who weighs the words of our Lord, and the circumstances in which he uttered them, must feel that he meant to confer on Peter high prerogatives in reward of his Divinely inspired confession, and that he extended to the Church founded on him the privileges conferred personally on this Apostle. That his successors in office should be embraced in the promise made to him, can surprise no one, who considers that he is evidently presented as a permanent foundation, and a supreme ruler, so that his prerogative must continue whilst the Divine fabric remains, and the spiritual empire needs a governor. Dr. Whately candidly avows, "That all Christians should belong to one single ecclesiastical community, the chief governor of which should reside at Rome, though excessively inconvenient, would not necessarily imply the abandonment of any Christian principle." * He also admits that the Church of Rome "was built by Apostles on Jesus Christ, the only true foundation; she was left by them with sound doctrines and pure Christian worship." This, independently of the Divine promises, forms a strong presumption of her orthodoxy, against which positive evidence becomes necessary. When it is considered, that, according to the confession of Dr. Whately himself, "she scarcely differs in doctrine at all from the Greek Church," the consent of two thirds of professing Christians, in connection with their predecessors during so many ages, cannot be lightly branded as erroneous. "It must be admitted, moreover," he remarks, "that the claim of infallibility in the Church, when it is distinctly avowed, is at least more consistent — perhaps I may say, more honest — than the sort of appeal which is sometimes made by Protestants to the authority of the 'Universal Church,' and which may be characterized by the homely but expressive proverbial metaphor, of 'playing fast and loose.'"

The closing essay on Persecution is ingeniously written, on the supposition that this is an acknowledged vice of Catholicity, from the danger of which Protestants are not entirely exempt. History indeed bears witness that it has invariably marked the ascendancy of Protestantism. We cannot agree with Dr. Whately, that persecution has arisen

from any natural instinct, prompting men to seek the spiritual advantage of others, although this may have been alleged by its apologists, and may have mixed itself up with the motives of its agents. "Too anxious," he remarks, "we cannot be, for the salvation of men's souls, — for the diffusion and for the purity of the Christian religion, — so long as we seek to compass these objects by the gentle force of persuasive argument and winning example: but when these methods fail, or even when it is apprehended that they *may* fail, the endeavor to prevent, by restraint, deviations from the established faith, and to force the stubborn and unpersuadable into that which appears to be for their own good, as well as for that of the community, is perfectly natural and conformable to the character of man."

We are borne out by history in the assertion, that coercive measures against sectaries originated in a desire to restrain their violence, as is clearly seen in the case of the Circumcellions. St. Augustine, it is true, modified his views as to their expediency, on seeing that many were reclaimed, being brought to investigate the truth, under salutary fear of punishment, and others were rescued from unjust intimidation; but he did not recommend their adoption as a means of proselytism, although he bore witness to the numerous and sincere conversions that had ensued when the terror of the law restrained the fanatical abettors of error. Coercive laws were enacted, in almost all cases, to maintain the established order of society, in conformity with the prevailing belief; not to introduce new doctrines, and terrify men into their profession. When this system of legislation prevailed, we may not wonder that its supporters, after the violence of the sectaries had subsided, sought for other motives to justify the continuance of legal restraints, and argued that it was a benefit and blessing to deter the bold and presumptuous by coercion, proportioned to their obstinacy and pride.

The excesses of sectaries, by which all society was convulsed in the Middle Ages, gave occasion to laws of great severity, which remained in force after these sects had spent their fury. This became the settled jurisprudence of all Christian countries, to which canonists and divines naturally adapted their reasonings. Generally, however, the execution of these laws was less rigorous, when the causes of them had ceased, as is evident in the history of

the ancient Inquisition, which, after its first efforts to root out the Albigensians, soon became inoperative. The revival of this tribunal in the fifteenth century was owing to the plots of false professors of Christianity against the independence of the Spanish nation, no less than against the Catholic faith, and its violence in the following age sprang from a similar sense of danger, inspired by the revolutionary movements of innovators in Germany and France. The Inquisitors themselves who pronounced on the guilt of heresy, and left the impenitent culprit to the severity of the law, did not regard this as a means of conversion, so much as a preservative of society against the contagion of dangerous principles. Even they subscribed to the principle of the old Council of Toledo, which forbade violence to be used for the purpose of bringing any one to the faith, and to the teaching of St. Gregory, who observed that it was a novel mode of preaching, to inculcate faith by blows of a club. All agree that unbelievers cannot be compelled by force to receive the faith, for faith is always voluntary.

“The tenet,” says Dr. Whately, “that salvation is impossible out of the pale of the Church, has been, not unfrequently, considered as the necessary basis of persecution.” From this view, however, he properly dissents. If St. Peter could avow, that under heaven there is salvation in no other name than that of Jesus Christ, without thereby pledging himself to persecute the heathens that heard it not, or the Jews, who blasphemed it, surely no principle, however exclusive, involves this necessity. If St. Paul could affirm, that “without faith it is impossible to please God,” without placing himself in the attitude of a persecutor of all unbelievers, it cannot be reasonably contended, that, by declaring that without the true Catholic faith no man can be saved, we become necessarily deadly enemies of all who reject it. We need not here stop to explain the precise import of this clause, or the theological distinction of vincible and invincible ignorance, which may pass for what it is worth. Taking the Catholic tenet in its most repulsive form, it clearly involves no duty but that of zeal and charity towards those who are out of the pale of the Church, of whom we might say with St. Paul, “I wished to be anathema from Christ for my brethren according to the flesh.”

The perusal of this work furnishes painful evidence of

the total absence of divine faith in its author, who scarcely labors to conceal his disbelief of the real distinction of the Divine persons, and of the atoning nature of the death of Christ. He avows his dislike of many usages which serve to transmit the knowledge of revealed truth, and to cherish piety. He objects to "the practice of reciting the Apostles' Creed as a portion of prayer," as if to confess the great truths of revelation were not an act of homage to God, implying a prayer to persevere in their belief. "The practice," he says, "of teaching or allowing very young children to learn by heart prayers, psalms, portions of Scripture, &c., which they are incapable at the time of understanding, is one which is very often superstitious, and almost always leads to superstition." He urges on clergymen "a constant care to check the superstitious idea, that either the consecrated ground (whether within or without the church), or the funeral service, have any thing to do with the individual's future destiny." His disregard of the ceremonial observances still retained in his communion was manifested on occasion of laying the foundation-stone of a church, which he performed *sans cérémonie*, lest the beholders should superstitiously ascribe any peculiar sanctity to the spot on which the temple was to rise. He complains that the sanctity attributed in Scripture to the Church, that is, to the body of believers, is commonly transferred to the *building* in which a congregation assembles, and he denounces as superstitious the "feeling of satisfaction on the supposed merit of having, in bodily presence, frequented it during life, with perhaps a hope of future security from the lifeless body's reposing within its walls." Although such a feeling may, in some instances, be open to censure, it originates in a sense of religion, and is associated with holy recollections. To condemn it as superstitious savors much of irreligion, and warrants no favorable judgment of his Christian faith. It must be humiliating to High Churchmen, and to all sincere believers in the great mysteries of Christianity, to hear the occupant of the metropolitan See of Dublin treating with open disregard the few religious rites which escaped the retrenching knife of the Reformers, denying all certainty of doctrine, and undisguisedly assailing the Mysteries themselves. Yet this is no novelty in a church of human organization, whose prelates are the creatures of the civil power. As Hoadley,

an avowed Unitarian, occupied for many years an English see, so Whately may continue to enjoy his titles and revenues without disturbance, as long as he does not put himself in opposition with the prime minister of the crown.

ART. III.—*God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.

WE proceed now to the second of these three Discourses, the one delivered at Cambridge, before the Unitarian Divinity School. It is on the Atonement, and is designed to give us Dr. Bushnell's views of the sacred Mystery of Redemption. The author discusses this subject with special reference to the points in dispute between Unitarians and the so-called orthodox Protestants, and not without the hope of disclosing a ground on which the two parties may come together, and each retain every thing really essential to its own theory. He selects for his text 1 John i. 2, "For the life was manifested: and we have seen it, and do bear witness, and declare unto you the eternal life, which was with the Father, and hath appeared to us"; or, as the author reads from the Protestant version, "For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us." Having recited his text, he proceeds:—

"This particular passage of Scripture has seemed to me to offer one of the most comprehensive and most deliberate announcements of the doctrine of Christ, that is anywhere given in the sacred writings, with the advantage that it is yet so far unoccupied as not to have become a technic, under the wear of any theory. In the verse previous, the writer opens by setting forth the fact, as I suppose, of a Divine incarnation in the person of Jesus. By the Word, or Word of Life, that peculiar power in the Divine nature by which God is able to represent himself outwardly in the forms of things, first in the worlds and now in the human person, which is the liveliest type of feeling possible, and closest to God,—by this Word of Life, God has now expressed himself. *He has set forth his*

Divine feeling even to sense and as a fellow-feeling, — he has entered into human history, as one of its biographic elements. We have seen, looked upon, handled, what may thus be known of him. Then he adds, — throwing in a parenthesis which is to be a solution of the whole evangelic history, — ‘For the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that Eternal Life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us.’

“Observe three points in this very peculiar language. First, there is a manifestation of something, the mission of the Word is looked upon inclusively as a manifestation, that is, a coming into visibility of something before invisible. Secondly, it is the Life that was manifested, — not life generally speaking, but *the* Life. And, thirdly, as if to distinguish it in a yet more definite manner, it is called *that* Life, that Eternal Life, that Eternal Life that was *with* the Father, and was manifested unto us.

“Taking, now, these three terms, in connection with the assumption, elsewhere made, that our human race, under sin, are alienated from the life of God; also, with the declaration of Christ, that, as the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son, as the world’s Redeemer, to have life in himself; and, again, with that deep utterance of joy sent forth by an emancipated soul, — ‘For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death,’ — taking the text, I say, in connection with these others, as commentaries, we have a good synoptic view, it seems to me, of the doctrine of the Messiah.

“It is not that Christ is a man, a human teacher, who is sent to reform us by his words and his beautiful human example, but it is to this effect: — All souls have their proper life only in the common vivifying life of God. Sin, being a withdrawal into self and self-hood, separates them from the life, and, as far as their own freedom is concerned, denies all influx of the Divine into their character and their religious nature. Passing thus into a state of negation, as regards the Divine all-sustaining life, they become imprisoned in darkness, unbelief, idolatry, and a general captivity to sense. And now the Life is manifested in sense; in Christ is life, and the life is the light of men. Christ enters into human feeling, by his incarnate charities and sufferings, to re-engage the world’s love and reunite the world, as free, to the Eternal Life. To sum up all in one condensed and luminous utterance, every word of which is power, *God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself*. The Apostle says nothing here, it will be observed, of reconciling God to men, he only speaks of reconciling men to God. Had he said, ‘The Life of God was manifested in Jesus Christ, to quicken the world in love and truth, and reunite it to himself,’ he would have said the same thing under a different form.

“I am well aware that, in offering such a statement, as the true doctrine of Christ and his work, I affirm nothing that is distinctively orthodox, and shall even seem to rule out that view of Christ as a *sacrifice*, an *expiation for sin*, a *vicarious offering*, which, to the view of most orthodox Christians, contains the real moment of his work as a Saviour. It will be found, however, that I am proceeding exactly in the line of the Scriptures, and I trust also it will appear, before I have done, that the Scriptures advance two distinct views of Christ and his work, which are yet radically one and the same.

“I. A subjective, speculative, — one that contemplates the work of Christ in its ends, and views it as a power related to its ends.

“II. An objective, ritualistic, — one that sets him forth to faith, instead of philosophy, and one, without which, as an Altar Form for the soul, he would not be the power intended, or work the ends appointed.

“Thus, when it is inquired, as in the first form specified, for what end did Christ come into the world, we have a class of terms in the Scripture which can scarcely get any proper meaning, if what is said under the second form is considered to be the whole doctrine of Christ. The converse also is equally true. The real problem is to find a place and a meaning for *all* that is said concerning him, — to effect a union of the two sides.

“As examples of the manner in which the Scriptures make answer, when the question is, for what ends did Christ come into the world, we have the following: —

“‘To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, to bear witness to the truth,’ — a passage that is remarkable as being the most direct, specific, and formal statement Christ ever made of the object of his Messiahship; and here he says, that he came to bring truth into the world.

“‘I am the way, the truth, and the life’; — ‘I am the light of the world,’ — are declarations of a similar import.

“‘Unto you, first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniquities.’ ‘Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works,’ — where the end of his mission is declared to be a moral effect, wrought in the mind of the race.

“For this purpose, the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the ‘works of the devil,’ — a passage declaring the precise object of the incarnation as affirmed in my text; and, as the work of the devil is not the punishment, but the corruption, of his followers, we are brought to the same conclusion as before.

“In all these citations, we have so many echoes of the one just produced, as the grand, comprehensive doctrine of Christ’s work,

or mission : — GOD IN CHRIST, RECONCILING THE WORLD UNTO HIMSELF. And I affirm, without hesitation, that whenever the question is about *the end* of Christ's work, that end to which he stands related as the wisdom and power of God, the answer of the Scripture will be, that he comes to renovate character ; to quicken by the infusion of the Divine life ; in one word, that he comes to be a Saviour, as saving his people from their sins." — pp. 187 – 191.

The reader will perceive here a repetition of that form of the old Apollinarian heresy which we pointed out in our last Review, and which, if it does not absolutely deny the Incarnation, at least completely reverses it; namely, that the Word, in some sense, enters into human nature, or is converted into flesh, or that the Divine is assumed by the human, instead of human nature by the Word or second Person of the Ever-blessed Trinity. The reader will also perceive that here again the author represents the Word, Logos, or Son, not as a Divine person or Hypostasis, but as the power or faculty of God to produce himself outwardly in the forms of things, which, if explained so as to escape pantheism, can only mean that the Eternal Word is simply the creative power of God, or God's ability to create existences, and therefore the Incarnation is only the creation of a human existence, or a human person. Giving the author the benefit of the most favorable construction his language will bear, he undeniably falls into these two fatal errors, errors which necessarily imply the denial of the whole Christian religion.

But passing over these two fatal errors, as already sufficiently discussed, it is obvious that the author's doctrine in regard to the purpose or purposes of our Lord's mission is, that Christ came solely to effect a moral renovation or change in the human race, to make satisfaction for sin, to fulfil the law, and effect the Atonement by reconciling us to God, that is, by leading us to repentance and newness of life. The whole significance, end, or aim of Christianity is the moral regeneration of mankind, or the production of certain subjective states or affections in us. This is evident from the extract we have made, and from the whole Discourse.

With some modification, we could accept this statement, so far as relates to the end of our Lord's mission. The end of his coming was undoubtedly the salvation of sinners. "The Son of man has come to seek and to save

that which was lost." (St. Luke xix. 10.) St. Paul says, it is "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the chief." (1 Tim. i. 15.) "The only cause of the coming of Christ," says St. Augustine, "was to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause for medicine. If the great Physician came from heaven, great infirmity was on the earth." — *Si venit de celo magnus medicus, magnus per totum orbem terræ jacebat ægrotus.* (Tom. V. 1208.) On this point we have no controversy with Dr. Bushnell. Mankind were sick, and Christ came to heal them; they were alienated from God, and he came to liberate them from their sins, and to reconcile them to God, — although he reconciles by liberating, rather than liberates by reconciling them, in the author's sense.

The author contends that Christ does not reconcile us as a human teacher, by his beautiful words and beautiful examples, as Socinianism holds. Something more is necessary. The subjective view alone is insufficient, and the objective view must always be joined with it.

"Then, again, to show that a view is offered of Christ, in the writings especially of the Apostles, which is wholly different from this, one that speaks of him as a propitiation, a sacrifice, as bearing our sins, bearing the curse for us, obtaining remission by his blood, is altogether unnecessary. In the Epistles to the Romans, the Galatians, the Hebrews, those of Peter and John, this altar view or form of Christ appears even as the eminent, or super-eminent truth of the Gospel.

"Omitting, therefore, because it is unnecessary, to offer any particular citations to this effect, I will simply refer you to a passage that is remarkable, as being an instance where one view runs into the other, and the altar form becomes, in the issue, a renovating power. The eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews opens with a look toward sacrifice, describing Christ as a 'priest' 'having somewhat to offer,' but still as 'having obtained a more excellent ministry' than the priests of the law, and brought in for us a 'better covenant.' How better? Because it has a more transforming power in the life, because it fulfils a better and higher design, writing the law in the heart: — '*I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts.*' Here the objective, ritual view passes into the subjective, and reveals the fact that it has and was designed to have a renovating power in character; — thus becoming a 'new' and 'better covenant.' Accordingly, I design to

show that, if the first or subjective view of Christ, that in which I state the end and aim of Christ's work, is true, that end or aim could not be effectively realized without the second, or objective view, in which his whole work is conceived in the altar form, and held forth to the objective embrace and worship and repose of faith." — pp. 191, 192.

But this objective or ritualistic view and the subjective "are yet radically one and the same." The objective view represents no objective reality, no truth independent of the subjective, and is only the subjective objectively expressed, or the machinery which the Almighty invents and employs to produce and express the subjective states or affections which it was the end of Christ's mission to produce in us.

To understand this, we must bear in mind that the end of Christ's mission, according to the author, is the production of certain moral changes, states, or affections in us, and the whole truth and value of all the transactions brought to view in the Gospel history consist in their artistic or æsthetic fitness to produce them. They do not produce these changes, states, or affections in the way of doctrine or didactic teaching addressed to the logical understanding, not as philosophy or as theology, but as art, addressed primarily to the feelings. This ritualistic view is the artistic form of the subjective or philosophical view, and without which it would be practically inefficient.

We shall better understand this, if we glance at the author's theory of language laid down in his Preliminary Dissertation. According to the author, all language depends for its significance, not on an objective world to which it introduces us, and of which it is primarily the sensible sign, but on the mind to which it is addressed. Words are signs, indeed; but not signs of objective realities; they are signs only of subjective states or affections, and the whole value of the verbal sign is in its fitness to suggest to the mind or call up in the mind a certain thought or feeling. All words, even those which are suggestive of spiritual thoughts and affections, will be found on analysis to be primarily signs of feelings, and only mediately signs of intellectual and spiritual affections. They are not purely arbitrary or conventional signs, but are significant by virtue of a certain innate correspondence between the sign and the feeling, and between the feeling and the

intellectual or spiritual affection. Our philosophical readers will readily understand this theory, which is substantially the old Conceptualistic theory, advocated in the twelfth century by the too famous Abelard, completely and confessedly refuted by St. Bernard. On this theory there is no intelligible reality, that is, the intelligible is simply *in mente* and does not exist *a parte rei*, and God himself is for us only our subjective conceptions. He can reveal himself to us only by means of certain sensible signs, which are significant only by the affections they are fitted to produce in us. God is supposed, mediately or immediately, to prepare the signs and to construct them artistically as signs of our feelings, as he does the feelings as signs of spiritual affections. Hence the whole value of the signs as a medium of Divine communication consists, not in what they signify of God to us, but in what they express in us that has its equivalent in God, or rather, that is identical with God.

Christianity is constructed and made expressive on the same principle. The author's radical conception of it is that of a work of art, a Divine drama, or fable, intended to illustrate and impress a moral, or to produce certain moral or spiritual states or affections in the soul. The Trinity, he tells us, is the *machina Dei*, or the Divine machinery by which God reveals himself to men; and he expressly calls the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation. They are not three persons eternally subsisting in the Godhead, but three impersonations, or representations expressing in a dramatic or poetic form to our feelings the three characters or attitudes which God, regarded as absolute being, bears to his creatures; or, in other words, they are the machinery or fable which God employs to make us aware of the contents of his own being. Their value is solely in what they express. They are real or true, because the subjective affections they stand for in us are the affections of God; but whether, beyond what they express to our feelings, that is, beyond the subjective affections, they have any reality or not, is more than we can affirm or deny, for to do either would require a knowledge of the internal nature of God to which we cannot attain.

The Incarnation completes God's dramatic representation of himself, and adds the fifth and last act to the Di-

vine tragedy. It includes, in fact, the whole of the Christian representation ; for the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are first brought to view in it, and are either incidental to it or produced by it. " This threefold denomination is itself incidental to and produced by the central fact, or mystery of the Incarnation, as an impersonation of God developed in time." (pp. 167, 168.) In it God expresses himself under a human form, under human relations, as living a human life, associating with us as a friend and a brother, and pouring out upon us the human contents of his being ; that is, he expresses in it, in a manner most impressive to our feelings, the human affections, charities, and sympathies which eternally dwell in the bosom of the Divinity. Strictly speaking, the Incarnation is not God exalting human nature by taking it up to himself, nor does it import new divinity into humanity, but is simply a new and striking manifestation of the substantial identity of the human and Divine natures. Christ is not God, is not man, absolutely considered ; but the expression of both in what they have in common. He is God in that what he expresses is God, and man in that what he expresses is also human, and both God and man in that he expresses the common properties of both, — that is, the humanity of God and the Divinity of man, which at bottom are one and the same. This must be the author's meaning, for he denies the doctrine of two natures in Christ, and contends that he has but one simple nature. If, then, he is the expression of both God and man, both God and man, as far as he is their expression, must be identical ; which follows, also, from the author's pantheism. But apart from the expression, what is Christ ? Is he man ? Is he God ? Is he both ? Let no one be foolish to ask ; for whether he is, or what he is, independent of the expression, is a matter clearly out of the range of our investigation. He is for us only in the expression, and as he expresses both God and man to us, he is both to us, and that is enough for us to know. Who asks whether the beasts and birds in Æsop's fables were or were not objectively real, and really talked or not ? The errors and divisions among theologians all grow out of the attempt to get behind the expression, and to impose their idle conjectures and uncertain guesses as dogmas of faith. We should learn to stop with the expression itself.

Such, in brief, is the author's conception of Christianity. It is a divine tragedy, conceived, written, and acted by Almighty God, by which he makes known to us through our own subjective states the affections of his own bosom, the feelings of his own heart. Like every dramatic performance, nay, like every work of art, it is addressed primarily to our feelings, and affects and improves us on the same principle that any tragedy affects and improves us, though in a far higher degree, as being far more perfect as a work of art than any human tragedy ever represented or conceived. Hence the author says : —

“ The value of Christ's mission is measured by what is expressed. And if so, then it follows, of course, that no dogmatic statement can adequately represent his work ; for the matter of it does not lie in formulas of reason, and cannot be comprehended in them. It is more a poem than a treatise. It classes as a work of Art more than as a work of Science. It addresses the understanding, in great part, through the feeling of sensibility. In these it has its receptivities, by these it is perceived, or perceivable. Moving, in and through these, as a revelation of sympathy, love, life, it proposes to connect us with the Life of God. And when through these, believingly opened as inlets, it is received, then is the union it seeks consummated. Were it not for the air it might give to my representations, in the view of many, I should like, in common with Paul (Phil. i. 9, 10), to use the word *æsthetic*, and represent Christianity as a power moving upon man, through this department of his nature, both to regenerate his degraded perception of excellence, and also to communicate, in that way, the fullness and beauty of God.

“ Hence, it would not be as wild a breach of philosophy itself, to undertake a dogmatic statement of the contents of a tragedy, as to attempt giving in the same manner the equivalents of the life and death of Jesus Christ. The only real equivalent we can give is the representation of the life itself. It is not absurd, however, to say something about the subject, if only we do not assume the adequacy of what we say ; we could offer some theoretical views of a tragedy, but our theoretic matter would not be the tragedy. No more can we set forth, as a real and proper equivalent, any theoretic matter of ours concerning the life and death of Jesus Christ, which is the highest and most moving tragedy ever acted in this mortal sphere ; a tragedy distinguished in the fact that God is the Chief Character, and the divine feeling, moved in tragic earnest — Goodness Infinite manifested through Sorrow — the passion represented.” — pp. 203 – 205.

We can now easily understand what this objective or

ritualistic view is, and what is its relation to the subjective view. The subjective view is Christianity philosophically stated, the objective is the same philosophical truth artistically represented. The former is plain prose, the latter is the former done into poetry, or the form in which it must be expressed in order to be practically efficient.

Turning now to the subjective view, we find that it represents Christ as accomplishing his mission, the salvation of sinners, — 1. By placing in the world “the example of a sinlessly perfect being,” which of itself is sufficient, by the new feelings and ideas it awakens, “to change the destinies of the race, and even their capabilities of good” (p. 205). 2. By the fact that it manifests the Life, the Eternal Life of God, which penetrates men’s souls, moves their feelings, enlarges their views, “elevates their ideas and purposes, and even their capacity of good itself” (p. 207). 3. By giving assurance, through the charity manifested in the Life, of God’s willingness to forgive and justify the sinner on condition of repentance and reformation of life; and thus dispelling the imaginary fears of the wrath and vindictiveness of God, and that dread of future punishment which sin generates in the breast of every transgressor, and exciting the sinner’s love to God, inspiring him with confidence, and giving him courage to begin a new life (pp. 213–216). And 4. By bringing the law closer to men’s souls, and giving it a more sacred rigor and verity than it had before his advent (p. 219).

Christ brings the law closer to men’s minds and gives it a more sacred rigor in four methods: —

1. By his instructions concerning it. The advent of Jesus was a new and more fearful revelation of God. Christ holds up the law in tones of greater rigor and exactness than any which had been used before. (pp. 219, 220.)

2. By his obedience. This and the two following methods the author considers in relation to the institution of sacrifices, and to do him justice we must extract at length his own words.

“The institution of sacrifice is most reasonably regarded as a positive institution, originally appointed by God. We find the rite in use at a time when marriage, a far less artificial institution, is represented as being received by God’s appointment, and when he himself was introducing, by his lessons, the culture of the ground and even the dress of the body. It was most natural, too, that,

when he was teaching the guilty, fallen pair their severance from him, by removing them from their paradise, he should also teach them by what rites of penitence and worship they might be purified and restored to union with him. We also find a positive statute enacted, at a very early period, forbidding the eating of blood, the object of which is to make it a sacred thing for the uses of the altar. Afterwards, undeniably, the system of sacrifice was carefully elaborated by the minutest and most specific positive statutes. Besides, which to me is most convincing of all, there is a certain fore-looking in this ritual, and then, when Christ appears, a certain retrospection, one answering to the other, one preparing words and symbols to express the other, and a beautiful and even artistic correspondence kept up, such as argues invention, plan, appointment, and indicates a Divine counsel present, connecting the remote ages of time, and weaving them together into a compact and well-adjusted whole. And if the redemption of man is the great work of the world, that in which all existences here find their highest moment, as most assuredly it is, then what may better occupy the wisdom and the greatness of God, than the preparation of so great a work?

“The matter and manner of the sacrifice are familiar to us all,—the going up to Jerusalem, driving thither, or purchasing there, a choice, unblemished animal; the confession of sin upon his head before the altar; the solemn formalities of the slaughter and preparation of the sacrifice; the sacred blood sprinkled before the vail that is closed against unholy feet, the horns of the altar touched with blood, and the remainder poured out before it on the ground; then the fire kindled and the smoke of the victim, made a total loss for sin, rolling up before the eyes of the worshipper to heaven. And then he returns again to his tribe, thinking, on the way, of the journey he has undertaken for his sins,—as he went up thinking of the sins that required him to go.

“What, now, is the real meaning or value of this transaction? The ceremony is proposed to be connected with the remission of sins. How thus connected?

“It is not that God has been appeased by the smell of the sacrifice. It is called an atonement, or propitiation, but it cannot be supposed that God is pacified in any way by the sacrifice.

“It is not that the worshipper has embraced the atonement of Christ, typified in his sacrifice, as we sometimes hear. He had no such conception. Even the sacred prophets themselves, we are told, were guessing *what*, as well as what manner of time, the Spirit that was in them did signify when they spoke of Christ and his day. Nay, his own disciples, explicitly taught by himself, could not understand the import of his death till they were specially illuminated. Doubtless the worshipper did sometimes, and ought always to have exercised faith in God, as a forgiver of sin;

and, as God is Christ and Christ is God, there was exercised, of course, a virtual, but not formal, faith in the Christ of the future.

“It is not true or supposable, as needs to be specially noted, that the animal offered is punished for the sins of the worshipper. No hint or trace of any such impression can be found. Nor can it be argued from the confession of sins upon the head of the victim ; for, when the scape-goat is employed, the confession upon his head is even more formal, and yet the animal is only driven away into the wilderness to signify the clearing of sin, its forgiveness and removal for ever. Besides, if there were any idea of punishment connected with the sacrifice, if the death of the animal had a penal character, because of the sins supposed to rest on it, then something would be made of the suffering inflicted ; which we know was never thought of, and made no part of the transaction. The animal was simply despatched, as when slaughtered for the table, and it nowhere appears, in the whole range of Hebrew literature, that any one ever thought of the sufferings of the animal as entering at all into the real moment of the transaction.

“We come now to that in which the real value of the sacrifice did consist. The institution had, of course, a historic value as connected with the future life and work of the incarnate Redeemer ; for in it are prepared correspondences and, so, types or bases of language, in which that more spiritual grace may be represented. It had also a value, considered as part of a great national religion, in which public remembrance of sin is made every year. It was also, as a rite, to have a renovating power over the character, somewhat as the manifested Life in Christ Jesus is designed to have ; only in a vastly feebler and inferior degree. And therefore, in cases where it had no such effect, it was openly declared, on the part of God, to be an abomination to him, and as such to be rejected. The value of the sacrifice lay chiefly, however, in the power it had over the religious character, — the impressions, exercises, aids, and principles, which, as a liturgy, it wrought in the soul of the worshipper. And among these, as connected especially with the remission of sins, was the impression it cherished of the sanctity of violated law ; for, as I have said already, it is on the ground of that impression secured, both that forgiveness will be wanted, and may be safely offered.” — pp. 222 – 225.

The design of the ritual sacrifices was to strengthen and sanctify the law in the minds of the worshippers, and especially to impress them with a sense of the sanctity of the violated law, however freely through God’s mercy sins may be forgiven. “The same impression is made, and far more deeply, by the obedience of Christ ; for, considering who he is, there is more of meaning in his obedience than

there is in the obedience of many nations." "God is really under the same law of obligation that we were under and [which we] cast off, and it is the glory and greatness of his nature that he delights eternally to acknowledge this law. Christ is the manifested Life revealing this everlasting obedience of the Divine nature. All that he does and suffers is but an expression of the homage, rendered by God himself, to that which we reject." If God himself renders homage to the law we have violated, how sacred must that law be! (pp. 226, 227.)

3. "Christ, coincidently with the sin-offering, sanctifies the law through expense and painstaking. The sacrificer must come bringing the best and choicest of his flock, — a lamb or a bullock without blemish. He must be absent from home, and leave his business behind for whole days, — all in the way of expense and painstaking." Save in its subjective effect on himself, all this is "a dead loss." The victim must be wholly destroyed, — must all "go to smoke," and then it will move his conscience, and make him feel the sacredness of violated law. "Christ, by the sorrow and suffering of his painstaking life, accomplished a like result." "Every thing he does and suffers, every labor, weariness, self-denial, and sorrow, becomes an expression of his sense of the value of the law, — every pang he endures declares its sacredness." (pp. 227 – 229.)

4. "The law of God is yet more impressively sanctified by Christ, if possible, in the article of his death, considered as counterpart to the uses of blood in the ritual." The whole ritual turns on the essential sacredness of blood. The blood was considered as the life, and its use in the ritual signified to the worshipper that "only the most sacred thing he knows, even life, can suffice to resanctify the law violated by his sins. Nay, more, a sacred thing is something that belongs especially to the occupancy and right of God, and the impression was that blood, being the mysterious principle of life, is somehow especially near to the Divine nature, — thus and therefore sacred." The meaning of sacrifice is, therefore, that "only something derivable from God, some sacred element yielded by him, can suffice to cover man's sin, and hallow again the violated majesty of broken law." Hence the maxim, "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sins." "Christ appears and closes his sanctified and sublime life

by submission to a violent death. He is not a sacrifice in any literal sense, as we know. There is no altar in his death; no fire is kindled; by no act of religion or priestly rite is he offered up; he is simply murdered by the malice of his enemies." But his life, considering who he was, in comparison with which the most sacred things the apostles had ever known were profane, — it was the life of God, and, being yielded up in devotion to the law, and in its honor, was admirably fitted to show us that nothing conceivable is too sacred for us to yield up to cover the breaches made by our sins.

Here the author apparently breaks down in the attempt to sustain the analogy which he asserts, and really gets no more in the death of Christ than he had previously got in the sacrifices under the law. The signification of the sacrifice, he says, was that "only some sacred thing, yielded by God, is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin," and therefore blood, as the most sacred thing known under the law, and yielded up by him, was offered in sacrifice. To carry out this view, he should be able to say that we have something infinitely more sacred than the blood of goats and calves yielded up in Christ, and which we can offer to God, or which by his death in our place he offered for us. Christ was sinless, and shedding his blood on the cross, not for us, not in the place of sinners, but simply as murdered by the malice of his enemies, could in no sense signify that only some sacred thing yielded by God is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin, for in his case there were no breaches made by sin to be covered. The only view the author can take, in accordance with his theory, is, that Christ was engaged in a work of charity to mankind, and he chose rather to suffer himself to be murdered by his enemies than to desert it, and thereby showed that the law of God exacts that in a charitable work we persevere unto death, even the death of the cross; which, we apprehend, is not true, since the law of God only commands us to love our neighbor *as* ourselves. However, let the author speak for himself.

"Looking, now, at the death of Christ in this manner, we are made, first of all, to feel, whether we can explain it or not, that it has a marvellous power over our impressions, concerning ourselves and our sins, the law of God and his character. It brings an element of divinity into every thing, sheds an air of solemnity and

grandeur over every thing. It is even more awful to the guilty conscience itself than the thunders of Sinai. And, then, secondly, we shall be able also, I think, to see that the whole effect, contemplated under the laws of art, is produced by the fact that the Life, thrice sacred, so dimly shadowed before in the victims of the altar, is here yielded, as a contribution from God, to the pacification and reconsecration of his realm. The effect depends, not on any real altar ceremony in his death, but it depends, artistically speaking, on the expressive power of the fact that the Incarnate Word, appearing in humanity, and having a ministry for the reconciliation of men to God, even goes to such a pitch of devotion, as to yield up his life to it, and allow the blood of his Mysterious Person to redden our polluted earth!" — p. 236.

Here is the whole significance of the Gospel considered philosophically in its relation of a means to an end. Setting aside the author's attempt to explain the Hebrew ritual, his blunder as to the significance of sacrifice, and his assertion that God is under the same law of obligation that we are, we recognize, not, indeed, the whole truth, nor the central truth of Christianity, but a truth, and an important truth, in what he appears to be driving at. Christianity, no doubt, is, in some sense, addressed to our feelings, and operates æsthetically. The life and passion of our Saviour are admirably adapted to affect us, and they move us far more powerfully than do the simple truths they express, when logically drawn out and stated in a dry and didactic form. Remembering who our Lord is, we cannot follow him step by step from his lowly birth in the stable to his agony in the garden and death on the cross, — we cannot see him, who was rich, for our sakes become poor, who was in the form of God and without robbery could judge himself equal to God, take upon himself the form of a servant, humble, and as it were annihilate, himself, live a life of poverty and want, go about doing good when he had not whereon to lay his head, — despised and rejected of men, derided and scorned by the world, betrayed by a follower, deserted by his friends, arraigned as a criminal, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between two thieves, — bearing all in meekness and patience, in sweetness and without a murmur, forgiving his enemies, and in the agony of his passion, with his latest breath, praying for his murderers, — without being touched in our hearts, filled with abhorrence for sin, and furnished with the most powerful incentives to contrition and virtue. Cer-

tainly one of the most efficient means of Christian growth is daily meditation on the life and passion of our Lord, and no one can hope to attain to Christian perfection who neglects it. All this is true, and well known to all masters of spiritual life.

But this is not by any means the whole truth, and would not be a truth at all on Dr. Bushnell's theory. The power of the life and passion to produce the effect indicated depends on their being believed to be the life and passion of a real being, a real individual, who in the highest and most absolute sense is both God and man. Dismiss this belief, let it be understood that the whole life and passion are only a grand dramatic representation, or theatrical exhibition, gotten up and displayed merely for artistic or æsthetic effect, and their power to move us would be destroyed, because they would want reality. In denying or rendering doubtful the objective reality or ontological truth of the Christian mysteries, the author should bear in mind that he takes away their very power to affect us. If Christianity is only a dramatic fable, designed simply to illustrate and impress a moral, and has no reality but in the feelings it excites, the thoughts it suggests, and the resolutions it leads us to form, he has done a very unhand-some thing in telling us of it. He has destroyed the illusion by admitting us behind the scenes.

There is no doubt that the ceremonies, sacrifices, sacred things, and observances enjoined by the Jewish ritual, reacted upon the worshippers in the way the author supposes, and that the worshippers, when sincere, were really instructed, edified, and made better by them, as simple spiritual exercises. But if the worshippers had approached them with the understanding that their sole value was in the spiritual exercises they demanded or were fitted to produce, they would have failed to receive from them even that advantage. Prayer is certainly the most holy and profitable spiritual exercise conceivable, — indeed, it includes every spiritual exercise; but if undertaken solely for the sake of the exercise, it would not be, for it would then cease to be prayer. Prayer is the elevation of the soul to God; but a man praying for the sake of spiritual exercise does not elevate his soul to God, and therefore loses the benefit of prayer even as an exercise. The poor man would be merely endeavoring to lift himself by pulling

away with all his might at his own waistbands. The Gospel, no doubt, operates to some extent on the principle *ex opere recipientis*, but to make it operate solely on that principle is pushing the matter further, we should suppose, than even Protestants generally are prepared to go.

But waiving these obvious objections to the author's doctrine, we confess that we do not see wherein he gets any thing more from Christ than beautiful words and beautiful examples. All the methods by which he represents the Gospel as regenerating men are reducible to the moral force of the truths Christ taught, and the examples he set. It is true, he calls Christ the Life of God manifested in the world, but this life, according to his own principles, operates only æsthetically, as a poem, a picture, or a statue, and connects itself with the life of mankind only in the thoughts it generates and the feelings it excites in them, — that is to say, only in and through the effects which naturally result from the contemplation of a holy life, — a life of truth and goodness, love and mercy, meekness and patience, disinterested affection and heroic suffering. That such a life has power to move and excite us to virtuous effort we have conceded; but it imparts no new power to the soul, no new strength to any of its faculties. It only stimulates the powers and calls forth the strength the soul already has, and always has had; for the author must remember that there is, on his doctrine, no infused grace, and that Christ does not exalt humanity, or import any divinity into human nature. He only declares the union of the human and Divine natures which has always existed, and all the additional power he imparts to us to keep his commandments is what naturally flows from a clear and full conviction, that, up to a certain point at least, the human and Divine are one and the same, — a conviction produced by a dramatic representation, instead of a dry, didactic statement of the fact. We confess, therefore, we do not see wherein the author rises above simple Unitarianism as to the substance of his doctrine, and he even falls far below it, for Unitarians in general do at least admit our Lord was a real man, not the mere hero of an epic poem, a drama, or a novel.

But the author himself concedes that this subjective view of Christianity is insufficient, — is not the complete Gospel of our Lord.

“ Here I close the subjective view of Christ’s mission. Considered as a power moving the spiritual regeneration and redemption of man, this is the conception we form of it. Is it a true conception? I have a degree of confidence that it is. But there is yet another question: is it satisfactory,— is it the Gospel of Christ? However it may seem to others, for it certainly appears to be a plan not wanting in magnificence, I am still obliged to confess, that, taken by itself, it is not satisfactory to me, and I could not offer it as the full and complete Gospel of Christ.

“ I observe, in the Scriptures, a large class of representations, such as speak of the *atonement* received by Christ, his *sacrifice*, his *offering*, his *bearing the sins* of many, the holiest opened by his *blood*, the *curse* he became, the *wrath* he suffered, the *righteousness* he provided, which do not seem to have their proper, natural place and significance in the view here presented. I recollect, also, that around these terms of grace the whole Church of God, with but a few limited exceptions, have hung their tenderest emotions, and shed their freest tears of repentance; that by these the righteous good, the saints and martyrs of the past ages, have supported the trial of their faith; that before these they have stood, as their altar of peace, and sung their hymn of praise to the Lamb that was slain; and remembering this, I cannot convince myself that they were wholly mistaken, or that they were not receiving here, in the living earnest of their spirit, something that belongs to the profoundest verity and value of the cross. Men do not live in this manner, from age to age and by whole nations, upon pure error. Spiritual life is not fed, thus interminably, upon a Gospel that mocks all reality. If their supposed Gospel does not stand with reason or theory, it must somehow stand with faith, feeling, and all that is inmost in eternal life. This brings me to the second department of my subject, that in which I proposed to unfold an objective ritual view, answering to the mere speculative and subjective now presented, and necessary, as such, to the full effect and power of Christ’s mission.” — pp. 244–246.

This would seem to be something; but, as we have seen, it is only the subjective view we have already stated, objectively expressed. In itself considered, this objective view contains no truth not contained in the subjective view, and is only a sacred language, a divinely constructed system of signs, for producing in us certain states or affections. It is true because it expresses the truth to us, but the truth it expresses is subjective, not objective truth. It is only the form under which Christianity is to be represented in order to have an artistic effect.

“ But it will be imagined, I suppose, by some, that the objective

religion, the view of vicarious atonement which, as we have seen, may be generated by a transfer of the speculative doctrine, is only a rhetorical accident, — that the Apostles and Evangelists only took up certain Jewish figures, made ready at their hands, using them to convey the Christian truths. Contrary to this, it is my conviction, and I shall now undertake to show, that God prepared such a result, by a deliberate, previous arrangement. It is the **DIVINE FORM** of Christianity, in distinction from all others, and is, in that view, substantial to it, or consubstantial with it. It is, in fact, a Divine Ritual for the working of the world's mind. It was not more necessary, indeed, that the Life should find a body, than it is that the power Christ deposits in the world should have an operative vehicle. The Christ must become a religion *for* the soul and *before* it, therefore a Rite or Liturgy for the world's feeling, — otherwise Christianity were incomplete, or imperfect." — p. 258.

This ritualistic view, if not a rhetorical accident, is not so only because its author is God, and not man. It is clearly an accident in relation to the substantive truth of Christianity, for it is only the artistic form of that truth, and is no more essential to it than the fable is essential to the moral it is intended to illustrate and impress. With this objective view the author's system is at best only Socinianism clothed in Christian garments, or Unitarianism expressed in orthodox phraseology; and the only reason why, in so expressing it, we are not guilty of fraud and deception is, that God himself has prepared that phraseology as the fitting vehicle of Unitarian doctrine. How the author has learned all this, and many other things he asserts, is more than we know, or are able to divine.

The objective or ritualistic view of the author comprises the whole of the great mystery of redemption objectively considered, or the representation of Christ as our sponsor, our redeemer, the propitiation for our sins; as dying in our place, bearing our sins, redeeming us by his blood, making satisfaction for us to Divine Justice, and by his own merits obtaining for us the grace of pardon, and sanctification, and heaven. This view must be taken, not because Christ really did die in our place, satisfy for us, and merit our pardon and salvation, but because this is the necessary form of Christian expression, the only form in which the Gospel can be expressed so as to produce its intended effects. It is a Divine form, because the old ritual from which it is borrowed was itself the work of God, designed, aside from the æsthetic effect it was to have on those who

observe it, to supply a fit and appropriate language for worshippers under the new law.

That the Mystery of Redemption expressed in orthodox language is admirably fitted to produce the subjective affections the author supposes, is not denied, and we have already conceded it more than once; but only on condition of its being believed to be objectively true. Reduced, as the author reduces it, to mere fable, to mere poetical machinery for the production of those affections, it would not be so fitted. Moreover, we are not prepared to look upon God as dealing in fable, using fiction, and requiring us to believe it literally and strictly true. To say that he cannot without fiction or fable reveal himself to us, or move us to contrition and virtue, is to derogate from both his wisdom and power; and to say that he uses fiction, and requires us to believe it as truth, is to derogate from both his truthfulness and his justice. God does not employ fiction as truth, and Christianity is not a fable. Either the objective form of Christianity is objectively true, true to the letter, or God has deceived us, and the Gospel is an imposition.

Dr. Bushnell is, no doubt, an able man, and many parts of his theory indicate no little ingenuity and speculative talent; but he fails to see his doctrine in all its bearings. If his theory, that Christianity effects its end only æsthetically, be true, the whole benefit of the life, passion, and cross of our Lord must be restricted to those who have lived and died since his coming. The old patriarchs, and the saints under the old law, were not then saved by Christ *crucified*, and they cannot hail him as the Captain of their salvation. He did nothing for them; he did not by his cross and passion consummate their faith, and perfect what was wanting to them; for, as all the transactions brought to view in the Gospel were subsequent to their death, they could not affect them as Divine art. The Divine drama, not being represented before them, could not touch their hearts, and operate their reconciliation to God. Either, then, they are not saved, and are suffering now in hell, or there is another than Christ crucified in whom there is salvation, contrary to St. Peter, who says, "Neither is there salvation in another. For there is no other name given under heaven to men whereby we must be saved." (Acts iv. 12.) It would not be true, then, as St. Paul teaches us, that "there is one God, and

one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all, a testimony in due time." (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6.) Nothing is more evident from the Scriptures, than that all who are saved at all are saved by Christ crucified, and that the effects of the cross of Christ extend backwards to the first sinner of our race, as well as forward to the last, and were as essential to the salvation of those who lived and died before his coming as to those who live and die since. There never has been but one true religion, but one medium of salvation, and that medium is the cross of Christ. Hence, St. Paul, enumerating the saints who lived and died before the Incarnation, and commending their faith, adds, "And all these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise, God providing something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us." (Heb. xi. 39, 40.) This plainly intimates that we have received something necessary to salvation, which they had not received; that we have received the promise, that is, the fulfilment of the promise, in which they confided, but which they did not receive; and that our having received it, or that which was promised to them having now come, not only perfects us, but them also. The author is therefore precluded from giving to the life and passion of our Lord any interpretation which restricts their effects to those living only after his advent.

The author denies the vicarious atonement, or that Christ suffered as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind, and made satisfaction for them to the justice of God. Such satisfaction, he contends, was not necessary, was impossible, could serve no purpose, and God would have been unjust and cruel either to have exacted or to have accepted it from an innocent person. That it was not absolutely necessary is conceded. God could have pardoned the sinner gratuitously on the simple condition of penitence and amendment of life, if he had so willed. "If God had willed," says St. Thomas, "to liberate men from sin, without satisfaction, he would have done nothing contrary to justice. The judge who is charged to punish crime committed against another, as another man, the commonwealth, or a superior prince, cannot, indeed, save justice, and dismiss the guilty without punishment. But God has no superior, and is himself the supreme and common good

of the whole universe. Therefore, if he forgives sin, which derives its guilt from the fact that it is committed against himself, he does no one any injury; thus a man who forgives an offence against himself acts mercifully, not unjustly. Hence David, seeking mercy of God, says, *Tibi soli peccavi*, as if he would say he can be forgiven without injustice.* On this point we have no controversy with the author, or with his Unitarian friends.

But because God could have willed to liberate us from sin without satisfaction, we cannot say he has so willed. *Argumentum a posse ad esse, non valet.* God was free to will not to pardon without satisfaction, as he was free, if he had willed, not to accept satisfaction, but to leave the sinner to suffer in his own person the full penalty of the law he had broken. He was not obliged to pardon either with or without satisfaction. Man had sinned wilfully, and had voluntarily incurred the penalty of everlasting death, and would have had no cause of complaint against the Divine justice if left to suffer it. To have pardoned the sinner on the simple condition of penitence and reformation would have been a great mercy, an act of grace on the part of God; but to refuse to pardon on that condition, for the sake of making a higher display of his infinite love and wisdom, and of raising us to a greater dignity and to a higher blessedness than we lost by sin, would have been a still greater mercy, a higher act of grace. Now this may have been the reason why God refuses to pardon gratuitously. He may have willed something better for us, something more to his own glory; and all orthodox Christians believe that such is the case, that he willed, not only to repair the damage done by sin, but to make even sin itself contribute to the exaltation of the sinner and the Divine glory by the means taken to repair it. Hence the Church in her exultation breaks out, "O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!" Hence, whether we reason either from the justice or the mercy of God, we cannot conclude, that, because God could have remitted our sins without satisfaction, he actually does so remit them.

To all human wisdom and power the satisfaction asserted is unquestionably impossible, and no created intellect

* *Summa* 3, Q. 46, A. 2, ad 3.

could ever have discovered its possibility. But not therefore was it impossible to God. The author's arguments against its possibility are irrelevant, because founded on a misapprehension of the orthodox doctrine. He states the doctrine as he may have learned it in the bosom of his own sect, but not as it is taught by our theologians. He gives what he calls "the Protestant views" of the Mystery of Redemption, and states them to be,—1. That Christ satisfied the Divine justice by suffering in his own body all the pain to which mankind were doomed for their sins; and 2. That he suffered simply to express the Divine abhorrence of sin. The cross certainly does express this abhorrence, and the suffering of Christ during his life, which was one continued passion, was beyond our conception, for never were there sorrow and pain like his, and his humanity was miraculously strengthened, by its union with the Divinity, to suffer; but neither view stated by the author is the essential condition of the satisfaction. The satisfaction contended for is what theologians call condign satisfaction, that is, a satisfaction which is equivalent in value and dignity to the penalty incurred by transgression, or that renders to the majesty of God offended by sin an honor equal in dignity to the offence. Christ does not make it by suffering in his own body the actual amount of the debt, for the satisfaction concerns personal, not material things; but by offering that which in the estimation of Divine justice is, to say the least, fully equivalent in value to the offence. A debt can be discharged, without paying its actual amount in money, by offering its equivalent in some other form, if the creditor consents to accept the commutation.

That Christ could make condign satisfaction, offer to Divine justice a full equivalent, and far more than a full equivalent, for our debt, or our dishonor to it by sin, is most certain; for he was both God and man, the union of the Divine and human natures in one Divine person, and we can therefore, as we showed in our last Review, predicate of him on the one hand all that is predicable of God, and on the other, all that is predicable of man, sin excepted. He could not, indeed, suffer in his Divine nature, but he could suffer in his human nature, and his suffering in his human nature would be as really his suffering as God as if he suffered in his Divine nature, since what I

suffer in my body is as really my suffering as if I suffered it in my soul. Christ could suffer, and, as the value or dignity of whatever is done or suffered is always determined by the value or dignity of the person doing or suffering, his suffering, since his person is God, would have an infinite dignity or value. We say not that it would be an infinite suffering, for human nature, however exalted, is still finite, and cannot be the medium of infinite suffering, but by virtue of Christ's infinite person it would be infinite in dignity and value. A single drop of blood, a single tear, a single sigh of the Incarnate God, therefore, was amply sufficient to satisfy for the sins of the whole world, whether we say with some that sin is finite, or with others, that, since committed against the infinite majesty of God, sin is itself in some sense infinite. But as his whole life on earth was one continued passion, simply consummated on the cross, and as he shed every drop of his blood for us, his suffering was not only a full satisfaction of the law even to its utmost rigor, but even a superabundant satisfaction. The value of this suffering of our Lord he did not need for himself, either as God or as man. Not as God, for as God he possessed the infinite fulness of the Divine nature, and could neither need nor receive any thing; not as man, because he was without sin, and had no sin to atone for. The title to this value was not in the Trinity, because it was acquired by suffering, and the Trinity did not and could not suffer, but was in Christ, the Son, who had acquired it in his human nature, the only sense in which God did or could suffer and die. It is, then, in the Son as the Son of Man. Possessing it as Son of Man, Christ could make it over to us, or, what is the same thing, offer it to the Trinity in satisfaction for our sins, and in doing so he would offer it to another than himself as Son of Man, in which sense he acquired and holds it, and offer what is even more than equivalent to all the demands of Divine justice against us. The satisfaction is, then, possible on the part of the Redeemer, and herein is seen the wonderful wisdom of God, as well as his unbounded goodness, that he should have provided a Redeemer who could make full and complete satisfaction to the law for all the sins of all mankind.

That it would be unjust on the part of God to accept this satisfaction in commutation of the penalty annexed to

transgression cannot be maintained. It is certainly not unjust to the sinner. To the sinner it is an act of pure mercy, because God might have justly refused to accept any commutation, and actually inflicted on him the whole penalty of sin. It is a great favor to the sinner, and not merely a favor of the Son distinctively considered, for, though only one person of the Trinity was incarnated, the Incarnation, without which no satisfaction or commutation could have been made, was the work of the whole Trinity, in which the whole Trinity concurred. The Trinity provided the Redeemer, and therefore the redemption is a display of the mercy of the Trinity, not, as the author supposes, of one person only. There is no violation of eternal justice in accepting the satisfaction in so far as it releases the sinner, because we have seen God could have willed to release the sinner without any satisfaction, and if he could justly release him without satisfaction, he certainly could with satisfaction.

But the author contends that it would have been unjust to Christ on the part of God to have required him to make the satisfaction, against his will, and still more to have accepted it in case the Son freely consented to make it. That it would have been unjust to have compelled the Son of Man to make the satisfaction against his will, we do not deny, but not unjust to exact or accept it, the Son voluntarily consenting to make it. The Son of Man freely consented to redeem mankind, and as he had the right to consent, since he had free will, and violated no law in consenting, no injustice is done in accepting it. Otherwise, we must say that every exaction from the surety of the payment of a debt is an act of injustice. If I voluntarily become surety for another, there is no injustice on the part of the creditor in accepting me as surety, or even in exacting payment of me, in case the one for whom I become surety fails to discharge the debt. If not unjust, it is not cruel, for there can be no cruelty where there is no injustice. Moreover, the injustice and cruelty, if any in the case, are not avoided by the author's own theory. There is just as much suffering of the innocent for the guilty, of the just for the unjust, according to his doctrine, as there is according to ours; for he holds that Christ was innocent and just, and that God permitted him to lead a life of humility, to be persecuted and finally crucified by his ene-

mies, for the purpose of manifesting to sinners the Divine love and mercy, and of reconciling them to God by taking away their sins. It is as unjust and cruel to permit him so to suffer for the sake of reconciling sinners æsthetically, or by way of dramatic representation, as for the sake of reconciling them by way of satisfaction. But there is no injustice or cruelty in the case, unless it is unjust and cruel on the part of God to permit any act of heroic charity, or any heroic suffering for the sake of others. All through the world the good suffer for the bad, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust, and if this were forbidden, not a flower of charity would ever bloom to gladden us with its beauty and fragrance, and not a shower of mercy would ever descend to refresh the earth, and clothe its dusty face with verdure.

Dr. Bushnell contends, that, even if Christ makes satisfaction for our sins, nothing is gained by the transaction but the simple transfer of the evil from the guilty to the innocent. This objection is founded on a misconception of the orthodox doctrine of Redemption. Christ does not satisfy for our sins by bearing in his own body an amount of pain equal to that which mankind have incurred by transgression, but by offering to God in its stead its equivalent in value, or that which does more to repair the honor of the law dishonored by sin than would be done by the actual infliction of the penalty. God is more pleased with the submission and obedience of his Son, than he is displeased with sin, and his justice is better satisfied by his offering than it could have been by the suffering of all mankind in hell eternally for their sins; for their suffering could never fully satisfy it, otherwise it would not be endless. There is, then, by the transaction the gain of perfectly satisfying the Divine law by the offering of Christ, and on such conditions that its honor may be fully repaired and the sinner be saved, enter heaven, which he could not have done if he had had to endure the penalty.

The author, moreover, does not seem to understand that to the innocent and just there is and can be no evil. Strictly speaking, there is no evil but moral evil, that is, sin and its penalty, because nothing else excludes us from our supreme good. The evil of what Christ suffered was not evil in him or to him, but solely in the malice of those who persecuted and crucified him, that is, in the malice of

mankind for whose sins he suffered, and to them alone. Christ merited in his sufferings. He merited for himself, as Son of Man, the resurrection from the dead, the glorification of his body, his exaltation to the right hand of God the Father, and all power in heaven and in earth. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. *Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him*, and given him a name which is above every name: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow of those that are in heaven, on earth, and in hell, and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father." (Philip. ii. 3-11.) He was rewarded for what he did with the glory as Son of Man which as Son of God he had had with the Father before the world was. He bore our evil, but none of his own, for he knew no sin, and his humility and obedience, his cross and passion, became, through God's wisdom and love, the medium of his exaltation to the glory of the Father, to be honored as we honor the Father, and obeyed as Universal Lord.

We, also, gain by the transaction, if we are sanctified, more than tongue of men or angels can tell over and above what we should have received by gratuitous pardon. In being redeemed by the passion of Christ, we receive many things pertaining to salvation besides the simple remission of our sins. We learn from his passion the great love wherewith God loves us, which excites our love to him, and in which consists the perfection of salvation. "God commendeth his charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us." (Rom. v. 8.) In being thus redeemed, we have given us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues exhibited by our Lord in his passion, and which are necessary to salvation. "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps." (1 Pet. ii. 21.) Again, Christ by his passion, besides liberating us from the penalty due to transgression, a penalty that God could have remitted gratuitously, merited for us the grace of sanctification and of final beatitude. The simple, gratuitous remission of our sins would have imparted to us no additional grace, would have given us no new interior strength, no supernatural elevation of our nature, and would have left us as blind and as weak as we

were before, and equally incapable of that supernatural virtue to which alone is promised the reward of heaven. We know little of what would have been the final destiny of Adam had he persevered in the original justice and sanctity in which he was constituted, but a higher destiny, a more supernatural blessedness, is promised to us who are redeemed and sanctified in Christ. The redemption we have in him is not merely the remission of the penalty of transgression, is not merely our restoration to the state in which Adam stood before he fell, but our supernatural elevation to a higher spiritual state here, and to a higher glory and blessedness hereafter. Christ does more than repair the damage done by sin; he makes the very fact of sin turn to the advantage of the sanctified. "Where sin abounded, grace hath abounded more." Christ was constituted our head, and Christians are members of his mystic body, and as such partake of his fulness. "And of his fulness we have all received, grace for grace." (St. John i. 16.) The grace by which he is constituted our head, and by which Christians are made members of his mystic body, and therefore the beatitude of being united to him, and participating not only of his human, but also of his Divine nature in heaven, the reward of the sanctified, we receive through his incarnation and passion, over and above the remission of sin, and over and above what we should have received even if restored to the state in which Adam was before he fell; and therefore it is the Church, anticipating as it were, on Holy Saturday, the resurrection of our Lord from the tomb, and his triumph over the grave, over sin, and the powers of darkness, breaks out, "O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!" Herein, we repeat, is displayed the wonderful wisdom and love of God. It were comparatively a small thing for God to defeat the Devil, and to repair the damage done by the fall of Adam, but to turn sin, which is the abasement of man, the death of his soul as well as his body, and his exclusion from all good, to his advantage, and to make it the occasion of exalting his nature, and raising him to a higher dignity and blessedness than he would have attained to had he not fallen, is what passes all created understanding, what we can never sufficiently admire, and what will excite the admiration and gratitude of the blest through all eternity. God's love and mercy are manifested to us not

merely in not leaving us to suffer the penalty incurred by transgression, not merely in restoring us to the state in which Adam stood before he fell, but in making man's sin, through the mode of reparation adopted, the occasion of ennobling our nature, and of raising us, who had offended, grossly insulted, his infinite majesty, to be in some sense companions of God himself, and coheirs with his Son. "Behold, what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be named and should be the sons of God." "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." (1 John iii. 1, 2).

Moreover, the reflection that we are purchased with a price, that we are redeemed by the precious blood of God, presents us a far stronger motive to preserve our bodies pure, undefiled by sin, than any that could have been furnished by mere gratuitous pardon. "Ye are bought with a price. Glorify and honor God in your body." (1 Cor. vi. 20.) And, finally, it turns to the greater dignity of man, that, as man had been overcome and deceived by the Devil, so there should be a man who should also overcome the Devil, and as man had merited death, so man might by dying vanquish death. Therefore, "thanks to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." (1 Cor. xv. 51.)* Here are considerations, and we have adduced only a few of the many we might adduce, to show that there is great economy in the transaction, and that it is not a simple transfer of the evil from the guilty to the innocent.

The author adduces other objections which it may be well to glance at.

"Then, again, according to the same view, Christ is also God and ruler of the world, in his own person. Would any king, then, be in a fair way to maintain justice in his kingdom, if he took all the penalties of transgression on himself? Or if it be said that the human nature only of Jesus suffered, then we have the brief pangs of one human person accepted, in strict justice, as the equivalent of all the penalties of all human transgression, since the world began!

"Again, there can be no such thing as future punishment or ret-

* *Summa* 3, Q. 8; Q. 46, A. 3; and Q. 48.

tribution, in this view, without involving a charge of injustice. For if justice be exactly vindicated, and the terms of the law exactly satisfied, to punish after that is plainly to exact double justice,—which is injustice.

“Again, it is a fatal objection to this view, that it sets every transgressor right before the law, when, as yet, there is nothing right in his character; producing, if we view it constructively, and not historically (for historic and speculative results do not always agree), the worst conceivable form of licentiousness. For, if the terms of the law are satisfied, the transgressor has it for his right to go free, whether he forsake his transgressions or not. As far as any mere claims of law or justice are concerned, he may challenge impunity for all the wrongs he has committed, shall commit, or can commit, while his breath remains!” — pp. 197, 198.

1. Christ makes the satisfaction as Son of Man, in which sense he was not the king against whom the offence was committed, for as Son of Man he was exalted to dominion only as a reward for having made the satisfaction, for having humbled himself and become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. It is not true, because our Lord suffered only in his human nature, that “we have the brief pangs of one human *person* accepted, in strict justice, as the equivalent of all the penalties of all human transgression, since the world began,” because his pangs are not accepted as satisfaction on the ground that they are equivalent as suffering to the penalty, but equivalent in value; and because there was no human person in the case. The person of our Lord as Son of Man is his person as Son of God, and therefore the pangs were the pangs of a Divine person, the pangs of God, not of a human person; and being such, although suffered by God in his human nature, not in his Divine nature, which is impassible, they are of infinite value, and therefore amply and superabundantly satisfactory in strict justice for all the sins of all mankind. The author must remember that Christ is the union of the human nature and the Divine nature in one Divine person, or Hypostasis, and that, though some things he can do only as the suppositum of the Divine nature, and others only as the suppositum of the human nature, yet in both he is the one Divine suppositum, and the dignity and value of either class follow the dignity and value of his person.

2. Christ in the Incarnation received not only grace as

an individual, but also the grace of headship, as the head of every man, and it is as our head that he makes satisfaction for us; that is, he satisfies for us as his members, on the principle that the members satisfy in their head. His satisfaction, though amply sufficient, and even superabundant, considered in relation to the offended majesty of God, for the sins of the whole world, can yet be as to us an actual satisfaction, an actual, or personal, remission of our sins, only on condition that we are joined to Christ the Head as members of his mystic body. We do not satisfy the Divine justice out of Christ; we satisfy only in him; and it is only in him that we have redemption from sin. Consequently, if we are not in him, if we are disjoined or sundered from him, we cannot reap the fruits of the redemption. If, then, we refuse to become members of his mystic body, through baptism, the medium he has appointed for the reception of the grace which incorporates us into his body, and unites us to him as our Head,—as we may refuse, since we are endowed with free will, and he forces no one to become his member,—we remain practically under sin, have no practical application of the Atonement, are not practically washed from our sins in the laver of his blood, and therefore remain as obnoxious to all the penalties of sin as if he had not died, besides being guilty of rejecting the grace proffered us, and despising the Lord who has died to redeem us. The Son of Man was free to establish the conditions on which he would apply the pardon he purchased, or bestow the grace he obtained for us, and if we refuse to comply with those conditions, we may be justly punished for our sins. So the author is mistaken in saying that the sinner cannot, since Christ has made satisfaction superabundantly sufficient for all men, be punished without injustice. If he remains a sinner after so much has been done for him, he only shows the deeper malice, and that he deserves the greater damnation.

3. The answer to the third objection follows from the answer just given to the second. Redemption does not set the transgressor, save in Christ the Head, right before the law while as yet there is nothing right in his character. The sinner, regarded in himself, is not justified before the law till he is intrinsically just. The law is satisfied in Christ, in whom is our redemption and our justification, or rather redemption and justification for us; but it is

practically *ours* only as we are practically united to him as our Head, or as members of his body. The justification is in him, not out of him, and we must be in him in order to have it practically ours; and whoever is in Christ is a new creature, is regenerated, and therefore right in character. Till thus right in character, he is not individually right before the law. The doctrine of forensic justification, or our justification in the eye of the law, while we are practically unjust, though held by some sectaries, is not orthodox doctrine, any more than is the author's doctrine that Christ has made no satisfaction at all. The practical application of his satisfaction to us is essential to our individual justification in the eyes of the law, so that there is no personal justification without sanctification. The justice of Christ is imputed to us, justifies us, only in that we are living members of him, and united to him as our living Head by the efficient operations of his grace in us.

We pass over without comment what the author says in refutation of what he calls "the mitigated orthodox view," namely, that Christ by his cross satisfied the Divine justice in that he showed the Divine abhorrence of sin, because, as he states it, we do not hold that view, and regard it as no less heterodox than his own. The cross expresses that abhorrence, no doubt, but the formal expression of that abhorrence is not the satisfaction which Christ offered.

The author objects to the doctrine of satisfaction, that it implies, as he alleges, that God transferred his displeasure against the sinner to his Son, which cannot be supposed, for the Son had never done any thing to displease him. The objection grows out of the author's misapprehension of the *Mystery of Redemption*. The Father transferred no displeasure to the Son. The voice from heaven was, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." And the Son himself declares that he always does those things which are pleasing to the Father, and never was the Father better pleased with the Son, than in his agony in the garden and in his passion on the cross. Christ did not incur the Divine displeasure against sin. Through love he bore the effect of sin, that he might deliver us from it, as the author must, even on his own hypothesis, concede; but as he was himself without sin, the Divine displeasure against the sinner was not manifested against him. He was made a curse for us, it is true, because it is written, "Cursed is

every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13), but only in the sense that the Scriptures frequently call sin the effect of sin. The curse of sin is death, for death came by sin, and whoever is made subject to death, or is in a mortal body, does so far share the effect of sin, and is cursed. Yet if sharing it without sin, he is not the object of the Divine displeasure. Thus, "God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful [that is, mortal] flesh, even of sin, condemned sin in the flesh." (Rom. viii. 3.) That is, removed the curse, or death, the effect of sin, through his resurrection, which he could not have done had he not been made in the likeness of sinful flesh, or subject to death. He did not suffer death as a punishment, but that he might destroy death by rising again, and becoming the first fruits of them that slept, the first-born of the dead, and obtaining our resurrection and triumph over death and the grave. Here was no Divine displeasure against the Son, but an excessive love of the Son for us, and of the Father, who so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son to die, that whosoever should believe in him might not perish, but have everlasting life. Nor less did the Father love the Son, for he hath highly exalted him, given him a name above every name for his humility and obedience in effecting our redemption, and hath received him into his own glory, and placed all things under his feet. The whole Mystery of Redemption is nothing but the manifestation of the surprising love of God to sinners and to his Son who died for them.

The objections to the orthodox doctrine urged by the author, being thus shown to be unfounded, he is bound to admit it; for he concedes that it is clearly taught in the literal sense of the Scriptures, and the rule is always to take the literal sense, unless something obliges us to take another.

The author concedes the fact and the necessity of sacrifice, and not merely such sacrifice as possibly Adam might have offered in paradise, or men may offer in a state of innocence, but such sacrifice as is demanded in the present order of things, offered on account of transgression, and designed to resanctify violated law, and to cover the breaches made by sin; that is, sacrifice designed in some way to repair the honor of the law dishonored by sin, as well as the damage done by sin in us. But sacrifice of

this sort is impossible without the propitiatory sacrifice of our Lord, and cannot be asserted without recognizing in his obedience, in his cross and passion, a satisfaction made for sin.

The author very properly concedes that the sacrifices under the old law were made on account of sin, and had reference to the honor of violated law; but he fails in his attempt to explain the true nature of sacrifice, and the mode in which it effects the purpose for which it is made. He makes sacrifice consist in offering some sacred thing to God, and tells us that its significance is, that only some sacred thing yielded by God, and by occupancy and right especially his, can serve to resanctify violated law, and cover the breaches made by sin. The sacrifices of the old law all turned, he says, on the sacredness of blood. Blood was held to be the most sacred thing yielded by God, because it was held to be the mysterious principle of life. Hence it was the most proper thing to be offered in sacrifice, and because it was so offered came the maxim, "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." This clearly proves that the author holds that the sacrifice was offered for the remission of sin, which is so far all very well. But blood, even considered as the principle of life, is not necessarily more sacred in the sacrificial sense of *sacred*, and no more God's by occupancy and right, than is every thing else he has created, for the earth is his and the fulness thereof. Life belongs to God as its author and sustainer, and so does every thing else in creation by the same title. The author puts the effect for the cause. The thing is not offered because it is sacred, but is sacred because it is offered, or rather becomes sacred in being offered. Sacrifice is making a thing sacred (from *sacrum* and *facere*), and consists not in offering a sacred thing to God, but in making a thing sacred by offering it to God; that is, in separating it entirely from its ordinary uses and devoting it especially and exclusively to God, to testify his supreme dominion, by way of satisfying his majesty dishonored by sin, rendering him supreme homage, giving him thanks, and impetrating his favors or his gracious assistance. The reason why blood was offered was not because blood was the most sacred thing known, but because, in all the sacrifices under the law, there was a remembrance of sin, and the offering of blood signified that the life of the sinner was

forfeited to God, and he had in strict justice no longer the right to appropriate it to the ordinary uses for which life is bestowed; that is, life itself was in justice sequestered from the purposes for which it was originally given, separated, made sacred, or accursed, as the penalty of transgression. This is wherefore the destruction of the victim, as to all its ordinary or human uses, was essential to the consummation of the sacrifice. Hence the bloody sacrifices, not only of the Jews, but also of the heathen, bear witness to the tradition of the fall of man, and the terrible penalty incurred by sin, — “In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.” They bear witness, also, to a promise and a hope of redemption through vicarious satisfaction; for the life of the sinner is sacrificed only vicariously, — not his own life is offered for his sins, but the life of another, and of one not a sinner.

Now it is certain that we have nothing in our own right as God's creatures that we can offer in sacrifice that will be a sacrifice of reparation, or that will tend in any way to resanctify the law violated by our sins, for the sacrifice of our own life would be simply an infliction of the penalty of death. The animals offered in sacrifice were not in themselves real sacrifices, and the shedding of their blood could in no sense vindicate the majesty of the law, could in no sense make it honorable, for they were wholly disjoined from the sinner, had no communion of nature with him, and in dying yielded no obedience to the law. They could be only symbolical or figurative sacrifices, needing a substantial sacrifice, which they were not, in order to have any sacrificial value. And hence St. Paul denominates them figures, types, or shadows of the one sacrifice of our Lord. Sacrifices in a state of innocence are, perhaps, conceivable, but sacrifices in such a state cannot be sacrifices in the Christian sense, nor in any sense applicable in the present order of things; for we are not born in a state of innocence. Through the prevarication of Adam, we are all born under sin, and sacrifices must in some way be reparatory of the honor of the law, and remove the disability of sin, before they can be acceptable to God as *latric*, *eucharistic*, or *impetrative* sacrifices. We do not mean to say that we can perform in our fallen state no actions not sinful, till the Divine justice is actually satisfied in us for the sin under which we are born, for that is not true. Not all

the works of unbelievers are sin. Men are not born with a totally depraved nature. They have not lost by the Fall reason and free will, nor any of the essential faculties of human nature. By the Fall man lost original justice, in which Adam was supernaturally constituted, with the integrity of his nature, and was turned away in his nature from God, passed under the dominion of Satan, and became darkened in his understanding and attenuated in his will; but his nature, as pure nature, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, is still substantially what it was before the prevarication of Adam, and he may still by actual grace perform acts which are not sinful, which are in some sense good and even meritorious in the natural order, though not meritorious in regard to everlasting life, or in the supernatural order, in which lies our real and only true destiny, since, strictly speaking, we have *in hac providentia* no natural destiny. What we mean, then, is, that we must be liberated from the curse of sin, before we can render unto God in the present order an acceptable worship, and therefore must be able to offer a sacrifice of propitiation before we can offer an acceptable sacrifice of homage, thanksgiving, or impetration. "The victims of the wicked are abominable to the Lord; the vows of the just are acceptable." (Prov. xv. 8.)

Sacrifices, of course, are not alone for propitiation, but sacrifices in the present order must always have a propitiatory character, and in some way liberate from sin. And hence they are always assumed to have this character, whether among the Jews or among the heathen. They are undeniably presented under this character in the Holy Scriptures, and the author implies it, by expressly connecting sacrifice with the remission of sins. Now sacrifices under this character, no mere creature, whether man or angel, can offer, for all the creature has or can offer is only sufficient to fulfil the law, and to save him from being guilty before it. Yet sacrifices in this sense are plainly possible. The sacrifices under the old law were sacrifices, and were expressly enjoined by God himself, as the author clearly allows. But whence became they sacrifices? Whence did they derive their sacrificial virtue? Whence do we derive our ability to offer real sacrifices to God?

Undeniably, we derive this ability only from the one sacrifice of Christ, for none but he ever could offer a sacri-

fice the value of which could be applied to repairing the honor of broken law, or to covering the breaches made by sin. He could offer such sacrifice, on the principle and for the reasons we have assigned in proving that he could make satisfaction for sin. The sacrifices under the old law not being in themselves sacrifices, they could be sacrifices only by virtue of a real and absolute sacrifice; and we not being able to offer any thing of our own, unless something made ours by supernatural gift, can offer them only in so far as they participate of the merit of a sacrifice offered by one who is competent to offer a sacrifice that is intrinsically and absolutely a sacrifice. No one but he who is at once God and man in the unity of one Divine person can offer such a sacrifice, and consequently our Lord, who is and who alone is at once God and man in one Divine person, alone could offer a real sacrifice of the character we are considering, and therefore all other sacrifices of the same sort can be sacrifices only by virtue of his one sacrifice, by which he has for ever perfected them that are sanctified.

But how could the sacrifices of the old law, and how can our sacrifices, derive their sacrificial virtue from the sacrifice of Christ? Nothing is more evident from the Scriptures than that sacrifices in the present order, in so far as they enter into the worship of God, whether propitiatory, latric, eucharistic, or impetrative, do derive all their virtue from his sacrifice, for we are not sufficient to think any thing of ourselves as of ourselves; our sufficiency is from God, through Christ (2 Cor. iii. 5), who expressly declares that without him we can do nothing (St. John xv. 5). How, we repeat, can our own sacrifices, or those of the old law, become sacrifices by virtue of his? Certainly, only on condition that his was offered for us; that is, that he, not needing the infinite value of his sacrifice for himself, since he was without sin, offers it to God for us, or, what is the same thing, makes it over to us to be offered by us in sacrifice for our sins. To offer it to God for us, or to make it over to us to be offered by us, is only offering it in satisfaction for us. Consequently, it follows that sacrifices in the present order, even of the sort the author concedes, if he understands himself, are and were possible only on condition that Christ offered himself a propitiation for the sins of mankind, and by the merits of his sacrifice made satis-

faction for them. Supposing him to have done so, then, as referred to him and as signifying his sacrifice, the sacrifices of the old law were truly sacrifices, acceptable to God; and every act of self-denial, mortification, or alms-deeds of ours becomes a true sacrifice by virtue of his one sacrifice of himself offered on the cross and perpetuated in the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Hence, in Christ we can do what the Apostle beseeches us to do, "present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," (Rom. xii. 1,) and it becomes literally true that "a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." (Ps. l. 17.)

No one who carefully studies the Scriptures, especially the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews, can fail to perceive that they fully warrant this view, and can be reconciled with no other. It is necessarily implied in the priesthood of Christ. Christ is a priest, our high-priest, and he abideth a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech. But the especial function of a priest is to offer sacrifice, and there is no more a priest without a sacrifice, than there is a sacrifice without a victim. "Every high-priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices; wherefore it was necessary that he [Christ] should have something to offer." (Heb. viii. 3.) Christ was both priest and victim, and what he had to offer, and what he offered, was himself. "Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God, for an odor of sweetness." (Eph. v. 2.) A priest is a mediator between God and men, and though men who are priests are obliged to offer for their own sins, as well as for the sins of the people, yet he who is the true high-priest, the source of all sacerdotal virtue, needs not to offer for himself, for he is without sin, and offers for the people only. "For it was fitting that we should have such an high-priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, as other priests, first to offer sacrifices for his own sins, and then for the people's; for this he did once by offering up himself." (Heb. vii. 26, 27.) The sacrifice is plainly propitiatory, and is offered in satisfaction for sin. "For if the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled to the cleansing of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who, through the Holy Ghost, offered himself without spot to

God, cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God." (Heb. ix. 13, 14.)

It is only on the principle, that all sacrificial merit in the Christian order flows from the one sacrifice of Christ, that the reasoning of the Apostle concerning the sacrifices of the old law becomes either intelligible or pertinent. These sacrifices were appointed by God himself, but in themselves they had no virtue to cleanse the conscience; "For it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away." (Heb. x. 4.) Yet they had a shadow of good things to come, and as a shadow implies a substance, they implied the sacrifice of Christ as their substance, as the substantial or real sacrifice which they foreshadowed, and without which they could be no real sacrifice. The Apostle plainly teaches that what was wanting in them was supplied by the one offering of Christ. "And every priest, indeed, standeth daily ministering, and often offering the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins; but he, offering one sacrifice for sins, for ever sitteth at the right hand of God, for by one oblation he hath for ever perfected them that are sanctified." (Heb. x. 11-14.) That this has reference to saints before as well as since his coming, is evident from what the Apostle says farther on, in a passage which we have already cited: "And all these [the patriarchs, and the saints under the old law] being approved by the testimony of faith, [that is, by the testimony they bore to the faith, or to the coming, of Christ, and salvation through him,] received not the promise, [the real sacrifice not having as yet been actually offered save in the prescience and decree of God,] God having provided something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us," (Heb. xi. 39, 40,) plainly implying that with us, or by the sacrifice of Christ which is now offered, and which we have, and which they had only in promise, they should be made perfect, for it gives reality to their sacrifices, and completes or fulfils them.

It is idle, after this reasoning, if we admit the authority of the Apostle, to deny that Christ offered a real propitiatory sacrifice, made by his obedience, his cross and passion, a real satisfaction for sin, and to assert that he removes our sins only on æsthetic principles, by the mere tragic display of his passion and death. The author in so doing loses the whole force of the Apostle's reasoning. The sacri-

fices under the old law did cleanse by way of satisfaction from defilements of the flesh contracted under the law; if they could do that, "how much more," asks the Apostle, "shall the blood of Christ, who, through the Holy Ghost, offered himself without spot to God, cleanse our *conscience* from dead works, [that is, from sin,] to serve the living God?" There would be no analogy in the case, and no place for the *a fortiori* of the Apostle, if the sacrifice of Christ did not cleanse from sin by way of satisfaction. On the author's theory, the sacrifices under the law could take away sins, in the same sense, though not in the same degree, perhaps, that the sacrifice of Christ takes them away; but this the Apostle denies, and declares that, in the sense in which he represents Christ's sacrifice of himself as taking away sin, "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away." If the Apostle was right, Dr. Bushnell is undeniably wrong, and ought to give up his æsthetic theory, and return to the orthodox doctrine of redemption.

Taking the view we have presented, it is easy to understand that the sacrifice of Christ was infinitely meritorious, in satisfying for our sins, and in procuring us grace to rise from sin and to walk in newness of life. We see, also, that all merit, in the Christian order, comes from Christ, that we have no merit of our own, that we merit only in his merit, and are saved by his justice and sanctity, not by our own,—the great truth which the author's Calvinistic friends and their Jansenistic allies so strenuously assert, and which they so seldom fail to abuse. Christ is the great fountain of merit, and is "made unto us from God wisdom, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption." (1 Cor. i. 30.)

But this can be true only in the orthodox sense. Christ satisfied and merits for us by his obedience, not simply by his suffering and dying on the cross. The cross stands for redemption, not because it was the mere death of Christ that redeems us, but because on it was consummated his obedience. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." What satisfies is not the death, but the infinite merits of the obedience of which submission to death was the last crowning act. "For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one shall many be made just."

(Rom. v. 19.) But merit is of a personal nature, and not transferable; how, then, can the merits of Christ's obedience become ours, or we merit in his merit? Christ was constituted, as we have seen, and as the Scriptures plainly declare, our spiritual Head, and he was obedient, offered himself for us, as our Head, and only as our Head, not merely as an individual man, and his merits, which, considered in their intrinsic value are amply sufficient and even superabundant for all men, can avail us only as they become ours; and they can become ours only on condition of our being mystically united to him as his living members. We are redeemed, sanctified, only in him, that is, only as we are in him, and merit in his merits, as the members are in, and merit in the merit of, their head. If we are out of him, sundered from him, and are not made, through the efficient operations of his grace in us, one with him, there is no connection between his merits and ours, but, as it were, a chasm between him and us, across which his merits cannot flow to us, and become ours. Hence the dogma of faith, *Extra Ecclesiam, nullus salus*, — Out of the Church, no salvation, — a dogma which many hold to be unreasonable, but which could not be denied without denying the whole doctrine of redemption, and of salvation through the merits of Christ. God operates by his grace, indeed, in all men to bring them to Christ, to be mystically united to him, and no one can come to him without grace; since he says, "No man cometh to me except the Father who hath sent me draw him." (St. John vi. 44.) But it is only as so united to him in his mystical body that the merits of his obedience are, as it is termed, practically applied to us, that is, become ours; for it is only as so united that we obey in his obedience, or are crucified with him on the cross, and can offer his merits, as merits acquired by us, not individually indeed, but in our Head, in satisfaction for our sins, and plead them as the ground of our title to pardon and everlasting life; since "Christ is the head of the Church," and "the Saviour of his body"; "he loved the Church and delivered himself up for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; that he might present it to himself a glorious church without spot or wrinkle, nor any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish." (Eph. v. 23–27.) Hence Christ tells us, "I am the true vine, and my Father is the

husbandman." "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless ye abide in me." (St. John xv. 1-4.) But when we are thus united to him as living branches to the true vine, or as living members of a living body to its living head, his merits, acquired as our Head, are, through his free gift, infused into us individually, as the sap flows from the root through the vine to its living branches, and become the principle of our sacrifice and our charity, — of our new life and all its acts, — and we are personally justified because personally just, and we are personally just by the justice of Christ, because as real members of him we participate of the justice of our Head; and being thus just, God can justify us and still retain his justice in all its rigor. Thus are we "justified gratis by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to the showing of his justice, for the remission of past sins, through the forbearance of God, for the showing of his justice in this time; that he himself may be just and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ." (Rom. iii. 24-26.)

The difficulty the author feels in admitting the doctrine of satisfaction, we apprehend, grows out of his having contemplated the Mystery of Redemption only in the form presented by his own and kindred sects, which regard the relation of Christ to us as our Head and of ours to him as his members, as merely extrinsic, as a matter of mere outward covenant or agreement. So regarded, Christ does not and cannot make any real satisfaction for us; his merits could only be imputed to us, or reckoned to be ours, without being so in fact, and our justification through him could be only an imputed justification, without implying any inward or intrinsic justice or sanctity on our part. God does not and cannot deal in fictions of law, and does and can pronounce no man justified who is not intrinsically just in the eyes of the law. The doctrine of imputed justice, the common doctrine of the Reformers, invented to save the glory of Christ, entirely mistakes the great Mystery of Redemption, and reduces the new law to the level of the old, and Christ to the level of Moses, instead of making him the mediator of a better testament. Moses was the mediator of an extrinsic testament, and his sacrifices did not and could not of themselves take away sin as

pertaining to the conscience, and were only types, figures, or signs of the real and intrinsic sacrifice, which was needed and was to be made. But Christ, we are told, is the mediator of a better testament than that of Moses ; and better because intrinsic, not extrinsic merely, so that justification and sanctification may in fact be one and the same thing. "For this is the testament I will make to the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord ; I will give my laws into their minds, and I will write them on their heart ; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." (Heb. viii. 10.) Hence a testament that effects the justice of the sinner while it justifies him before the law, which the sacrifices of the old law could not do.

Here is the truth the Mercersburg Reviewer so strenuously contends for, and which, singularly enough, he accuses the Church of denying, although it is well known that she has always asserted it, and condemns the Reformers, in condemning their doctrine of imputed justice, its contradictory, for denying it. The original pretence of the Reformers for separating from the Church was that she held it, and our Mercersburg friend, having discovered its importance, does not do well to charge us with denying it, and claiming it as the great and essential doctrine of the Reformation. This is at once to bear false witness and to be guilty of the attempt to commit robbery. The doctrine is a truth essential in Catholic faith and theology, and after we have been abused by the whole Protestant world, during three hundred years and over, for holding it, we cannot now consent to be robbed of the honor of having held it, and declared to have rejected the Gospel on the grounds of our not having held it. The Reviewer has well seen that Christ's obedience can satisfy for us, and his merits become ours, only by virtue of our real, living union with Christ as our Head, what the Church has always told him, but, having no infallible guide in matters of faith, he exaggerates the union, makes it hypostatic, asserts that every believer bears to the Divine Word the same relation which subsists between the Word and the human nature he assumed in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, which is to fall into a sort of Christian pantheism, the grand error of our author, and of a large class of German neologists. The union is mystical, not hypostatic, and is effected, not by way of the emanation of Christ, but by the efficient op-

erations of his grace in us, by which he *creates* us anew in him, or by which he begets us unto himself, generates his own life in us, and through it transmits to us his merits.

The author may here see that the two views of Christianity he insists upon can coalesce more really than on his hypothesis, without denying, but by asserting, the objective reality of what he calls the objective form of Christianity. What he wants to maintain is, that Christ actually redeems only in sanctifying us, that the redemption becomes effectual in us only inasmuch as it removes our sins and renders us intrinsically just; and this on the orthodox doctrine is actually the case, and hence, though his merits are always declared to be sufficient and even superabundant for all mankind, none are represented as ever really participating of them but those who are living members of Christ, because it is only *in* him as our Head that we merit, satisfy, or are saved. No man has ever any occasion to be heterodox in order to assert truth, for there is no truth not amply provided for in orthodox theology.

In the orthodox view we have presented, we may see the wonderful wisdom and goodness of God, who not only redeems us from sin through Christ, but gives us the power to render every one of our acts a sacrifice well pleasing in his sight, by enabling us, through a mystic union with Christ, to participate of the infinite merits of Christ's one sacrifice, which was offered in a bloody manner on Calvary, and is perpetuated in an unbloody manner upon our altars, — whether regarded as a propitiatory or a latric, a eucharistic or an impetrative sacrifice, — and of the infinite merits of his most perfect obedience, freely given us through grace operating efficiently in us. On the score of mere magnificence, this somewhat surpasses the author's æsthetic scheme; and to even untutored reason must appear far more worthy of the Divine interposition for the salvation of men. If joined to Christ, through his mystic body, by faith, hope, and charity, we share his infinite merits, and the gift of even a cup of cold water in the name of Christ is sufficient to entitle us to the infinite reward of heaven. What dignity to be bestowed on man, who in himself is but a worm! What grandeur does it give to the humblest act of the humblest Christian!

ART. IV. — *Discours prononcé par M. DE MONTALEMBERT, Représentant du Peuple (Doubs) dans la Discussion du Projet de Loi tendant à ouvrir au Ministre des Finances un Crédit de 1,800,000 Francs, pour Frais de Représentation du Président de la République, Séance du 10 février, 1851. 18mo. pp. 32.*

WE always read with interest the eloquent parliamentary speeches of Count de Montalembert, for we always find in them a noble spirit, and principles becoming the Christian and the statesman; but we have read none of them with deeper interest or more pleasure than the one now before us; nor any one which has given us so strong a proof of his practical wisdom, and real independence of character. M. de Montalembert is not the man of a party; he is a Christian and a Frenchman. He himself was known to our public, in 1830, as connected with the Abbé de la Mennais, in the religious and political movement represented to some extent by *L'Avenir*, and which sought to induce the Church to accept and foster the democratic tendencies of the European populations. The movement, under some of its aspects, was noble and praiseworthy, but under others it was injudicious and revolutionary, and calculated to embroil the Church with the temporal governments, to the serious detriment of religion. It was therefore disapproved at Rome, and forthwith abandoned by M. de Montalembert, and nearly all those who had projected and sustained it, with the exception of the unhappy Abbé de la Mennais himself, who finally for his persistence incurred excommunication from the Church.

In the Chamber of Peers, of which he was an hereditary member, M. de Montalembert, under the monarchy of July, was not a Philippist nor a Legitimist, a republican nor a dynastic oppositionist, but was generally in opposition to the government, with strong sympathies with the European liberal movement. He did not oppose the Orleans dynasty, he did not advocate a republic, but he opposed the government, because it showed itself hostile to religious and civil freedom. His sympathies were with the party struggling for larger liberty, and his parliamentary labors were specially directed to obtaining the freedom of education, which was enslaved by the state through the

infidel University, established in its main features by the Convention. He may be said during this period to have represented in Parliament the Catholic party of young France.

In February, 1848, came the revolution that overthrew and exiled the Orleans dynasty, and proclaimed the French republic. M. de Montalembert was returned a member of the Constituent Assembly, or convention summoned to give France a constitution, and reëstablish social and political order. In this Assembly he took his stand, not as a republican nor as an anti-republican, not as a Legitimist nor as an anti-Legitimist, but as the advocate of order and defender of religious liberty. He saw that the first want of France was legal order, and that every attempt to found such order without a religious basis must prove abortive. Hence the freedom of the Church and the establishment of social order became his watchwords; and he proved himself ready to coöperate with any party devoted to the maintenance of order, and able and willing to recognize, as its indispensable conditions, the full freedom of the Church and of Catholic education. This position he still maintains. Without any preferences for a republic as such, he seems, now that the republican order has been proclaimed, fully disposed to accept it, to give it a fair trial, and a loyal support so long as it is able to maintain social and political order for his country. As he would never have conspired to overthrow the monarchy for the sake of introducing the republic, so he will never conspire to overthrow the republic for the sake of restoring the monarchy, either in the family of the Bourbons or in that of the Bonapartes. In the present crisis in European, and especially in French affairs, the most pressing question, he holds, lies not between one form of government and another, but between government and no government, between order and anarchy, civilization and barbarism; and any existing government, able to sustain order and provide for the wants of civilized society, ought to be loyally supported, irrespective of the claims or pretensions of particular families or individuals. Governments are instituted for the public good, and power is a sacred trust from God, not a personal right of its depositaries; and whenever these have lost it, it must be suffered to pass into other hands if the public good clearly demand it, for society is paramount to the individual.

We have, ever since we can remember, advocated, and we trust we ever shall advocate, the *jus divinum*, or government by Divine right; for we hold that under the law of nature all men are equal, and that no man, in his own name, has the right to govern another. All dominion of man over man is of the essence of despotism. All power is of God, and no power is legal save as ordained of God; and no man has any right to exercise any authority save as the vicar or delegate of Almighty God, immediately, or mediately, appointed by him to govern. Ministers may be variously appointed according to the respective constitutions of different countries; they may obtain office hereditarily, or by popular election; but always their ultimate right to govern derives from God, and they hold it only as his delegates. They are, therefore, bound to exercise it according to his will, that is, according to the laws of eternal justice. This is what we mean by the *jus divinum*, and holding this, we hold that whoso resists government in the discharge of its legal functions resists the ordinance of God, and purchases to himself damnation.

But God authorizes government and invests it with the right to govern for the public good, not for the private good of the governors, and hence power is a trust, and therefore amissible. It may be forfeited, as any other trust, for it may be abused, and it is abused, whenever it is exercised for a private end, in opposition to the public good. It may be lost, also, without the particular fault of its depositaries, by such changes in human affairs as render it impracticable or impossible for them to continue to exercise it compatibly with the peace and welfare of the public, or so as to secure the ends for which government is instituted. In France, the old public order has, by successive revolutions, been completely broken up, and the French statesman is now free, and even bound, to take that course which is most in accordance with the true interests of his country, without reference to the rights of particular families, deriving from an order which has in fact passed away. He is free to support the republic, in total forgetfulness, as it were, of the hereditary claims to reign of the Bourbons or of the Bonapartes, and ought to do so, if in the providence of God and the mutations of human things the republic has become the only practicable order, or the best practicable government for his country; for there is

a broad difference between hereditary personal rights and hereditary public trusts; between overthrowing a monarchy for the sake of establishing a republic, and supporting a republic after monarchy has been overthrown; and between struggling to sustain a monarchy that is assailed, and struggling to restore a monarchy that has fallen. The first want of France is government, and its second want is wise and efficient government, able alike to protect itself and the freedom of the subject; and the duty of the French statesman is to provide for these wants in the best and speediest manner now practicable. If they can be best provided for by monarchical restoration, royal or imperial, in the elder or the younger branch of the Bourbons, then he should labor for such restoration; if they can be best provided for by the republic, princely under Louis Napoleon, or citizen under General Cavaignac, then such republic should be accepted and supported. We regard France, since the revolution of February, as to the constitution of political power, as to a great extent thrown back under the law of nature, and as not only free, but bound, to reconstitute government in the manner best adapted to her future welfare, and the question for her to settle is, not the claims of princes, but the political constitution she needs to preserve herself from becoming a prey to the Socialists and Red Republicans, led on by Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin, and company, those conspirators-general against the rights of nations, the peace of society, and the civilization of Europe.

M. de Montalembert, in the speech before us, as we have intimated, seems disposed to accept and sustain the republic, and the republic with Louis Napoleon for its chief. He is not a Bonapartist; his sympathies are rather with the Legitimists; but he contends that Prince Louis has merited well of France and Europe, and, without committing himself for the future, he ably defends the conduct of the President thus far, and awards him the well deserved praise which many from various quarters have denied him. He concedes that the President has committed some faults, the gravest of which, however, was his ill-advised letter on Roman affairs to Colonel Edgar Ney, which he hastened immediately to repair, and which has had no grave consequences. He regrets the dismissal of General Changarnier from his important military com-

mand, but thinks it was not wholly without excuse. He also regrets the new ministerial appointments, and would seem to regard the new ministry as not likely to inspire confidence in the friends of order; but he is disposed to judge it by its acts. The President is the responsible head of his administration, and he thus far has proved himself the friend of religion, of order, of legal government, and determined to maintain internal tranquillity, peace and dignity abroad.

To appreciate the merits of the French President, we must take into consideration the very delicate and embarrassing position in which he has been placed from the first. He received it in charge to maintain the republic at home, and the influence and dignity of France abroad. When he was elected, December 10, 1848, the Convention had promulgated the constitution, — a miserable abortion, satisfactory to nobody, — and the power of the state was in the hands of the so-called moderate republican party, a feeble minority of the nation, and, whatever their good intentions, without political, and especially administrative capacity. The great majority of the French people were and are monarchists, are not and never have been republicans, and the republic proclaimed by the Parisian mob in February, 1848, could not have lived a week had it not been acquiesced in and supported by those who did not wish it, had no hand in introducing it, and no sympathy with it. It was impossible for Prince Louis to administer the government without the aid of the monarchists, for the moderate republicans were too few and too imbecile to afford him any real support, and the Red Republicans were powerful only in a work of destruction, and were the enemies alike of order at home, and of peace and just influence abroad. He must then conciliate the moderate republicans, secure the aid of the monarchists, and defy the Socialists. But if too decidedly republican, he could not count on the support of the monarchists; and if he trusted exclusively the monarchists, he might awaken monarchical hopes and prepare the way for a restoration of monarchy, to the destruction of the republic, — or for the division of the monarchical party, which would allow a triumph of the Red Republicans to the destruction of social order and the peace of Europe. Here was his great difficulty.

The solution of the difficulty depended on the fact

whether the old monarchical party, composed of Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists, had really resolved to let monarchy go, and henceforth to accept without reserve, and to support loyally, the republican order. The republicans themselves could not sustain the republic, for the Reds would soon absorb the Moderates, as in the old Revolution the Mountain absorbed the Gironde, and a Red Republic is as impracticable as undesirable. The fate of the republic was, then, in the hands of the monarchists, and would not they at the first favorable opportunity seek to restore monarchy? It was to be feared. At the time of the inauguration of the President, it is true, they seemed to have dismissed all monarchical regrets, and to be prepared to support the republic without any after-thought, and the President showed that he had no serious distrust of them, and wished to make no unfavorable distinction between them and the republicans.

Abroad matters were, if possible, still more delicate and embarrassing for a republican President of France. All Europe was divided into two hostile camps, and it was not yet decided which was the strongest. The Holy Father was in exile, and the infamous Triumvirate had established their Reign of Terror in the capital of the Christian world; the Radicals were triumphing in Tuscany; Charles Albert was preparing a second invasion of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom; Austria was maintaining an apparently doubtful contest with her Red Republican anarchists and her Magyar rebels; Central Germany was in flames; and Prussia alternated between Red Republicanism and despotism, played fast and loose with anarchy, as her sovereign was drunk or sober, was dazzled by visions of the imperial diadem or feared the loss of his hereditary crown. France held the balance, and the party into whose scale she should throw herself could not fail to preponderate, at least for the time. If she manifested any strong sympathy with the republican camp, war would blaze out all over Europe. If she did not, and if she threw her influence on the side of authority, then she would stand in the apparently contradictory light of sustaining a republic at home, and exerting herself to suppress republicanism abroad, and would have to encounter the wrath of all the disorganizers of Europe and of America.

The President does not seem to have hesitated long as

to the part he should take. He seems to have resolved to sustain the republic at all hazards, not so much because he was a republican as because he was a Frenchman, and France had had revolutions enough, and to support the party of order abroad, as the party of justice, of right, and because it was the only means of preserving the peace of Europe, alike essential to France and to the other European nations. He did not break entirely with the republicans at home, but he gave the best pledge possible to the friends of order that he was no revolutionist, that he respected the rights of sovereigns as well as of the people, and, above all, the sacred obligations of religion, by restoring, in harmony with the other Catholic powers, the Holy Father to his temporal dominions, and by expelling the miserable banditti who professed to govern the Eternal City in the name of the Roman people. He withdrew France from her false position as the head of the European anarchical propagandism, and placed her on the side of religion, of order, of legal right, and therefore on the side of liberty. From that moment the reaction against anarchy became decided, and victorious in every Continental state except Sardinia, and that too without in the least compromising the dignity or the stability of the French republic. No ordinary credit is due to the man who, without political experience, could assume the direction of the affairs of such a country as France, at such a time, with such obstacles within and without to encounter, and yet bring them to as happy an issue as they had attained to in March, 1850, and Prince Louis may henceforth without a blush call himself "the nephew of my uncle," for his uncle did nothing greater or really more glorious.

Undoubtedly, the President must divide this glory with the monarchists of France, the majority in the Assembly, for if he had had only the republican party, Red or Moderate, on which to rely, he could never have carried France and Europe through the crisis; but the larger share of the glory is unquestionably his own, as the elected chief of the French nation.

Up to March, 1850, the monarchical party seem to have been united to a man, and determined to support the republic, although they had never desired it. The greater part of them seem still determined to do so, but, unhappily, they are no longer united. The reaction against an-

archy having everywhere proved decisive, the imminent danger of Socialism having been somewhat diminished, monarchical regrets seem to have been awakened, and dreams of restoring fallen monarchy to have been indulged. A greater danger than France has yet had to meet, we fear, now awaits her, and from this very cause, for without the support of the monarchists the republic cannot stand, and hereditary monarchy, we fear, is henceforth impracticable in France.

The republicans, including both Moderates and Reds, are, no doubt, a minority, and even a small minority, of the French people. The monarchists are certainly the majority, and, if united, they could without difficulty sustain themselves against their enemies. But they are not united, and cannot be united. Three times within the last sixty years they have possessed, and three times they have lost power, through their fatal dissensions. The old French monarchy expired in 1789, when Louis the Sixteenth became, instead of king of France, a constitutional king of the French, and no human power can resuscitate it. The order instituted in 1789 by the Constituent Assembly, with a few exceptions, was the clear and spontaneous expression of the will of the French nation, including the king, the nobles, the clergy, and the people. It is worse than idle to attempt to go behind that new order, and undertake to reëstablish the throne of Saint Louis. There is nothing in the habits, the sentiments, or the institutions of the French people at the present time to sustain that throne. The feudal nobility is gone; the feudal church is gone; the distinction of ranks is abolished; and chivalry, if not extinct, has taken an entirely new direction. Sixty years of revolution have destroyed loyalty, changed habits of submission into habits of insubordination, obliterated the sense of law, of the fixed and permanent, and superinduced a morbid desire of change, an absolute impatience of all repose as of all restraint. Here is no place for the throne of Saint Louis, nor even for that of "Le Grand Monarque." We may or may not regret it, according to the temper of our minds. For our part we do regret it, as we regret all modern changes, none of which can we recognize as improvements. But while we regret it, we hope we have the good sense to conform to the inevitable necessity of things. We are not in relation to our own

country any the less loyally republican because we believe the departure from Mediæval Europe has been a deterioration instead of a progress. We seek no impracticable restorations ; we ask what here and now is our duty, and that is plainly for us to support the republican order established, here and now, alike against monarchy and against mobs.

To attempt to restore the monarchy of 1789, is as idle as to attempt the restoration of the authority of the British crown in this country. That monarchy, when it had far more of the sympathy of the nation than it now has, and was surrounded with a prestige which it now wants, could not sustain itself. As a monarchy it rested on a novel basis, and it left too much power in the democracy for a new monarchy. If the order attempted by the Constituent Assembly had been the slow and natural growth of ages, it could have sustained itself, and would have been a model government for the civilized world. Its grand defect was that it was new, a novel creation, and therefore without the power to restrain the popular impulse which had created it. The same thing will occur again, should there be an attempt to reëstablish it, though in a different sense. The monarchical impulse strong enough to restore it would not stop, and could not be stopped, with it. It would seek to give greater strength to the monarchy ; and that would exceed the sentiment of the nation, and provoke a popular reaction against it, which would cause again its overthrow. Without more power in the throne than the constitution of 1789 gave, the monarchy in these times could not sustain itself, and with more it would become odious, and would be resisted, not obeyed, and could sustain itself only by mere physical force ; and every government obliged to sustain itself by mere physical force, sooner or later inevitably falls.

The empire would stand, perhaps, a better chance ; but what chance may be learned from the fate of Napoleon. The empire fell, not solely by foreign bayonets, but through the combined opposition of the Bourbonists and the republicans, and chiefly through the opposition of the latter, — led on by Lafayette, whom the United States have far more reason than France to honor, — always powerful to destroy, always impotent to establish. The same causes which overthrew Napoleon would conspire to over-

throw anew the empire were it reëstablished in the person of his nephew. We have never known political restorations to be successful, and in France the great majority of the monarchists are not imperialists; and if they are to support a monarchy at all, it will most likely be in the family of the Bourbons. They and the republicans of all shades would unite against the empire, if reëstablished, and against the combined opposition of these it could not stand. In our judgment, France cannot again be a monarchy for any great length of time; for there will always be an opposition strong enough to overthrow it. Suppose Henry the Fifth to be crowned; the Orleanists, the imperialists, and the republicans will in a short time combine against him, and against their combined opposition he cannot stand. Suppose the Count of Paris is proclaimed under the regency of the Duc de Nemours, the imperialists, the republicans, and the Legitimists will oppose him, and he must fall. Suppose, finally, that Prince Louis is proclaimed Emperor, the Legitimists, Orleanists, and republicans, especially all the republicans not bribed with office or title, after a little, will unite to oppose him, and his fall become inevitable. Hereditary monarchy, owing to the rooted divisions in the monarchical party, we therefore believe, whether desirable or not, is henceforth impracticable in France, and such is apparently the conviction of a very considerable portion of the monarchists themselves.

We do not profess to be very well versed in French politics, and things change in France so rapidly that a judgment sound at the time we are writing may be unsound before we go to press; but looking calmly at French affairs from this distance, and with such lights as we have, it strikes us that the true policy of the monarchists is to abandon all monarchical regrets, all thoughts of restoring fallen monarchy, and to accept, loyally, without reticence or after-thought, the republican as the definitive political order for their beautiful country. We do not say this as a republican, as one who holds that the republican order, abstractly considered, is preferable to monarchy, but we say it because we believe it now the only practicable order for France. We are for ourselves no fanatical democrats, no republican propagandists, and it was with no pleasure that we heard of the French revolution of February, 1848. We are no more attached to one form of government, ab-

stractly considered, than to another. Perhaps, living as we do under a republic, and, like most people, more impressed by the evils we experience than by those we are ignorant of, we are disposed to underrate the advantages of a popular government, and to think too favorably of monarchy. However this may be, we are sure that, if we have prejudices, they are not republican prejudices. Moreover, government is never an abstract question, and we have never asked ourselves which, abstractly considered, is the best form of government. Government is a thing of practice, not of speculation ; and that is the best form which is best adapted to the people who are to live under it. Despotism, whether monarchical or democratic, we detest ; but a republican order such as our fathers established here, but which our people are doing their best to revolutionize, we believe the best form of government for us, but we believe it, by way of example, a bad government for Mexico,—not because we are more or less enlightened than the Mexicans, but because government must be to a great extent a matter of routine, and republicanism is congenial to our habits and is not to theirs. We do not pretend that republicanism is better for France than monarchy would be, if practicable ; nay, we do not believe it so good, and we think it a great calamity for her that she has abolished monarchy, and rendered its permanent reëstablishment henceforth a vain attempt. But a republic is practicable, if the monarchists choose to make it so, and France can live and prosper under it, provided that its constitution and management are not left to those who conspired to introduce it.

There is wisdom as well as point in a remark once made by the late Chief Justice Parsons, that “The young man who is not a democrat is a knave, the old man who is, is a fool.” We have no confidence in the statesman who is a democrat in principle, for pure democracy is only pure despotism, as we are in this country beginning to experience. The men who can make a revolution for the sake of introducing a popular form of government, can never safely be intrusted with its administration. Our government owes its success not to the democracy of the country, for that is ruining it ; but to the fact that it was established, and for the first twelve years of its existence administered, by men who had no democratic sympathies,

who were not in their personal preferences even republican, but who yet gave the republic a loyal support, because they saw that it was for us the only practicable government, except sheer despotism.

We would not speak lightly of the genuine republican party in France, but having studied their history with some care from the time of Henry the Second,—for it is not a party of recent origin,—and witnessed their disastrous influence on their own country, as well as on other nations, we must be pardoned for saying that we have no confidence either in their integrity or in their capacity,—except for destruction. They are destitute alike of practical wisdom and loyal dispositions. They are moved, not by love of liberty, but by hatred of restraint. What they want is not the freedom and prosperity of France, but power to govern her, and they will be, with some honorable exceptions, the enemies of every government which they do not govern. No real dependence can be placed on them in or out of office, and the greatest of all conceivable calamities for France would be to give up the republic to their management, and this whether they are Moderates or Reds; for the difference between the two classes is not one of principle, and consists simply in the fact that the Reds are good and the Moderates bad logicians. The Reds draw boldly the logical consequences of the principles which they and the Moderates hold in common. They say at once two and two make four, while the Moderates stop short, and stammer out two and two make — *three*, persuading themselves that the poor people will not see that two and two make three and *one more*. The republicans have clamored for the republic, and have finally got it. Let them have it. They wanted it because they trusted, if they got it, they could manage it, and control the destinies of France; in that let them be disappointed. Let them have the republic and share equally whatever advantages it secures, but do not let them be its chiefs.

The republic has thus far been sustained by the men who did not want it, and, if sustained at all, it must continue to be sustained by them. But if they are to do this, they must accept it in good faith, must really resolve to live and die by it, and, if need be, for it. Legitimists, Orleanists, and imperialists must give their united support to the republic, as they did up to the 31st of March, 1850, and

by so doing they can save it from being strangled by its unnatural parents. To do this requires no sacrifice of principle, no change of political creeds; it only requires a little of that chivalry in which French monarchists always abound, and of that readiness to devote themselves to the best interest of their country, in which they ought never to be found deficient. They are not only the majority, but they are the *pars sanior et potior* of France, and the only danger France can run must come either from their standing aloof from public affairs, or from their dividing their influence by movements designed to prepare the way for a new monarchical, royalist or imperial, restoration. France wants repose; she wants time for her numerous wounds to heal, time to recover habits of order and subordination, for the growth of loyalty, and the love of order, — time for a new generation to spring up, trained under better influences than have heretofore prevailed. She needs to feel that sixty years is as much time as any nation can afford to throw away in revolutions or uncertain experiments for the organization of power, and that she must contemplate no new revolution; that the order now established, whether the best or not the best possible, must be final, in order that an end may be put alike to criminal hopes and utopian dreams. The monarchists have it in their power to make her so feel; and to do it, they have only to persevere as they commenced, the day after the revolution of February.

The monarchists have nothing to lose by supporting the republic. They have proved this during the last two years. The revolution of 1789 swept away nearly all the privileges of the old French aristocracy, and introduced equality before the laws; the revolution of 1830 abolished the hereditary peerage, and nothing would remain to the old noblesse, even if monarchy were restored, but empty titles and the memory of the glorious deeds of their illustrious ancestors. These they may retain equally under the republic, and as for distinction, they have shown and are now showing that they can secure that even under universal suffrage. Before the revolution, the republicans talked as if they monopolized all the wisdom and virtue of France, and half persuaded themselves that, under a *régime* of universal suffrage, the monarchists would be nobody. The result must have disappointed them, though

it has disappointed nobody else. In the struggle, man to man, the monarchists have maintained their former superiority over the republicans. They saved the republic from being devoured by its authors; they took it under their protection, and have rendered it powerful and respectable; they have maintained internal tranquillity and peace, and dignity abroad. With the single exception of General Cavaignac, who is a brave officer and a very worthy man, not a single republican has, so far as we can discover at this distance, honorably distinguished himself under the republic. All who have tried to be leaders, and to become great men, have failed, miserably failed. Of the men who made the republic, not one has proved himself competent to its management, and most of them are now in exile or forgotten. In the assembly, in the cabinet, in the army, in the diplomatic corps, the great men are they who were the great men under the monarchy, and who, whatever their errors, were never identified with the republican party. The republic has wellnigh extinguished the republicans. Who hears now-a-days of Lamartine, Arago, Marle, Marast, Cremieux, Garnier-Pages, the more respectable part of the provisional government and its supporters? And who would hear of Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Caussidière, Blanqui, and their compeers, were they not in exile, intriguing with the madmen of Europe against society itself? The monarchists have maintained, and must continue to maintain, their superiority, and retain the lead in affairs, unless they weaken their strength by division, or by attempting what seems to us an impracticable restoration, that is, impracticable as a permanent and peaceful order.

Assuming that the republic, and we mean a republic of order, not a republic democratic and social, which would be only an organized anarchy, is in the present juncture desirable for France, and to be maintained, the true policy of the French statesman cannot be doubtful. It is, first of all, to prevent the election as its chief of a man whose convictions and sympathies are with the old republican party. We have a very high regard for General Cavaignac, but we should deprecate his election as the successor of Prince Louis Napoleon. He must be elected, if at all, not as the representative of France, of the French nation, but as the representative of the republican party, a feeble minority

of the French people. He will be elected, no doubt, if elected, as a Moderate Republican; but that makes little difference. He will not be able to command the confidence of the monarchical party, and will be obliged to strengthen himself by concessions to the Reds, which will only place the republic on the declivity to anarchy. There is no radical difference between a Moderate Republican and a Red Republican, and all history proves, that, of two branches of the same family, the more consistent will always be the more energetic, and being the more energetic, will, in the long run, be the ruling branch. We do not distrust the honorable intentions of the distinguished general who so nobly defended France in the terrible days of June, 1848, but he and Ledru-Rollin adopt the same political premises, and Ledru-Rollin draws, if more fatal, at the same time more logical consequences from them. We can give a republic a loyal support, but we detest the modern republican theory of government, whether Moderate or Red. It is the modern republican, or rather democratic, theory of government, namely, the sovereignty of the people, that is false and dangerous, not a republican government itself. The monarchists of France can accept the republic, and will, if they accept it at all, without accepting the modern democratic theory; but the republican party cannot. Hence, in the hands of the former a republican government may be a good government, as in many countries it is the best possible government; but in the hands of the latter it must always be a bad government, because their principles in their logical development are repugnant to all government. General Cavaignac's election, in our judgment, would be the doom of the republic, and plunge France anew into all the horrors of civil war, because it would be the attempt to install a political doctrine which the majority of the French nation do and will repudiate, and which no civilized nation can safely tolerate.

All government, practically considered, is founded more or less on compromise, and no government can stand in France that attempts to exclude any of the great parties now existing. There must be a compromise of some sort, and that compromise must be honorable to all parties. The monarchical party cannot abandon its principles, and ought not to do so, though it may perhaps give up some of its prejudices, and the republicans cannot be

expected to become monarchists. A compromise such as M. Guizot proposes, which recognizes the hereditary monarchy and aristocracy on one side, and the democratic principle on the other, is impracticable, because it introduces into the fundamental organization of the state two hostile and eternally irreconcilable principles. This illustrious statesman seems to us to have been misled by his eclecticism, and also to have mistaken the real theory of the British constitution, which he appears to adopt as his model. The monarchical and aristocratic principle is preserved in the king and the House of Peers, it is true; but the basis of the House of Commons is not democracy, or the sovereignty of the people. The British government in its theory — we say nothing of what it is becoming in practice — is a government of estates, and the House of Commons represents, not the sovereign people of Great Britain simply restricted in their power by king and Lords, but an estate, the Commons, as its very name implies. This government of estates since 1789 has become impracticable in France, for then the estates were abolished, and the *Tiers-État* declared to be the nation. Here was the grand error of 1789. The Constituent, instead of abolishing the estates, should have preserved, reformed, and perfected them, and provided for their regular assembling in parliament; but it is too late to attempt this now.

Checks and balances, as they are called, are undoubtedly necessary in a government, and without them every government is a despotism; but no government can stand if organized on two fundamentally irreconcilable principles. This dualism is as objectionable in politics as in religion; and its objectionable character in the latter is strikingly displayed by the whole history of Protestantism. Diversity may be introduced into the organization, and must be, but it must be a diversity with unity for its basis. The compromise that is required cannot be a compromise of principle, but must take place in a sphere that leaves to each party for itself its own principles, and therefore must be a compromise in the order of facts, not in the order of principles. The monarchists can without any compromise of principle accept and support a republican form of government for France, as they have done for the last three years. The republicans can of course do the same. The compromise must be, then, for each to support the republic

as a fact, and as a legal fact, the monarchist foregoing the attempt to carry out into fact his monarchical preferences, and the republican forbearing to attempt to make the republic the embodiment of his theory of popular sovereignty, not necessary to the establishment or free and salutary working of the republic, and necessary at all only as a condition of revolutionizing or overthrowing it. The monarchists must concede the republicans the republican form of government, and with that the republicans must be satisfied, although the republic be not founded on their doctrine of the "sacred right of insurrection," and they must be held, and, if need be, forced to obey it, as they were to obey the monarchy. This is the only compromise that can be honorably made. The monarchists give up monarchy for the sake of peace, and the republicans get what they pretended to want, a republic, and must in turn give up the attempt to realize anarchical theories. But as they will never do this willingly, they must be compelled to do it, and till they are completely subdued, they must not be intrusted with power, although the particular individual they put forward as a candidate for popular suffrage should be personally unexceptionable.

We hope our friends in France will not deem us impertinent in these remarks, or if we express our conviction that their aim should be to preserve, for the present at least, the princely republic; for we fear that, if any other than Louis Napoleon is chosen as its chief at the next presidential election, disastrous consequences will follow. If it is resolved to maintain the republican order, it will be exceedingly dangerous to change the person of its present chief before it is more perfectly consolidated. We have no prejudices in favor of the Bonapartists, and what prejudices we have are on the side of the Legitimists. Our own political principles would lead us to wish Henry the Fifth to be king, — to wish the reëstablishment of legitimate royalty in France, — if we believed the thing practicable; but we go on the supposition that that is impracticable, and that the long line of the kings of France and kings of the French ended with Louis Philippe. On this supposition, Louis Napoleon seems to us now, even more than in 1848, the most proper person for president of the republic. He may have had visions of an imperial restoration, but if so, he appears to entertain them no longer.

As far as we can discover from his messages, and, what is more to the purpose, his acts, he has accepted the republic in good faith, with a firm resolution, so far as depends on him, to render it successful. He has nobly redeemed the promises he made on assuming the reins of government, and has manifested eminent ability as well as loyal intentions; and if now and then we have discovered a Gallican reminiscence in his administration, he has as yet been found on the side of religion, and been surpassed by no sovereign in Europe in yielding what is due to the Church, or in his respect and submission to the Holy See.

The revolutions of 1848 had even more at heart the destruction of the Church than the abolition of monarchy, and the loud wail that is heard over the fall of Mazzini and his Roman republic is far more anti-Catholic than anti-monarchical. But these revolutions have been overruled and made to redound to the glory of the Church against whom they were chiefly designed, and in no country more so than in France. Never since Charlemagne has the Church in France been more free than under the administration of Louis Napoleon. The legitimate kings of France seldom permitted the Church in their dominions to manage her own affairs in her own way, and their ostentatious protection of her was often, nay, generally, only her enslavement to the temporal power. Not under the empire certainly, not under Louis the Eighteenth, not under Charles the Tenth, nor under Louis Philippe, was there any thing approaching the respect to the Church by the government that has been paid her by the republic, since the terrible days of June, 1848. It may be policy on the part of the President, but if so it is a wise and just policy, and such as marks the Christian statesman. But we believe it something more than policy, and we are not surprised that a man whose life has been checkered like that of Louis Bonaparte, and the greater part of which has been passed in exile or in prison, should feel the need of religion for his own support, as well as for the support of the state. He has shown his respect for religion, not only in his relations with the Holy See, but in the support he has given to the law on instruction, a concession to the Church, not indeed of all that her friends had the right to demand, but of more than any other modern government has conceded, unless it be that of the young Emperor of

Austria, and more than under the late monarchy any friend of the freedom of education from the University monopoly ever thought of asking, and perhaps as much as, in the present state of things, it is prudent to concede. Moderation in removing abuses is necessary lest the attempted reform fail, and matters be made worse than before.

The Catholic party in France, it strikes us, should ask themselves very seriously whether religion is not now doing well, and whether it would not be more likely to lose than to gain by the restoration of monarchy, with its old Gallican traditions, — traditions which no government will surrender unless forced to do so in order to sustain itself, and which no Bourbon on the throne of France can be forced to surrender, so long as a large minority of France are not Catholic, and a large majority of her statesmen, as statesmen are prone to be, are Gallican. In a country where the majority are Catholics, the government, if it rests on popular suffrage, will be pretty sure to respect the freedom of the Church. A republican government, accepted and supported by the majority, will hardly oppress, for it will have little motive to oppress, the religion of the majority. It was, therefore, with great pleasure that we saw the bishops and clergy of France expressing, with singular frankness and unanimity, their adhesion to the republic. The Church is doing well now, and her friends have comparatively little to complain of, — less than almost everywhere else. Will they have less under a king who will study only to enlarge the sphere of the temporal at the expense of the spiritual authority? Why, then, seek a change? Why run the risk of losing what is obtained, in the uncertain attempt to get more? We hear good accounts of the Count de Chambord, and we doubt not his good intentions; but he is heir to the prejudices and traditions, as well as to the rights, of his family, and the promises of a prince in exile are not precisely the acts of a king firmly seated upon his throne.

The difficulty in the way of the reëlection of Prince Napoleon is that the constitution renders him ineligible for a second term, till after an interval of some years; but there is time enough to amend the constitution, and it ought to be amended in that particular, or at least so as to prolong the term of office beyond three years, to eight or ten. Our experience in the United States may not be in favor of re-

eligibility, but it proves clearly that four years are too short a term for a president to adopt and consolidate any policy, and that a change of administration every four years must very soon unsettle every thing. The restriction in the French constitution, as well as the short term of office ordained by ours, betrays the insane jealousy, inherited from the old English Whigs, which is entertained by modern republicans of the executive power. No government is good for any thing without an efficient executive, and where, as in France, the executive is responsible, and is restricted in great part to the execution of laws made by an independent legislature, elected for a short term of years, the power of the executive is more likely to be too little than too great. Moreover, no large and populous country can long survive the repeated shocks which it must receive from the election of a president with extensive patronage every four years. If we do not lengthen the presidential term to eight or ten years, we Americans shall soon find the whole political business of the country resolving itself, directly or indirectly, into president-making. No harm can come, but great good must surely come, to France from amending her constitution so as to prolong to eight or ten years the presidential term of office; and she can now do it, though after a few years she will find it for ever too late.

We are aware that some of our French friends object to prolonging the term of office of the present incumbent, lest he attempt to get himself proclaimed emperor. But is this fear warranted? Is it generous? Louis Napoleon has disclaimed all pretensions as the heir of his uncle; he has sworn to maintain the republican constitution; and it is an undeniable fact, that he has thus far observed with scrupulous fidelity his oath of office, and has labored to protect the republic alike against the anarchical attempts of the Socialists, and the movements of the royalists for a restoration of fallen monarchy. What right has any one to distrust his intentions? For our part, we believe him resolved to support the republic, and we would rather trust the fate of France in his hands, with legislative power in the hands of the party of order, than, in the present state of opinion, to run the risk of a change in any direction.

But it is time to close. It may be said, that, in the whole of this article, we have been volunteering opinions

on matters which only remotely concern us, and on which we can, of course, have only imperfect information. We cannot deny that there is truth in the charge; but the opinion of a disinterested foreigner, who takes a deep interest in French politics, who has no republican prejudices, although a supporter of republican government, and who looks at all political questions mainly in their bearing on religion and morals, perhaps may not be wholly without interest, nor wholly destitute of value, to French statesmen. We offer them in no intermeddlesome spirit, and in no arrogant tone, though we freely and frankly express them. France is the great central power of Europe, and, with the exception of Austria, the only great European power to which the Catholic in other countries can turn with affection and hope. Austria has done and is doing well, and the present emperor bids fair to give additional lustre to the illustrious house of Hapsburg, besides removing the stain from its escutcheon caused by the half-insane Joseph the Second. But France exerts, and must continue to exert, a powerful influence on all Southern and Western Europe, and on our own country in particular. She is as it were the missionary nation of the world, and it is not a matter of indifference to other nations whether she preaches the true Gospel, or another. Her doctrines have immense weight in England; they reign supreme in this country; Germany reaches us only through France, and from France we import not only our fashions, but our tastes, our principles, our ideas, our philosophy, and our literature. In France is the fountain whose streams flow either to fertilize or to deluge our land. This must be our apology for venturing to speak of French politics very much as if they were our own. We have spoken kindly, in love of that beautiful country, with which, though we have never seen it, we have so many pleasing associations, and whose literature has had more to do in forming our mind and taste than that of our own mother tongue. With our mother's milk we drew in a love of France, and we were early taught to be grateful to her for the generous aid she lent our own beloved country in her struggle to become a free and independent nation; and may God bless thee, beautiful France! and give thee, after thy long struggle, the freedom, the order, the peace, and the repose, thy heart so much needeth.

ART. V.—*The Chief Sins of the People: a Sermon delivered at the Melodeon, Boston, on Fast Day, April 10, 1851.* By REV. THEODORE PARKER. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1851. 8vo. pp. 40.

THIS singular sermon was called forth under the excitement occasioned by the arrest in this city, last April, of a fugitive slave, named Sims, and the determination to give him up to his owner in Savannah, Georgia. Two attempts had been previously made here to execute the recently amended Fugitive Slave Law, but without success. In the first case, that of Crafts and his wife, the officers did not succeed in making an arrest, and the fugitives, it is supposed, were shipped off by their Free Soil or Abolition friends to England; in the second case, that of Shadrach, an arrest was, indeed, made, but the fugitive was rescued from the custody of the United States Marshal by a mob, and probably made his escape to Canada. In the case of Sims, better precautions had been taken against a rescue by a mob, whether black or white, and on the day this sermon was preached, it was highly probable that the law would be executed, and the fugitive given up to his master.

This probability threw all our Free-Soilers into a perfect frenzy. They called public meetings, harangued the mob, made the most inflammatory appeals to passions already greatly excited, and would, most likely, have attempted another rescue by force, if the vigilance of the police, and the military under arms and advantageously posted, had not made it pretty evident that it could not be done without serious inconvenience. Every method, short of physical violence, to intimidate the authorities, and to induce them to desist from the performance of their duties, was resorted to, and all that rare professional ability, craft, cunning, and unscrupulousness could do to evade the law was done; but all in vain. On the day of our annual State Fast, though the case was not yet decided, the friends of the Union, the supremacy of law, and social order, began to breathe more freely, and felt it to be reasonably certain that at length something would be done towards wiping out the disgrace which our city had incurred from the fanatics she had madly cherished in her

bosom. The fanatics were disappointed, and deeply mortified, and Mr. Parker availed himself of the occasion of the Fast to pour out their wrath and bitterness, as well as his own, in the sermon before us, which is equally remarkable for bad taste, bad temper, bad logic, bad religion, and bad morals. It professes to treat of the chief sins of the people, but finds the chief of these to be suffering the law to be executed.

We are not called upon to discuss the merits or demerits of slavery as an abstract question. If slavery did not exist in this country, we should oppose by all lawful means in our power its introduction; but it is here, one of the elements of American society, and directly or indirectly connected with the habits and the interests of the whole American people, and the only question for the moralist or the statesman is, How shall it be dealt with? Even supposing it to be evil, and only evil, the question as to the treatment of it where it exists is very different from the question of introducing it where it does not exist. To suffer a wrong to remain is not always to commit a wrong; for often in the complicated affairs of this world it is impossible to remove a long or widely existing evil, without causing a still greater evil. Be it that slavery is as great an evil as Free-Soilers pretend, it by no means follows that they are bound, or even free, to bring the political or social power of the country to bear on its abolition. Undoubtedly, we are never to do wrong that good may come, and if slavery is evil, and only evil, no advantages likely to result from it can ever justify us in introducing it; but of two evils we must choose the least, and when slavery cannot in all human probability be abolished without producing a greater evil, we are not even free to abolish it, and must tolerate it till it can be abolished without such result.

In this world, we must, to a greater or less extent, tolerate even moral wrong. It is a great moral evil that in the spiritual field the cockle should spring up to choke the wheat, and yet our Lord commands us to let both grow together, lest in attempting to root up the cockle we root up also the wheat with it. Infidelity, heresy, irreligion, are sins, and very grievous sins, and yet it is not lawful to extirpate them by fire and sword. The magistrate may, undoubtedly, repress their violence, and protect Christian faith

and social order from their disorderly conduct; but their extirpation must be the work of the missionary, not of the magistrate, — for faith and obedience must be voluntary, a free-will offering to God. There were zealous disciples of our Lord, who would have called down fire from heaven to consume his adversaries; but he rebuked them. “Ye know not of what spirit ye are. The Son of Man came not to destroy souls, but to save.” To a greater or less extent, we must tolerate sin, not in ourselves assuredly, but in others, and bear with transgressors, even as God bears with them. We must respect their free will, leave them the responsibility of their own misdeeds, because this is what God himself does, and because to attempt to root out all sins by violence, whether physical or social, for there is a social as well as a physical violence, would in the end only render matters infinitely worse, by destroying virtue itself. We cannot make this world a paradise, and all its inhabitants saints, as foolish puritans dream. As long as man retains free will, there will be abuses, there will be wrongs and outrages, and the sooner we come to this conclusion, and conform ourselves to it, the better will it be for all concerned, and the more real progress will there be made in virtue.

We have no quarrel with Free-Soilers for being hostile to slavery. We have as little sympathy with any species of slavery as they have, and perhaps as deep and as true a devotion to freedom. They are far from monopolizing all the love of freedom and all the hatred of slavery in the community. “Brave men lived before Agamemnon,” and love of freedom and hatred of slavery were born before Gerritt Smith, Robert Rantoul, William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Theodore Parker, or Abby Folsom, and would suffer little diminution were these choice spirits to die, and leave no heirs. It is very possible to oppose them and their proceedings without thereby opposing freedom, sympathizing with tyrants, or adding to the burdens of the oppressed. We oppose them, not for opposing slavery, but for the principles and methods by which they oppose it. These principles and methods are repugnant to freedom, and as friends of freedom we oppose them, and must oppose them.

Nothing in the world is easier than to get off stale commonplaces against slavery and in favor of liberty; but the

man who deals largely in these commonplaces is always a tyrant in his heart, and one whom it will never do to trust with power. The essence of all slavery is in the predominance of passion over reason, and passion predominates in the community over reason in the exact ratio in which law is weak or wanting; for law is the reason of the community. As the individual can be free in himself only by the predominance of reason in his interior life, so can a community be free in its members only by the supremacy of law in its bosom. The maddest madness conceivable is that which proposes to abolish slavery and secure freedom by abolishing law, — or government, without which the supremacy of law cannot be maintained. It is this madness that has seized the Free-Soilers or Abolitionists. Their principles strike at the foundation of all government, and therefore are repugnant to the indispensable conditions of freedom. Without government, strong and efficient government, it is impossible to maintain the supremacy of law, and without the maintenance of that supremacy, there is no guaranty of freedom either for black man or white man. The supremacy of law is as necessary to secure the freedom of the slave when emancipated, as to preserve the freedom of the master now. Without it there is only anarchy, in which might usurps the place of right, and the weak are the prey of the strong. You do not advance freedom when you emancipate the slave from his master by overthrowing government; you only render thereby freedom impossible, and introduce the most detestable species of tyranny conceivable, of which your emancipated slave will be the first victim, because the least able to defend his liberty.

The cause of freedom is never aided by injustice; and yet the Free-Soilers, who, in principle, are not at all distinguishable from the Abolitionists, are urging the commission of open, palpable injustice. Slavery exists in this country by law, and by law which is enacted or sanctioned by the American people in their highest legislative capacity. Suppose that law is unjust, still its injustice is on the part of the law-making power. Before that power the master who owns slaves is not unjust; as before it, he has justly invested his capital in slaves, and therefore it cannot justly require him to free his slaves without full compensation. The people, who have authorized him to

hold slaves, cannot cast the burden of their wrongs on him. If they have sinned, they must bear their sin in the same capacity in which they have committed it. If they wish to repent and repair it, they must indemnify the master for the property they have authorized him to hold, and now require him to surrender. To propose, after having authorized it, the abolition of slavery, without proposing a just compensation to the master, is to propose a scheme of public robbery, is virtually to deny private property, and to claim for the state the right to plunder its subjects. And yet our Free-Soilers will not listen a moment to the proposal to indemnify the owners of slaves. They are urging the people to compel the masters to emancipate their slaves without compensation. Between the proprietor and the state, the property in slaves, whatever view we take of slavery itself, is as sacred and as inviolable as any other species of property, and to attack it is, in principle, to attack every species of private property, and to make the state the only proprietor, — the extreme of despotism, hardly reached by the pretensions of the Grand Turk. And yet the men who propose this do not blush to talk of justice, and to insist on being honored as friends of freedom!

We bring no unfounded charges against the Free-Soilers. Whoever has any acquaintance with their real principles and proceedings knows that what we allege is true. Mr. Parker is one of their most gifted leaders, and a faithful exponent of their doctrines, and he fully bears us out in what we say. Let us hear him for a few moments.

“Last Thanksgiving Day, I said it would be difficult to find a magistrate in Boston to take the odium of sending a fugitive back to slavery. I believed, after all, men had some conscience, although they talked about its being a duty to deliver up a man to bondage. Pardon me, my country, that I rated you too high! Pardon me, town of Boston, that I thought your citizens all men! Pardon me, lawyers, that I thought you had been all born of mothers! Pardon me, ruffians, who kill for hire! I thought you had some animal mercy left, even in your bosom! Pardon me, United States Commissioners, Marshals, and the like, I thought you all had some shame! Pardon me, my hearers, for such mistakes. One Commissioner was found to furnish the warrant! Pardon me, I did not know *he* was a Commissioner; if I had, I never would have said it!

“Spirits of Tyrants, I look down to you! Shade of Cain, thou great first murderer, forgive me that I forgot your power, and did not remember that you were parent of so long a line! And you, my brethren, if hereafter I tell you that there is any limit of meanness or wickedness which a Yankee will not jump over, distrust me, and remind me of this day, and I will take it back!

“Let us look at the public conduct of any Commissioner who will send an innocent man from Boston into slavery. I would speak of all men charitably; for I know how easy it is to err, yea, to sin. I can look charitably on thieves, prowling about in darkness; on rum-sellers, whom poverty compels to crime; on harlots, who do the deed of shame that holy woman’s soul abhors and revolts at; I can pity the pirate, who scours the seas doing his fiendish crimes, — he is tempted, made desperate, by a gradual training in wickedness. The man, born at the South, owning slaves, who goes to Africa and sells adulterated rum in exchange for men to sell at Cuba, — I cannot understand the consciousness of such a man; yet I can admit that by birth and by breeding he has become so imbruted, he knows no better. Nay, even that he may perhaps justify his conduct to himself. I say I think his sin is not so dreadful as that of a Commissioner in Boston who sends a man into slavery. A man commits a murder, inflamed by jealousy, goaded by desire of great gain, excited by fear, stung by malice, or poisoned by revenge; and ’t is a horrid thing. But to send a man into slavery is worse than to murder him. I would rather be slain than enslaved. To do this, inflamed by no jealousy, goaded by no desire of great gain, — only ten dollars! — excited by no fear, stung by no special malice, poisoned by no revenge; — *I cannot comprehend that in any man, not even in a hyena; beasts that raven for blood do not kill for killing’s sake, but to feed their flesh. Forgive me, O ye wolves and hyenas! that I bring you into such company. I can only understand it in a devil!*

“When a man bred in Massachusetts, whose Constitution declares that ‘all men are born free and equal’; within sight of Faneuil Hall, with all its sacred memories; within two hours of Plymouth Rock; within a single hour of Concord and Lexington; in sight of Bunker Hill, — when he will do such a deed, it seems to me that there is no life of crime long enough to prepare a man for such a pitch of depravity; I should think he must have been begotten in sin, and conceived in iniquity, and been born ‘with a dog’s head on his shoulders’; that the concentration of the villany of whole generations of scoundrels would hardly be enough to fit a man for a deed like this!

“You know the story of Sims. He crept on board a Boston vessel at Savannah. Perhaps he had heard of Boston, nay, even of Faneuil Hall, of the old Cradle of Liberty, and thought this was a

Christian town, at least human, and hoped here to enjoy the liberty of a man. When the ship arrived here, the first words he spoke were, 'Are we up there?' He was seized by a man who at the Court-House boasted of his cruelty towards him, who held him by the hair, and kept him down, seeking to kidnap and carry him back into slavery. He escaped!

"But a few weeks pass by, the man-stealers are here; the Commissioner issues his warrant; the Marshals serve it in the night. Last Thursday night, — when odious beasts of prey, that dare not face the light of heaven, prowl through the woods, — those ruffians of the law seized on their brother-man. They lie to the bystanders, and seize him on a false pretence. There is their victim, — they hold him fast. Can you understand his feelings? Let us pass by that. His 'trial'! Shall I speak of that? He has been five days on trial for more than life, and has not seen a judge! A jury? No. Only a Commissioner! O justice! O Republican America! Is this the liberty of Massachusetts?"

"Where shall I find a parallel with men who will do such a deed, — do it in Boston? I will open the graves, and bring up most hideous tyrants from the dead: come, brood of monsters, let me bring you up from the deep damnation of the graves wherein your hated memories continue for all time their never-ending rot. Come, birds of evil omen; come, ravens, vultures, carrion-crows, and see the spectacle; come, see the meeting of congenial souls! I will disturb, disquiet, and bring up the greatest monsters of the human race! Tremble not, women; tremble not, children; tremble not, men! They are all dead! They cannot harm you now!

"Come hither, HEROD the wicked! Thou that didst seek after that young child's life, and destroyedst the Innocents! Let me look on thy face! No; go! Thou wert a Heathen! Go, lie with the Innocents thou hast massacred. Thou art too good for this company!

"Come, NERO! Thou awful Roman Emperor! Come up! No; thou wast drunk with power, schooled in Roman depravity! Thou hadst, besides, the example of thy fancied gods! Go, wait another day: I will seek a worser man.

"Come up, thou heap of wickedness, GEORGE JEFFRIES! thy hands deep purple with the blood of thy murdered fellow-men! Ah, I know thee! awful and accursed shade! Two hundred years after thy death, men hate thee still, not without cause! Let me look upon thee! I know thy history. Pause and be still, while I tell it to these men.

"Brothers, George Jeffries 'began in the sedition line.' 'There was no act, however bad, that he would not resort to to get on.' 'He was of a bold aspect, and cared not for the countenance of any man.' 'He became the avowed, unblushing slave of the court,

and the bitter persecutor and unappeasable enemy of the principles he had before supported.' He 'was universally insolent and overbearing.' 'As a Judge, he did not consider the decencies of his post, nor did he so much as affect to be impartial as became a Judge.' He was a 'Commissioner' in 1685. You know of the 'bloody assizes' which he held, and how he sent to execution three hundred and twenty persons in a single circuit. 'The whole country was strewed with the heads and limbs of his victims.' Yet a man wrote that 'a little more *hemp* might have been usefully employed.' He was the worst of the English Judges. 'There was no measure, however illegal, to the execution of which he did not devotedly and recklessly abandon himself.' 'During the Stuart reigns, England was cursed by a succession of ruffians in ermine, who, for the sake of court favor, wrested the principles of law, the precepts of religion, and the duties of humanity; but they were all greatly outstripped by Jeffries.' Such is his history.

"Come, shade of a judicial butcher! Two hundred years, thy name has been pilloried in face of the world, and thy memory gibbeted before mankind! Let us see how thou wilt compare with those who kidnap men in Boston! Go seek companionship with them! Go claim thy kindred, if such they be! Go tell them that the memory of the wicked shall rot,—that there is a God, an Eternity, ay! and a Judgment too! where the slave may appeal against him that made him a slave, to Him that made him a man! What! dost thou shudder? Thou turn back! These not thy kindred? Why dost thou turn pale, as when the crowd clutched at thy life in London street? 'T is true, George Jeffries, and these are not thy kin. Forgive me that I should send thee on such an errand, or bid thee seek companionship with such,—with hunters of the slave! Thou wert not base enough! It was a great bribe that tempted thee! Again, I say, pardon me for sending thee to keep company with such men! Thou only struckst at men accused of crime; not at men accused only of their birth! Thou wouldst not send a man into bondage for two pounds! I will not rank thee with men who, in Boston, for ten dollars, would enslave a negro now! Rest still, Herod! Be quiet, Nero! Sleep, Jeffries, underneath 'the altar of the church' which seeks with Christian charity to hide your hated bones."

"Well, my brethren, these are only the beginning of sorrows. There will be other victims yet: this will not settle the question. What shall we do? I think I am a calm man and a cool man, and I have a word or two to say as to what we shall do. *Never obey the law.* Keep the law of God. Next I say, resist not evil with evil; resist not *now* with violence. Why do I say this? Will you tell me that I am a coward? Perhaps I am; at least I am not

afraid to be called one. Why do I say, then, do not now resist with violence? *Because it is not time just yet; IT WOULD NOT SUCCEED.* If I had the eloquence that I sometimes dream of, which goes into a crowd of men, and gathers it in its mighty arm, and sways them as the pendant boughs of yonder elm shall be shaken by the summer-breeze next June, I would not give that counsel. I would call on men, and lift up my voice like a trumpet through the whole land, until I had gathered millions out of the North and the South, and they should crush slavery for ever, as the ox crushes the spider underneath his feet. But such eloquence is given to no man. It was not given to the ancient Greek who 'shook the arsenal and fulminated over Greece.' He that so often held the nobles and the mob of Rome within his hand, had it not. *He that spoke as never man spake*, and who has since gathered two hundred millions to his name, had it not. No man has it. The ablest must wait for time! It is idle to resist; *it is not the hour.* If in 1765 they had attempted to carry out the Revolution by force, they would have failed. Had it failed, we had not been here to-day. There would have been no little monument at Lexington; no little monument at Concord; nor that tall pile of eloquent stone at Bunker Hill, to proclaim that 'Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God.' Success is due to the discretion, heroism, calmness, and forbearance of our fathers: let us wait our time. It will come,—perhaps will need no sacrifice of blood.

"I suppose that this man will be carried back to slavery. The law of the United States has been cloven down; the law of Massachusetts cloven down. If we have done all that we can, we must leave the result to God. It is something that a man can only be kidnapped in Boston by riding over the law, and only tried in a Court-House surrounded by chains, when the Judges go under the iron of slavery to enter the house of bondage; that even on *Fast day* it is guarded by one hundred police, and three companies of military are picketed in Faneuil Hall. The Christians saw Christ crucified, and looked on from afar; sad, but impotent. The Christians at Rome saw their brethren martyred, and could not help them: they were too weak. But the blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church. To-day is *St. Bademus* day: 376 years after Christ, that precious saint was slain because he would not keep the commandment of the king. By crucified Redeemers shall mankind be saved. If we cannot prevent the crucifixion, let us wait for the redemption.

"Shall I ask you to despair of human liberty and rights? I believe that money is to triumph for the present. We see it does in Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington: see this in the defence of bribery; in the chains of the Court House; in the judges' pliant necks; in the swords of the police to-day; — see it

in the threats of the press to withdraw the trade of Boston from towns that favor the unalienable rights of man.

“Will the Union hold out? I know not that. But, if men continue to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law, I do not know how soon it will end; I do not care how soon the Union goes to pieces. I believe in justice and the law of God, and ultimately the Right will prevail. Wrong will prevail for a time, and attract admiration. I have seen in a haberdasher’s shop-window the figure of a wooden woman showily arrayed, turning round on a pivot, and attracting the gaze of all the passers-by; but ere long it is forgotten. So it will be with this transient love of slavery in Boston; but the love of right will last as long as the granite in New Hampshire hills. I will not tell you to despair of freedom because politicians are false; for they are often so. Despair of freedom for the black man! no, never. Not till heaven shakes down its stars; nay, not till the heart of man ceases to yearn for liberty; not till the Eternal God is hurled from his throne, and a devil takes his place! All the arts of wicked men shall not prevail against the Father; nay, at last, not against the Son.” — pp. 30 – 39.

This is strange language for a man who writes *Rev.* before his name. But what had this Commissioner, who is a respectable man, a loyal citizen, and a distinguished lawyer, done, to warrant this bitter, not to say foul-mouthed, denunciation? He had broken no law, attacked no man’s freedom, violated no public or private right; he was honestly and faithfully discharging his official duty, executing in a legal manner as far as depended on him a very necessary and just law of his government. Is not that party hostile to all personal liberty and to all government, that for such a reason pronounces such a man and such a public officer a “wolf,” an “hyena,” nay, worse than either, and matched in iniquity only by the Devil himself? Is a man a devil because loyal to the state, and because he refuses to trample its Constitution under his feet?

All history, it seems, fails to furnish a tyrant who is not surpassed by Mr. Commissioner Curtis, and the officers of the United States government in this city, and simply because they execute a just and necessary law in opposition to the wishes of traitors and disorganizers. Is the preacher in earnest, or is he joking? Is his sermon irony, or is it an admirable specimen of the bathos? He speaks of excitement. Who caused that excitement? Certainly, he and his friends. He complains that the military were under arms, the Court-House guarded with chains, and sur-

rounded by a numerous and vigilant police. Against whom were these precautions necessary? Not assuredly against orderly citizens, not against the friends of the Union, not against loyal subjects opposed to the commission of treason; but against the Rev. Theodore Parker and his Abolition mob, black and white. But for them and their treasonable resistance, no such precautions would have been necessary. A man threatens to rob you; you call the watch, and are guilty of causing a disturbance! He threatens your life, and you call the police to prevent him from cutting your throat, and you are kicking up a row! Do these gentlemen need to be told that it is not they, but we, who have the right to complain of the excitement, and the precautions which they made it necessary for us to take to prevent THEM from violating the law!

Mr. Parker plainly counsels resistance to the laws, downright treason, and civil war,—only not just yet. The hour is not yet come, and armed resistance might be premature, because just now it might be unsuccessful! The traitorous intention, the traitorous resolution, is manifest, is avowed, is even gloried in, and nothing is wanting to the overt attempt to carry it into execution but a fair prospect of success. And what is of more serious consequence, the party of which this fierce declaimer is an accredited organ is now in power in this State, and has the Governor and the majority of the representatives in both houses of Congress. It rules or misrules the great State of Ohio; it is numerous in Pennsylvania, almost the majority in New York, triumphant in Vermont, and, we can but just *not* say, also in New Hampshire. Its principles are entertained by men who do not profess allegiance to the party. Nearly every member of Congress from this State, with the exception of Mr. Appleton of this city, is in reality as much of a Free-Soiler as Horace Mann or Robert Rantoul. Mr. Winthrop, the Whig candidate for the Senate, was not a whit sounder than Mr. Sumner, his successful Free Soil competitor, and would have made a far more dangerous Senator. The party has absorbed in its bosom all the separate fanaticisms of the Free States; and all who, like ourselves, have watched its growth from 1831, are well aware that it has been steadily advancing, that it has never lost an inch of ground once gained, and that it has never for a moment met with a serious check. It is as certain as any thing

human can be, that, if it is not speedily resisted, and resisted as it never yet has been, it will in a short time possess the power in nearly all the Free States, and consequently in the Union itself. To what then are we coming?

This statement will, no doubt, gratify and encourage the party; but the party has already become too strong to be pushed aside as contemptible, and we must not deceive ourselves as to the magnitude of the danger that threatens us. Both parties, Whigs and Democrats, — Whigs more especially till lately, — have criminally tampered with it, and aided it to acquire its present formidable power, — a power which, perhaps, is no longer controllable. The measures hitherto taken against it have thus far only exasperated and strengthened it. The “Compromise Measures” of the late Congress, which it was hoped would allay the excitement, and extinguish the party by depriving it of all pretence for further agitation, have had only a contrary effect. We do not agree with the so-called Disunionists of the South, for we are Unionists, but it must be confessed that they have been the only considerable party in the country that has had any tolerable appreciation of the Free Soil movement. They were correct in their predictions that the Compromise Measures would be ineffectual, and they have not overstated the danger. We say not danger to the institution of slavery, for the question of slavery loses itself in a much higher question, even higher and more important than the simple maintenance of the Union, — in the question of the maintenance of society itself. The Free-Soilers are to American society what Red Republicans and Socialists are to European society, and their triumph is the triumph of anarchy and despotism.

Good, quiet, easy men, looking over their ledgers, or sipping their wine, may flatter themselves that there is no serious danger, and tell us that we are unnecessarily alarmed; but in all human probability, if the fugitive slave Sims had not been given up on the claim of his owner, the American Union had now already ceased to exist. It is all very well to talk of “Southern bluster,” and the “Hot-spurs” of the South, but there is something more than bluster just now. The Southern people are as virtuous and as patriotic as we, and their statesmen are as enlightened and sagacious as ours. They see what, with

individual exceptions, we do not permit ourselves to see, that the Free States are fast losing all their respect for law, and becoming unfaithful to their solemn engagements, and blind to all the claims of religion and morality. They see that the abolition of slavery at the bidding of our fanatics would be the dissolution of American society itself. They see the disorganizers steadily advancing, and that we are taking no efficient means to repress them, and they very naturally consult secession from the Union as the only means of self-preservation that remain to them. They may be wrong, but we of the North have no right to blame them for doing what we are forcing them to do, if they wish to retain any semblance of freedom.

We regard the Union as we do marriage, that is, as legally indissoluble. We deny in the one, as in the other, the lawfulness of divorce, and therefore are not accustomed to dwell on the advantages of the Union, or to speculate on the consequences of its dissolution. We will not so insult the friends of the Union as to enter into any argument to prove its absolute necessity to the well-being of the people of this country; but we may be permitted to say, that if the slave-holding States secede in a body, and form a Southern confederacy, they will not be the greatest losers. In all the Free States, the moment the conservative influence of the Union is withdrawn, Free-Soilism triumphs, and under the reign of its principles civilized society cannot subsist. The wild radicalism that underlies it, and which is suspected as yet, no doubt, only by a minority of those rallied under the Free Soil flag, will not be slow to develop itself, and to carry on with it even the mass of those who are unprepared at this moment to follow it to all lengths it may go. That radicalism, being in principle sheer anarchy or despotism, cannot serve as the basis of a civilized state. The Free States, paradoxical as it may seem to them, are, by the prevalence of this radicalism, deprived of the social and political virtues necessary to found or preserve civilized society. In an industrial and commercial point of view, the Southern confederacy would have the advantage over the Northern. It would include the great exporting States, and could therefore always trade more to its advantage in European markets than in ours. We are now the factors and manufacturers for the South, but we should not be when we come to sustain to

in the relation of a foreign government. We should lose two thirds of our foreign exports, a very large proportion of our internal trade, and the best markets for the larger portion of our manufactures. What, in case of division, would naturally form the Southern republic or kingdom, would have more fully the elements of national greatness in itself than the Northern, at least, till some great change should come over the present state of commerce and industry. These considerations can have no weight with the fanatics, but they should have weight with our cool-headed business men, and with all that portion of our population that have not yet entirely lost their senses.

It is well known that the union of the American States could never have been formed if the Free States had not consented to the insertion in the Constitution of the provision in regard to the surrender of fugitive slaves, and no man who is really aware of the feelings of the South can doubt that its preservation in any thing like its original character is impossible unless the Free Soil fanaticism is effectually suppressed, and the Fugitive Slave Law faithfully executed. This law, which Mr. Parker and the more open and honest portion of the Free-Soilers counsel us to resist, and the more shrewd and cowardly portion tell us must be repealed, is now a test law. Let us, however, be just to the South. They, no doubt, are attached to the institution of domestic slavery, at least determined to follow their own judgment in regard to it, but they do not insist on this law merely on account of the protection it affords to negro slavery, and we much mistake their character if we suppose they would secede from the Union, or hazard a civil war, for the sake of a few dozens of runaway slaves. They never seem over-anxious to recover the slaves that escape into the Northern States, and it costs in general more to reclaim one, even when no resistance is offered, than his services are worth. That it is not the value of the runaway slaves they mainly consider, is evident enough from the fact, that the feeling on the subject is deepest in those very States from which the fewest slaves escape, or are likely to escape. They insist on the law because it is constitutional, because in executing it we give them assurance that we are willing and able to abide by our constitutional engagements, and are not disposed to abuse the power of the federal government, now

passing, once for all, into our hands. They want some pledge of the ability and determination of the Free States to restrain the wild radicalism so rife amongst them, and which laughs at constitutions and laws, and in its onward career is madly sweeping away in them all the defences of personal freedom and social order instituted or preserved by the wisdom of our fathers. They take their stand on this law as a frontier post, which, if carried, admits the enemy into the interior, and leaves them no alternative but to surrender at discretion, — not merely negro slavery, which, comparatively speaking, were a small affair, but liberty itself, to the unrestrained despotism of an irresponsible and fanatical majority.

Let no man deceive himself with the vain hope that this radicalism now represented by the Free Soil party would stop with the mere abolition of negro slavery. It is the persuasion of so many of our citizens that it would, which renders it so dangerous. The abolition of slavery by violence, against the will of the masters, and without compensating them for the property we compel them to surrender, would be a great evil, but it is one of the lightest evils to be expected from the progress of Free Soil fanaticism. We assure the public, — and it is the point we wish particularly to impress upon our readers, — that the abolition of negro slavery is only an incident in Free-Soilism. Neither the Free-Soilers nor we can foresee where they would stop. Combining as they do in one all the several classes of fanatics in the country, and being the party opposed to law, to constitutions and governments, certain it is they would not stop so long as there remained a single safeguard for individual freedom, or a single institution capable of imposing the least restraint upon lawless and despotic will. No doubt there are honest, but deceived, individuals in the party, who will not go all lengths with it; but they will be impotent to restrain it, and the party itself, augmenting its forces as it marches, will on whithersoever its licentious and despotic principles lead, unless speedily and effectually resisted by the sounder part of the community, or by the merciful interposition of Divine Providence.

The essential principle of the Free Soil party, that which gives it so terrible a vitality, is not, we repeat, exclusively or mainly, opposition to slavery. Half unknown to itself, it is a party organized against law in all its forms, against

all the principles and maxims of the past, and all the moral, religious, social, and political institutions of the present. It is a party formed against the common reason, common sense, and common interests of mankind. With the cant of religion and morality on their lips, its leaders are, almost to a man, infidels and blasphemers, as well as traitors and disorganizers. They are men for whom it is not enough to sin from appetite or passion, but who must sin from principle, — for whom it is not enough to see the good, approve it, and yet pursue the wrong, but who must pervert conscience itself, erect evil into good, and make sin pass for virtue. They aim at reversing all the judgments of mankind, and brand the Christian virtues as vices, and exalt the vices opposed to them to the rank and dignity of Christian virtues. Whatever has hitherto been counted sacred they pronounce profane, and whatever has been hitherto counted profane, they command us to respect as sacred. They say with Milton's Satan, —

“ All good to me is lost ;
Evil, be thou my good.”

They carry their zeal for reversing so far as to seek to reverse the natural relation of the sexes, to dishonor woman by making her the head, and sending her to the legislature, the cabinet, or into the field to command our armies, and compelling man to remain at home, and nurse the children, wash the dishes, make the beds, and sweep the house. Already are their women usurping the male attire, and beginning to appear in our streets and assemblies dressed out in full *Bloomer* costume, and little remains for the men but to don the petticoat and to draw the veil over their faces.

Let no man accuse us of exaggeration. We do not exaggerate in the least, and are only giving our readers a sober statement of the spirit and tendency of the great movement party of our times, — Red Republicans and Socialists in France, Italy, and Germany, *Progresistas* in Spain, Radicals in England, Free-Soilers and Abolitionists, just now, in the United States, — Destructives everywhere, borne forward by the under-currents of nearly all modern societies, glorified by all the popular literature of the age, defended by the newspaper press generally, and with us in the Free States already able to blast the reputation of al-

most every public man who ventures to assail them. We speak of a party which we have long known, and which, we grieve to say, we ourselves, when we had more influence with our countrymen than we can ever hope to have again, supported, under more than one of its aspects, with a zeal and an energy worthy of a better cause. Alas! men are often powerful to do evil, but impotent to repair it. Now that our eyes are open, and we are able to see the mischief we did, we have no power to undo it, and if we are permitted to speak out freely and boldly, as we do, against the party, it is because that party can afford to let us say what we please. No voice raised against it seems to be any longer heeded, and if a man of standing and weight in the community assails it under one of its aspects, he must save himself and friends by giving it a new impetus under another, as we see in the case of Mr. Webster, who apparently writes his Letter to the Chevalier Hulsemann to atone for his speech in the Senate-chamber on the 7th of March, 1850. He appears to have felt that the only way in which he could obtain a popularity for the administration, to balance the popularity lost by its adhesion to the Compromise Measures, was to express sympathy with radicalism and revolutionism abroad. In this he may have judged patriotically, if not wisely and justly; for to sympathize with foreign radicalism is less dangerous to us for the moment, than to sympathize with domestic radicalism. Now it is the progress and triumph of this wild radical party that the South really dread. They see it under the Free Soil and Abolition aspect, but also — though less clearly, perhaps — under other aspects, and they see that they have every thing to fear and nothing to hope from it. Hence the firmness with which they insist — and we, too, ought to insist, for we are as deeply interested as they — on the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; for if the party cannot be successfully resisted on this law, it is idle to think of resisting it at all. We and all the members of the Union are then without protection, and at the mercy of the worst and most frightful despotism, under the name of liberty, that it is possible to conceive.

But the Fugitive Slave Law, Mr. Parker and his associates tell us, is unjust, and they add, that, if the Union

cannot be preserved without sustaining an unjust law, let it go to pieces.

“*Quicquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*”

However that may be, we distrust Satan, even when he preaches morality; for he never preaches morality unless to persuade us to outrage it. We cannot prize very highly the moral lectures of those who are daily and hourly violating all social morality, and counselling us to do the same,—who are undeniably traitors, really guilty of treason, by their combined and persevering resistance to the execution of a law of Congress. No lawyer of character can doubt for a moment that persons associating together for the express purpose of permanently defeating the execution of any law of the State or of Congress, and in their conventions passing resolves to resist it, incur the guilt of treason; and treason, whatever some people think, is a violation of the moral law, a sin against God, as well as a crime against the state. It is a sad day for both public and private morals, when treason is regarded as a virtue, and the traitor punished for his treason is looked upon as a martyr. Men have, no doubt, been unjustly accused of treason, and punished as traitors when they should not have been; but this does not in the least lessen the crime of treason, and should not in the least screen from punishment those who are really guilty of it. It seems to be forgotten by the great mass of our people, that treason is a crime under our form of government, as well as under other forms, and that to sympathize with traitors, whether at home or abroad, is not even here a virtue. Perhaps the government would do well, if, instead of sending out ships of war to bring foreign traitors into the country, it would make examples of some few of our domestic traitors, and thus remind the people that here no more than elsewhere is it lawful to conspire to resist the laws. Perhaps some examples will have soon to be made, if the government intends to maintain itself. But be this as it may, it is certain that the Free Soil resistance to the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law is treason as defined by our laws, because it springs not from a momentary impulse or sudden exasperation, but from a settled purpose of defeating the law, not in one instance only, but in every instance in which there shall be an attempt to execute it.

We must be pardoned, then, if we are not disposed to listen to lectures on morals from the Free Soil leaders, especially when the morals they would teach us are only such as they need to save their own necks from the halter.

The Fugitive Slave Law is not unjust. It is a constitutional law, so declared by Judges Woodbury and Nelson of the United States Circuit Court, and by the Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth. Chief Justice Shaw, than whom it would be difficult to find a higher legal authority, in giving the unanimous opinion of the court, said that the law was not only constitutional, but necessary, and Congress was bound to pass it. In principle it does not differ from the original law of 1793, and differs from it at all only in devolving on officers of the federal government certain duties which that law devolved on officers of the State governments. The amendment became necessary in consequence of several of the States having prohibited their officers, under heavy penalties, from performing those duties. The amendment which transferred these duties to officers of the federal government cannot in the least affect the constitutionality of the law, and therefore, since no one can pretend that the original law of 1793 was unconstitutional, the amended law of 1850 must be conceded to be constitutional. The law was enacted by the proper authorities, according to the forms prescribed by the Constitution, for the purpose of carrying into effect an imperative provision of the Constitution, and, after the decisions of the several tribunals, its constitutionality must be held to be settled, and no longer an open question. Unjust, then, it cannot be, unless the Constitution is unjust. The Constitution is not unjust, unless it contravenes the law of God. That the Constitution does contravene the law of God, no religious man can pretend, for men of all religions have approved it, and men of no religion have nothing to say on the subject, since for them there is no law of God, and therefore no conscience.

The Constitution ordains that persons held to service in one State escaping into another shall be given up on being claimed by those to whom such service is due. An independent state in the absence of treaty obligations, or with us in the absence of constitutional obligations, is not bound to give up fugitive slaves, or even fugitives from justice; but it is free to do so, for reasons satisfactory to

itself. To reduce a freeman to slavery is a sin, so declared by the highest religious authority, and accordingly our government prohibits the slave-trade under its flag, and declares it piracy. But to give up a slave to his owner is by no competent authority declared to be a sin. To give up a fugitive slave is not to reduce a freeman to slavery; it is simply not interfering to liberate a slave. The slave in escaping does not become a freeman, nor in the least alter the relations between him and his master. So far as he is concerned, the master has the same right to reclaim him when he has escaped into another state that he would have if he had only escaped to a neighboring plantation in the same state. The right that debars the master from asserting his claim is not the slave's right, but that of the state into which the slave has escaped, which prohibits the assertion of the claim, because it cannot allow the laws of another state, however just, to operate by their own force within its jurisdiction. The question is not here between master and slave, but between two independent states. The state may, if it chooses, waive its rights, and permit the master to reclaim his slave, without adding to or taking from the previous right of either slave or master, as between themselves. Its waiving of its territorial jurisdiction is only not interposing it, and is therefore simply non-intervention, or not asserting, when it might, its right to intervene. It simply remains neutral, and leaves the relation between the master and slave as it finds it. This is all that the Fugitive Slave Law requires of any of the States, for the process it prescribes, and the powers it requires to be exercised, have for their sole object, on the one hand, to prevent a freeman from being taken under pretext of recovering a fugitive slave, and on the other, to maintain the neutrality of the State by preventing any portion of its citizens or subjects from interfering to prevent the recovery of his slave by the master.

Thus viewed, the question, even supposing slavery to be wrong, is simply, Has a state the right to remain neutral between two foreign parties, and suffer or permit the party assumed to be in the wrong to bear down the party assumed to be in the right? If the state has this right, it of course has the right to take all the necessary measures to compel its citizens or subjects to remain neutral. Has the state this right? It certainly has the right, for it is idle to

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pretend that we are bound, either as states or as individuals, to interpose to redress all wrongs, real or supposed, committed or tolerated by others. The question is not as to the *right*, but as to the *obligation* to intervene. There may be cases when we are free to intervene, and others when we are bound to intervene; but the former are not numerous, and the latter are very rare. The experience of our Puritan ancestors proves this very clearly as to individuals, and that nothing is worse than to make every individual in a community the guardian of the morals of every other individual. It leads every one to mind every one's business but his own, establishes a system of universal espionage, and sacrifices all individual freedom and independence. It destroys all sense of individual responsibility, precludes all firmness and manliness of character, and superinduces the general habit of consulting, not what is true, what is right, what is duty, but what is popular, or rather, what will escape the censure of one's neighbors. Whoever knows what our society was under the strict Puritan regimen knows well how fatal to virtue is the system. The New-Englander of to-day bears but too many traces of the system, which makes him but too often a hypocrite at home or in public, and somewhat of a rowdy in private or abroad. The whole system, out of which Free-Soilism undeniably springs, is false, of immoral tendency, and founded on a misapprehension of the nature of man and the government of God. We must leave scope for individual freedom; we must trust something to individual responsibility, and place our main reliance on the principles we early instil into individuals, the religious influences with which we surround them, and the workings of their own consciences. It will not do to keep them always in leading-strings, or under lock and ward. If we do, we shall never have any strong or masculine virtue; never have any men on whom in the hour of temptation and trial we can rely. No doubt, outbreaks of passion, of wild and exuberant spirits, there will be; no doubt, disorders will occur, scenes of personal violence will be exhibited, scandals will be given; but these things, however much to be deplored, no human foresight or power can prevent, and we must make up our minds to bear with them. To attempt, as Calvin did in Geneva, and as our fathers did in New England, to guard against them by an

all-pervading espionage and minute legislation, descending even to prescribe the fashion of cutting the hair, only substitutes a darker and more fatal class of vices and crimes, such as can be practised in solitude or carried on in secret. We must bear with them, — knowing that, if there is less virtue than we wish, what virtue there is will be genuine, and able to abide the test.

The same principle applies to nations, for nations are only individuals to each other. As long as they remain unaggressive, disposed to live in peace with their neighbors, and to fulfil the obligations of good neighborhood, they must be left to stand on their own individual responsibility, and each to be supreme, under God, in managing its own internal affairs. To make them guardians of the morals and policy each of the others, would result only in evil. It would excite perpetual jealousies and heart-burnings, give the strong and grasping a pretext for interfering with and subjugating the weak, rendering peace impossible, war, rapine, and oppression permanent and universal. We deny, then, the moral obligation of independent states — unless it be in certain rare cases, when the very existence of society itself is threatened, and a given state is really waging war against social order and the common interests of mankind, and therefore really attacking the common right of nations — to interfere to redress even the moral wrongs which may be perpetrated in the interior of each other. Granting, then, — what we certainly do not grant, — that slavery is a moral wrong in itself, one state is not bound to interfere for its abolition in another. Then it is free to preserve in regard to it a strict neutrality, and to enforce that neutrality on its citizens or subjects. Then, as what is called giving up a fugitive slave is really nothing but remaining neutral between the master and slave, for by it the state only refuses to interpose its territorial jurisdiction as a bar to the recovery of his slave by the master, the state is not bound to prohibit the recovery of fugitive slaves; and in permitting and compelling its citizens to permit them to be recovered, it does and requires no one to do a moral wrong. It is false, then, to pretend that the Fugitive Slave Law or the Constitution in requiring it is unjust, — contravenes the law of God. The States, then, in forming this Union, had the right to stipulate that fugitive slaves should be given up, and their stipulation binds all their citizens or subjects.

The Free-Soilers and Abolitionists profess to appeal from the state to what they call the higher law; but no such appeal as they, in fact, contend for, is ever admissible. There is certainly a higher lawgiver than the state. God is the Supreme Lawgiver for states and individuals, and no civil enactment contrary to his law is obligatory, — not precisely because his law is a higher law, but because such an enactment is no law at all, and is null and void from the beginning. God as Universal Sovereign ordains civil government, clothes it with authority, within the limits of his law, natural and revealed, to govern, and we must never forget that it is by his authority that it governs. Consequently its enactments, within these limits, are, in effect, the laws of God, and being his laws, there can be no higher laws on the matters they include to override or annul them. They are by the will of God supreme in their province, and bind us as laws of God; and they can no more be disobeyed without sin against God, than they can without crime against the state.

But the Free-Soiler alleges that the Fugitive Slave Law transcends these limits, and ordains what the law of God prohibits; and concludes, therefore, that it is no law, and he is not only free to disobey, but even bound to resist it. This is not true, as we have shown in proving that an independent state has the right to remain neutral in the question between the master and slave of another state, and therefore the American States, in forming a federal union for their common weal, had the power to bind themselves to give up fugitive slaves. If they could not, as we know they could not, secure the advantages of the Union without so binding themselves, they had the right to do it, and a sufficient reason for doing it, and this obligation is binding in conscience upon all their citizens respectively. But let this pass. The burden of proof is on the Free-Soiler. Civil government exists and governs by Divine appointment, and therefore the presumption is always that its acts are in accordance with the Divine will, till the contrary is shown. Consequently, they who allege that they are not, must prove their allegation. It is not enough to say, that all civil enactments in contravention of the law of God are null; therefore the Fugitive Slave Law is null. The fact of its contravening the Divine law must be proved as the condition of concluding its nullity. This

the Free-Soiler does not even attempt to prove, or, if he attempts to prove it, it is simply by alleging in proof his own private opinion, private judgment, or, as he says, conscience: that is, by adducing in proof the very matter to be proved. The conscience he alleges is his private conscience, and private conscience is simply one's private judgment of what is or is not the law of God, and may be true or false. To allege this is only to allege private judgment, and to allege private judgment is to allege the very matter in question: for the very matter in question is the truth or validity of this private judgment of the Free-Soiler, that the Fugitive Slave Law contravenes the law of God.

Here is precisely where the Free-Soiler breaks down. His declamation is superior to his logic. He professes to appeal from the civil enactment to the law of God, but in reality appeals only to his own private judgment, and this appeal is not admissible: because it is not an appeal to a higher court, or to a court competent to interpret and declare the will of the Higher Lawgiver. The state is the lawgiver for individuals, not individuals for the state. The judgment of the state in all cases overrides the private judgment of individuals, and the individual is bound to submission, whatever his private convictions, unless he can back his private convictions by an authority paramount to that of the State, and which States as well as individuals are bound to obey. Such an authority the Free-Soiler has not, as we may presume from the fact that he does not attempt to allege it. His pretence is, that his private convictions themselves are the higher law, and override all civil enactments opposed to them, which is manifestly false, as well as repugnant to civil government itself.

Mr. Parker tries to prove that a man's private convictions are themselves the higher law, from the example of the early Christian martyrs, who absolutely refused to sacrifice to idols at the command of the Emperor. But this example is not to his purpose; for they offered only a passive resistance, and did not refuse to obey the Emperor on the authority of private judgment or private conscience, but on an authority which the Emperor himself was bound to obey, that is, the authority, not of private, but of universal reason, which forbids idolatry, and an express revelation of the will of God to the Church infallibly interpreted

to them. When the Free-Soiler will bring these authorities, or either of them, — that is, the authorities themselves, not merely his notions of them, — to back his private convictions or conscience, that the Fugitive Slave Law contravenes the law of God, then we will concede his right, and even his duty, to disobey it; for it is necessary to obey God rather than men. But this he cannot do, for if he could, he would have done it long ago. Conscience is the law for the individual in the absence of all other law, but is sacred and inviolable before civil enactments only when supported by the law of God; for it is not itself the law of God, but simply one's judgment of what that law does or does not command. The appeal to it, then, can never avail the Free-Soiler; for of itself it can never override a civil enactment.

The appeal to the Supreme Lawgiver is compatible with civil government, but the appeal to private judgment, or conviction, as to a higher law than that of the state, is not; for it virtually denies government itself, by making the individual paramount to it. The Free-Soiler, then, by the very fact that he appeals to private convictions or private conscience as the higher law, proves, what we have alleged, that his principles strike at the foundation of government. He asserts the supremacy of private opinion, and exalts private judgment to the dignity and authority of the law of God. If this pretence that private judgment is the law of God were an isolated fact, if it were a temporary resort of a party hard pressed, we should smile at its absurdity, and pass it over as harmless. But it is a settled doctrine, received as an axiom, as a sacred dogma, as their fundamental principle, by the universal Radical or Movement party of our times, and holds with them the rank and authority which the dogma of the infallibility of the Church holds with the Catholic. They seek to make it the basis of all ethical and legislative codes. Strange as it may seem, whatever minor differences there may be among the members of the party, they all agree in setting up man — humanity, as they say — in the place of God, and man's will — that is, their own — in the place of the Divine will. As if preluding Antichrist, they have the incredible audacity to allege that they do this in the name of our Blessed Lord himself. The sacred Mystery of the Incarnation, they tell us, symbolizes the Divinity of man, and signifies

to all who understand it that God is *for us* only in man. Man is the only God for men, and man's will is for men God's will, therefore the supreme law, *lex suprema*, to which all creeds, codes, hierarchies, and states must conform, or lose their right to be. This is the doctrine of Red Republicans and Socialists on the Continent of Europe, to a great extent of the Radicals and Chartists in England, and of the Free-Soilers or Abolitionists of this country. There can be no question of the fact. It is read in all the literature of the party; it is plainly taught in the Sermon before us; it is clearly implied in this very appeal to private conviction as to the law of God, which is made by even the more moderate of the Free-Soilers. Nor is the doctrine entertained simply as a closet theory. It is no longer a mere speculation; it is no longer confined to books, pamphlets, or newspapers; it has come forth into practical life, organized parties, formed conspiracies, produced revolutions, expelled sovereigns, convulsed all Europe, kindled the flames of civil war, and, if defeated on some points, is as yet nowhere subdued. It is here, laughing at constitutions, collecting mobs, arming a party to resist the constituted authorities, undermining the state, corrupting public and private morals, and preparing the way for the horrors of anarchy. It has become an organized party, and as such we have now to meet it, not in the schools only, but in the field, and with something more than syllogisms or moral protestations.

We shall not undertake to refute this doctrine, for they who entertain it are past being reasoned with. Reason and argument were thrown away upon them. But we do entreat such of our countrymen as have not yet entirely lost their senses to open their eyes to the dangers that threaten us. This terribly destructive doctrine takes possession of people in the name of liberty, and it captivates because it is supposed to exalt the individual, and to guaranty his freedom. But it does no such thing. It destroys all individual freedom. It magnifies the individual in the face of government, indeed, but it is only, after having used him to break down government, to crush him beneath the despotism of what it calls society. Why advocate we so strenuously, in season and out of season, the sacredness and inviolability of government, and inscribe **LAW AND ORDER** on the banner we throw out? Is it because we have no

sense of individual freedom, because we would sacrifice the individual to the state, because we would have government everywhere, and suffer no one to sit down or rise up but at the bidding of a master? Let no one be so foolish as to do us that injustice. We are freeborn Americans; we have battled for liberty all our life, and were never more resolute to battle for it than we are now. We love liberty, and would leave always a large margin for individual freedom. We oppose Socialism, because it destroys individuality, and is nothing but despotism; we oppose Radicalism, because it is despotism; we oppose Free-Soilism, because it is despotism; and we assert the necessity of government, because without it there can be no margin left for individual liberty. Tell us, ye wise ones, ye enlightened reformers of the nineteenth century, when ye have succeeded in making way with government, what protection ye will have left me for my individual and personal freedom? Whither, then, shall I be able to fly to save myself from being crushed beneath your huge, social despotism, rolling on under the impetus of lawless passion and irresponsible demagogues? What refuge can there be for personal freedom, when what is called society, as distinguished from government, is supreme, without law, without restraint, but the will and passions of the Radicals who are at its head? A cruel and despotic public opinion, variable and capricious as morbid feeling, will then become supreme, universal, all-pervading, and overwhelm every individual who has the hardihood to hesitate for a moment to comply with its imperious demands. What now takes place on a small scale in your voluntary associations for reforming society, will then be exhibited on a large scale. The capricious despotism will not stop with putting chains on the limbs, and a padlock on the lips, but it will enter into the soul, penetrate into the very interior of man; all free thought will be stifled in its conception, all manliness, all nobility of character, depart, virtue be unheard of, and men become a race of mean, cringing, cowardly slaves of an intangible despot, and wild and lawless passion revel in one universal and perpetual saturnalia. It is to prevent this fatal result that we demand government, strong and efficient government, — not to crush the individual, but to save him from being crushed under the tyranny of an ungoverned society, by restraining social action and influ-

ence within their legitimate bounds. Let the principles of Free-Soilism, of the fanatics, become predominant, as they are becoming, and government cannot be maintained, or, if maintained, only as an instrument of oppression. We demand, therefore, in the name of liberty, that the movements of the fanatics be repressed, and that the utmost rigor of the laws be enforced against their leaders. Lenity to them is cruelty to the people, and irretrievable ruin to the country.

Some cowardly but crafty Free Soil leaders counsel, it is true, not resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law, but agitation for its repeal. We confess that we respect in comparison with these the bolder traitors, who advise open and unremitting resistance. The highwayman is less despicable than the swindler, and of all traitors those who practise treason under cover of law are the most detestable. The man who, in our times, agitates for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, is as much of a traitor in his heart as he who bids it open defiance. Why repeal it? It is constitutional. Would you have another more efficient? It is not needed. One less efficient? that is, one that you can evade, one that will not compel you to comply with the solemn obligations of the Constitution? So you would evade obedience to the Constitution, but without endangering the safety of your necks? No doubt of it. But agitation in the sense of Free-Soilism is precisely what now creates the danger, and every man who would keep it up in that sense is morally a traitor to his country.

But our limits are exhausted. We have not said half of what we intended to say when we commenced; but we have said perhaps enough. The question is one of vital importance to the republic. We have spoken strongly, but far less strongly than we feel. We see not in Free-Soilism a single redeeming element. It is wild, lawless, destructive fanaticism. The leaders of the party that sustain it are base and unprincipled men, whose morality is cant, whose piety is maudlin sentiment, and whose patriotism is treason. A more graceless set of deluded fanatics or unmitigated hypocrites could not be found, were we to search the world over. Some worthy persons may have been attracted to the party by their horror of slavery, and by their belief in the loyal intentions of its leaders; but no religious man, no loyal citizen, can, after the developments

the party has recently given, any longer adhere to it, or afford it the least conceivable countenance. Whoever continues to support it can be excused from treason only on the ground that he is insane, or else that he stands too low in the scale of intelligence to be responsible for acts.

Whether there is sufficient political virtue or intelligence remaining in the country to meet successfully the crisis, time must disclose. We hope there is, but we certainly have our fears. Matters have gone so far, that it will be no child's play to arrest them. The South must not now desert the North. They have their faults as well as we ours, and have erred as much in their encouragement of the "expansive democracy," as we by our disregard of constitutional engagements. But their interests must prompt them to discountenance internal radicalism, and to exert at home a conservative influence. Without them there is no hope for us, but with them, with their hearty coöperation with the friends of the Union yet remaining in the Free States, we may outride the storm; we may preserve the Union, check radicalism, and save American society from utter dissolution, and the liberties transmitted us by our fathers from utter annihilation. But we can do so only by waiving all minor issues, disregarding old party organizations, dismissing old party animosities, and bringing the whole conservative party of the republic to act together with one heart and soul, as one man.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Elements of Latin Pronunciation, for the Use of Students in Language, Law, Medicine, Zoölogy, Botany, and the Sciences generally in which Latin Words are used.* By S. S. HALDEMAN, A. M., Professor of Natural History in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, & Co. 1851. 16mo. pp. 76.

THERE is something in this title which is calculated at the same time to surprise and to mislead. A Professor of *Natural History* publishing a work on the Elements of Latin Pronunciation is certainly a new and rather startling phenomenon; and when he in-

forms us, that his work is "for the use of students in Language, Law, Medicine, Zoölogy, Botany, and the sciences generally in which Latin words are used," we naturally infer, that we are to find in these same "Elements" some new and much improved system of the usual school-book kind, the offspring of that perplexity and despair which the utterances of a class-room are apt to generate in the breast of the college tutor. But Professor Haldeman has never been, we dare say, a college tutor, nor is he even, in the stricter use of the term, a classical scholar; his book is no book of "Elements" at all, nor was it suggested by the ordinary wants of the older or younger youths who are pursuing certain studies in which Latin words are used. Professor Haldeman is, heart and soul, an enthusiastic investigator of Nature; he has won distinction, at home and abroad, in various departments of natural history; but his favorite department has been the natural history of man. And whereas some naturalists, in studying the relations of the various races, compare the forms of the skull, others the peculiarities of the skin, and so on, another class examine their phonetic characteristics, and thus identify themselves, more or less, with the comparative philologists. It is to this latter class that Professor Haldeman belongs. He has been a most ardent and successful investigator into the phonetic peculiarities of the Indian languages, and it was while endeavoring (as he informs us) to record his results in the characters of the Latin alphabet, that he found himself under the necessity of ascertaining the real power of those characters beforehand. In the course of long-continued and extensive investigations for this purpose, he naturally found himself obliged to reëxamine the foundations, and many of the details, of etymology. The book which he has produced, therefore, is really an essay on the powers of the Latin alphabet with reference to the wants of the etymologist and comparative philologist, and of such classical scholars, of course, as choose to enlarge the domain of their studies in that direction. It is true that Professor Haldeman, while showing himself fully aware in what sense "pronunciation is the basis of philology," and in reference to what ends alone it is absolutely indispensable to use the true and original pronunciation of Latin, while for other purposes any conventional system may be adopted without hindrance to the acquisition of the knowledge which is sought for, would seem to be sanguine enough to hope, that the theoretically true may supersede the conventional in the schools, as well as in the study of the etymologist, and to urge the adoption in general practice of the results ascertained in his book. In so doing, he undoubtedly incurs the risk of being considered as a visionary, devoted to the pursuit of an object purely chimerical; but such a view of his real aims and hopes would evidently be entirely unjust; and we have only to regret, that he

should have so expressed himself on his title-page as to confound the secondary and merely accidental object of his work with that which was first in importance and in his intentions.

We think it a happy circumstance, that the subject of Latin pronunciation should have engaged the attention of a physical inquirer. "Scholars" have always confined themselves to what may be called merely *historical* materials,—the incidental testimonies of the ancient classical authors, the statements of the ancient grammarians, inscriptions, &c. But in many cases the use of these materials produces results entirely unsatisfactory. Descriptions of sounds are generally imperfect and inadequate; and a very slight examination of the matter would satisfy us, that what we might think a surer testimony, namely, the same word written in the elements of two or more different languages, may often likewise fail. In many such cases, nothing more may have been intended than a convenient approximation; and even where the writer supposed there was strict identity, he may have been under an entire misconception. Something more is wanted to harmonize such historical testimony where it is discordant, to complete it where it is imperfect, and to clear it up where it is obscure. This is to be found, if anywhere, in a knowledge of the mechanism of human speech, and of the natural relations and interchange of the vocal elements. But here is where the naturalist must come in to the aid of the scholar. And herein lies the strength of Professor Haldeman, that in the region of phonetics he walks as a master; that he has investigated the laws of human speech with the perseverance and tact of a practised observer and with the anticipative insight of a true discoverer; that, having thus attained sure footing in this region, he has accumulated literary and historical materials in surprising abundance, but, instead of being overwhelmed by them, has managed them with a perfect control.

Professor Haldeman informs us, that his results usually agree with those of his predecessors. This is true; and yet the reader will receive the impression of originality from sections in which the materials referred to, and the results arrived at, have the least of novelty, the method is so obviously original and the evidence of genuineness speaks out so convincingly in the unauthorlike simplicity of the style. The features of the greatest novelty are those which are found in the accessory details of the book. At page 16, for instance, he has given us, without a word of heralding or a line of commentary, what he calls a "Scheme of Affinities between the Vocal Elements in Latin." We are much mistaken if the reader will not find it necessary, and well worth his while, to meditate this modest *Scheme* often and long. It contains the skeleton of an entire system of etymology, and is the original result of independent investigations by our author. It is to be regretted that he has *not*

attached to it a commentary of many pages. So again, in speaking of the Latin substitutes for the *Zeta* and *Phi* of the Greek, Professor Haldeman has been led, while asserting with Quintilian that the former was equivalent to *sd* and not to *ds*, to sustain his position by a convincing argument peculiar to himself. If (he argues) *ds* were found in Greek, we should certainly find *ts* also, for "*surd consonants being less difficult to form than sonant ones*, they may be expected where the latter occur. But the Italian *ds* and *ts* are *not Greek combinations*; and were the former included in *z*, we should still want *ts*, which should at least be as common as *ds*." But the same principle justifies the identity of *z* with *sd*, for "compounds like *esdechomai* show that *sd* is a Greek combination, although usually represented by *z*; we may, therefore, naturally expect its corresponding *surd* *st*, which we find so common, that it has been provided with a character [*ς*], as in *ἀστρον*, a *star*." (p. 45.) With respect to the *Phi*, he explains it in a manner peculiar to himself, as neither *f* nor *p* followed by an aspirate (as in *haphazard*), but as the cognate of the Digamma and of the Spanish *B*. In this instance he founds his deduction entirely upon the writings of the ancients, which had failed to suggest any thing definite to his predecessors.*

In a mere notice like the present, we cannot enter into further details. The specimens we have given may serve to show that Professor Haldeman's work, besides being an accurate manual of Latin pronunciation, abounds with discussions of the greatest interest to the philologist. The specimens of etymology scattered over its pages, when compared with the *Scheme of Affinities* before alluded to, have impressed us so strongly, that we cannot but urge the author, with the most unfeigned earnestness, to favor the public as early as possible with the elementary work on etymology which he informs us, in his *Preliminary Remarks*, he now has in preparation.

2. — *The Golden Manual : being a Guide to Catholic Devotion, Public and Private, compiled from approved Sources.* New York : Sadlier & Co. 1851. 24mo. pp. 1041.

THIS is a reprint from an English Manual approved by Cardinal Wiseman, with large additions by the American editor. It is the

* Pennington, in his *Essay on the Pronunciation of the Greek Language* (p. 71), had thrown out a hint that *Φ* might not be *r*, when he said it was "more like a sigh"; and Mr. Castanis, in his *Greek Exile* (p. 246), published since Professor Haldeman's view had been made known in the *Proceedings of the American Academy*, under date of Octo-

largest and most complete manual of devotion we are acquainted with. It contains a great variety of devotions, adapted to almost every occasion and to every taste, and, as far as we have examined it, selected with judgment and true devotional feeling. We know of little, except in devotions before and after communion, that we could desire to have added, and we have met with nothing in it that we wish to have omitted. It is due to the publishers to say that the copy before us is well printed, and richly bound. It contains numerous illustrations, several of which are executed with much artistic skill and taste. We have noticed several typographical errors, especially in the references in the Index, which we presume will be corrected in a second edition. There is no occasion to commend this Golden Manual to the public, for it is approved by the Most Reverend, the Archbishop of New York, and is sure to become, and deservedly, a great favorite with devout Christians.

3. — *The Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church.* By the Rev. JOHN LINGARD. 2d American from the London Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1851. 8vo. pp. 322.

WE wish to be grateful to such enterprising publishers as Messrs. Murphy & Co., but we regard this edition, in 1851, of Dr. Lingard's work on the Anglo-Saxon Church as an insult to the author and an imposition upon the public. It is a reprint of the second English edition, published at Newcastle, in 1810, — a valuable work certainly, considering what was then the state of Anglo-Saxon literature; but the author, in 1845, published a new edition in two volumes, entirely recast, greatly enlarged, and much improved, under the title of "*The History and Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church; containing an Account of its Origin, Government, Doctrines, Worship, Revenues, and Clerical and Monastic Institutions.*" This new edition contains the substance of the earlier edition, and supersedes it. He who has this does not want that edition, but he who has that needs this. It is altogether a superior work, and is the one that should have been selected for republication. It is no more than fair, when we republish an author's works, that we republish them with his latest corrections and improvements.

4. — *Annie and her Aunt.* By a Convert to the Catholic Church. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 24mo. pp. 72.

ber, 1849, and even since the *Elements of Latin Pronunciation* was in press, has ascribed to the Φ the very same power, and has thus given Professor Haldeman the support of a testimony entirely independent.

5. — *Concilia Provincialia, Baltimori habita ab Anno 1829 ad Annum 1849. Editio altera.* Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 8vo. pp. 307.
6. — *Ancient History : from the Dispersion of the Sons of Noe to the Battle of Actium and Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire.* By PETER FREDET, D. D. Second Edition, carefully revised, enlarged, and improved. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 490.
7. — *Modern History : from the Coming of Christ and the Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire to the Year of our Lord 1850.* By PETER FREDET, D. D. Fifth Edition, enlarged and improved. Baltimore. 1851. 12mo. pp. 552.
8. — *Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church : delivered at St. Mary's, Moorfields, during the Lent of 1831.* By CARDINAL WISEMAN. Two volumes in one. Third American, from the last London Edition, revised and corrected. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 484.
9. — *Songs and Ballads.* By SAMUEL LOVER. New York : Sadlier & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 224.
10. — *Christ in Hades. A Poem.* By WM. W. LORD. New York : Appleton & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 183.

New Catholic Quarterly Review. — We are informed that it is in contemplation to publish for Europe, at Paris and in French, a Catholic Quarterly Review, devoted to the discussion in the light of Catholic truth of the great historical, literary, social, and political questions of the day. The names of the projectors have been communicated to us ; they are names already well known to the Catholic world, and such as offer a sufficient guaranty that it will be a work of rare merit, and admirably adapted to the wants of the age. It will command the attention of philosophers, moralists, statesmen, and scholars out of our communion as well as within it. We can promise it, when it appears, a hearty welcome, and no mean circulation, in this country. The work is called for, and we pray God to prosper it.

. The request of "An Irish Ecclesiastic," Birmingham, England, will be cheerfully complied with, and most probably in our Review for October next.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1851.

- ART. I. — 1. *The Soul, her Sorrows and her Aspirations. An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology.* By FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN. Second Edition. London: Chapman. 1849. 12mo. pp. 264.
2. *Phases of Faith; or Passages from the History of my Creed.* By FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN. London: Chapman. 1850. 12mo. pp. 234.

MR. FRANCIS NEWMAN is a younger brother of the Very Reverend John Henry Newman, D. D., the Superior of the English Oratorians. He was formerly Fellow of Baliol College, Oxford, and, as far as he reveals himself in the works before us, is a man of a grave and earnest turn of mind, good natural parts, and respectable scholarship. He evidently has a kind and warm heart, and full persuasion of his own honesty and sincerity. As a man, he interests us much, and we regret to see him wasting his fine powers and attainments in the unpraiseworthy effort to obliterate faith from the human heart, and reduce mankind in their own estimation to a level with the beasts that perish.

It were easy to say severe things against Mr. Francis Newman, and to prove even from his own writings that his persuasion of his own sincerity and guilelessness is simply a delusion. We cannot respect his complaints of the coldness or harshness with which he says his religious friends have treated him, and we regard him as quite wrong in alleging that he could not honestly have escaped

the infidel conclusions at which he has arrived. No man, brought up and liberally educated in a country where Christianity is preached as extensively as it is in England by the Catholic clergy, can be an unbeliever, except through culpable ignorance, or wilful persistence in error. In fact, no modern infidel's plea of sincerity can be entertained, for no really sincere mind, honestly and loyally seeking the truth, can ever fall under the gross delusion that truth warrants the rejection of Catholicity. Nevertheless, Mr. Newman must stand or fall to his own master. We remember our own past delinquencies, and the great mercy of God in bringing us to the truth, as it were in spite of ourselves, and we can speak of no one personally in severe or censorious terms. We can interpret his unbelief, and even his blasphemies, by our own past experience, and although unable now to sympathize with him, we remember all too vividly the time when we should have done so, and have hailed him as one of the lights of the age.

But however we may be disposed to treat the man, we can have no toleration for the author. His principles and doctrines are utterly abhorrent to Christian faith and piety, and we have the right to subject them, if we choose, to the most rigid criticism. In setting them forth, he has challenged the Christian world to mortal combat, and he is not permitted to complain if his challenge is taken up, and some stripling from the camp of Israel shall do his best to discomfit the modern son of Anak, who rashly defies the armies of the living God. Between his system and the Gospel there can be only war, and war to the death; for if the Gospel is true, if our Blessed Lord was not an impostor, but what he declared himself, his system is false and destructive; and if his system be true, the Gospel is a cheat, and all who adhere to it are wretched idolaters, enemies of God and man, laboring only to keep the human race bound in the chains of ignorance, vice, and superstition.

For Mr. Francis Newman as a man, and before his Protestant brethren, there may, indeed, be some excuse; for he has only followed out to its last consequences the Evangelicalism in which he appears to have been brought up. He was reared in the bosom of the so-called *Church* of England. The members of that crazy Establishment are divided, among other divisions too numerous to mention, in-

to High-Churchmen and Low-Churchmen. High-Churchmen speak always with a double tongue, — a thing which God abhors. They both assert and deny sacramental grace. They assert it against Low-Churchmen or Evangelicals, who deny it, and they deny it against Catholics, who always assert it. If they are right against Evangelicals, they are wrong in protesting against Catholics, and can never clear themselves of the charge at least of schism, since they are severed from the Holy See, and are out of Catholic unity. If they are right against Catholics, they are, since distinguished from Evangelicals, mere formalists, holding that the observance of a few outward forms and ceremonies, or, at farthest, the practice of mere natural morality, is sufficient for salvation, than which nothing is more unchristian or unreasonable. No earnest-minded man, with tolerable intellectual capacity, can long continue a High-Churchman. He must either press forward to Rome, or fall back on Evangelicalism, as Mr. Francis Newman says he told his illustrious brother, as far back as 1823. Protestantism is essentially in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, as its whole history proves, and for a Protestant, holding as he invariably does to imputed justice, to embrace what the Puseyites call “the sacramental system,” is suicidal, since justification by faith alone, in his sense, is simply the denial of sacramental grace.

Evangelicalism on one side stands opposed to mere formalism, and is so far commendable; but on another side it stands opposed to sacramental grace. Its blunder is in recognizing no distinction between mere formalism and the infusion of sanctifying grace into the heart by the Holy Ghost through the sacraments as its instrumental cause. Denying habitual grace, infused through the sacrament of Baptism, and renewable, if lost, by the sacrament of Penance, the second plank after shipwreck, as the Fathers are accustomed to call it, the Evangelical has no resource but the assertion of justification by faith alone. But this justifying faith, since it is not an infused habit, cannot be intellectual faith, for the devils believe and tremble. Nor can it be an affection of the will; for, since the will is unelevated by habitual grace, such an affection could not rise above the order of natural morality. Justifying faith, then, must be an affection of the sensitive nature, and be essentially a feeling or a sentiment. Hence

Evangelicalism, as every body knows, is mere sentimentalism, and teaches that sanctity consists in a right state of the sensitive affections. Consequently, it teaches that concupiscence is in itself sin, and that its motions are sinful, even when not assented to by the will, but actually resisted.

Starting as an Evangelical from this point, with the doctrine of imputed justice, that is, that Christ justifies forensically, without sanctifying, you fall practically into Antinomianism, and conclude with Luther that the regenerate are in effect relieved from the obligations of the moral law. Or if, to escape this difficulty, you hold, with the more recent Evangelicals, that there is a twofold imputation of the merits of Christ, one which justifies us in the eye of the law, and another which effects in some way internal sanctity, you fall, if of a tender conscience, into despair; for you always find concupiscence, a law in your members, warring against the law of your mind, and bringing you into captivity to the law of sin and death. Brought to this point, what are you to do? Feel right and you will be right. Perhaps so, perhaps not so. But the precise difficulty is that you do not feel right, and your feelings are not under the control of your will. Here was our great difficulty, when, awaking from our rationalistic dream, we felt it necessary to escape from sin, and to strive after real sanctity; and God in his mercy sent us to the Church for a solution. The Church solved it for us by teaching us that concupiscence, when not assented to, is not sin, that our merely sensitive feelings count for nothing, and that all we need strive after is to have the will or the voluntary affections right, in which, through the aid of Divine grace, never withheld, we may be always successful. But this solution is no solution at all to those who reject the Church, deny sacramental grace, and place sanctity in a right state of the sensitive affections. For them there are only three alternatives;—1. The practical Antinomianism just mentioned, that is, that sins committed after justification are not imputed or reckoned as sins; 2. Perfect despair of God's mercy and salvation; or 3. The denial of sin itself, by resolving all that passes under the name of sin into simple imperfection, natural defect, or natural infirmity. The first alternative is the one generally adopted by Evangelicals. They make a superb act of hypocrisy,

and persuade themselves that they are regenerated by the Spirit, and therefore that they are saints. Assuming that whatever saints do must be saintly, they conveniently conclude that they may do whatever they list, without detriment to their sanctity or danger to their salvation. How can this thing be a sin, since he who does it is a saint? A smaller number, yet at times comparatively large, adopt the second alternative, and fall into complete despair, conclude that they are reprobates, predestined to hell, and become religious maniacs, and not unfrequently murderers and suicides; or, assuming that their doom is sealed, and that nothing they can do will affect it one way or the other, give loose reins to their appetites and passions, and plunge into every excess of vice and iniquity. Mr. Francis Newman adopts the third alternative, and denies sin to be properly sin, and considers it the necessary result of natural imperfection, and as naturally tending to develop and perfect the sinner, or the one we should call a sinner; which is only another phase of the first alternative, or Antinomianism.

Again, by placing the faith by which the sinner is assumed to be justified in the sensitive nature, as distinguished from reason, that is, intellect and will, Evangelicalism necessarily declares all dogmatic theology and all belief in dogmas proposed to the intellect, unessential, and really worthless, if not absolutely hurtful. It leaves the believer, therefore, free to reject, without any impeachment of his religious character or danger to his salvation, any intellectual proposition he pleases. If he has the approved feelings or affections, he has all that is required, although he denies every article of the creed, and even the existence of God; and perhaps the farther he carries his denial the better, because the affirming of dogmas requires an intellectual exercise, and leads to a reliance on intellect, which tends to impair the purity and intensity of the feelings, and therefore the true religious life. The nearer one approximates the pure animal, or, it may be, the mere sensitive plant, the better Evangelical he is. Moreover, placing religion in the sensitive affections as its subject, Evangelicalism makes one's feelings the test or criterion of truth, and therefore binds him to reject as false and hurtful whatever is disagreeable to them. Mr. Francis Newman finds the inspiration of the Scriptures, the Church, ecclesiastical authority and discipline, the sacred mysteries

of the Trinity and Incarnation, and especially the doctrine of future retribution and the endless punishment of the wicked, very disagreeable to his feelings, and therefore boldly and decidedly rejects them as blasphemous errors, as lets and hinderances to Christian freedom and genuine piety. All this is deplorable, but it is only the legitimate development of Evangelicalism, and no Protestant has the least right to complain of it.

We have foreshadowed in these preliminary remarks the general character of Mr. Francis Newman's doctrines, or rather negation of doctrines. His system, if system it can be called, is no novelty to us or to our readers, and we have on several occasions discussed its chief principles and main features, especially in our admonitions to Protestants and our articles on Parker, Channing, Morell, Bushnell, and the *Mercersburg Reviewer*. The author is a Developmentist, and belongs to the great Protestant neological party of our times. In this city, he would be classed with the Transcendentalists, though transcendentalizing in very tolerable Anglo-Saxon. The second title of the first-named of the works on our list reveals at once his principle and method;—*An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology*. His system, be it what it may, is derived, then, from the *natural* history of the soul, and therefore excludes the supernatural order, and can be only naturalism. If derived from the natural history of the *soul*, it must be pure humanism, egotism, or psychological idealism; for from the soul alone, only the soul can be obtained. This in the very outset asserts both the unchristian and the unphilosophical character of his system, and ranks it among the later forms of infidelity.

“By the soul,” the author says, “we understand that side of human nature upon which we are in contact with the Infinite, and with God, the Infinite Personality; in the soul, therefore, alone is it possible to know God; and the correctness of our knowledge must depend eminently on the healthy, active, and fully developed condition of our organ.” (Preface, p. vii.) The author, therefore, it would seem, distinguishes between the Infinite and God. Can he tell us what the Infinite is as distinguished from God? or what God is as distinguished from the Infinite? Nothing is or exists but God and his creatures; no creature is or can be infinite, and consequently, if God is not the Infinite,

there is no Infinite, and if no Infinite, then no God. What, we may ask, does the author mean by "our organ"? Does he, as his words seem to imply, mean the soul? Does he then regard my soul as distinct from me? What, then, am I whose organ is the soul, and who am distinguishable from it? The human personality, then, is not in the soul, and does not pertain to it, but uses the soul as its organ! What is this personality? Of what is the soul an organ? And what sort of an organ is it? Material, or spiritual? If spiritual, what is a spiritual organ? Moreover, what is the test or criterion of the soul's healthy, active, and fully developed condition? How is the author, or how are we, to know whether the soul is in that condition, or whether it is in an unhealthy state, abnormally developed, and morbidly active? Unless he can determine this, he cannot determine the correctness of his knowledge, and his utterances are worthless for him and for us, for they may turn out to be those of a diseased soul or a madman. Here is a grave difficulty at the very threshold, and one which excites numerous misgivings. But let this pass.

The author says that it is in the soul alone that it is possible to know God. But he distinguishes, as is evident from his book, the soul from the intellect or understanding, and therefore must make it, in itself considered, a mere blind faculty, like the will, and without light except as enlightened by some other faculty. How, then, can the soul be a medium of knowledge, correct or incorrect, of God, or of any thing whatever? The soul distinguished from the intellect cannot know any thing at all, and consequently we can know in it or through it only what is intelligible, or an object of intellect. The soul, in Mr. Francis Newman's sense, is the sensitive nature, or the capacity of feeling,—as he supposes, of *feeling the infinite*; but feeling is always, as feeling, purely subjective, and never of itself introduces us to any object distinguishable from the sensitive subject or feeling itself. The apprehension of an external, material, or sensible object as the exterior occasion or cause of the feeling or sensitive affection, is never the work of the feeling, or of the soul as simple, sensitive subject, but always of the intellect, that is, of the soul as understanding, or intellective subject. If, then, the author distinguishes the soul from understanding, as he certainly

does, and maintains that it is only in the soul that we do or can know God, he virtually denies that we can know God at all, and excludes from his religion all objective reality, that is, resolves religion into mere egotism or psychological idealism.

That religion has a subjective side is unquestionably true; but to assume that it is purely subjective is to deny it outright. Religion, or worship, the author says, "is a state of the affections"; and that he means sensitive affections is evident from his adding, that they "are not under the control of the will," and defining them to be "gentle emotions," or a lower degree of the same thing. But worship can be a state of the affections, sensitive or otherwise, only in relation to an object really existing. The author elsewhere calls worship "a spiritual exercise"; but it cannot be a purely subjective exercise, for by the very force of the term it is an exercise in reference to and for an object, that is, God, and therefore an exercise not possible without intuition or intellectual apprehension of God, or the object who commands it, and to whom it is due. In point of fact, every exercise of the soul demands as its essential condition intuition or intellectual apprehension of its object. None of our faculties can operate without their specific objects. The specific object of the eye is light, and where there is no light there is and can be no seeing; the specific object of the intellect is truth, and where there is no truth, that is, no objective reality, there can be no intellection, or act of knowing; the specific object of the will or of love is good, and where there is no good apprehended, there can be no act of will or of love. No faculty creates its object, because no one can operate without its object. Abstract the subject from all object, and you annihilate its actual existence; abstract any particular faculty from its specific object, and you annihilate it as an active faculty, render it inoperative, and practically as if it were not. Consequently, the author by losing the object loses the subject, and by excluding religion as objective necessarily excludes it as subjective, that is, even as a spiritual exercise, or state of the affections.

The author asserts in his very title-page that the natural history of the soul is the true basis of theology, and therefore, in philosophical language, supposing him really to intend to admit objective reality, that psychology is the true

basis of ontology. Nobody can suppose that the author in this really means to affirm that the soul is the true basis of all being, and that God is merely a creature or emanation of the human soul; yet this is the real import of his assertion, for psychology can be the true basis of ontology, or the natural history of the soul the true basis of theology, only on condition that the soul is the true basis of all being, and therefore of God himself. From the natural history of the soul, strictly defined, we obtain only the soul and its subjective affections, and therefore no predicates of which the soul is not the subject. This fact is evident enough of itself, and has been proved again and again by modern philosophers. To call any thing we thus obtain theology, which is the science of God and whatever pertains to him as cause, — either first cause or final cause, — whether evident *per se* to natural reason or evident only by faith, is to assume, either that God and the soul are identical, or that God is an affection or mere product of the soul.

What deceives many excellent people on this point is their not taking note, in stating their thesis, that the facts they include under the name of psychological facts are always complex facts, having always a twofold character, the one psychological and the other ontological. As the soul never actually exists or operates abstracted from its object, so we never do or can apprehend our soul without at the same time, and in the same act, apprehending that which is not the soul, but its object, really distinguishable from it, and existing objectively *a parte rei*. Contemplating this object, which we intuitively apprehend in apprehending ourselves, or rather, in apprehending which we recognize ourselves as apprehending subject, and reflecting on it as it is presented to us anew in language, we without much difficulty find it to be real and necessary being, that is, God; but having neglected to distinguish the intuition of it from the recognition of ourselves as the subject of the intuition, they conclude it to be a product of our intuition of ourselves, and therefore that psychology is the basis of ontology, the natural history of the soul the basis of theology, — a grave mistake which vitiates all modern philosophy.

Chronologically considered, it is no doubt true that the psychological fact and the ontological, the *primum psychica-*

logicum and the *primum ontologicum*, are given to the mind simultaneously ; but they are not given as identical, nor is the ontological given as contained in the psychological, but the psychological is given as proceeding from the ontological. It is this fact that the psychologue overlooks, when he makes war on the ontologist, and contends that psychology is the basis of ontology. He assumes that all the facts he studies in studying psychology are simple psychological facts, and neglects to observe that in all these facts there is an element purely ontological in its origin and character. In every cognition, or distinct act of knowledge, there is unquestionably a recognition of the soul as knowing subject, or subject of the act, in scholastic language, as *ens percipiens*, and it would be a grave mistake to regard the intellectual act as a pure intuition of the object. But it were equally a mistake to regard any intellectual act as a pure apprehension or recognition of the subject perceiving, including no intuition of object. There is no apprehension where no object is apprehended ; and there is no apprehension of the soul by itself, where there is no intuition of object distinguishable from it, and existing objectively *a parte rei*, that is, there is no *ens percipiens* where there is, distinguishable from it and independent of it, no *ens perceptum*. This *ens perceptum*, regarded simply under the relation of object perceived, is consentaneous with the *ens percipiens*, but in itself, in the order of reality, it must be prior to the perception, or *ens percipiens* ; because no *ens* can be perceived before it is, since what is not is not perceptible, and because the *ens percipiens* is *percipiens* only in perceiving. As the soul is percipient, or *ens percipiens*, only in perceiving the object, as perception or intuition does not create its object, and as the object must be in order to be perceived, it follows that also in the order of science the object is logically prior to the subject. Hence the order of science, contrary to the pretension of the psychologists, follows the order of reality, or the ontological order, and therefore the *primum logicum*, or *primum philosophicum*, must be the *primum ontologicum*. The *primum psychologicum* is the recognition of ourselves as percipient, or *ens percipiens*, and it can never be the *primum philosophicum*, as Mr. Francis Newman and modern psychologism assert, because, though chronologically simultaneous with the *primum ontologicum*, it is logically

subsequent to it, and dependent on it, since the soul perceives itself only in perceiving the object which is not itself. The *principium*, or *primum philosophicum*, must then be the *primum ontologicum*, and the first verse of the book of Genesis gives us the *principium* of all philosophy as well as of all theology, namely, *In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram*.

The mistake of psychologists on this point lies in supposing that what they call the genesis of ideas, that is, the genesis of knowledge, is in the reverse order of the genesis of things, and that the *primum philosophicum*, or principle from which in philosophizing we are to start, is not the *primum ontologicum*, that is, the principle of things, but the *primum psychologicum*, or the soul apprehending itself. They suppose that we do not see things as they are in the order of reality, in the order in which they exist to the Divine mind, but in a contrary order; and therefore they imagine a *mundus logicus*, or logical world, distinct from the *mundus physicus*, or real world. The former they give as the immediate, and the latter as only the mediate, object of intuition, or of knowledge. They appear to have been led into this error by the doctrine of Aristotle, that the mind can know only in itself, and by their laudable effort to escape Platonic pantheism. But they should recollect that this *mundus logicus*, as distinguished from the *mundus physicus*, is a mere abstraction, and, in itself considered, a sheer nullity, for there are no abstractions in nature; and they should also bear in mind, that, if the soul has immediate intuition only of this logical world, it is impossible to assert any real existence, for nothing can be concluded from abstractions not contained in them, and if in intuition of them there is no intuition of the physical or real world, no such world is contained in them. Moreover, if the mind can have intuition only of what is in it, since whatever is in it is it, the mind can know only itself, and then can assert nothing but itself. How the soul can perceive what is not in it, or what is objective to it, we for ourselves do not know, any more than we know how it can know itself or any thing in itself. How it can know at all is to us an inexplicable mystery, and we take good care to refrain from all attempts to explain it. We know that we know, and we know that if the soul cannot know what is objective to itself, or if it can know only in identi-

ifying the object with itself, or if knowledge be the identification of the subject with the object, as some of the Alexandrian philosophers seem to teach, we cannot really know at all. We explain nothing by means of the *phantasms* and *species* of the Peripatetics. There is no *tertium quid* between subject and object conceivable. What is not subject is object, and what is not object is subject. The subject either apprehends the object, or it does not; if it does not, there is the end of the matter, and science or knowledge is out of the question; if it does, it apprehends it where and as it is, in so far as it apprehends it at all.

The Peripatetics sought very properly to escape the pantheism evidently involved in the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Plato made all science consist in the intuition or knowledge of ideas, and ideas were in fact the only reality he recognized. All else he regarded as merely phenomenal. The *idea* in his system is the Divine paradigm, or archetype in the Divine mind or reason, and therefore God himself; for whatever is in God, or the Divine reason, is God. Hence St. Thomas says, "*Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.*" Plato, then, must have regarded God as all and the only reality, and the universe merely as phenomenal, of which God is the substance or subject, which is sheer pantheism. To avoid this fatal conclusion, the Peripatetics, in accordance with their doctrine that the mind apprehends only in itself, conceived ideas to be in the mind, and a *tertium quid* between the mind and the object existing *a parte rei*. Hence they regarded ideas, which are also the forms or possibilities of things, as something distinguishable from the mind on the one hand, and from God on the other. Hence they asserted an ideal or logical world, in itself neither ontological nor psychological, neither God nor creature, like the *ens in genere* of Rosmini. Hence the interminable question of the scholastics as to *possibilities*, which a slight reference to the pages of St. Augustine would have speedily disposed of. Plato was right in asserting the objectivity of ideas, and the old realists, like St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and St. Bonaventura, were perfectly right in asserting their reality, their existence *a parte rei*; Plato was also right in considering them as the paradigms, archetypes, or models of things in the Divine reason or mind, for as St. Thomas says, "*Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo*

omnium rerum";* but he erred in regard to the fact of creation, and in considering actual things not as creatures, but as the mere impress of these ideas or forms on an eternally existing matter, as the impress of a seal on wax. Man according to him is this Divine idea or eternal form impressed on matter, instead of a real creation by God from nothing, according to, or after, this idea, form, or archetype in the Divine mind. But this idea, regarded as paradigm or archetype, is simply the Divine Intelligence, and is the same whether there be or be not a creature *ad extra* created after it. The Divine Intelligence, being infinite, includes all ideas, paradigms, archetypes, or *creatable* existences, which God may or may not create as it seems to him good. As paradigms, archetypes, models, or ideas, they are *creabilia*, or possible creatures, the possibilities of things, or, as some say, *essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ*, and therefore the Divine Omnipotence, and consequently really and identically God, for no distinction *in re* is admissible in God between one attribute and another, or between his attributes and his essence. Ideas, the eternal forms, essences, or possibilities of things, are then neither mental conceptions existing only in our own minds, nor a *mundus logicus* distinguishable from the real world, but are God himself, apprehended by us in him, and real with all the reality of his being. God is himself the ideal or the possible, the paradigm and possibility of all things. The distinction we are to make is not a distinction between God and the possible, nor between ideal or possible and real, but between God and creature, between the idea and the actual existence created after it. The possible creature is God; the actual creature is the product of God's creative act, creating according to his own Divine idea, or the form eternal in his own mind, that is, according to his own Divine essence, the *similitudo omnium rerum*.

The error of the Platonists lies precisely in confounding the creature, the *creatum* or *creatura*, with the creatable, or *creabile*, that is, in overlooking or denying the intervention of God's creative act, and thus asserting only God and in him the possible world, but no actual world created *ad extra*. The error of the Peripatetics lies in distinguish-

* *Summa* 1, Q. xv., a. 1 ad 3.

ing the ideal or possible from God, making it neither something nor yet nothing, and at best only subjectively real. Such modern philosophers as follow the Platonists tend to pantheism; and such as follow the Peripatetics tend to conceptualism, nominalism, and nihilism. The former lose the creature as actual existence. The latter lose God, for the creature is inconceivable without the creator. To escape atheism, we must understand that ideas are the Divine Intelligence, and possibles the Divine Omnipotence, therefore truly and identically God; and to escape pantheism, we must understand that ideal or possible existences are actual and distinguishable from God only *mediante* the creative act of God, or that the idea or the possible is actual existence distinguishable from God only as an existence, responding to it as its type or paradigm, is actually created by God from nothing.

It follows from this that there is and can be no *mundus logicus* distinguishable from the *mundus physicus*, or possible world, interposed midway, as it were, between reality and nullity. God and actual creation include all that is or exists, and what is not actual creation is God, and what exists and is not God is creation. As what is not is neither intelligible nor conceivable, it follows that in every intuition there must be intuition of some object existing *a parte rei*, and this object must in all cases be either God or actual creature. The *ens possibile* of the philosophers is *ens reale* in God, is God himself, and therefore in conceiving it we really conceive God. In conceiving it as possible, or in denominating it possible, we only say it is an idea in the Divine mind, which he can endow with existence if he chooses. We conceive it in conceiving the Divine Intelligence and Omnipotence, and it is intelligible to us only in the intelligibility of the Divine attributes, and known only in so far as we know them, in which it is real, because identically God in his own being. The logical order and the real then are identical, and the genesis of knowledge follows the genesis of things; that is, in knowledge we know things themselves and as they are, not the mere images, species, or phantasms of things, and things as they are not. Consequently, the *primum philosophicum* must be the *primum ontologicum*, and as God creating is the *principium* in the ontological order, so God creating must be the *principium* in the order of science. To deny

God the creator in the order of science is as really to deny all knowledge, as to deny him in the ontological order is really to deny all existences. Psychology, then, strictly defined, can no more be the basis of ontological science, than the soul can be the physical basis of all existences. Utterly impossible, then, is it, that the natural history of the soul should be the true basis of theology. Theology, on the contrary, is the true basis of the natural history of the soul. Instead of its being true that we know God only in the soul, it is only in our knowledge of God that we can know the soul itself. We must study, not God in the soul, but the soul in God, as all masters of spiritual life uniformly teach; and it is only in proportion as we know God that we ever do know ourselves,—the natural history of the soul, her wants, her sorrows, or her aspirations.

The reason why some learned and good men, whom we love and venerate, shrink from admitting that the *primum ontologicum* is the *primum philosophicum*, is their supposing that they who assert it hold that we have a distinct and conscious knowledge of God prior to our knowledge of existences or consciousness of ourselves, which manifestly is not the fact. The *primum ontologicum* is undeniably the formula, God is, and is the creator of all things or existences distinguishable from himself, as faith teaches us all. In proving that the genesis of knowledge follows the genesis of things, and therefore that in every intuition the immediate object apprehended is God, we have proved that this formula must be the *primum philosophicum*. But while we assert intuition of God in every intellectual act, and that the soul in the intuition really apprehends God, we yet maintain, as St. Augustine says, that it does not intuitively advert to the fact that what it thus apprehends is God. Though it really apprehends God intuitively, it does not take note intuitively that it apprehends him. It comes to know this only subsequently, by means of reflection on the intuition repeated in language, the indispensable instrument of all reflection. To be able to say to others or to ourselves, God is, and is the creator of the world and all things therein, demands, besides the immediate intuition, both instruction and reflection; and to *prove* that God is, to him who rejects instruction, demands reasoning, and not seldom long and intricate processes of reasoning, of which St. Thomas has

given us, in his *Summa Theologica*, most admirable specimens in his five well-known arguments for the existence of God.

The question between us and the Peripatetics is not as to the necessity or the legitimacy of these arguments in a controversy with atheists, but as to the principle on which they as arguments are conclusive. They could not prove the existence of God, if we had no intuition of God, if in the act or fact of knowledge or intellectual apprehension we did not along with the apprehension of that which is not God apprehend also that which is not ourselves or creature, — that which is increate, independent, real, necessary, and eternal, on whose creative energy we and all other creatures depend, and without which neither we nor they could either begin or continue to exist. The real office of the argument in the case is not strictly to prove that God is, but to prove that what we thus intuitively apprehend is God. As a matter of fact, in arguing against atheists we use the very arguments and method used by theologians in all ages and of all schools. We have invented or discovered no new method or argument, and we have not the temerity to assume that the Fathers and Doctors of the Church have never understood how to combat atheism. We do not believe in modern discoverers. We use the syllogism precisely as others use it, only we deny what some few pretend, that we can conclude in it matter which transcends the matter of intuition. Demonstration does not supply new matter; it only clears up and establishes the matter already intuitively apprehended, and never enables us to assert any existence not apprehended in the intuition. From our intuitions of what are really creatures, we demonstrate the existence of God, but solely because in these intuitions there is always intuition of that which is not creature, and which therefore is God. The real demonstration is in detecting this intuition, and showing that its object is God the creator. Here the basis of the demonstration is this intuition, really and truly intuition of God, an ontological, not a psychological intuition.

The doctrine we oppose is, that the existence of God is concluded from the pure intuition of creature, or that his existence or being is a deduction from the simple intuition of created existence, or recognition of ourselves as thinking

subject. Its error lies in assuming that God may be concluded from *data* in which he is not given, or in which there is no intuition of his being or attributes. It is a principle of logic, that there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If God is not contained in the premises intuitively given, or rather intuitively evident, he cannot be concluded from them. They who fall into this error do so by confounding proof with knowledge, and the intuition of God with the intuition of creature. They take in their reasoning the complex fact as a simple psychological fact; but as it really is a complex fact, and really does contain intuitive apprehension of God, they in point of fact, though illogically, arrive at the conclusion that God exists. This conclusion being true and evident *per se*, they cannot or will not be persuaded that they have not attained it by a strictly logical process. But having formally excluded God from their premises, from the intuitions from which they reason, the conclusion, on their ground, is logically unsound. The fact is, in all our intuitions which include intuition of the relative, the finite, the contingent, the temporal, we have always intuition of real being, of the independent, the infinite, the necessary, the eternal; and real being, the independent, the infinite, the necessary, and the eternal, are God, and if we have intuition of these, we have all that is meant by intuition of God. If we have no intuition or intellectual apprehension of these, we have no means of proving the existence of God. Without intuition of the necessary, for instance, we could not in the syllogism assert that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and therefore could not reason in proof of any proposition whatever. All reasoning rests on the supposition of a necessary *nexus* between the conclusion and the premises, or between the effect and the cause. And if we have no intellectual apprehension of the necessary, how can we conceive even the possibility of this *nexus*? And yet the necessary is always God, for he is necessary being, and he alone is necessary being, since all that is distinguishable from him is contingent, created by him, and dependent on his free will.

We have enlarged on this point, because necessary to show the radical falsity of Mr. Francis Newman's principles, and the utter viciousness of his method, common to nearly all British and American neologists. Evidently we

do not mean that Mr. Francis Newman, in asserting that the natural history of the soul is the true basis of theology, admits, in fact, no objective reality, and therefore falls into absolute nihilism. Common sense and common tradition in general get the better of speculation, and even the wildest theorizers, by a felicitous inconsistency, seldom fail to recognize more truth than their theories can embrace. No man, can be totally depraved in a rational, any more than in a moral sense, and every one always retains some traces of the image and likeness of God to which he was originally created. Moreover, no man ever really divests himself of all traditional faith or science. What we mean to charge upon Mr. Francis Newman is, that he cannot consistently with his own principles and method assert any existence but the soul itself, and this is amply confirmed by the details of the book under review. Undoubtedly, as a matter of fact, there is an ontological element in the premises from which he reasons, but he does not distinguish it; he even denies it, and contends that his only ontological element is concluded from purely psychological *data*. Logically, according to his own principles, his *principium* or *primum philosophicum*, or point of departure, is the soul, which is therefore necessarily the subject of all his ontological or theological predicates. Analysis of the soul, however sharp or thorough, can obtain only the soul and its subjective contents. No man capable of any degree of reasoning can deny this; consequently, from psychological *data* alone, supposing it possible, which it is not, to commence with such *data* alone, it is impossible to conclude any God but the human soul. In the sense of his system, Mr. Francis Newman's God is simply an abstraction of himself, the several faculties, qualities, or properties of his own soul, taken abstractly, and carried up, in imagination, to infinity, and concentered in an imaginary perfect soul. Systematically considered, this is the only God of the majority of our modern metaphysicians. Their God is no objective reality, but a mere logical abstraction of themselves, and hence their reasonings to prove that God is seldom satisfy any one really troubled with atheistical doubts. Their arguments professedly proceed on the supposition, that we can conclude beyond what is contained in our premises,—that from intuition of the soul, without any intuition of an objective reality distinguish-

able from it, we can conclude that which is distinguishable from it, and in fact its creator and preserver. But reasoning never supplies its own premises, and can operate only on premises given; hence the premises are called *data*. They must be given, that is, intellectually apprehended, prior to reasoning, and must be intuitively evident, or science is not possible, and the reasoning concludes nothing. If intuition supplies only psychological *data*, gives us only the soul for our premises, or our *principium*, we can conclude only the soul. To conclude something beyond, we must have intuition of something beyond, and therefore to conclude God we must have intuition of that which is really God, although not without reflection distinctly known to be God; that is, he must be really given us in our *principium*, or intuitive premises. As Mr. Francis Newman does not concede this, but avowedly proceeds from purely psychological *data*, his system necessarily excludes God, and all objective reality, and is mere egotism, and in the last analysis mere nullism.

But our difficulties with Mr. Francis Newman's doctrine do not end here. The theology he proposes to construct from the natural history of the soul is natural theology, that is, what we call philosophy; and as he derives it from the *natural* history of the soul, and denies all supernaturally revealed and all traditional *data*, it is evident that he proposes to construct it by the independent operations of his natural reason alone. He then assumes two things. First, philosophy is an independent discipline, and secondly, reason by her own light and energy, without the aid of tradition or the light of faith, is competent to construct it. We can admit neither of these assumptions. Philosophy is not properly an independent discipline, and it is not possible without faith or supernatural revelation to construct for even the natural order a complete and coherent system of philosophy, or of natural theology.

Others than Mr. Francis Newman, it is true, maintain that philosophy is and should be an independent discipline, and that it can be constructed by natural reason alone. Some go so far in this direction, as to maintain that moral obligation may be asserted even on the supposition that there is no God, and that a respectable code of atheistical ethics is not impossible. But all moral obligations, even in the natural order, and the natural relations of

men. are resolvable into the single obligation to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, or to render unto him, as our Final Cause, the tribute of our whole being; and therefore no moral obligation is conceivable without God. The atheist may practically observe some of the precepts of the moral law, but if there were no God there could be no moral law, and therefore no morality; as an atheist may be a geometrician, but, as St. Thomas says, if there were no God there could be no geometry. Morality does not consist in fitness, propriety, or utility. Its basis is not the Greek *νόμος*, but the Latin *lex*, which imports on the one hand authority which has the right to command, and on the other a subject bound to obey. It implies the Supreme Lawgiver and the obligation of obedience, and therefore is inconceivable without God; for neither men nor nature have in themselves any legislative authority, or law-making faculty.

No doubt, as a matter of fact, the atheist has the conception of justice, or sense of duty, and therefore, to some extent, does hold himself bound to observe what is due from man to man, as well as from man to society; and this we suppose is all that they really mean, who assert the possibility of atheistical ethics. But this conception of justice, or of duty, is manifestly an inconsequence in the atheist, and wholly incompatible with his atheism; for the denial of God is really the denial of justice. God is justice, and justice in itself, and therefore there can be justice aside from him only by participation of his justice. Doubtless, the atheist can have the conception of justice without any distinct or reflex conception of God, but not without a conception of that which really is God, though he may not take note or even deny that it is God. The conception depends on the intuition of God, which, as we have seen, is an element of every intellectual act. The fact that even the atheist has it is not a proof that atheism and morality are compatible one with the other, but that no man can wholly divest himself of the virtual conception of God, or make himself really, truly, and consistently an atheist; for let him do his best, there will always be at the bottom of his thought intuition of God.

We therefore deny the possibility of atheistical morals, and we even go farther and deny the possibility of constructing a code of natural ethics, theology, or philosophy,

by reason alone. We say nothing in the present discussion of the purely industrial, or strictly material order; but aside from that order, whatever he may be within it, man is neither an inventor, nor an original discoverer of truth, and is restricted in his knowledge to what has been taught him, and at first immediately by God himself. This is as true of that portion of his knowledge which pertains to the natural order as of that portion which pertains to the supernatural order. What man in the pride of his heart calls his progress in philosophical, ethical, political, and social science, is but a forgetting, is but his departure from truth, and unhappy fall into error. He walks securely only as he walks in the path of instruction, — in the light, only as he walks in the wisdom of the fathers in primitive tradition, under the guidance of its Divinely assisted and protected guardians.

The truth man has been taught from the beginning is twofold, — truth pertaining to the natural order, and truth pertaining to the supernatural order; but both were taught by supernatural revelation to the first man, — save further explications of the supernatural subsequently made by our Lord and his Apostles, — as two parts of one whole, and in the Holy Scriptures they are never found separated, or even formally distinguished from each other. In the Holy Scriptures philosophy is never disengaged from theology, or reason from faith; or if St. Paul, for instance, sometimes distinguishes philosophy, and seems to speak of it as an independent discipline, it is only to condemn it, as the folly of the gentiles, to declare its impotence and vanity, and to bid the faithful to beware of being spoiled or deceived by it. The sacred writers and even the Doctors of the Church treat the two orders of truth uniformly as one complex body of truth, neither able, in the present providence, to subsist without the other, as they always treat man himself as a being with a single, never with a twofold destiny. The man of Christian theology, though a natural creature and endowed with reason, exists only in a supernatural providence, destined either to a supernatural recompense or to a supernatural punishment. He has no natural destiny, for he is not in a state of pure nature; and if no natural destiny, it is certain that he can have no independent natural discipline. Every such discipline must be adapted to an order which does not exist, and to a purely imaginary man.

Let it not be objected, that we confound the natural and supernatural, and therefore identify either faith with philosophy or philosophy with faith. We no more confound the natural and supernatural, than the theologian confounds nature and grace, when he says nature accomplishes nothing without grace, and grace always supposes nature. Reason and faith stand in the same relation to each other in which stand nature and grace; and as man cannot fulfil even the law of nature without the assistance of grace, so reason cannot construct for even the natural order an adequate philosophy or theology, without the light of faith, as all imply who attempt to prove from reason alone the necessity of supernatural revelation. Yet as we distinguish in the meritorious act, without separating them, the part of nature and the part of grace, since there is no such act without the concurrence of both nature and grace, so in the truth transmitted us, or presented for our assent, we distinguish, but also without separating them, a part belonging to the natural order, and a part belonging to the supernatural order. The two parts are distinguishable, but both must mutually concur to make either the perfect theologian or the perfect philosopher. Theology is mutilated without the rational element, indeed inconceivable, as grace would be without nature; and philosophy without the light of supernatural faith, or separated from the revelation of the supernatural order, would be unable even to state its problems, and would fall not to the level of reason merely, but far below it.

The natural and supernatural truth are distinguishable, but not separable, first, objectively, in that they pertain to two different creations, and, second, subjectively, as to the conditions on which we assent to them, or affirm them. The natural is evident *per se*, or intuitively evident, to natural reason; the supernatural is not evident *per se*, and is assented to or affirmed by us only on the authority of God revealing it. The former is reason or philosophy; the latter is faith, and, when drawn out by reflection and its several propositions placed in their logical relations with one another and with reason, supernatural or Christian theology. So, in saying both are originally given supernaturally by Divine revelation, and therefore in admitting no distinction between them as to the mode or manner in which they are made objects of the reflective under-

standing, we do not, as some suppose, fall into the absurdity either of basing philosophy on faith, or faith on philosophy. We give a supernatural basis for faith, and a rational basis for philosophy, which is all that is required to save science on the one hand, and faith on the other.

The point to be observed here is, that, while we adopt the ordinary distinction between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, we reject the doctrine contended for by rationalists, that the principles of philosophy are originally *discoverable* by natural reason. These, when they admit Christianity, distinguish the two, by defining faith or theology as embracing all the matter supernaturally revealed, and philosophy as embracing all those first truths which are not only evident to natural reason, but discoverable by it. But we deny that the principles of philosophy are ever distinctly discoverable by natural reason, although they are when stated intuitively evident to it. We make a distinction between being intuitively evident when presented to reflection, and being intuitively discoverable and presentable to reflection. We assert, indeed, against the psychologists, direct intuition of the ontological principles of all philosophical science, but we do not assert, nay, we deny, that reflection takes the principles immediately from intuition, because intuition is always indistinct and indeterminate, and because man is not a pure intelligence, but an intelligence united to a body, and has never in this life that sort of intuitive vision of intelligibles which supersedes reflection as essential to distinct science. Intuition affirms the principles, but does not teach them, or present them as objects of distinct and reflex thought. It is itself a universal and permanent fact, inseparable from the human intellect, and is really what is ordinarily called reason, when reason is distinguished from the intellectual faculty, and from the habit or act of reasoning. The real purport of what we affirm in affirming it is, that reason as so distinguished, instead of being a faculty of the soul, is a real intuition by the soul of the intelligible world. The importance of this, in settling the question of the validity of science, or of our cognitions, is very great. All demonstration rests, in the last analysis, on reason as thus distinguished. If, as most modern philosophers maintain, we assume reason to be a faculty of the soul, we assert only a psychological basis of certainty; and we may ask

the value of this basis, and what is the voucher for reason itself. Having only reason, a psychological faculty, with which to answer, we are involved in a paralogism from which there is no escape but absolute scepticism. But understanding that it is not a faculty of the soul, but a real intuition of the intelligible world, affirming simply, not itself, but the object apprehended, we can ask no such questions, and scepticism becomes absurd and inconceivable. Proof or demonstration is then conclusive; for it rests on immediate intuition of the principle, and therefore on a real ontological basis.

The instrument of distinct science is reflection, in which the mind returns upon or rethinks the matter of the intuition; and the instrument of all reflection in the intelligible order, as distinguishable from the sensible, is language, — a sensible sign by which the primitive intuition is repeated, or its object presented anew to the mind and held there till the mind distinctly seizes it. The principle when thus presented, or re-presented, is immediately evident, or immediately affirmed, by virtue of the primitive and permanent intuition. With all the intuition of the intelligible we claim for man, he would be practically unable to make any distinct affirmation either to his own reflex consciousness or to others, if deprived of language, and of all direct or indirect instruction through the medium of words or signs of some sort, repeating to reflection the matter of intuition. Hence M. de Bonald was right when he asserted that man cannot think, or, as we say, *reflect*, without language, and thus refuted those who allege that language is a human invention. Language is as essential to reflection as the algebraic signs are to the algebraist, and as man evidently could not invent it without reflection, it must have been a Divine creation and given to our first parents by their Creator. God in giving to the first man language must have given him the understanding of it, that is, infused into him with language the significance of language, or the knowledge of the truth it contains or is fitted to signify, and therefore all the principles of moral, philosophical, political, and social science that belong to our order of intelligence, — the principles of the whole science of the natural order, or what is evident *per se* to natural reason; in like manner as through the infallible language of the Church he has given us in addition all the truth he has revealed of

the supernatural order. Both orders of truth are alike taught us or communicated to us through the medium of language, and both have been preserved by language, and transmitted in substance from the first man by tradition from hand to hand even down to us, unseparated, in their unity and integrity, through the patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Christian Church, but out of the Church altered, broken, corrupted, and travestied, as it is in all gentilism and heresy.

In the view taken here, two errors are avoided, which have vitiated much modern speculation. M. Cousin claims for man intuition of the intelligible, of what he calls absolute idea, or ideas of the Infinite, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, that is, of the principles of all science; but he supposes the reflective understanding takes them immediately from the intuition. This is the grand error of our modern Transcendentalists. It implies that man knows all that is intelligible to him at once, and distinctly, by direct and immediate intuition, thus denying the possibility of error, and claiming infallibility for every man. It places the new-born babe and the full-grown man, the simple rustic and the ripe scholar, on the same level as to knowledge. Hence instruction, study, reflection, reasoning, become quite superfluous, for all knowledge is obtained by immediate and open vision, than which nothing is more false or absurd. The error lies in supposing that reflection discovers its principles immediately in intuition, or, what is the same thing, that intuition itself distinguishes and determines its objects. This error is avoided by the doctrine that reflection takes its principles from language, as represented through the medium of words, and only finds them affirmed by immediate intuition.

M. de Lamennais fell into an opposite error, by denying that any thing is evident *per se* to natural reason, and reposing the principles of science for their certainty on faith. This seems to us to be the error of the estimable M. Bonnetti, with whose general spirit and tendency we sympathize not a little. He maintains that we know the principles of philosophy, that is, distinctly apprehend them, only as they are supernaturally revealed and taught us through the medium of words. Thus far we go with him; but is what is taught formally assented to on the authority of the teacher or revealer? Then it is received on testimony,

and philosophy is identified with faith, and science is denied to be possible. But if science be impossible, how establish the credibility of the testimony, or the competency of the authority? Nay, how do we apprehend or take cognizance of the principles taught, or of the fact that they are taught at all? Deny to man all power of knowing, deny that any thing is evident to him *per se*, and he becomes as little the subject of faith as of science. There must be somewhere, in some form, a *nexus* between science or reason and faith, or faith itself becomes wholly unreasonable, and therefore impossible. M. Bonnetti's doctrine, as we understand it, demolishes science to make way for faith, as Lutheranism demolishes free-will to make way for grace, and loses both in an inevitable and universal scepticism, as Lutheranism loses grace by leaving it no subject. This fatal consequence is avoided, by understanding that the truths taught us pertaining to the natural order, and constituting the principles of philosophy, do not rest, when taught, on the authority of the teacher, but are evident *per se*, or intuitively evident, affirmed by primitive and unailing intuition.

Understanding now that the principles of philosophy are obtained neither immediately from direct intuition, nor by way of induction from psychological *data*, but from language in which, so to speak, they are incarnated, it is evident that the method of philosophy or of natural theology cannot be, as Mr. Francis Newman assumes, that of psychological observation and induction, or the natural history of the soul. Nothing is more fatal than the Baconian method applied to philosophy, to the moral and intellectual sciences, and it is due to the memory of Bacon, a great though not a good man, to say, that he himself proposed his method as applicable only to the purely physical sciences, and expressly asserted its inapplicability to the moral and intellectual,—a fact his English and American disciples generally remember to forget. The Baconian method in the physical sciences, which are only secondary, is legitimate enough, because those sciences deal with sensible objects, which can be observed and distinguished without the medium of language, so long as they remain in their proper sphere below philosophy and under its dominion; but it is inapplicable in the region of philosophy, which deals solely with principles, that is, with non-sensi-

bles, or intelligibles [*intelligibilia*, νοητά], it is inapplicable, because the object cannot be observed and studied in the intuition, since to all observation an object sensibly represented is essential, and in the intelligible order language is the only sensible representation possible. In philosophy, then, the only proper method is to take the *principium* or *primum philosophicum*, that is, the *primum ontologicum*, from language, and proceed by way, not of observation, but of ratiocination, bringing every conclusion in the last analysis to the test of intuition. This is what we call the synthetic as opposed to the analytic, and the ontological as opposed to the psychological method.

It is evident that if, in philosophizing, we must take our principles, that is, the ontological *data*, from language, we can take them only as we are taught them, for it is only by instruction that we do or can learn the signification of words. Words are no signs to us, but unmeaning sounds or characters, till we are taught what they signify. Hence philosophy or natural theology is not possible by the independent operations of individual reason alone, and no individual deprived of all instruction and left to the operations of his own individual mind could ever attain to philosophy or natural theology, either as to its principles or its conclusions. Instruction is indispensable; the elders must instruct the juniors, as we assert in sending our children to school, or in providing masters for them. But the elders, for the same reason, cannot teach unless they have been taught, and hence there must have been an unbroken series of instructors or teachers till we arrive at the first man, and him God himself must have instructed, — since for him no other instructor is conceivable. So in philosophy, as well as in faith, we must assert Divine revelation and tradition, and whoever denies the former or breaks the thread of the latter fails in philosophy as much as he does in religion. To deny revelation and break away from tradition is the way, not to philosophize, but to remain fools all our life long. In philosophical science, as in Christian dogmata, the method of ascertaining or knowing what is to be held is one and the same, namely, that of instruction, of learning from the teacher, though in the latter we take the truth learned on the authority of the teacher, because it is not intrinsically evident to reason, and in the former on the authority of the intuition, or its intrinsic evidence.

But to true philosophy, then, as well as to true religion, it is necessary that language from which we take our principles should be preserved and handed down to us in its unity and integrity, and that the teachers have an infallible understanding of its sense. If language has become corrupt, as indeed our modern pantheists are corrupting it, or if the teachers have lost its original sense, in whole or in part, philosophy is vitiated in its source, and serves only to mislead. True philosophy becomes impossible, and we have for schools of philosophy only schools of sophistry, error, and vain speculations. But as language is preserved, even as to the natural order, uncorrupted, in its original purity and integrity, only in the Church or orthodox society, and as its original sense is retained unimpaired only in the Divinely assisted and protected teachers of the Church, it is evident that it is impossible to have sound philosophy out of the orthodox society, and that schism and heterodoxy in an ecclesiastical or theological sense involve schism and heterodoxy in a philosophical sense. The gentile philosophy was schismatic and heterodox, and deserves no respect any farther than it follows primitive tradition. It contains many fragments of truth, but it is always, systematically considered, even in its two greatest masters, Plato and Aristotle, radically false, for it always mistakes the fact of creation, the creative act of God, by which the world and all things therein are created from nothing. Gentile philosophy has no knowledge of the first verse of Genesis. Gentilism itself was the Protestantism of the old world, the falling away of the nations from the patriarchal traditions, as Protestantism is the gentilism of the modern world, the apostacy of the Protestant nations from the traditions of the Church; and neither, how much soever it may philosophize, ever attains to sound philosophy. Either may have its schools, sects, or systems, but they only recall the confusion of tongues at Babel. No sound philosophy is ever to be looked for out of the Church, because out of her language is confounded or corrupted, and the chain even of scientific tradition is broken.

But even in the bosom of the Church it fares no better with those individuals who attempt to disengage philosophy from theology, reason from faith, and study to build up, distinct from the supernatural theology, a system

of pure rationalism. We have even amongst ourselves a great diversity of philosophies or philosophisms, and not seldom do we find men able to preserve their orthodoxy only at the expense of their logic, as in the case of the excellent Abbate Rosmini. The reason of this is obvious enough. When a Catholic waives his theology, and turns his back on the supernatural light of faith, and enters upon the field of independent philosophical speculation, he foregoes all the advantages of his Catholicity, and places himself on a level with the ancient Greek or the modern Protestant, and there is no reason conceivable why he should succeed better than a heathen or an infidel. Moreover, success is impossible in the very nature of the case, because man since the Fall is neither in the state of integral, nor even of pure nature. In his present state, he has no natural destiny, and his reason does not suffice for his reason, nor his nature for his nature; otherwise we could never conclude the necessity of supernatural reparation from his present infirmities, and it would not be true that medicinal grace is necessary to enable us to fulfil the law of nature. Every system of pure rationalism denies this, and proceeds on the assumption that man has a natural destiny, or at least, that in thought we can abstract him from the supernatural providence in which he now exists, and construct a system of philosophy, of metaphysics, and ethics, that would be true and conformable to his intellectual and moral state, were he, as he is not, and probably never was, in a state of pure nature. Every such system proceeds, then, from false or at least unreal premises, and can at best end only in falsehood or vain abstractions. The only safe way of reasoning is, to reason from man as he is, and not from him as he is not, and what is wanted is a discipline adapted to his present state, to his actual condition in the present providence, not a discipline adapted to some imaginary state or condition, which is not and cannot be real.

The grand heresy of our times is rationalism, — rationalism in religion, in politics, and in morals; natural theology is set up against revealed, the state against the Church, and morals against religion; and all this has originated, not in the denial of supernatural revelation outright, but in attempting to assert the independence of reason in the natural order. The state did not begin to assert its independ-

ence by denying the Divine authority of the Church, or what is the same thing, its obligation to be Christian, but by disengaging the temporal from the spiritual, and asserting its supremacy in its own order, — claiming at first to be only the friend and ally of the Church, then her protector, and then her master and oppressor. Just so has it been in the philosophical order. Abelard, the father of modern rationalism, only sought to disengage philosophy from revealed theology, to erect it into a separate and independent discipline, supreme only in its own order. His philosophy would be the friend and ally of Catholic theology, would even serve her by vindicating her titles; but, under pretence of proving her titles, it assumed the right to sit in judgment on her dogmas, and therefore to be her judge and master. The movement, thanks to St. Bernard and the Roman See, received a check for a time; but ere long it manifested itself anew; and, strengthened by the political rationalism of Louis of Bavaria and Louis the Twelfth of France, and by the revival of Greek literature, it gradually became formidable, mastered some of the later scholastics, disputed the empire of the schools in the sixteenth century, won the victory in the seventeenth, and enjoyed its triumph in the eighteenth in the worship of an infamous prostitute as the Goddess of Reason. This tendency to rationalism manifests itself now everywhere, though not without some earnest voices to protest loudly against it. Unhappily, it is not confined to persons out of the Church. In the Church even we find men deeply affected by it, and, as they cannot indulge it in matters strictly of faith, they seem resolved to indulge it to the utmost extent in all else. But it would be well to bear in mind, that to contend for a system of rationalism in regard to matters *extra fidem* is not only to prepare a rival to faith, but to assume that there is a body of truth, and therefore a real good, for man without faith, which is not true, and thus, instead of weakening, to strengthen the very world, the flesh, and the Devil, which as Christians we are compelled to renounce and to wage unremitting war against. Let it not be supposed that we are to cure the prevailing disease of our times by homœopathic prescriptions. The maxim *similia similibus curantur* is of as little value in relation to moral as to physical diseases, and as in the latter all trustworthy practitioners adhere to the principles of

medical tradition, so in the former all sound Doctors rely on the Church and her teaching.

St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and all the great Doctors of the Church, are able reasoners, and some of them now and then, it is true, seem to recognize a *quasi* independence in philosophical discipline ; but it will be found that they accept and use philosophy only as the rational element of theology. They use reason in the service of religion, and whenever they discuss questions of pure reason it is always with an eye to supernatural theology, and by the supernatural light of faith. They regard philosophy, not as the independent ally of theology, or, as we Yankees say, "help," but as the *ancilla*, or *slave* of revelation, with no independence or will of her own, and bound to do the bidding of her mistress. They compel her to serve, and to serve faith, her mistress, not herself, or mere rationalism, whether a rationalism assumed to be above or below faith. Hence, although we always find them making a free and noble use of reason, we never find in them a philosophy disengaged from theology, and presented as a separate and complete body of independent rational truth. They are Christian theologians, and philosophers only in that they are Christian theologians. They have true theology, and therefore they have always sound philosophy, that is, sound reason. But all, whether in or out of the Church, who undertake to build up an independent philosophy, that is, a system of pure rationalism, are sure to fall into grievous errors, even as to the rational order itself.

We repeat that it must be so, because man is in a supernatural providence, not in a state of integral, or even pure nature. Being in a supernatural providence, if the words mean any thing, he has no natural destiny, that is, no destiny lying in the plane of his nature as it now is, or to which he can attain by his unassisted natural powers. Manifestly, then, his nature has no purely natural good, and therefore does not suffice for itself. It follows necessarily, then, that his reason alone cannot construct a system of rational truth complete and coherent in its own order, for truth is only the intellectual phase of good. Philosophy deals with principles, and last principles as well as first ; it embraces always ethics, and ethics have always reference to final causes. If man has only a supernatural destiny, his final cause cannot be in the natural order, and

consequently simple natural ethics must be impossible and absurd; and so then must also be the philosophy that not only asserts, but undertakes to teach them. What is the significance of a system of doctrines constructed in relation to the state of pure nature, and on the supposition that man has a natural destiny, when it is conceded that the state of pure nature does not exist, and that there is and can be no natural destiny?

As nature subsists, though in a supernatural providence, questions of reason will arise, and must of course be solved; but they must be solved under the conditions of the providence in which we are, that is, in relation to supernatural theology. All rational questions needing to be solved can be solved, one after another, when taken up in connection with the dogma or theological principle to which they are related. When the revealed truth raises the question of pure reason, then is the time to settle it, because then it is raised in the form in which it can be settled, and reason is then, and then only, in the proper state to settle it. It is only by the light of Catholic faith that we can truly state even rational problems, and reason cannot solve them unless they are truly stated, that is, proposed to the understanding according to the truth of things. Who has not found that, in discussing a point with another, the chief difficulty is to make him understand the state of the question, the precise point in issue? A question properly asked is already virtually answered, unless a question as to simple matters of fact. But it is only Catholic faith that can rectify our point of sight, or place us in the position from which even questions of reason can be seen in their real character and relations; for it is only from the point of view of supernatural faith that we see the natural universe in its real order, in the real relations of the several parts to one another, and of the whole to God as its first and as its last cause. We could not philosophize at all without the principle that God is, and creates the world and all things therein, and creates them for himself, as final cause, or *finis propter quem*; and this principle, although when stated in language and subjected to reflection, it is evident *per se* to natural reason, could never have been distinctly known or practically available without supernatural revelation, and is attainable by us only from tradition as embodied in the Catechism.

Clearly, then, Mr. Francis Newman's doctrine, which is not only rationalism, but mere psychological rationalism, cannot be even entertained, and would deserve no respectful consideration as a system, even if it were conceded that we have received no revelation of a supernatural order; for without revelation and tradition, by reason alone, man is utterly unable to construct even a complete and self-coherent system of rationalism, and for the best of all reasons, because he does not exist in a purely rational order. Our preliminary difficulties in the way of Mr. Francis Newman's theory are of themselves conclusive against it. We have no occasion to go beyond his title-page. That asserts his principle and method. His principle being false, and his method vicious, his theory, though it may contain by a happy inconsistency some slight traces of rational truth, must be, as a theory, utterly worthless, and, as far as it goes, mischievous. It is entirely unnecessary for us to take it up and examine it in detail. It is clearly antichristian and repugnant to sound reason, and having refuted it in principle, we may dismiss it as unworthy of any further consideration; for a man who starts wrong, and travels in a wrong direction, is pretty sure never to reach the goal.

In fact, in what we have said we have had no special reference to Mr. Newman as an individual author. We have aimed to discuss rather the general question the principles and method of his book raise in the mind of the theologian. Our purpose has been to refute his psychological rationalism, and to vindicate the ontological method of philosophizing, not for the sake of substituting ontological rationalism in the place of the psychological, but for the sake of demolishing rationalism altogether, and bringing the student back to tradition and the method of the Catechism. What we really oppose is every system of pure rationalism, whether psychological or ontological. Logic, which teaches us to use and to make a good use of reason, we respect, we demand, and consequently we honor reason; but we have, and we want, no philosophy any further than it enters as the rational element of true Christian theology. We have never known any good purpose answered by your independent philosophies or philosophisms. The attempt to disengage the rational from the supernatural element, and to give it an independent disci-

pline, whether it be in the form of Gallicanism, natural ethics as distinguished from revealed religion, or metaphysics as disjoined from supernatural theology, never comes to any good, and we have never yet met a system of philosophy, that is, of pure rationalism, ancient or modern, that we could not push logically either to pantheism or nihilism. The spirit that leads men to attempt the separation is at bottom a schismatic and heretical spirit, and we owe to its prevalence most of the schisms, heresies, and moral disasters of the last three or four hundred years, and we wish to protest not only against its effects, but against the spirit itself. They who cherish it are unwilling to admit the universal supremacy under God of the Church, but wish to have at least a subordinate sphere in which they can assert human independence, and be as gods knowing good and evil without having learned them. Let our readers ponder well, whether the spirit that dictates the wish is Christian or Satanic.

For ourselves, we aimed to be a consistent rationalist, to spin all knowledge, spider-like, from our own bowels, till we found the thing was impossible. There was for us no alternative but rationalism, and with it nihilism, or the Catholic Church and tradition. We were never able to comprehend, with our Anglican friends, a *via media* between truth and falsehood. Nihilism, therefore, pure rationalism, is pure falsehood, for pure falsehood is simply absolute negation. Then Catholicity must be true; for nothing else is or can be. We must then take the Church as supreme, and as supreme in the natural as well as in the supernatural order. Then nothing is independent of her, and as the vicegerent of God on earth she has authority over all disciplines, and in every department of life. Her appropriate sphere is universal, and whoever seeks in any thing to act as independent of her, sins against the very providence of God in which he is placed.

God has made us, and not we ourselves; he has made us for himself, to know, love, and serve him here, and to be happy with him for ever hereafter. This is our only end, the end of all life, and for this end and this alone we are to live. If we live for this end and for this alone, there is and can be nothing else for us to care for. The earth, society, the state, instruction, education, are valuable only in relation to and as they subserve this end. The state,

though it deals directly only with temporal matters, is bound to manage these matters themselves with sole reference to this the only end of man, and woe to the state that forgets it, that imagines itself free from the law which binds it in its temporal enactments to consult only the spiritual good of its subjects, for sooner or later it will fill up the measure of its iniquity. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, all the nations that forget God." Here is the most fearful condemnation of the rationalist politics that have reigned throughout all modern nations if we except Austria, and even her we cannot wholly except, and the bitter fruits of their madness are they now beginning to reap. The functions of the state are indeed secular, but it is bound to discharge them in relation to a spiritual end, and the spiritual end man himself is bound to seek. All life, individual, social, political, is by the law of God subordinated to this end, and has no legitimacy, no right, no morality, but as rendered subservient to it.

How it is to be subordinated and made subservient to this end, God has not left us to find out by our individual reason; he himself has condescended to teach us in his revelation, and continues to teach us by unfailing tradition, of which he has made the Church the depositary, the divinely assisted and protected keeper and witness, teacher and judge. It is to her, that is, to her pastors, and especially to her chief pastor, the successor of St. Peter, that, directly or indirectly, all individuals, states and nations, subjects and rulers, must repair to learn their duty in the natural order and in the spiritual, for God has made her the judge of both laws, the natural and the supernatural, and in her courts made them but one law. She is the keeper of the consciences of princes and peoples in all things, for she alone has received from God authority to teach and declare his law. This is what we must concede if we concede the Church, or even truth at all. Men of the world, haughty statesmen, and proud philosophers may reluct at this, may turn away from it, and say they will never submit to an order so humiliating, so fatal to human independence; but that will not alter the truth, and it will still remain true that true wisdom and sound reason approve it. The Church is Catholic, for she subsists through all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth. We may learn sophistry and error outside of her;

we may have pride and slavery without her; but truth and freedom, real virtue and beatitude, only in and from her. Happy are they who as docile children delight to sit at her feet and learn the gracious truths that fall from her lips, who wish to be humble, faithful Christians, and desire nothing more.

ART. II.—*De la Restauration Française. Mémoire présentée au Clergé et à l'Aristocratie.* Par B. SAINT-BONNET. Paris: L. Hervé. 1851. 8vo. pp. 424.

THIS is certainly an able and interesting work, opportune, and well fitted to exert a great, and upon the whole a salutary influence, in the present crisis of European thought. Its author is evidently a man of faith and conscience, who has studied the social problems of the age long and profoundly, with deep earnestness and rare intelligence. He has characterized our moral, social, and economical wounds, probed them to the bottom, traced them to their origin, and prescribed the only possible remedy, namely, a hearty return of the age to Christian faith, and the practical observance in every department of life of Christian principles and maxims.

The remote cause of the present frightful state of the civilized world is, no doubt, to be looked for in the prevarication of Adam, in which man sought to substitute himself for God, and to make himself his own final cause; but the more proximate cause is the revolution effected in European thought and practice at the epoch of the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the revival of Greek studies and literature in Western Europe. The prevailing opinion of the world has been, and is, that the four centuries then commencing have been centuries of unequalled progress, and that the revolution then effected was entirely in the interests of true civilization. These centuries are applauded, are boasted as the most glorious in the annals of our race, those in which mankind have best understood their true destiny, and most successfully accomplished it; and whoever should venture to set himself against them, or to hint that the progress effected in them has been

in a downward direction, or more specious than real, would be almost universally branded as an enemy to his kind, as a barbarian, or as a lunatic.

This should create no surprise. Men of the world always judge with the world's judgment, — according to the principles and maxims of their age; and seldom incorrectly, if their standard of judgment be conceded. The human race may be now and then afflicted with lunacy, but it is never an idiot. An idiot is one who has just premises, but cannot draw from them just conclusions, that is, one who cannot reason; a lunatic is one who has false premises, but who is, nevertheless, able to draw logical conclusions from them. His insanity is precisely in his inability to seize and hold true premises. He binds a wisp of straw around his hat and calls it a crown, picks up a mullen-stalk and calls it a sceptre, ascends a mole-hill and calls it a throne, and proceeds to issue commands and proclamations coherent and proper, if he were, as he assumes he is, a real king. Assuming the principles or premises asserted by the revolution of which we speak, mankind reason coherently, and even sanely, in concluding that they have really been advancing in true civilization with unprecedented rapidity for the last four centuries; for it is undeniable that these centuries have been remarkably successful in reducing those principles to practice, and in drawing from them their last logical consequences.

But it is undeniable, and now conceded by many, that the revolution effected in the middle of the fifteenth century was a reaction, in every department of life, of ancient Paganism against Christianity, and the progress since effected has been simply a progress in the restoration of the ancient heathen order. This reaction commenced in philosophy, literature, and art, and passed into the political order under Louis the Eleventh and Louis the Twelfth of France, Henry the Seventh of England, and Maximilian the First and Charles the Fifth of Germany. From the political order it passed into the religious order, under Luther and Calvin, and the paganized princes and nobles who protected them; and it now, under the modern industrial system, triumphs in the economical order. The modern world, in philosophy, literature, art, politics, religion, morals, and economy, is in principle nothing but the reproduction of ancient heathendom. The simple question,

then, to be settled, in order to determine whether the world in applauding or we in condemning it are to be counted the lunatic, is whether Christianity or Paganism is the true social and religious order. If Paganism is from God and the true civilization, we are the lunatic, and unquestionably ought to be shut up in Bedlam ; but if Christianity be true civilization, be from God, and the Gospel is not a cheat, nor our Blessed Lord an impostor, but what he professed to be, then the world is the lunatic, and they who glory in it are laboring under a most deplorable hallucination.

One thing is now certain ; the revolution in favor of heathenism has been sufficiently developed to enable all who retain any portion of their wits to see its real character and tendency. Enough has already been experienced to prove that the happy results originally counted on are not likely to follow. The world expected on returning to Paganism to recover in some form the Eden lost by the prevarication of Adam, and at every successive step in its progress it has exulted as if on the very eve of recovering it. The restoration of Paganism was at first complete only in principle, and it has been only gradually, after successive struggles, that it has been practically realized. Christian civilization, the growth of fourteen centuries, effected by the labors and heroic sufferings of so many saints and martyrs, was not to be uprooted in a moment, especially as the Church remained to inspire and defend it. A direct attack on the Christian order in its totality would in the beginning have been imprudent, and defeated itself. It was necessary to divide in order to conquer, to begin by detaching the secular from the spiritual, the human from the Divine. This has been now in a great measure accomplished, and the revolution has finally passed from the order of ideas to the order of facts, and in Catholic nations as well as in Protestant. Philosophy has been disengaged from Christian theology ; literature and art have been sundered from Christian faith and piety ; religion from the Church ; morals from religion ; politics from morals ; industry from virtue ; earth from heaven ; man from God. The whole secular order is divorced from the spiritual, and civilization is shaped to man simply as an inhabitant of this world and a creature of mere animal wants and instincts. Nevertheless, the lost Eden has not been recovered, and, to

all appearance, no advance has been made towards its recovery. The separation of politics from morals, and the assertion of the strictly human origin of power, and the absolute independence of the state, have resulted only in anarchy and despotism, not in establishing liberty, as paganized statesmen madly dreamed; philosophy disengaged from Christian theology has become miserable psychology, and results in pantheism or atheism, scepticism or absolute nihilism; literature and art, disengaged from Catholic faith and piety, remain sterile, or bring forth only monstrous births, watery sentimentalism, or gross sensuality; morals sundered from religion become dull routine, heartless conventionalism, all-absorbing selfishness, flimsy sentiment, or unrestrained licentiousness; religion declared independent of the Church sinks into a matter of private reason and mere private caprice, and disappears in gross superstition, wild fanaticism, or cold indifference; and the emancipation of industry from morality, and moulding the whole economical order to the satisfaction of man's sensual wants, have resulted in impoverishing modern nations, and reducing the great mass of the people to the most abject misery.* The divorce of the secular order from the spiritual, the human from the Divine, the boasted achievement of modern progress, has undeniably resulted in the dissolution of society itself. There is absolutely, except the Church, no society now existing, no social order now standing; for that is not society which is sustained only by chicanery and armed force, or which like ours is only a huge mob, acknowledging no law but its own arbitrary will. Disband your great European standing armies, and there is not a single European state that could maintain even the semblance of social order for a single week. Our gain in substituting heathenism for Christianity has been

* The apparent exceptions to this statement are this country and England. In this country the full effects in the economical order of the heathen reaction have not yet been fully experienced by the *free* population of the United States, but it is owing to accidental and temporary causes fast disappearing, such as the youth of the nation, and the vast extent of rich lands unoccupied, and capable of being procured and rendered productive at comparatively a trifling expense. In England herself there may have been no real decrease of capital, but in considering her economically she includes Ireland and India, in both of which the poverty and destitution of the people are such as were unknown, except with the slave populations, if even with them, in the ancient heathen world.

the loss of all spiritual life, all religious faith, all morality, all intellectual freedom and greatness, all loyalty, chivalry, and nobility of sentiment, all political wisdom and all political liberty, all real social order, and, for immense numbers of the poor people, all honest means of subsistence, nay, of the means of subsistence at all. The whole annual income of France, for instance, if equally distributed among the thirty-six millions of Frenchmen, would give to each only between nine and ten cents a day.

Here is where modern progress has brought us. Here is the stern reality that now stares us in the face. Mad as the world is, it cannot be satisfied with this result. Nay, it does not even profess to be satisfied with it, as its heavings and commotions, its insurrections and revolutions, its Communistic and Socialistic theories and schemes, daily and even hourly put forth, amply prove. Never was the world more uneasy, agitated, discontented; and it acknowledges that all it has thus far gained has been a dead loss, unless it be regarded as the necessary condition of attaining to a state not yet attained to. Every body, or almost every body, feels, and feels in his heart and all through his frame, that it is impossible to remain where we are, that we must either push on in the direction we have been rushing for the last four hundred years, or recoil and retrace our steps.

Precisely here comes in our author, and shows, on the one hand, that to advance is impossible without precipitating ourselves into the Socialistic abyss, and, on the other, that, if we recoil and retrace our steps, it is impossible to find a stopping-place short of the Church. The only alternative is now either Socialism or Catholicity. No compromises, no *via media* schemes, no heathen premises with half-Christian conclusions, can now avail any thing. A great man, and for the moment one of the most useful men of society, M. Proudhon, has stripped of all disguises, and with an invincible logic given the thought of the age its precise formula, *LA PROPRIÉTÉ, C'EST LE VOL*, Property is robbery. None of the usual subterfuges of sophists and demagogues, such as Protestantism, liberalism, and moderate democratism, can now be resorted to, for this bold man, with his clear head, iron nerves, and invincible dialectics, has laid them bare, and revealed the age to itself. Nothing therefore remains but Socialism or Catholicity. This assumed or established, the author applies

himself to prove that Socialism is the inevitable result of the Paganism we have fostered, and that it is intrinsically repugnant to all civilization, being in direct contradiction to all the laws of Providence, intellectual, moral, social, political, and economical, and that, on the contrary, Catholicity is adapted to all the real interests of man and society, has been the creator of all the capital of the modern world, is the sole civilizer, and, if submitted to, amply sufficient to redeem us from our present frightful state, to reëstablish social order and political as well as moral freedom, by inspiring virtue, consecrating labor, and inducing moderation in enjoyment.

This is what the author aims to prove ; how true and just it is, in our judgment, we need not to inform our readers, for in one form or another we have for years been doing our best to set it forth and to establish it. But the author must permit us to say, and we do so, with great respect and deference, that, in developing and proving his thesis, he uses language, and sometimes adopts, at least in appearance, principles, borrowed from the very heathen schools against which he so nobly and so ably protests. It may be that we do not always catch his precise meaning, and also that what seems to us objectionable comes less from the unsoundness of his thought than from his neglect to state his meaning with the requisite clearness, distinctness, and precision. Nevertheless, we are not able to explain him always in harmony with the Catholicity he professes.

The fundamental distinction between Christianity and heathenism is, that the former asserts God as man's sole first cause and his sole final cause, and the latter asserts man as his own final cause. The one commands us as the rule of life to seek God in all things, and to do all for him ; the other bids us in all things to seek ourselves, and to consult in all only our own pleasure. Heathenism was first preached in the Garden by the serpent, who summed it all up in the promise, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," — a promise which, though a lie, and made by the father of lies, this age holds to have been true, not hesitating to maintain that the serpent promised the truth, and that man did, by eating of the forbidden fruit, really become as a god. In heathenism man takes the place of God, and stands as the sole end for which he is to live. But man cannot assert himself as his own final cause

without also asserting himself as his own first cause, from which it must follow, either that man is in the strictest sense God, or that man makes himself. But as to assert that man makes himself, and as to hold that man is absolutely God, is too open an outrage upon common sense, heathenism in our times compromises the matter by conceding that God creates the germ, or at least man is given in germ, but is left to develop and complete himself by his own efforts. This developing and completing himself from the original germ is what our age calls progress, and hence progress in the heathen sense implies that man is joint creator, or in part at least the first cause of himself.

Progress in this heathen sense is, as somebody has said, the Evangel of the nineteenth century. We find it asserted everywhere, in theology, ethics, politics, metaphysics, and in universal cosmology. All modern science, in so far as it deigns to recognize a creative God at all, recognizes him as creating only the germs of things, which are completed by their own internal law or force. As to the material universe God created only the gases, which from their own intrinsic force have developed in globes, suns, stars, minerals, plants, and animals. Man is only the last term known to us of a social development which begins in the lowest and rudest form of animal life, and the civilized man is only the development of the savage. Religion is only the successive development and growth of a vague sentiment of the human heart called sometimes a sense of dependence, a sense of the infinite, and Christianity is only the product of this sentiment successively working its way upward through fetichism, polytheism, monotheism, and reposing in a grand syncretism of all preceding religions. Even men who have not the least suspicion of their own orthodoxy carry the same principle into Catholicity, and maintain that Christian doctrine itself was revealed only in germ, and has been formed, completed, in the course of time by development. All proceeds on the assumption, that God never finishes any thing, never creates any thing but the mere germs of things, or reveals any thing but the germs of doctrine, leaving them always to the creature to complete. This is the grand thought of all modern science, and the illustrious author of the *Essay on Development* only applies to the supernatural order, to the formation of Christian doctrine, the principles which the author

of the *Vestiges of Creation* applies to the natural order, or to the formation of the universe, and his well-intended justification of his conversion is after all only an ingenious but undesigned attempt to harmonize unchangeable Christian doctrine with the modern heathen doctrine of progress. So all-pervading is this heathen doctrine, that very few of us are able entirely to escape it; and men whose faith and piety are unquestionable give utterance to principles which need only to be developed to be pantheism or nihilism. These men will not themselves so develop them; the grace they have received, and with which they freely concur, will save them from that; but who can say that others may not come after them who will develop them, and push them to their last logical consequences?

Now we do not suppose that our author in any thing he says intends this heathen doctrine of progress, but he certainly says some things which seem to us to involve it. He, indeed, expressly states that God is our final cause, the end we are to seek at all times and in all things. This is much, and, if consistently maintained, is every thing. But he tells us, man is placed in this world not to satisfy his wants, which is true enough, but to grow, and rise in being by the efforts they awake in his soul (p. 5). "Man is born," he continues, "neither free nor perfect; but simply with the capacity to become so. He brings only his germ. The germ of the apple, for instance, does it not envelop apples? If it withstand the winds and drought, above all, if grafted, as we are, by society, then it bears fruit." "Open your eyes, see that infant in its long clothes. That infant is man. Idiots, lunatics, do not become, they only remain such. Man is born an idiot, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of his soul." "God has given to men only the capacity to acquire liberty, will, memory, reason, and the other faculties, but only in proportion as they acquire them, so that the inequality among men comes from the fact that they have not all acquired them in equal degrees." (pp. 181, 182.) Over and over again he both asserts and implies that man makes himself, and is the product of his own labor and virtue. He reasons continually on the supposition that man commenced his career in space and time, not merely without political or social liberty, but without liberty as free-will, the principle of moral responsibility, and

had to create his liberty and constitute himself a moral agent. To form his *moi* or personality four thousand years of heathenism were necessary, and the reason why our Blessed Lord was not sooner incarnated is, that the human person, human freedom, human responsibility, was not sooner formed. The Gospel could not have been sooner given, because there was not sooner a human person to receive it, and hence heathenism was a sort of necessary preparation for Christianity. So also he contends, or appears to contend, that Protestantism is a necessary preparation for Catholicity. Protestantism is the religion of personality; it can begin human nature, but cannot complete it. Man forms his personality to offer it to God. Protestant nations are those to whom God has offered half the task, because not prepared for Catholicity, which undertakes human nature on all points at once. This old human nature, though ransomed by four thousand years of suffering and slavery, cannot bear at once the flood of Catholic light and virtue. Though Christianity from the first day triumphed in the Byzantine Empire, the human mind would not adhere to it; and Islamism has saved a people to civilization that else had irrevocably returned to barbarism; and on the decline of Islamism, we shall, perhaps, see them pass under the Aurora of some Protestant sect before arriving at the noonday of Catholicity. (pp. 395, 396.)

The author assumes that man commenced a mere infant, and that the savage is to be regarded as the primitive man. Men were first hunters, then shepherds, and then agriculturists. The earth, as man received it from his Maker, was empty and void, barren sand or naked rock, and he had not only to make himself, but the soil by which he makes himself. As a matter of fact, God, indeed, assisted man in the beginning, made him certain advances; but these are to be considered in the light of temporary loans, to be redeemed in proportion as man forms his own personality, and is able to subsist by himself on his own products. Even Christianity is given to man only in germ, and left to be developed and completed by his own intelligence and virtue, because God cannot outrun man himself, or travel faster than the race. These statements, principles, reasonings, scattered all through the volume before us, and some of them repeated almost to weariness, if

words are to be used in any relation to their plain and natural sense, prove that the author does not wholly escape the errors of modern progressists and developmentists, but does, in some respects, at least, assert progress in what we have termed the heathen sense.

Let us not be misunderstood; we do not condemn progress in every sense. Progress is certainly recognized, demanded, and assisted by our holy religion. But progress in what? We may regard the universe as presenting two cycles, the one the procession by way of creation, not emanation, of existences from God as their first or efficient cause, and the other their return, without being absorbed into God, as Indian pantheism teaches, to him as their final cause or last end. God has created all things, and has created them for himself alone. These two cycles are presented alike in the primitive creation or natural order, and in the new creation or supernatural order, that is, Christianity. In both orders progress in the second cycle is admissible and commanded. But progress in the second cycle is simply moral progress, not physical, a progress in *doing*, not a progress in *being*. It is a progress not in making ourselves, nor in completing ourselves physically, but in fulfilling the end for which God has made us, — in a word, a progress in moral perfection. This is the progress of which St. Paul speaks, when he speaks of pressing forward towards the mark of the prize of the high calling in Christ Jesus, the progress for which we were all made free moral agents, for which the law was given, Christian truth revealed, the Church founded, and the sacraments were instituted, after which every Christian aspires, and the saint successfully strives. This progress is very admissible, and we cannot insist too strenuously on it, or have too much of it.

But in the first cycle, that of creation, there is no progress by the agency of the progressing subject admissible, because God is sole creator, and creates by himself alone; and this alike whether we speak of the natural creation or of the supernatural. Creation *ad extra*, or placing existences in space and time, may or may not be progressive, according to the will of the Creator; all we mean to deny is, that it is progressive in any sense by the agency, will, or concurrence of the creature. In the first cycle God is sole actor, for the action of second causes in all cases, in so far

as the action of second causes, is in the second cycle, or return to God as final cause. Their action never reacts, and completes themselves physically, nor can it ever create any substance or entity. God himself creates all things from nothing by the sole energy of his word, and each after its kind, with a specific and determinate nature, unalterable physically, except by his own will and omnipotence. Thus is it in the first cycle of the natural order. It is the same in the first cycle of the supernatural order, as really and as truly a creation as the natural order itself. *Gratia est omnino gratis.* We can do nothing of ourselves to merit grace, for all merit is of grace. All in this order that pertains to the first cycle is the pure creation or free gift of God, without any merit, effort, or activity of ours; hence Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism are heresies. In the second cycle we of course are active, and to merit must concur actively by grace with grace; but in creating, procuring, conferring, or infusing the grace, we have no part or lot. Determining what shall be revealed, what shall be taught and believed as Christian doctrine, and revealing and teaching it, pertain exclusively to the first cycle, and therefore to God alone. Consequently the development or gradual formation of Christian doctrine by the activity of the human mind, or believing subject, cannot be supposed. Development of Christian doctrine there undoubtedly has been, and if the Gospel were provisional, if it looked to a more perfect religion, as the law looked to Christ, we would add, development there may be. The whole Christian doctrine was revealed in substance to our first parents, but nobody pretends that it was revealed to them as fully and as explicitly as it is possessed by us. But the development, explication, or completion of the primitive revelation has not been affected by the agency of the human mind, supernaturally assisted or unassisted, but by inspiration, by Divine revelation through prophets and apostles, that is, by action of the Holy Ghost in the first cycle. What is to be denied is not the progressiveness of past revelation by Divine agency, but the development and growth of doctrine by the mental or moral action of the faithful.

Here was the radical error of the distinguished author of the *Essay on Development of Christian Doctrine*, an ingenious work, indicating severe intellectual labor, rare speculative powers, extensive erudition, and much honest

endeavor, but which undeniably transports human activity into the first cycle, the peculiar province of God, and makes man joint creator with the Holy Ghost of Christian doctrine. It should excite no surprise that the learned author fell into this error at the time of writing his Essay, for he was not then even a Catholic, and, as he himself confesses, "his eyes were dim, and could but employ reason in the things of faith." He was led into his error by the false philosophy of the age, which asserts that the mind apprehends truth only under subjective forms, and by his Protestantism, which misapprehends the real character of those new definitions and further explications of the faith opposed by the Church to novel heresies and errors as they arise. Confounding the simple belief of the truth with the intellectual process of comprehending it, he fell into the mistake of supposing that heresy has always an honest origin, that it always springs from the necessary and laudable effort of the mind, an effort which every true believer must make, to ascertain and comprehend the truth, and that it always presupposes the faith on the point it contradicts was previously unknown even to the pastors of the Church;—a sad mistake, for the Church has never hesitated as to the faith to be opposed to the novel heresy, which proves that she knew it prior to the heresy, and the heresy never originates in ignorance of the faith or in an honest endeavor to ascertain it, but in the desire to establish a favorite theory, or to follow one's own private judgment. If Dr. Newman, now that he knows something of Catholic theology, and can take St. Thomas for his guide, were to review the Fathers, he would probably find that the theory he has adopted to reconcile their teachings with the actual faith of the Church, or to explain what he regards as their discrepancies and variations of doctrine, is as unnecessary as it is historically, philosophically, and theologically false and inadmissible; and were he to reëxamine his theory itself, he would find, we doubt not, that he has throughout, unconsciously, mistaken development and growth of heresy for development and growth of Christian doctrine. In the sense of further explications or new definitions of the faith explicitly held from the beginning by the Church, though not by every individual pastor, *contra errores insurgentes*, as St. Thomas says, development is certainly to be asserted; but in the sense of evolving by

the action of the faithful new articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith, unknown to the primitive pastors of the Church, and not proposed to primitive believers, it cannot be asserted, especially on the ground, that the human mind can apprehend and believe truth only under special aspects, and as it subjects it to its own formative process; for it gives to the mind a share in the formation of Christian doctrine. It is as to doctrine precisely what Semi-Pelagianism is as to merit; for it assigns to revelation, the Divine action, in the formation of doctrine, the precise office that Semi-Pelagianism assigns to grace in the formation of Christian character. Semi-Pelagianism developed is pure Pelagianism, and pure Pelagianism developed is pure heathenism, the last word of which is Socialism.

Now it is precisely progress in this first cycle that modern heathenism asserts, and the real error of the age is in attempting to do God's work, and in neglecting its own. The more advanced portion of the age, they who best represent its spirit, reject the supernatural order altogether, and assert progress in the first cycle simply of the natural; the less advanced portion, who wish to be considered as remaining within the pale of Christendom, admit the supernatural order indeed, but they show their sympathy with the age by asserting that God creates and reveals it only in germ, and we are to complete it by our own intelligence and virtue. But do we know what it is to assert progress in the first cycle? It implies, as we have seen, that man, in part at least, is his own first cause, the joint creator of himself, and this, which is a manifest absurdity, implies that God is not our sole final cause. God is our sole final cause only in that he is our sole first cause. If he is not our sole creator, we are not bound to seek him as our ultimate end in all things and at all times. Thus to seek him is to render unto him the tribute of our whole being as his due; but we cannot so render unto him the whole as his due, unless he has created the whole. What we have ourselves created, supposing it possible for us to create something, is our own, and we owe it to no one. We may, *pro tanto*, live for ourselves, and therefore are not bound, as our author and Christianity assert, to live for God alone. "Man forms his personality," says the author, "to offer it to God." This has a pious sound, but if man is the author of his own personality in whole or in part, he

does not owe it to God, and then in giving it to God he offers God something he has not received from God, and in crowning it God crowns, not his own gifts to man, but man's gifts to him. This is not Catholic doctrine. God is our sole final, because our sole first cause. To deny that he is our sole first cause is to deny Catholic faith, to subvert the foundation of Christian morals, and to assert in principle the very heathenism our author so bravely, and for the most part so successfully, combats.

The author is correct in saying that idiots do not become, but simply remain such, though not in affirming the same of all lunatics, *aliénés*; for men of intelligence and virtue have been known to become insane. It is not true to say that man is born an idiot, without any of the faculties of his soul, and with only the capacity to acquire them, for idiots are precisely those who are born without that capacity, in the only sense in which we can be said to possess it. It is, moreover, a grave error to maintain that any man is born without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of the soul, and only with the power to acquire them. The soul, strictly speaking, does not and cannot acquire its faculties, for they are it, and indistinguishable from it. Faculties are distinguishable in the soul, not from the soul. They are not accidental to the soul, but essential, and enter into its very substance or entity. To suppose it *in potentia* to any one of them is to suppose it *in potentia* to them all; and to suppose it *in potentia* to them all is to suppose it to be itself *in potentia*, a merely possible soul, without any actual existence, — a soul which God indeed may create *ad extra* if he chooses, but which he has not as yet so created. The soul may be *in potentia* to acts, but not to faculties.

In a certain sense the infant is no doubt the germ of the man, but only as to the body, not as to the soul, which is properly the man. The soul is born with all its faculties even in the idiot, and is no subject of development or growth, for it is a simple, immaterial substance; and hence it is not by development and growth, but by infused grace, that man is able to aspire to a perfection above the plane on which he is born. In passing from infancy to manhood the soul does not grow; only the bodily organs grow, and their development and growth fall within the second cycle, not the first. To assume that the soul grows be-

cause these material organs grow, is to confound the soul with the body, and to assume that the faculties of the soul are simply bodily developments, which is rank materialism. The soul, being in a manner inexplicable to us united to a body, has no ordinary way of manifesting itself externally except through bodily organs; but it in no sense depends on them for its faculties or intrinsic power to operate. Moreover, even since the Creator has willed to perpetuate the race by generation, as to the body, rather than by renewed creations, if man born in the bosom of society were born only in germ, it would not follow that the race began as a mere germ, and that the law which governs the race is that of development and growth; for the new-born child is not a new mankind, nor a renewal of mankind, but the continuation of the race, and presupposes the race already existing in its maturity.

The author cannot maintain that man is born without liberty in the sense of free will, and that he is not created, but makes himself, a responsible being. Free will is essential to man. The author himself terms it *le moi*, the personality, and therefore it is the last complement of man's rational nature, without which, unless supplied by the Divine personality, as in the human nature of Christ, that nature has no subsistence. Yet man, as yet insubsistent, gives to his nature its last complement! Free will is a *vis*, and therefore an *ens*; can man create not only an *ens*, but his own *ens*, or rather *existens*? It would require, we apprehend, somewhat more than four thousand years of heathenism to enable him to do that. If man is born without free will, without responsibility, or even the principle of responsibility, how will the author explain original sin, and the baptism of infants? If the child is not born with free will, a real person, he is born simply a thing or an animal. Can a mere thing or a mere animal be born a sinner, and be the proper subject of baptism? The author can hardly be aware of the heretical consequences his doctrine, that men are born idiots, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of the soul, necessarily involves.

There is something unpleasant to us in the doctrine that heathenism was a necessary preparation for Christianity, or that Protestantism is a useful preparation for Catholicity. The author seems to us to lose sight in his theorizing

of the salvation of individual souls, the bearing of heathenism and Protestantism on the world to come, and thus incurs the very guilt he charges upon the age. Those false and heretical religions are fatal to the souls of all who adhere to them, and it does not seem to us compatible with what we know of God, that he should make it necessary for generations to live and die in a state of sin and damnation, in order to prepare the way for succeeding generations to live and die in a state of justice and salvation. We would respectfully recommend to the author's meditation the assertion of St. Paul, that without faith it is impossible to please God, and the Catholic dogma, which so many in our days forget, or attempt to explain away, that out of the Church no one shall ever be saved.

Moreover, the author mistakes the duration of heathenism as the prevailing order of society. He speaks of its having endured four thousand years before the birth of our Lord. No doubt it was in the world from the time the serpent seduced Eve in the Garden, but it was formed and carried away the nations not till about the time of the calling of Abraham. The primitive patriarchal religion even in the time of Abraham does not appear to have been generally abandoned by the nations, and idolatry was probably general only in Chaldea. Melchisedech king of Salem, worshipped the true God. So did Abimelech king of Gerar, and so also Pharaoh king of Egypt. But let this pass. Heathenism, we are told, prepared the way for Christianity by constituting human liberty, the personality, or free will; but this cannot be true, for the origin of heathenism was precisely in the abuse of free will, in the perverse activity of human personality, in egotism or pride, and necessarily supposes the personality already formed. Protestantism again is, the author says, the religion of personality; yet, with his permission, not, as he supposes, the religion that forms the personality, and so far so good, and failing only in that it does not offer the personality to God after having formed it; but a religion that springs from the personality substituting itself for God. It is simply apostasy from the Church, as heathenism was from the primitive or patriarchal religion, that is, simply heathenism under modern conditions. It is a grave mistake to suppose that an apostasy from the truth is a preparation for the truth. Christianity in its substance is older than hea-

thenism, and has come down to us, not through the line of the gentiles, as the author's St. Simonian friends maintain, but through the Patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Catholic Church. Protestantism is not the dawn of Catholicity, but its setting; and if it retains some rays of light, they are only such as gild the evening clouds after the sun has sunk below the horizon. Mistake not the evening twilight, which soon is swallowed up in darkness, for the morning twilight that ushers in the day. Catholicity is prior to Protestantism, not its development. Truth is before error; God before man; orthodoxy before heresy. This old human nature, of which the author speaks, is undoubtedly unable to bear on all points at once the flood of Catholic truth and virtue, but who asks it to bear it? Nature alone assuredly is unequal to the splendor of Catholic faith or the sublimity of Catholic virtue, but what then? The author should not have forgotten that Catholic faith and virtue are not expected without grace, that sufficient grace is given unto every man, and that, though we can do nothing of ourselves, we can do all things through Christ strengthening us. The Catholic never reasons well when he forgets to make any account of grace.

We cannot accept the author's doctrine that the savage was the primitive state of mankind. It is not historically true that men were first hunters, then shepherds, and then agriculturists. Cain, the first-born of Adam, was an agriculturist, and offered in sacrifice the first fruits of the earth; Abel, the second-born, was a shepherd or herdsman, and offered the firstlings of his flocks. Some suppose Lamech was a hunter, but the first hunter distinctly named is Nemrod, who is also represented as a great builder of cities. It is the opinion of theologians that men did not eat flesh till God gave them permission to do so after the flood. There is no evidence that Adam, immediately after his expulsion from the Garden, or that Noah and his family, immediately after the deluge, fell into the savage state, and all the monuments of antiquity that remain tend to prove the reverse. Universal tradition ascribes civilization directly to the Divinity, and those nations that have in process of time become civilized always confess to having borrowed their civilization from nations previously civilized. Thus the Greeks ascribe theirs to Egyptian and Phœnician colonies. Nations once civilized have been

known to lapse into the barbarous or savage state, but there is no instance on record of a savage tribe, by its spontaneous efforts, having risen from the savage to the civilized state, and the author himself maintains that the savage state is unprogressive. The savage is the degenerated, not the primitive man, and no more the inchoate civilized man than the heretic is an inchoate believer.

These considerations sufficiently refute the doctrine which appears to be authorized by the plain and natural force of M. Saint-Bonnet's language; but we are free to confess that it is not impossible but that, in some respects, we have drawn a meaning from his language which he does not himself distinctly intend. Though as a writer he is bold, vigorous, and striking, he is not remarkably clear, precise, or exact. He writes as if he held logical precision and technical exactness in lofty disdain; and he appears to aim at moving the heart through the imagination still more than through the understanding. His words are familiar, and his sentences for the most part simply constructed, but what he really means by them we are often at a loss to determine. He is a disciple of the modern Romantic School, and, like Chateaubriand, sacrifices at times distinctness of thought and exactness of doctrine to æsthetic effect. The Church in the Catechism is always clear, distinct, exact, and precise in expression, and in reading the brilliant pages of the author of *Les Martyrs* and *Le Genie du Christianisme*, we often wish that he had taken the pains to learn it. His errors, although never springing from his heart, are but poorly atoned for by the charms of his style and the fervor of his sentiments. We are old-fashioned enough to prefer orthodoxy to highly excited sensibility, felicitous phrases, or happily turned periods. In his own mind, in his own understanding of his words, it is not impossible, after all, that our author is, for the most part, defensible. The chief errors we seem to find in his pages grow out of his neglect to distinguish the meaning of his terms, and to distribute his assertions according to their respective categories. He usually says what he means, but we suspect he does not always mean what he says. He expresses his meaning, but at the same time something more, or something else.

The author certainly uses the word *liberty* in the sense of free will, *le moi*, personality, the principle of moral re-

sponsibleness, and just as certainly uses it for the perfection which is acquired by the right exercise of free will, and that, too, without in the least distinguishing the one sense from the other. In the sense of free will, liberty is the person, enters into the essential definition of man, and pertains to him in the first cycle, or to his physical nature. To say that liberty in this sense is acquired, or that in this sense man is born without liberty, is false, and involves all the consequences we have indicated. But to say that liberty, as the exercise of free will, as sanctity, as "the liberty of the sons of God," of which the Blessed Apostle speaks, is acquired, or that in this sense man is born without it, is perfectly true, for he is born a sinner, and not even with the capacity to acquire it without grace. The author confounds the two senses and reasons as if the two were one and the same sense, and hence asserts the error along with the truth.

Man, the author says, is born neither free nor perfect, but simply with the capacity to become so, and if he were born free and perfect the Socialists would be right. The question as to freedom we have just disposed of. As to being born perfect, we must distinguish. In the first cycle, in his physical nature, in his essential qualities or attributes, man is most certainly born perfect, that is, perfect in his kind, perfect man, though not, of course, perfect God; that is, again, he is born with the full complement of his nature as pure nature; but in the second cycle, in the moral order, he is not born perfect, for he is born a sinner under the dominion of Satan, as the Church teaches expressly in her Councils, and in exorcising and baptizing the newborn infant. The author confounds these two senses, and so asserts the error with the truth, and fails to negative, except in part, the doctrine of the Socialists. The error of the Socialists is not in asserting that man is born perfect as to the first cycle, for that they do not assert; but in asserting that he is born perfect as to the second cycle, that is, without sin, pure, holy, in no need of pardon or redemption. The author contradicts them in this last doctrine, it is true, but agrees with them in the former, which, if possible, is the more fatal error of the two.

The author makes an analogous mistake in regard to all our faculties. He uniformly confounds the faculty in the first cycle with the faculty in the second; that is, the fac-

ulty as it enters into the essential definition of man with its exercise, or the perfection attainable by its exercise. Man is born, he says, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of his soul. God has given him only the capacity to acquire them; and men possess them only in the degree in which they acquire them; and hence the inequality which exists among men in society comes from the fact that they have not all acquired them equally. Hence the origin of ranks and social inequalities. They express the varying degrees in which individuals have acquired their faculties. Here is a truth and a falsehood. As they enter into his essential definition, man is not born without his faculties; as they mean simply the perfection acquired by their exercise, of course he is born without them, and possesses them only in the degree in which he acquires them. But whether social ranks and distinctions are always in the ratio of virtue is another question, to which we shall have occasion to return before we close.

What we regard as the author's errors originate mainly in this confusion of thought, this confounding of faculty with the perfection attainable by it, of the actor with the act, being with doing; but it is only simple justice to him to say, that, though he fails to distinguish the truth from the falsehood in his expressions, and even in his reasonings, the truth is that which is uppermost in his mind. When he tells us man is born an idiot, without any of his faculties, it is only fair to presume that it is faculty in the sense of the perfection that comes from its exercise that he chiefly intends. When he says that man makes himself, his real though not distinctly stated meaning is, that man makes himself morally, which, though rather commonplace, is strictly true, for a man's morality or virtue is always his own act. This is true, notwithstanding his moral perfection of himself is not possible without grace moving, assisting, and elevating him, because the grace by which he perfects himself is in the first cycle, and is not his act, but the principle of his act, and only physically completes him, so to speak, as an actor under God's *gracious* Providence. If man makes himself morally, that is, developes and completes himself in the second cycle, he must make morally, as to the same cycle, whatever enters into him as its necessary condition. Thus, though he has

nothing to do with creating, procuring, conferring, or infusing grace, yet, to obtain the perfection that is by it, he must by it concur voluntarily with it, and by this concurrence make it his, or, what is the same thing, the perfection that is by it his perfection. So of the globe and all the things pertaining to it, necessary to his perfection; he must himself morally make and appropriate them. Hence man makes both himself and the soil of the globe he inhabits; that is, in order to attain the end for which God has made him, man must make a right use of his free will, both in regard to himself and to all not himself, and can no more become perfect by immorality in the economical or industrial order, than in any other department of life, which is undoubtedly true. Man must use, and not abuse, both his faculties and the world.

Keeping in mind these distinctions, we may proceed to a more particular analysis of the volume before us. The work is directed against the Revolutionists, Socialists, Liberalists, and Communists of the day. It is divided into three books, the first on Capital, the second on Order, the third on Aristocracy; and it is designed to show that the economical, social, and political doctrines approved by the age, and contended for by the classes named, if reduced to practice, must result in the destruction of all virtue, all capital, all government, all society, and of man himself, save as a mere savage. It undertakes to do this by showing the conditions of capital or property, its relation to individual virtue and the constitution of families, the relation of families to the aristocracy and social order, and the relation of the aristocracy to government, to the constitution, preservation, and progress of society, or the continued increase of capital and virtue. Capital founds man, the freeman as distinguished from the slave, man founds the family, families found the aristocracy, and the aristocracy found and direct society, while capital itself is founded by virtue, and virtue by religion. To destroy religion is to destroy virtue, to destroy virtue is to destroy capital, to destroy capital is to destroy liberty or the freeman, to destroy the freeman is to destroy families, to destroy families is to destroy the aristocracy, to destroy the aristocracy is to destroy government, and to destroy government is to destroy society, and to destroy society is to drive men back to the savage state. The labor of the au-

thor is to show that all these elements act and react on and produce one another, and that civilization is only the result of their mutual action and reaction, and can be produced, preserved, or restored only by the presence and concurrence of them all. Consequently, to attack religion, virtue, capital, individual freedom, family, aristocracy, or authority, is to attack civilization, nay, man himself.

The author starts with the important assertion, that the radical error of the age, under an economical as well as a theological point of view, is the assumption that man is here simply to enjoy, that the end of production is the satisfaction of his desires, and therefore that in all his efforts and arrangements he is to consult the greatest possible consumption. Man is not placed in this world to satisfy his wants, but to grow,—morally,—by the efforts they awaken in his soul. The end of production is not consumption, but moral growth, the establishment of man in his liberty, his individual independence, and the development and completion of his moral faculties. In consequence of the Fall, man has now to make this independence for himself, and he makes it by virtue of capital. But such is the disorder of his nature that to acquire capital without effort, or to possess it without labor, is morally destructive. Wealth acquired by idleness or robbery only corrupts him, while wealth acquired by labor renders him moral. Hence, as God has made capital necessary to the production and maintenance of liberty or manhood, he has made labor necessary to the production of capital; and therefore has placed in man hunger, thirst, and other wants, for the purpose of forcing him to labor.

Capital is not, as Jews and merchants formerly imagined, a surplusage of coin laid by, but what man has produced over and above what he has consumed, and consists in the soil he has created and fertilized, his dwelling-houses, barns, out-houses, fixtures, utensils, implements of agriculture, mechanics' shops and tools, provisions, clothing, mills, roads, governments, laws, institutions, manners, customs, habits, education, instruction, &c. Capital is the product of labor, and labor decomposed is sorrow and liberty. Sorrow or pain, *douleur*, excites liberty or activity, and man labors or works, and produces.

Man has had to produce all by his own labor,—himself and the very soil of the globe. The world when he re-

ceived it from his Maker was, under the economical point of view, empty and void, barren sand or naked rock. Its soil was not yet created, its surface was not yet clothed with verdure, for the rains had not descended to water it, since as yet there was no man to till it. Man had not only to make himself a freeman, but the very soil of the globe, without which he could neither make himself nor even subsist. True, his Creator came to his aid, made him certain temporary advances, placed him in the East in a warm climate, under a clement sky, on a fertile oasis, where he could live with scanty clothing, and on the spontaneous productions of the earth. But this was only a provisional order, and in no sense the law by which man was to subsist on this globe. These advances were only temporary loans to liberty, indispensable in the first instance, but to be redeemed or withdrawn in proportion as man acquires his liberty, and becomes able to stand by himself and subsist on his own products, and therefore not to be considered in determining the great economical law by which capital is created, and liberty constituted. “En dehors de l’absolu il y a la liberté. Bien qu’elle ait eu commencement, elle repose sur la grande loi ; il faut qu’elle soit par elle-même. Sa première mise de fonds lui est retirer tous les jours, afin que son moi lui soit propre.” We are therefore to proceed as if no advances had been made, and to consider the law to be precisely what it would have been, if man had really been cast a mere germ of a man upon the barren sand or naked rock, and left to create the soil, and complete himself by his own efforts, or the efforts to which his inherent wants impel him. Without these wants he would not labor ; without labor he could neither grow nor subsist. But if he wastes his faculties as fast as he develops them, consumes as fast as he produces, he creates no capital ; for capital is the excess of production over consumption. Hence the conditions of capital are want, — sorrow or pain, *douleur*, — liberty, and abstinence ; that is, labor in producing, and moderation in consuming.

Man is naturally averse to this moderation. He is naturally inclined to produce only to satisfy his wants, and — as his wants always more than keep pace with his means of satisfying them — to consume all he produces. To practise this moderation therefore demands an effort against nature, the virtue of self-denial, not possible with-

out religion. Religion is indispensably necessary to produce this virtue of moderation, and it produces it by teaching us that the end of production is not consumption, is not to satisfy wants, but to prepare man for the future life, to form his personality that he may offer it to God. Hence, in the last analysis, religion is the essential basis of capital, and through it of liberty, family, aristocracy, government, order, and society. As religion depends on the Church, the clergy are the real producers of capital; and as a matter of fact, the modern world while it listened to the Catholic clergy had augmented its capital fivefold over that of the ancient world, and has found it diminishing in proportion as it has ceased to respect them, abandoned the Church and her maxims, and returned to heathenism. So great has been this diminution of capital in the principal European nations during the last century and a half, that they are, unless they immediately retrace their steps, on the eve of being forced to reëstablish slavery, the resort of antiquity to supply the deficiency of capital.

Man constitutes his liberty, and therefore his virtue, only by the creation of capital, and in proportion as he creates it. Capital, as the indispensable condition and as the product of liberty and virtue, is always in proportion to merit. It is acquired by individuals in various degrees, according to their respective degrees of merit. Hence in society we find a distinction of ranks, such as people, burghers, nobles, saints, and the several ranks express the various degrees in which capital, and therefore personality, liberty, and virtue, have been acquired. Every rank is the expression of the degree of merit acquired by its members. The superior ranks owe their superior rank to their superior merit. The aristocracy of a nation are its merit, its capital, its virtue, its religion, and the more numerous and powerful they are, and the higher they are elevated above the people, the more wealthy, virtuous, and meritorious is the nation. A nation that can no longer produce an aristocracy, or that has lost its aristocracy, whether by democratic revolution or by their adopting the manners and sentiments of the people, has ceased to be progressive, has become a spendthrift, is obliged to live on its capital, its past savings, which must be soon exhausted, and, if left to itself, cannot fail to lapse into the barbarous or savage state.

The aristocracy, the superior classes, are the saved prod-

ucts, the hoardings of a nation. In like manner as capital is indispensable to production are they indispensable to national progress. They are literally the capital of the nation, at once the producers and the product of its virtue. A nation without an aristocracy can no more be productive, than labor can be productive without capital. Religion founds virtue, virtue founds the aristocracy, the aristocracy founds capital, and through it society, and society founds man, or is the essential condition of man's development and completion of himself. This is the order.

The people of themselves found nothing; they have never constituted and never can constitute society, because they are precisely those whose liberty or virtue is least developed, and who are nearest the infancy of the race, the least advanced from the savage state. To turn towards them, as is the fashion of the day, to find the institutors or restorers of society, is to turn towards brute matter. The present deplorable condition of the European nations springs from the vices and faults of the aristocracy, who have abandoned their order in adopting the manners and sentiments of the people, or, in a word, have ceased to be aristocrats, and made themselves *people*, or at best mere burghers or commons. The question as to social restoration, especially as to the restoration of French society, turns entirely on the fact whether the aristocracy have still remaining capital and virtue enough to resume and perform the proper offices of their order, and as to France in particular, whether the *Bourgeoisie*, who by the revolution of 1789 wrested power from the hands of the old *Noblesse*, are able to take their place, and discharge the proper functions of a true aristocracy. If so, European society will be restored; if not, the great European nations must fall into the condition of savages, or of the barbarous tribes that now roam over the sites of the once renowned empires of the old Asiatic world.

This is a brief and a very unsatisfactory analysis of M. Saint-Bonnet's work, and can give no adequate conception of its value to one who has not read the volume itself, the great merit of which consists in its details, in its treatment of particular or special questions, rather than in its general theory; but we have given as faithful and as full an analysis as our time and space have permitted. To our apprehension there is much and important truth in the

volume, but also much error, growing out of what is to us a painful confusion of thought, a careless blending together of distinct categories. We agree entirely with the author as to the essential elements and conditions of society; but as to the production or evolution of these elements and conditions, if we understand him, we must differ from him. Is the author treating of the historical origin and constitution of society, or of its mere logical origin and constitution? Is he describing the action and reaction of the several social elements in society regarded as already constituted and in operation; or is he pointing out how in the historical order these elements have been successively developed from original germs, and combined into a civilized society? We confess we are unable to say which he is really doing, and he seems to us to do sometimes the one and sometimes the other, without noting that both are not one and the same. As we understand the author, he is obliged throughout to obtain the cause either from the effect or in producing it. He assumes that man starts as a mere germ, to be completed by self-development, and yet he makes completely developed manhood the essential condition of that self-development. Man is virtually cast a mere germ upon the barren sand or naked rock, and compelled to make himself and the soil of the globe by which he subsists and makes himself. Man, the author tells us, makes the soil, the soil makes the climate, the climate makes the blood, the blood makes the man, and thus man makes himself. But how make the soil before he himself is made? How get the effect before the cause, or convert it into the cause of itself? Capital is given always as the essential condition of religion and virtue, and yet it is declared to be the product of religion and virtue. Savages remain savages because they have no capital. They cannot cease to be savages without capital, and cannot acquire capital without ceasing to be savages. The human race began in the savage state, and the *people*, or lowest class, in civilized communities, are those who remain in that state or who have advanced but a step beyond it. The aristocracy have been produced by an advance beyond it, and yet no advance beyond it is possible without the aristocracy, but by their aid. We do not see how the author has contrived to get his aristocracy, or the human race out of the savage state.

The necessity of the aristocracy — we use the word in a good sense — we cheerfully concede; that they raise the people, not the people themselves, and found, preserve, and govern society, we hold to be indubitable. Society without an aristocracy, without diversities of ranks and conditions, is absolutely inconceivable, and what your mad European and some American democrats propose as society, constituted after their principles of *liberty, equality, fraternity*, is only the negation of all society. But we are unable to reconcile this with the author's doctrine that mankind began in the savage state, that the aristocracy have been evolved by man's labors at self-development, and that the *première mise de fonds* of liberty are to be regarded only in the light of temporary loans, to be daily withdrawn as man's personality is formed. Holding with the author in the former doctrine, we are obliged to dissent from him in the latter. We are obliged to hold that the adult is prior to the infant, the aristocracy to the people, civilized society to the savage state; and that the advances made by the Creator in the beginning are to be regarded not as temporary loans simply, to enable the race to start, but as a permanent grant of capital to the race; and therefore, that the economical law is not that of the creation from nothing, but the preservation and right employment of capital. Consequently, when individuals or nations have exhausted their portion of the original capital, or advances made by the Creator, their only resource is in those who have retained their portion, and properly employed it. This capital, in so far as essential to individual virtue and social well-being, was originally invested with the priesthood as its trustees, who were thus constituted from the beginning the true and only real aristocracy, the first fathers, institutors, and directors of the people, or of society.

No doubt, M. Saint-Bonnet concedes the fact of the primitive advances, but, if we understand him, they are to be regarded as merely accidental, and the law which governs the race is that of self-evolution and self-subsistence. He seems to suppose, because individuals born in the bosom of society have a progress and grow from infancy to manhood, we must, in considering the law of civilization, assume that the race itself began originally in infancy, and has had an analogous progress or growth. The race, indeed, exists not without individuals, but yet it

exists, the author's conceptualism to the contrary notwithstanding; but abstracted from individuals it has no destiny. It returns to God as final cause, but only in individuals; consequently, only individuals have, or can have, any progress. The physical conditions of this progress pertain solely to the first cycle, and must therefore be given outright by the Creator; for man creates only morally, that is, by the physical aid of the essential conditions of progress morally concurs with them. These conditions, under the present point of view, are expressed by the word *society*. Individuals can be born only in society, and it is only in society that they can subsist, grow, and accomplish their destiny. Consequently, society, and whatever is essential to it, must be instituted and exist before the race can begin to propagate and continue itself by the generation of individuals, or by the production of man in germ, as M. Saint-Bonnet considers the infant. Man as the race must therefore have been man before he was a child, and the race, that is, mankind on this globe, must be conceived as commencing, not in infancy, but in adult age, in complete and vigorous manhood, as we know from faith was the fact. God created our first parents, not babies, not savages, but full grown, and gave them to start with all that is essential to the institution and conservation of the highest civilized society. Thus we must always proceed on the principle that man started, not from the lowest, but from the highest level of human society, and with the means of raising individuals, as successively born, to the same level. The aristocracy which founds society, civilization, elevates the people, and renders virtue possible and actual, was given in the beginning, was originally in Adam, and during the whole continuance of the primitive or patriarchal order, in the patriarch, in the *pater-familias*, who was both priest and king.

In process of time the priest and the king have been disengaged from the *pater-familias*, and separated into a sacerdotal class and a royal class. The king has gradually become the king and nobility, the secular prince and the secular aristocracy; but the clergy, the king, and nobility were all in Adam, and whatever virtue or capital they represent is only the virtue or capital with which mankind started in him. The aristocracy have always subsisted in the race, and never been evolved from the people, or ob-

tained as the result of the growth or progress of individuals. They subsist always in society, engaged or disengaged, as its essential elements, and no society is conceivable without them, any more than an individual man is conceivable without reason and free will. The moral progress of man is not in creating them, is not in becoming them, but in submission and obedience to the principles they embody and the laws they administer. Consequently, though the aristocracy have been disengaged and become in some respects distinct classes in society, we are not to consider them the product of acquired virtue, and must still assume them as existing and in full vigor at the moment God placed the human race on this globe; and therefore we must take as our point of departure society constituted, civilization or social perfection realized, or placed by God in advance.

We thus, when we reason of the human race or of society, place the point of perfection in the beginning, not in the end, in God's work, not in man's. For individuals in a moral sense we place the point of perfection in the end, and regard it as the product of individual effort under the social conditions which God has provided. Hence we do not fall under the necessity of supposing self-production, which is inconceivable; that man makes the aristocracy, the aristocracy make society, and society makes the man. The aristocracy, in our sense of the word, subsist from the beginning, therefore from the beginning society exists, is constituted; and therefore from the beginning there subsist all the necessary conditions of individual growth, all the conditions necessary for the individual to fulfil his destiny, that is, return to God as his final cause. We have nothing to do with founding society, or founding an aristocracy to found it. God has done all that for us.

M. Saint-Bonnet holds that social ranks and distinctions as they actually exist are determined by virtue or merit, and simply mark the several degrees of moral progress made by the members of society. He recognizes four different ranks, the people, burghers or commons, nobles, and saints. The people are the lowest, the poorest, the least virtuous, those who have advanced least in forming their manhood, and remain nearest infancy or the savage state. The burghers, *la Bourgeoisie*, are those who have risen a degree above the people, the nobles those

who have risen a degree above the burghers, and saints are those who rise above the nobles, those who have reached the goal, attained to perfect manhood. Every individual, in his own person or that of his family, must pass successively through these several degrees in order to become a saint, must be successively people, burgher, noble, and then saint; for he can be a saint only by these successive purifications of his blood. Sometimes a rare individual goes in his own person through all these successive purifications, and from one of the people becomes a saint; more ordinarily, however, a man of the people becomes, by his virtue, accumulation of capital, and the purification of his blood, a burgher, and founds a respectable burgher family; in process of time, a member of this burgher family by a similar process raises himself to the class of nobles, and founds a noble family; after some generations, perhaps, a member of this noble family in the same way rises to be a saint, and it may be to found a family of saints. Saints are generally from the ranks of the nobility.

This is too fanciful for our taste. In our mode of considering social ranks, the lowest are not those who have not yet risen to manhood, but those who have fallen below it, and the highest are not those who have acquired, but those who retained, their original rank of freemen. The aristocracy may be replenished or recruited by individuals from the people, but, as a social order or class, they are never to be regarded as people developed and completed, any more than believers are to be regarded as heretics developed and completed, or Catholicity as the development and completion of Protestantism.

Moreover, we are not prepared to concede that the true aristocracy owe their rank either to their blood or to their personal merit. We are too much of a republican to believe that God has created two races of men, one noble and the other ignoble, and men themselves cannot create races. The most subtle chemical analysis can detect no difference between the blood of the noble and that of the people. M. Saint-Bonnet himself places, very properly, the clergy at the head of the aristocracy, and calls them the first or chief aristocracy; and the clergy, under Christianity, are taken indiscriminately from all classes of society, and it is fair to presume that, if blood were a matter of importance, the Church would make it a condition in can-

didates for Holy Orders. Our Lord selected his Apostles, not from the highest, but the lowest class of their countrymen, poor fishermen and despised publicans. It does not appear that St. Peter was distinguished for his blood, nor is the aristocracy, the aristocracy that founds and directs society we mean, always such in consequence of personal merit. It is an aristocracy of office, position, education, science, and manners, an aristocracy which does not make itself, but which God mediately or immediately institutes for religious, moral, and social purposes. The efficacy of the sacraments does not depend on the personal merit of the minister. Aristocracy is an office, a trust, and they who hold it are responsible for the manner in which they discharge its duties. This is certainly true of the clergy, and was originally true of the secular nobility, and the great and deplorable fall of modern society was effected when the title became expressive of a social rank without an official rank or corresponding employment. The feudal nobility was not a mere titular nobility, and England shows some relic of her old Catholic wisdom in restricting the title of noble to the members of her House of Peers. The author either takes blood and merit in an unauthorized sense, or else he pushes his theory to a ridiculous extreme. As a matter of fact, the clergy, the only real aristocracy, are in personal merit infinitely superior to any other class of society, but some of them have not led very edifying lives, and their efficiency in respect to civilization, as in respect to salvation, is in their office, in the doctrine, the sacraments, the discipline of which they are the ministers, not in their personal virtue.

The author attributes the savage state to the lack of capital, and the lack of capital to the lack of security. The savage has no security that if he sows he shall reap,—and therefore sows not and fails to make the soil, the soil fails to make the climate, the climate fails to make the blood, and so he himself remains unmade. But savages have among them all the social ranks and distinctions ordinarily found in civilized communities. Our American Indians have their priestly, their royal, and their noble families. How happens it that their aristocracy do not establish this security, found society, and raise their people to a civilized state? Nay, this very lack of security is exaggerated. The depredations of one tribe upon another are not

more common than the depredations of one state upon another among modern civilized states, and there are few civilized communities now to be found in which internal police, according to the Indian sense, is better maintained than in the bosom of the tribe itself. The reason is obvious enough why our Indian aristocracy fail to establish society. It is not in the lack of capital, unless we use the word in a sense which begs the whole question, not in the lack of security, nor yet in the lack of blood; but in the lack of the true religion and the orthodox clergy, the only civilizers. Send the Catholic missionary among them, let him preach Christ crucified to them, catechize and baptize them, and feed them with the bread of angels, and they become good Christians, even saints; and that too in the first generation, without any change as to material capital, the soil, the climate, or the blood. Here is a fact that suggests to us a strong doubt as to M. Saint-Bonnet's theory of capital and blood. The saint, according to that very theory, is highest in the social hierarchy, and the most perfect form of developed manhood. Yet here is your poor savage, by faith and the sacraments, with no other change than they imply, becoming a saint, and rising to the topmost round of civilization. Many a congregation of savages, converted by our humble, laborious, and self-sacrificing missionaries, in all the really Christian virtues can put to shame not a few of your European kings and nobles. Yet nothing in their condition that comes properly under the head of capital has been changed. They live mainly by fishing and hunting, as did their ancestors.

The early Christians, the saints and martyrs, who by their faith, their piety, their zeal, their charity, and their heroic sufferings conquered pagan Rome, and planted the cross in triumph on the capital of the world, were seldom gathered from the secular nobility or the nominally superior classes of society, but chiefly from slaves, the poor, and the ignoble. "For you see your vocation, brethren, that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble; but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the strong; and the mean things of the world, and things that are contemptible, hath God chosen, and things that are not, that he might destroy the

things that are; that no flesh should glory in his sight. But from him are ye in Christ Jesus, who is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption, that, as it is written, He that glorieth may glory in the Lord." * This was true not only in the beginning, but it is the settled order of God's providence in advancing his kingdom in this world. He chooses always the course opposed to that which human wisdom opposes. The Blessed Apostle makes no account of material capital; he says nothing of its being necessary, in order to attain to sanctity, that man should make the soil, the soil the climate, the climate the blood, and the blood the saint. Capital and blood, except the blood of Christ that cleanseth from all sin, do not appear to have been regarded by him as of any importance at all, in the process of making saints. The reason probably is, that sanctity is not a plant of natural growth, nor a product of natural culture. The Apostle always places it in the supernatural order, and teaches that it is from God through Christ Jesus, who is made to us wisdom, and justice, and sanctity, and redemption, and therefore not through human culture and development, through man's labor making the soil, the soil making the climate, the climate making the blood, and the blood making the saint. This process of making saints the Apostle certainly does not recognize, no doubt because he received no notice of it in the revelation of Jesus Christ. It is probably a recent development.

The author tells us that, notwithstanding the Apostolic labors of St. Francis Xavier and others in India, Japan, and China, Christianity could not take root there, and the holy missionaries failed entirely to establish there a Christian civilization, and because the blood of those old effete nations would not bear it. He thinks that those nations can be converted and made Christian nations only by carrying there the European, and perhaps the French flesh, which has for eighteen centuries been nourished by the *flesh* of Christ.

“ Le Christianisme n'entrera vivant au Japan et ailleurs, que lorsque des masses de Chrétiens vivants iront porter leur sang dans les veines épuisées de ces peuples. Il n'a été donné à la morale de commencer des races que

* 1 Cor. i. 26 - 31.

chez nous, loin du soleil, loin de toutes les avances faites par la nature aux premiers humains. Désormais la race cérébrale a fait trop de progrès pour qu'on puisse racheter un peuple à notre degré sans le faire communier à notre chair. Malgré ses efforts, sa vie, sa sainteté, son martyre, Saint François-Xavier n'a pu laisser une civilisation Chrétienne au Japan. Par de révolutions peu prévues, cette chair *humaine*, à laquelle la chair du Christ sert de levain depuis dix-huit siècles, ira porter son ferment de vie dans la chair esclave des enfants de Sem et de Cham. Et d'ailleurs, si l'Orient eût pris le premier le Christianisme, c'eût été le Christianisme rêveur avant d'être le Christianisme pratique des peuples occidentaux. L'amour s'y fût formé avant la personnalité; le sol humain n'y eût pas reçu un assez profond labourage; il n'aurait pu fournir la sève au monde Européen, comme il est appelé maintenant à l'en recevoir. Saint Pierre fut établi avant Saint Jean, bienque ce dernier soit, aussi, celui que mon âme préfère." — pp. 398, 399.

It is true the author cites in this passage M. Enfantin, late sovereign pontiff of the Saint-Simonian religion; but he cites him in a manner which proves that he adopts it, and adopts it as showing the reason why Christianity has not maintained its ground in the East, and why the Oriental nations still remain out of the pale of Christian civilization.

M. Saint-Bonnet contends that the order of Providence is, that in this world all should be distributed according to merit, and that men are people, burghers, nobles, saints, and nations are savage, barbarous, civilized, Christian, most Christian, according to their several degrees of merit. As merit proceeds from the will, from the activity of man, God is obliged in the order of facts to follow man, and therefore Christianity cannot precede or go before man's merit. What the author really means by this is to us uncertain; but certainly, as he not seldom applies his principle that all is according to merit, that principle is one which as a Catholic he cannot hold; for it is rank Pelagianism, the dominant heresy of the age. A man does not become a saint because he merits to be a saint. Did not St. Paul say, "By grace I am what I am"? Is grace of merit? Is not grace always gratuitous, even by the very force of the word? Man prior to grace cannot merit grace, nor even prepare himself for it. The beginning and

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end of his sanctity are of pure grace. Even by keeping the precepts of the natural law man does not positively dispose himself for grace; he only removes the obstacles which actual sins interpose to its operation. The author in his brilliant theorizing seems to us to forget this important Catholic doctrine. By making all depend on merit, instead of the free grace of God, by representing man as making the soil, the soil the climate, the climate the blood, and the blood the saint, he gives man the right to glory in himself, whereas the Apostle allows him to glory only in the Lord. The author, too, we suspect, is a little *carnal* in his views of the influence of the sacred body of our Lord received in the Blessed Sacrament. We are not aware that it works a revolution in the blood or flesh of the race. Its influence we had supposed was spiritual, not carnal. The Old Adam remains even in the saint, as long as he lives, and the child of saintly parents is born a child of wrath as well as the child of infidels, and in administering baptism to either the Church observes the same rites and ceremonies. The Christian transmits no Christian virtue with his flesh. Now, as before the coming of our Lord, every one of us must say, "I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." The Christian graces and virtues are personal, and affect solely the personal character; they do not enter into human nature, and become the natural inheritance of the race. The Son of God assumed human nature *in individuo*, not *in specie*, and he was not, and is not, converted into flesh; he only took human nature up to himself. The author seems also not to remember that the virtues by which, according to him, wealth is accumulated, are not Christian virtues, and have no necessary connection with Christian sanctity. Sanctity is not in their order, and they, or any of the secular virtues, are never its germs. The author could not fall into a graver mistake than to suppose that the saint is the natural development or complement of what he calls *people*.

Slavery, in the ancient world, the author says, was a sort of *forced* Christianity, and justifiable because necessary to supply the deficiency of capital, to break down human pride, and to produce the Christian virtues of patience and resignation. But where is the justice in reducing one portion of mankind to slavery that the other portion may be free? Why is it necessary that a freeman should consume

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more in proportion to what he produces than a slave? If it is not, there was no necessity of slavery to supply the lack of capital, and it was no real substitute for capital. Did slavery tend to humble or to exalt the pride of the slaveholders? Were the *forced* virtues of patience and resignation *Christian* virtues? If they were, and slavery is favorable to their growth, why does the author represent it as one of the chief glories of the Church that she has abolished slavery throughout the European world? St. Augustine teaches us that slavery pertains to the penal providence of God, originates in sin, and may serve, like all the sufferings of this life, as a salutary penance, if properly submitted to.

Labor, says the author, is not for wants, but wants are for labor, and labor is to prevent wealth from being a great evil. But what is wealth for, if not for wants? Wealth acquired by idleness or robbery, that is, without labor, always corrupts. How, then, does the author defend hereditary wealth against the Socialists, since wealth inherited is not acquired by the labor of him who inherits it? Wealth acquired by immoral means, no doubt, proves that corruption already exists, and with just as little doubt it tends to extend or increase corruption; but is it true, on the contrary, that wealth acquired by labor always tends to make the possessor moral? If so, the Chinese, the Scotch, the English, and the Anglo-Americans should be the most moral people on the globe, instead of being, as they are, the most immoral, if we speak, as the author must be understood to speak, of Christian morality. In fact, labor for the accumulation of wealth for the sake of gratifying sensuality, or for its own sake, as the miser accumulates it, is itself immoral, and repugnant to Christian sanctity. Labor in itself considered is neither moral nor immoral. It is a punishment imposed upon the human race, and, like all punishments in our probationary state, may or may not have a moral effect, according to the temper in which it is borne, and the end to which it is directed by the will of him who bears it. As a general rule, wealth, however acquired, is a temptation and a snare.

But we are exhausting our space, and most likely the patience of our readers. We do not regard our author as a profound or an exact theologian, but we do think him an able political economist, and wise and just in his political views and observations. His practical remarks on our cur-

rent politics deserve the highest praise, and we are really grateful to him for having, demonstrated in an unanswerable manner, that all labor bestowed on the fabrication of luxuries adds nothing to capital, but really diminishes it, and thereby demonstrating that our modern industrial and commercial system, so much applauded, tends to impoverish instead of enriching the nations that have adopted it. Here, and in most of the special questions he treats, the author shows extensive knowledge, rare sagacity, and just thought, which, notwithstanding its errors in a theoretical point of view, give to his work in the actual state of things a very great practical value. We hope to return to his views of some of these special questions hereafter; for we would not have our readers infer that we hold either the author or his labors in light esteem, because we have found in his volume some things to censure. He has bravely combated the modern enemies of society, he has exposed most satisfactorily the fallacies of the Socialists, and vindicated the absolute importance of the Church as the first and only source of civilization, order, and society. If he has erred, it has not been with malice; the sincerity of his faith is unquestionable, and his heart is in the right place.

The errors we have indicated may be traced to the same causes which came so very near leading the excellent Balmez astray, which make us tremble for Padre Ventura, which engulfed the brilliant De la Mennais, and have stranded the proud and philosophic Gioberti. They come, when they come honestly, as in the case of our author, from the attempt to combat the enemies of religion and society with their own weapons, or rather from the habit of considering Catholicity in its relation to society and civilization, instead of considering it in its relation to the supernatural destiny of man, or the salvation of the individual soul. We are, perhaps, in danger of falling ourselves into the very heresy we are combating. Our religion is just now opposed in the name of man, of liberty, of society, of the earthly well-being of mankind, as our Blessed Lord himself was by the old carnal Jews, who rejected him, and crucified him between two thieves, because he came as a spiritual prince, to save men's souls, not as a temporal prince, to found an earthly kingdom and secure prosperity to his followers. We meet them on their own ground. It is an undeniable fact, that the Church has founded modern

civilization, and has been the source of all the real well-being of modern nations. We hasten to bring forward and prove this fact, and having done so, we say to her enemies, *Therefore* return to the Church, and love and obey her as your mother. M. Saint-Bonnet sees — what is most true — that there is no good for us even in this life, unless we live for God and heaven, and he adds, *Therefore* live for God and heaven, not reflecting that, if *therefore* we live for God and heaven, we do not live for them, but for this life alone, and are still carnal Jews expecting a temporal Messiah and an earthly paradise. The Church secures us the real goods of this life precisely because she does not propose them, because she makes no account of them, and subdues in our hearts the desire to possess them; precisely because she proposes only God and heaven, concentrates our affections on another life, and entirely absorbs us in the great work of saving our souls, of making our calling and election sure. God and heaven are gained by being sought; earth, by being rejected, despised, trampled on.

We seek the reason of the lapse of nations once Catholic into heresy, infidelity, barbarism, in extrinsic causes, now in this civil or ecclesiastical policy, now in that particular national vice or corruption; and we seek to win them back to their duty and to salvation by a variety of extrinsic motives, addressed to the dominant tendencies of the age. All this is natural, but we suspect not altogether as wise and as prudent in God's eyes as in our own. When individuals or nations break away from the Church, the reason is, that the natural pride of the human heart and the love of the world have gained dominion over them, and in most, if not in all, precisely in consequence of temporal prosperity. "The beloved grew fat and kicked. He grew fat, and thick, and gross; he forsook God who made him, and departed from God, his sovereign." And we can recall them to faith only in proportion as they are humbled, and we can make them feel that they have souls, souls exposed to eternal damnation, and which cannot be saved out of the Catholic Church. The world is bad, but not, after all, so bad as in the days of St. Paul; and yet he went forth to correct it, not with speech of man's wisdom, not with systems of political economy, nor human philosophies, nor with long arguments to prove the adaptation

of the Church to the earthly wants of society; but with the word of God, as the humble minister of the Gospel, resolved to know nothing, in the midst of the corrupt and abandoned world, but "Christ and him crucified." The germ of all the evil that afflicts individuals and nations is in the individual human heart, is born with us, and loses not its vitality of death so long as we remain in the flesh. It is only by Catholic faith, sacraments, and discipline that it can be repressed or prevented from sprouting forth and bearing its poisonous fruit; and these, by repressing it in the individual heart, and generating in the same heart the dispositions and virtues requisite to eternal salvation, do all that can be done to remove even national evils, and secure temporal well-being. Here is the conclusion of the whole matter, and they after all who confine themselves solely to the eternal destiny of the individual, without once thinking of the bearing of their labors on this world, are under God the true founders of nations, promoters of social order, and reformers of society. God's ways are not ours, but it is only as we follow his ways that we can succeed.

Works written to show the civilizing influences of Catholicity, its absolute necessity as the founder and preserver of society, the assertor and only real defender of liberty, may do great good in removing prejudices, and the various impediments to the reception of the truth placed in its way by the false liberalism and mad Socialism of the age. And so far as they are fitted to have this effect, we are grateful for them; but the more exclusively even such works are written from the point of view, not of an earthly destiny, but of our supernatural and eternal destiny, which after all, *in hac providentia*, is our only destiny, the more really serviceable will they prove. The fault of most of the works of this sort which fall under our notice is, that they consider God and heaven from the human point of view, in their bearing on man and society, not man and society from the point of view of God. Their authors proceed from man, society, history, to the Church, not from the Church to these; that is, they start with man, with psychology, and not with the Catechism, and really seek to develop the Church from man and society, instead of man and society from the Church; or if they go not so far astray as this, they still assign to man an earthly destiny, distinct, and in

some measure separable, from his heavenly destiny, and then attempt to consider the Church solely in her relation to this earthly destiny, — Gioberti's grand error in his *Del Primato*, — sometimes under the special aspect of philosophy, sometimes under that of literature and art, and sometimes under that of politics and political economy. The fate of De la Mennais, Hermes, and Gioberti, not to say of Rosmini and Ventura, is the best evidence we can ask of the dangerous tendency of this method of considering our holy religion. By the Catechism, which, as we learn more, becomes more precious to us, and by the Holy Scriptures properly read and meditated in the light of the Catechism, we are placed at the point of view, if we may so speak, of God himself, and see things, as far as we see them at all, as God sees them, as they are, and become able to judge them with his judgment. Seen and judged according to Divine revelation, we can represent them in their true light, and then in that light in which alone their representation becomes effectual for good.

God has placed the Church in the world to redeem men from sin, and elevate them to himself. He has placed her here as the Divine and essential element in society, and without her no true society is practicable, or even conceivable. He has enriched her with the infinite treasures of his love and his wisdom. In the patriarchal form, in the synagogue, or as the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, she subsists in all ages and nations, and is in each the Divine assistance requisite to enable man to return to God as his last end, to save his soul, and thus fulfil his only destiny. In her is the necessary capital, the *première mise de fonds* of liberty, the blood that forms the true aristocracy; nay, the true aristocracy itself, that institutes, preserves, or restores society. She through her clergy can preserve the old civilized state, restore the state when fallen into the condition of the modern European nations, and civilize the most barbarous and savage tribes, by insisting, and because insisting, only on the things which pertain to the salvation of the individual soul, if she be obeyed and her instructions followed. If individuals and nations submit to her, and, according to her instructions, seek only the eternal salvation of the soul, all will go well with them; if they will not, there is no help, there is no good for them; and they shall be turned into hell, and the greater

their temporal prosperity the deeper will be their damnation. Here is the settled order of God's providence, let men wrangle, fight, dispute, speculate, reason, as they will. So we need not trouble ourselves with philosophical, political, social, or economical problems as such. Let us once acquire the virtues indispensable to salvation, and these problems will solve themselves, or cease to need solution. We must be Christians, not heathens or carnal Jews, or else there is no good for us.

- ART. III.—1. *Hungary and Transylvania. With Remarks on their Condition, Social, Political, and Economical.* By JOHN PAGET, Esq. From the new London Edition. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1850. 12mo. 2 vols.
2. *The City of the Magyar. Or, Hungary and her Institutions in 1839–40.* By MISS PARDOE. London: George Virtue. 1840. 3 vols. 8vo.
3. *Souvenirs et Scenes de la Guerre d'Italie, sous le Maréchal Radetsky. Souvenirs de la Guerre de Hongrie, sous le Prince Windischgrätz et le Ban Jellachich.* Par le COMTE GEORGE DE PIMODAN. Paris. 1851.
4. *Hungarian Military Sketches.* London: Williams & Norgate.
5. *War in Hungary.* By MAX SCHLESINGER. Translated by J. E. TAYLOR. Edited by FRANCIS PULSZKY. London: Bentley. 12mo. 2 vols.

ONE more chapter on Hungary remains to be written, in order that our readers may thoroughly understand our judgment concerning the affairs of that unhappy kingdom. We have shown that the cause of the Magyars was not a republican cause, and that it was not a good cause. The popular errors with reference to Hungary may be summed up in those two points. We have now another question before us, and it is, How came the people to be so grossly mistaken about the Hungarians? We will briefly answer this question, and it will lead us into a discussion more grateful to our feelings than our former thesis was, inasmuch as it is always more pleasant to praise than to blame, where the subject-matter allows us to bestow honest

praise. In our previous articles, we accepted as guides, either Magyar authors, or writers who are intensely Magyarized, because we were aware that direct evidence, given by them, that the Magyar cause was not republican, and that it was not good, could scarcely be rejected, even by the most earnest patrons of Magyardom. For the views now presented by us, we lean upon the authority of almost every person who has ever written a line concerning Hungary. As we have to say something in favor of the Magyars, however, it is as well to quote, not only Magyar testimony, but also the evidence of authors who are not Hungarian. The English works whose titles we have given at the head of this article, although they are not new to the public, are sufficiently trustworthy, and they will answer our purpose as well as the others, written before the sound of Russian cannon had ceased to reverberate among the Carpathian Mountains.

The public error with reference to Hungary was not, as every one knows, merely a speculative error. It was reduced to practice, and not always of the most creditable nature. The mistaken notion which prevailed here, in America, led to an intensely partisan stand in favor of the Magyars. Two honorable Senators, both shrewd statesmen, both candidates for the Presidency, debased themselves so far as to pander directly to the popular frenzy. One called for a suspension of diplomatic intercourse with Austria; the other made complimentary speeches to Magyar refugees, and wrote radical letters to the Austrian ambassador. Both thought, or seemed to think, that the pro-Magyar feeling was so strong in this country, that no candidate for the Presidency could safely disregard it. And the wind that blew to Austria Senatorial threats, and letters on the "manifest destiny" of the United States, reached Massachusetts, and was strong enough to frighten Old Harvard out of her propriety, and to sweep a professor who had endeavored to resist the popular feeling from his chair. And the consequences of the radical mistake made by most Anglo-Americans, unpleasant as they were, did not confine themselves within American limits. American travellers in Austria were closely watched; obstacles to their entrance into the empire were multiplied; one, a spy employed by our government, came near being hanged; and quite recently another, who, if not a spy, was cer-

tainly a very imprudent person, passed several days in an Austrian prison. A popular error which leads to consequences like these is a grave matter. It is time that it should cease, and, if we mistake not, it is rapidly going its own way.

The causes which led to a firm persuasion, on the part of so many, this side of the Atlantic, that the Magyar war was a just war, and that it was waged on democratic grounds, — and led, also, to the earnest sympathy for the Magyars which was so freely manifested amongst us, — may be summed up under three heads. Radicalism is gaining ground, in truth, it may be said to possess the ground, in the United States. The public mind, and the public institutions, which are supposed to represent that mind, are becoming exclusively democratic, with a rapidity which, however grateful it may be to democratic propagandists, is sure to please the enemies of genuine republicanism, and the men who never tire of saying that the great American experiment will fail. It pleases them, as it pleases the prophet to see the fulfilment of his predictions hastening with a rapidity greater than he had reason to expect. In the last number of our Review, the attention of our readers was directed to the cheerless fact, that, while our Constitution presents a balance of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements, the democratic element is fast eliminating the others. Exponents of this elimination may be seen almost as often as our legislators meet, our courts sit, or a popular movement is made. One effect of the radical principles which alone we seem willing to recognize as American principles is, to bring about a total change in our theory of government. Power is no longer from God; magistrates no longer rule by his grace. The Vigilance Committee at San Francisco are not many years in advance of their Eastern brethren, if they are an hour in advance of them, in basing public action upon the assumption that the process of elimination is completed by the democratic element of our institutions; — upon the doctrine that in the mob, whether well or badly dressed, resides the power which creates legislatures and courts of justice, and which holds suspended over the guilty, and, it may be, over the innocent, that sword which only God unsheathed, and placed in the hands of the lawful magistrate, for the terror of evil-doers. The spirit which

establishes at San Francisco the Vigilance Committee, and proclaims the absolute sovereignty of an irresponsible mob, is also strong, fearfully strong, in our midst, and our apathy is the apathy, our blindness is the blindness, which goes before death when it comes like a thief in the night.

This change in our notion of government leads to a result which may place us, as it once placed France, in the attitude of a natural enemy of every civilized government on earth. The question whether a perfect form of government should be monarchical, aristocratic, or republican in its principal elements, is a question which cannot well be settled in the abstract, that is, from a comparison of mere ideas. In the concrete, no one of the three is absolutely superior to the others. Rulers and people can save their souls, can obtain the first and final end of society, under any one of the three forms. Each is in harmony with the natural law, and, of course, with the positive law of God. Wherever any one of them is established, is in possession with its historical rights, is the legitimate order, it will be found to be the best form for the people who live under it; it exists under the Divine sanction, and it is to be respected as the just expression of the right of that people to government, order, and law. A republican form of government is the exponent of American right to an organized society, a monarchical form is the expression of Austrian right. That government is the best for a people which best enables them to fulfil the end for which society exists.

These are elementary truths; but the American mind has made such vast progress that it is beginning to regard plain, elementary truths as recondite axioms, quite unintelligible to good democrats, and only to be granted, or perhaps comprehended, after an elaborate argument. Hence it is necessary that grave writers, even, dwell upon them at every fitting season. It may be said of Protestants, that one can safely give them the credit of knowing every thing excepting the plainest principles of religion. It may, judging from present appearances, soon be truly said of most Anglo-Americans, that they are excellent judges of every thing excepting the science of government.

The notion which at this time prevails among our people is, that no other than the democratic form of government is legitimate. All other forms are inadmissible, or

at best mere preparatory institutions, designed to conduct the affairs of society until the people become able to govern themselves. As all power resides in the people, or is derived from them, it follows that government is only an agent whose business it is to execute the popular will, or, at farthest, a corporation holding certain powers in trust for the people, until these can resume the management of their own concerns. It follows that any movement, which tends to make the people sovereign in fact, as well as in theory, is a just, a legitimate movement. Governments, as such, have no rights, they have only duties. The people, as such, have no duties, they have rights. It cannot be asked of a revolutionary movement in the direction of democracy whether it be just; the only question is, Is it prudent? Is it time?

It is easy, therefore, to conceive why so many amongst us favored the Magyar cause. That cause was supposed to be a democratic cause. It was certain that the Hungarians were in arms against Austria, and that the government of Austria was monarchical. These simple considerations settled the whole matter. The people, in similar cases, have forgotten to ask what are the character, motives, and number of the rebels, whether their grievances be real and their statements true. These and the like topics are unnoticed. The case for the government is not allowed a bare hearing, far less a fair trial. The whole matter is settled by an *a priori* argument, according to which government must always be in the wrong. Why, then, waste time in listening to its defence.

Of the American sympathizers with Hungary, probably nineteen twentieths have arrived at a conclusion by the foregoing *a priori* argument against Austria. Unfortunate men! They do not see, or seeing, they rejoice, that the same argument is urged against our own government by Free-Soilers and radicals of every hue, and that it is urged with a fearful efficacy. The steam-engine is the exponent of our type of civilization. Steam and fire, if good servants, are bad masters. The ascendancy of steam is terrible on earth, as the ascendancy of fire is terrible in hell.

Had the American people thoroughly understood the character of the Hungarian rebellion, had they known that it involved a war of races, that it was an intensely aristocratic movement, and that the great mass of the inhabitants

of Hungary were likely to fare no better, and perhaps worse, under independent Magyardom than under Austria, they would not, possibly, have wasted so much time, breath, and sympathy upon the Magyars. But they knew not these things; neither are many quite willing to believe them now.

The press, of course, is, in a great measure, responsible for this curious specimen of national ignorance. To a certain extent, the newspapers may be excused. Hungary is a distant kingdom; it lies on the frontier of civilized Europe, and in 1847 Americans knew as much about it as they knew about the southern slope of the Caucasus. No American traveller, and but two or three English tourists, had written about Hungary. Paget, Miss Pardoe, and one or two French travellers who had visited that romantic land, testify strongly and repeatedly, not only to the fact that Western Europe knew nothing of Hungary, but also that even the tourist might spend a year in the country without learning much about it, so strange, so anomalous, according to our notions, is the state of society in Hungary. To get any information worth having, the traveller was obliged to avoid the common error of visiting only the places and persons named in his letters of introduction. . We can appreciate the magnitude of this difficulty, when we remember how hard it seems for Englishmen, whose institutions do not differ generically from ours, to gather and to convey to their countrymen a tolerably accurate notion of the state of our society. To understand that it is difficult to obtain the most common information concerning interesting events transpiring in other countries, it is enough to point to the fact, that a popular commotion of some sort has disturbed the island of Cuba for nearly two months, and, notwithstanding the letters, despatches, and other documents which have filled the columns of the papers for the last few weeks, it is not easy for the closest observer to know, at the time we are writing, whether the revolution has taken place in Cuba, or within the limits of the United States. It will probably turn out that there have been a few petty fights on Cuban ground, but that the war of independence was fought and won in American printing-offices, and in the New York and New Orleans Cuban club-rooms. Why, any good Whig or Democrat, who reads only his own partisan journal, is a living

and—it is a comical circumstance—an unconscious witness of the difficulty of obtaining correct information concerning political events which happened in his own State. Each man gets, from his favorite paper, the most distorted accounts of things done and said by the other party. The foreign journalist, who reads both papers, and who sometimes believes both, is, perhaps, less in the dark than our free and enlightened voter is concerning events which transpired almost in his very presence.

All this does not precisely demonstrate that the conductors of American newspapers are dishonest, it only leaves room for a surmise of that nature; but it proves that editorial honesty and editorial dishonesty are terms which are rapidly losing their meaning, on account of the objective absence of the thing signified, and they are words which may be soon too antiquated even for the best dictionaries. The old system of publishing newspapers, which was based upon the idea of personal, moral responsibility, has almost disappeared. Modern progress has left it far behind. The management of a newspaper has become, strictly, a thing amenable to the laws or customs of trade. It is as marketable, as subject to quotations, to the prices current, as cotton and indigo are. Immense sums of money must be invested in its establishment. In the estimate of its worth, no considerations touching its honesty or truthfulness are allowed to enter, and if they were, they would not be intelligible. Its value is estimated from the number of copies sold and advertisements inserted, from the amount of dividends paid, and from the par value of its shares. Hence the successful editor must be a speculator, a gambler. He must watch the current of popular feeling, popular passion, as closely, and for the same reasons, as the merchant watches and calculates the receptivity of the market for his cottons and sugars. It is clear enough that the editor who does not obey the laws which now govern the newspaper trade, is a fool according to current notions. He is poor, he always will be poor, and he deserves no better fortune. The editor must bow and bend, not only his knee, but his whole body, before the mob, which exacts a homage, a sycophancy, compared to which the habits of courtiers in the presence of absolute European monarchs are manly habits. If he refuses to pay this tribute, he is likely to perish for want of bread. Why should he hesitate to pay it, when he can

make it build for him palaces, win for him fame, and open to him the doors of legislative assemblies? Why should he not pay it, when others, in every walk of life, yield it without hesitation, or die of hunger when they refuse to pay it? The politician who scorns to flatter the popular passions need not look for office; the merchant, need not expect to sell his goods; and both are fortunate if they experience no other effect of their imprudence in neglecting to pay servile court to the idol which, by a strange confusion of terms, is sometimes called the public will.

Now if we bear in mind the fact to which we have already referred, that our notions, our national tendencies, and the changes in our institutions all indicate the advent of unmixed democracy, and therefore of the worst tyranny, in America, we shall be prepared with an apology for the course pursued with reference to Hungary by the American press. When a WEBSTER thinks that it is necessary to conciliate the spirit of democratic propagandism, under pain of losing votes, what can the poor editor do? The truth about Hungary could not be told in his columns; the people would not believe it, they would not like it, they would not buy his papers, and he would go to bed supperless. Truth is powerful, no doubt, but so is an empty stomach. And the motives which led him to tell the people news which pleased them about Mexico, California, and Cuba, which urged him to say nothing about the guiltiness of our dealings with our neighbors, and which induced him to talk about the manifest destiny which is to extend the blessings of freedom to every inhabitant of the northern continent by exterminating the natives, and planting the hickory flag-staff in the soil made fat by their bodies, led him also to tell the American people that the Magyar cause was a just, a republican, and even a democratic cause.

The poor soul, notwithstanding the enormous amount of money invested in his paper, labored under singular disadvantages when he came to talk with his patrons about European politics. Being a tradesman, a merchant in news, a speculator in fancy intelligence stock, he had to sell only the wares which were sent to him by his European agents or correspondents, and, as happens often enough with other European goods sent hither for sale, his wares were of an inferior quality, made expressly for the Amer-

ian market. This is literally true. The foreign news manufactory is as real an entity as the Birmingham or Brummagem depot of imitation wares. Let any person observe, in the column of foreign news, the names of the papers to which American editors are indebted for their latest European intelligence. These are certain Paris, London, and Liverpool journals. It is now a notorious fact, that in these offices the manufacture or adaptation of news for particular markets is reduced to a most elaborate system. The reader of an American paper gets, in reality, his news from a fellow comfortably seated in a printing-office at Paris, with a pile of newspapers, in all languages and of every political shade, before him. When he knows who his customers are, he can send them just the news they wish to hear. He tells the American that the Magyars are entitled to American sympathy, because they are democrats. He tells the Englishman that the Magyars are entitled to English sympathy, because they are aristocrats. And the establishment of weekly steamers and of telegraph lines has only increased the difficulty. There was a time when correct news could be obtained from Europe; but that was forty years ago, when American institutions were not quite democratic, when American readers of newspapers were comparatively few, and when it was of no use to arouse in them a false sympathy in behalf of European vagabonds, because long voyages made the sympathy of too old a date to be of any use. But now the Atlantic has become narrow, and America a great nation. Hence, American ideas about European affairs are of some importance, and, that those ideas may be of the required sort, the foreign news-manufacturer sends, and the steamer and telegraph carry, such intelligence as may appear to the democratic supreme committee suitable for the American market.

Besides, our journalists do not understand the Magyar language, and few are able to read German or Latin, and hence the papers published in Hungary are, to them, sealed documents. It was not safe, or expedient, to copy from the few English or French journals which professed either to be neutral or to oppose the Magyar pretensions, because, in the first place, no one would read their extracts; then it was, *a priori*, certain that such extracts would contain false, because anti-radical statements; and finally, because readers would buy their papers at another office.

In France and in Italy the true character of the Magyar struggle was pretty accurately understood. In England the press succeeded in making the people believe that the movement was precisely similar to the English struggle which resulted in the accession of William III. We all know what stories the American press poured into our willing or unwilling ears. It is certain that an honest attempt, on the part of an American, to get a true notion of the real state of things in Hungary, involved more trouble than most men were willing to undergo.

All this forms a curious illustration of our boasted American freedom. We fear that, in some other important respects, our freedom is a chimera, or at best an *ens rationis*; but let that pass. We are far more dependent upon Europe than we were in 1770, and our dependence has assumed a form which, if it be not slavery, is wonderfully like it.

There is yet another cause which can be assigned for the popular errors with reference to Hungary, and this is more creditable to Americans, as well as to the Magyars, than the others are. We referred to this branch of our inquiry when we observed that our present discussion is more grateful to our feelings than our former essays were, inasmuch as it permits us to bestow praise without the sacrifice of truth.

The Magyars are, in many respects, a most interesting people, and their many noble qualities may well challenge for them the good-will, and, to a certain extent, the admiration, of Americans. Our countrymen were not wrong in praising the Magyars; they erred in their approval of the cause in which the Magyars were engaged. In one point of view, something may be said in favor even of that cause, as we shall presently see. If it had been undertaken at another time, in another spirit, by other leaders, with a different scope, it would not, in our opinion, have been opposed even by an Austrian statesman.

The Magyar is either a soldier or a shepherd,—we mean the true Magyar. When he is compelled by his poverty to wear the livery of a servant, the "*Nemes ember vagyok*," "I am a nobleman," is ever at the end of his tongue, and as he says it he twirls his mustachios, strikes his spurs, and very plainly intimates that he is a soldier, only for the moment relieved from duty. Now the shepherd and the

warrior are characters whom the poets, from Homer to Tasso, have delighted to celebrate.

Miss Pardoe characterizes the Magyar country gentleman as hospitable, haughty, ostentatious, fond of luxury and splendor, sincere and frank, with a high feeling of honor and courage. The Magyar peasant is warlike, bold, and courteous; of melancholy temperament, and greatly inclined to indolence, preferring a rifle to a plough, and a gallop to labor in the fields. He is proud of his nation and of the antiquity of his descent. When brought into the presence of a superior, unlike the Slave, he takes off his hat and stands erect.

In truth the Magyars are a primitive people. With the vices, they have all the virtues of chivalrous times. Feudal institutions have long since disappeared from Western Europe; but the Magyars have in Christendom no brethren in blood, and this circumstance, together with their intense national pride, may account for the fact that a state of society which is now historical for the old nations of the Continent should be still cherished in Hungary.

What has become historical is already good material for romance. Most of the best romances in our language, and, indeed, in all languages except the Magyar, describe times, scenes, and men which have long since passed away. It is curious, it is pleasant, to read about men and things now existing, existing too in Christian Europe, which are like the things and men whom we are accustomed to look upon as belonging to bygone, romantic ages. The Magyar is at once a living being, and the creature of a pleasing dream. This, we take it, is one of the causes which have won, somehow, our sympathies in behalf of the children of Arpad. Heroes of romance and of song know the way to the heart, and the heart is not always that of a woman either. Americans cannot spare time to be ideal, or to live in any other than an atmosphere of facts and dollars, but they like to hear of other people living higher up in an ideal world, and to see them there. It is true that a close inspection of the Magyar destroys much of the illusion which distance creates; but enough of antiquity, of romance, and of positively good, solid material remains to make him an interesting character. No man wins the love of those with whom he is thrown into friendly contact as the Magyar wins it. So say all travellers, and our own limited experience inclines us to believe that it is so.

The primitive manners of the Magyars belong to a type of civilization which we are accustomed to regard as less advanced than ours. They care little for commerce, and all the efforts of Count Szechenyi, and of other Magyar noblemen who have studied English customs, cannot suffice to make them understand that, in order to be better able to cope with Austria, and to be regarded as a nation in Europe, they must be merchants as well as soldiers. The internal resources of Hungary are vast, almost beyond description. Americans would make the country, if it were theirs, the mistress of Europe. But it would be as profitable to talk of commerce to the knights of the Round Table as to the true Magyar. He despises the Germans as much for their commercial habits as for any other habit of theirs. He allows others to trade for him, and is satisfied with such internal improvements as God has vouchsafed to the country. The German, we mean the Hungarian German, whose paradise is a counting-house, while he profits by the indifference of the Magyar to commercial affairs, cannot understand it. He regards him as only half-civilized, and calls him a *betyar*, a groom.

Property is most unequally divided, of course, as it was in all countries in the feudal ages. We have in a preceding article explained the land tenure, so that here it is only necessary to repeat that land can be held only by a nobleman, that is to say, by a Magyar, or a Magyarized Slave, or alien. Prince Esterhazy is the greatest landholder in Hungary, and his title-deeds date as far back as the year 1300. His lands cover an area of twelve hundred square miles, or about a thirteenth part of the whole kingdom. His peasants number three hundred and sixty thousand. He possesses the *jus gladii*, — the power of life and death; and therefore is entitled to keep soldiers in his pay. His armory contains weapons for two regiments, one of cavalry and one of infantry, each twelve hundred strong. At the time of Miss Pardoe's visit, in 1840, his dungeons contained twenty prisoners. His estates equal the kingdom of Wurtemberg in size, and they contain one hundred and thirty villages, forty towns, and thirty-four castles. His acres, however, bring him a revenue averaging only about twelve cents each, in all, \$ 700,000 a year. His sheep are numerous enough to employ 2,500 shepherds. The mere recital of these facts throws more light upon the state of Hungary than chains of argument.

Out of the ninety-seven towns and villages in the county of Arva, the family of Phurzo possessed eighty-two. The last Count left these to his daughters and their descendants. The property has never been divided, and it is administered by one for the benefit of the rest of the heirs, numbering upwards of sixty. Yet the revenue is not more than \$60,000 yearly. These revenue returns prove that the peasant is not very profitable to his lord.

A few of the great estates, belonging to magnates who have visited England, are in comparatively good condition, and several agricultural societies have been established of late years, which promise well. But the greater portion of the land is treated according to rules which were old even three centuries ago. The Magyar leaves the land nearly as God made it.

Every nobleman, that is, every Magyar, should, according to the Hungarian theory, hold land. Yet every Magyar does not. Some have sunk into the peasant condition. Many follow mechanical employments. Still the Magyar will divide the land until further division becomes impossible. Whole villages are sometimes seen, inhabited chiefly by poor nobles, the descendants, probably, of an old Magyar who possessed the entire property. Now it is subdivided to an almost absurd degree of attenuation. Each poor noble holds a piece of land a few hundred feet in length, and just wide enough to give room for a small cottage.

According to the Hungarian law the holders of land are supposed to be descendants of the Magyars who conquered the country. The land belongs to the king, and it is held on the tenure of military service. Hence, land cannot be sold, legally, although the law is sometimes evaded; but the purchaser cannot secure his title. On the failure of male heirs, the land reverts to the king, only two or three exceptions existing to this rule in the case of female fiefs. The king is bound to bestow this land thus returned upon an Hungarian subject. This person may not be noble, in which case the gift ennobles him. In this way, some Slovacs have become Magyarized. These laws concerning land will show why the Magyar clings to even his tiny spot, scarcely large enough for a cottage ground, with such an enduring embrace. *Fundo ne inhereat onus*, — No burden can be attached to the land, — was a law of Hungary.

It secured the owner from the burden of paying taxes, and it made land in Hungary a more important possession than in any other European country. At the same time, the law rendering the sale of land illegal, and making the land itself free from burden, brings its disadvantages to the magnates. They are prodigal, and the least in the world of a mercantile spirit. They are often in want of money, and the Jews are not always willing to lend it, as only personal security can legally be given. Still, this law is evaded, and it is probable that Jews hold the title-deeds of many impoverished magnates, although with an uncertain grasp. There are upwards of a hundred and sixty thousand Jews in Hungary, and in the late war they were liberals, of course. This arose partly because of their hereditary disposition to make mischief in Christian nations, and partly, doubtless, in order that they might possess land once owned by the magnates of the kingdom.

In a country where the land is held in this primitive or feudal way, feudal concomitants are sure to obtain; and among them, the primitive virtue of hospitality. Accordingly, the Magyars are the most hospitable people in Europe. Almost every page of our English authorities bears strong testimony to this point. The stranger is always welcome to a Magyar house. Excepting in the great cities, there are no taverns in Hungary where a traveller can possibly stay an hour. There would be no earthly use in building them, for no one would, or rather could, patronize them. The nearest Magyar noble would not permit it, and a refusal of his hearty invitation would make of him an enemy for life. The traveller, after a few hours, feels as though he had known his kind entertainers for years. There is no dash of worldliness in their hospitality; it comes from the warm Magyar heart. Two or three anecdotes will illustrate this matter better than encomiums can.

Paget, with a friend, was travelling in Transylvania, and they came near the house of a Magyar as the snow began to fall. There was no public house in the village. They hesitated not, however, to throw themselves upon the hospitality of the Magyar; but when they reached the house, they found that he was not at home. Nevertheless, the servants opened the dining-room, offered the travellers

every thing in the house, and all this as a matter of course. The horses fared as well as their masters. The coachmen gave them double feed.

At Thoroczko, Paget found a miserable inn. His servant was a Magyar, and Miklós knew that a countess lived not far distant, at whose house he thought that better fare could be had than at the inn. So he endeavored to persuade his master to visit the countess; but Paget, this time, refused. A servant of the countess passing through the village, and hearing that a stranger was at the inn, stopped to ask who had arrived. Miklós scrupled not to tell the servant, that his master would visit the countess on the following day. Then Miklós informed his master that the countess had sent her servant to invite him to her palace. Paget discovered the lie that evening; nevertheless, he went the next day to the chateau, where he found that the lady expected, not only him, but all travellers, to visit her on their way. Miklós, being an Hungarian, could not understand why his master was at times unwilling to ask admittance into houses where he would be received as if his family and that of his entertainers had been allied for twenty generations.

Mrs. Pulszky tells an amusing story in point.

The Baron Palocsay, grandfather of the present magnate, notwithstanding his generous hospitality, often found himself without visitors, particularly in winter, as his castle was situated on a lofty and bleak eminence. This lack of visitors annoyed the Baron, so he was in the habit of sending out in search of guests, when there were none at his table. His servants went to the high road, and when they saw a travelling-carriage, they forced the travellers to turn to the castle, where the Baron, without listening to their protestations, entertained them for three days in the most princely manner, because, as he said, the Hungarian has a right to keep his guests for three days; if they are willing to remain longer, it is a great honor to the host.

Mrs. Pulszky testifies that many Magyars retain this notion, and, when practicable, they enforce it. She mentions the case of a friend of hers, who went to the house of a Magyar with the intention of making an ordinary visit. His visit lasted seven years.

She observes, also, that visits for several months are by no means unusual, and that persons who come with three

or four children frequently apologize, not for their visit, but for not having brought with them their whole family.

And this primitive spirit is by no means confined to the wealthy Magyars. Paget (Vol. I. p. 105) says, that one of his friends was benighted near Füred. A poor carpenter offered him shelter. A bed was prepared, and the traveller groped his way to it, through the dark, for the people were too poor to buy candles. He found that he was not alone. A coughing on one side, cries on the other, a cackling and rustling of feathers above, and a butting of horns below, continued at intervals through the night. When daylight came, he found that he had been sleeping with two women, half a dozen children, a hen and chickens, and a huge goat. In fact, the carpenter had given his own place to the stranger. A bit of black bread and a little goat's milk was all the poor man could offer him for breakfast; but the sturdy Magyar firmly, though respectfully, refused compensation of any sort.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that there will be no taverns in Hungary while the Magyars are masters of the land, and that the roads are, and always were, bad. Miss Pardoe remarks, that the traveller in Hungary must make up his mind resolutely to fling from him every feeling of hyper-fastidiousness, both as regards roads, horses, drivers, and accommodations; to brave delay, disappointment, and even danger; and to prepare himself to do battle with inconvenience of every description. The roads are made by the compulsory labor of the peasant, and he deposits there whatever rubbish he can the most readily collect. The stone bridges are in ruins; the wooden bridges are no better, being made of planks thrown carelessly together along beams resting on wooden piles, and unsecured by a single nail. There are four ways of travelling. The first is the government post, on the high roads. This is seldom used, because of its slowness. The second is the peasant's post, running between Pesth and Vienna. The method commonly adopted is, to bring out the *Norspann*. This is a compulsory post, furnished by the peasants. By law they are compelled to furnish horses to the Magyar nobles, and to travellers who have obtained a written order from a nobleman. A certain sum is paid to the peasant, and he must forward the traveller to the next station, where another peasant must provide horses, if required.

The fourth method of progress is by the open peasant cart. A fifth must be added, for travellers are sometimes forced to resort to it; we mean, to trudge on foot. But there is not in the world a more beautiful country than Hungary, and the traveller who overcomes all these obstacles will be amply repaid for any amount of toil.

Persons who desire to make primitive manners their study will find abundance of food for meditation in Hungary. The manners peculiar to every age, from the last century back to the time of Noah, may be seen in that country. Paget speaks of a place, a little beyond Stuhlweissenburg and not above forty miles from Pesth. It is a cluster of villages, at least one of which is inhabited entirely by noblemen, untitled of course. Every one of the houses is subterranean, only the roof being visible. They are mere holes cut in the ground, and covered with straw.

Although few noblemen have now the historical right to flog their peasants, yet the peasants do not escape. The sentence of a county or town officer is required, to make the punishment legal. The peasant is bound to the flogging-block, and the Haiduk gives the blows with a hazel stick, about the thickness of the finger. Great skill is required to inflict the greatest pain with the least bodily injury. Some of these hardy fellows, says Paget (Vol. I. p. 230), laugh at the punishment, and it is a point of honor among them to bear it without flinching. Nothing renders the young peasant so irresistible to his mistress as his heroic support of the five-and-twenty blows.

The cholera broke out in Hungary in 1831. The Slovak peasants, believing that the nobles had poisoned them, rose, and brutally murdered every Magyar they could catch. Paget saw one gentleman who had been beaten for several hours, and then had hot ploughshares applied to his feet. The lord lieutenant of the county, while attempting to quiet the crowd at another village, was dragged from his horse, and, but for the interference of a Slovak peasant, would have been savagely butchered. When order was restored, about fifty Slovak peasants were hung in chains. Their bodies remained exposed for several years, but each body received a new dress annually, from surviving friends. This story is an epitome of the state of affairs between the Magyars and Slaves. On one side, unutterable contempt; on the other, a hatred that

defies description. And travellers are generally found to pity the Slave, but to uphold the Magyar withal. Paget, even, testifies that he could not but feel some contempt for the Slovak peasants of Hungary. There is something in them which, notwithstanding the hardship of their position, inclines the stranger to say that the proud Magyar, although he may err in opposing Austrian measures for the benefit of the peasants, is right in refusing them equality with himself.

Bathing in society seems to be the established mode at most watering-places, and Paget was horrified when a young lady invited him to bathe in company with a score of noble females. Yet this practice is condemned by many Magyars, and with reason. In the churches, there is a complete separation of the sexes. The men sit on one side, the married women on the other, and the maidens crowd around the steps of the altar. So in ball-rooms in the interior. The gentlemen stand in the middle of the room, the ladies sit in a row all around. There is no mixture except for the purposes of dancing. Paget mentions, that, when he offered to accompany ladies with whom he danced to promenade the rooms, his conduct was regarded as sadly heterodox. At another party, where he found the company in two distinct circles, the women at one end of the room and the men at the other, he, supposing that it was a national custom, was about to join the men, when the lady of the manor told him that the gentlemen congregated together only because they found their own society more agreeable than that of the ladies. Of course, this state of things cannot be universal, but it is a significant index of the state of society when it is so frequently noticed in the interior. In the large cities such things have long since been changed, whether for the better we cannot tell. Paget and others mention, that, at many assemblies, while some were dancing, others were singing, and others smoking. Tobacco-smoke frequently drove the women from the rooms. Combs, too, were ostentatiously used, even when ladies were quite near. At one of these parties, a countess observed to Paget that women in Hungarian society must submit to such scenes. Men, she continued, prefer their pipes to our drawing-rooms. The woman who should attempt to civilize them would be exposed to neglect and insult. The capital is

worse than anywhere else. Paget, however, observes that he did not find these scenes universal. The misbehaving men were mostly country squires. The ladies were high-born absentees.

The pious salutation, " Praised be God ! " " Praised be Jesus Christ ! " takes the place, among the simple Hungarians, of our " Good morning ! " " How do you do ? "

Paget observes that in no country is the behavior of the child to the parent more respectful than in Hungary. From infancy the child is taught to kiss the parent's hand as its ordinary salutation, and the morning and evening greetings are considered matters of duty, and scrupulously observed. The married daughter places her mother at the head of her table, and receives her blessing as she leaves for the night. It is common to see grown-up sons preserve absolute silence in the presence of their fathers, and even sacrifice their political principles at the parent's bidding.

The condition of the Hungarian women merits a passing remark. Paget (Vol. I. p. 210) remarks that at Schemnitz an exhibition of public flogging takes place every Sunday morning, and that it rarely happens that some women are not among the sufferers. The conduct of the men at ball-rooms may already have induced the surmise that Hungarian notions about women are as conservative, as old-fashioned, as their notions are about most other things. The Magyar country-women are worse clothed than the men ; where they can afford it, however, they wear knee boots, and sheepskin jackets. The covering for the head is a handkerchief. Unmarried country girls wear their hair in a plait hanging down the back. Married women tie it up. Peasant women, throughout Hungary, are very unwilling to change the costume of their ancestors. A sentiment of shame, says Paget, is attached to any change, and especially to an imitation of the higher classes. The saying with them is common, that an honest Hungarian peasant girl should wear the same clothes as her grandmother wore before her. Paget (Vol. I. p. 297) quotes several Magyar love-songs, which indicate some of the duties of an Hungarian wife. The lover says that he should like to drive six oxen in the plough, if his dove would hold it, and four horses in a sledge, if his rose would hold it up. This last duty must be performed by some one, as the roads are so bad that the sledge would empty its load into the ditch if

it were not occasionally held up at one side. The girl, far from resenting this exposition of the services expected from her, answers that her dove shall have a clean shirt, if she be obliged to soak it on Saturday and wash it on Sunday. He shall have a cake, if she have to beg the flour and manœuvre for the butter.

Miss Pardoe (Vol. II. p. 103) mentions a visit made to the county jail of Buda. There were many women confined there, and two thirds of them for the crime of child-murder. She observes that this crime is very prevalent in Hungary, and on one occasion she asked a friend of hers, a judge, to explain the matter. He answered, that the cause was twofold, poverty and shame. There is no law to enforce the support of an illegitimate infant by its father, and the mother is frequently unable to maintain it. Divorces, says Paget, are far from uncommon among the Protestants, and they are seldom regarded as disgraceful occurrences. Most divorced women marry again quite as well as before. Inveterate dislike, ill-treatment, impossibility of living together, or the employment of threats or force to bring about the marriage, is, in law, a sufficient reason. The woman retains her property and her rights unimpaired.

Women have rights in Hungary. The widows of magnates can send a deputy to sit, though not to vote, in the lower house of the Diet. In the county meetings, the widow of a noble can send a deputy to act in her name. An Hungarian lady never loses her maiden name. During the life of her husband all actions at law, in which she is interested, are conducted in her name. Her husband has no control whatever over her property, and, if she chooses, she can retain the management of it in her own hands. A maid, however, remains a minor, and a ward of her nearest male relation, no matter how old she may be. Women, as one may suppose, after hearing all this, are as interested in political discussions as the men.

It is the fashion, says Paget, for two ladies to walk and sit together, and this custom is not confined to young ladies; so that, go where you will, there is a third person in the conversation. This is a praiseworthy regulation of fashion.

The administration of justice is as old-fashioned as every thing else. Paget (Vol. II. p. 272) observes, that it is

the custom for both plaintiffs and defendants to make private visits to the judges before trial, in order to instruct them about the causes. An Hungarian boasted that the courts were better than in old times, for, said he, the judges do not like to take bribes openly now! The delays of justice in Hungary are proverbial, even in criminal cases. Paget saw at St. Benedek a number of old men in chains. They had been confined only a few months, and their offence was, that they had stirred an insurrection, fifty years before. The process against them had lasted half a century. No doubt this is an extreme case. The fault is not in the law, but in the executive. Corvinus and Joseph decreed that trials of right of possession should end within a year from the opening of the case. Yet trials often last in Hungary longer than a lifetime. Almost the only persons who obtain justice, precisely because suits may last so long, are the Jews. They will buy up all the products of the land of a magnate, paying in advance a ruinously low price. It frequently happens that suits are moved to recover the goods, so that the Jew, after robbing the indolent noble of two thirds of his property, is compelled to disgorge the remaining third.

Manorial courts existed by law until the Diet of 1836; and, although illegal, there is no question but that they exist to this day. The Magyars are the most odd conservatives the world ever saw. It is no new thing with them to disregard a law providing even for a change which they themselves regard as beneficial, because it is a change. This remark will apply to several customs noticed in this article, which have been declared illegal since 1836. Where the law providing for an alteration can be evaded, it is most religiously done.

The jurisdiction of the manorial courts extended, in civil matters, to all cases under the value of thirty dollars, and, in criminal cases, to the infliction of twenty-five blows. The lord sat in judgment, either in person or by his representative. The manorial court settled differences between the peasants, and between peasant and lord. In the latter case, the lord judged a case to which he was a party. Where the dispute was between peasants, the system might have been a tolerable method of administering justice. There was a right of appeal to the county court, but only after the infliction of the twenty-five blows, or the

payment of the money. This court was a patriarchal hall of justice; the peasants did not like it; the Magyars did.

Paget saw, at the castle of Thurzo, the flogging-board, and the Haiduks preparing to punish some peasants by order of the bailiff. Here was the great defect of this court. Bailiffs were too often the judges. Where the question was between peasants, the parties were commonly satisfied when their lord sat in person. The jurisdiction of his court, under the revised law, does not extend to the infliction of corporal punishment, nor to disputes between peasant and lord. These were to be decided by a court of five disinterested persons, of whom the lord nominated three. It is difficult to say what has become of these courts, as well as of some other peculiarly Magyar institutions, since 1849, but the probability is that, at least in the interior, they remain unchanged. With a people like the Magyars, much time is required before innovations can become settled practice. The *Urbarium* of Maria Theresa, the greatest innovation ever introduced into Hungary in behalf of the peasants, required a probation of nearly a hundred years.

With regard to the prisons, Miss Pardoe, who (Vol. II. p. 78, *et seq.*) gives a satisfactory account of them, observes that a culprit must be thoroughly hardened who allows himself to be incarcerated for the second time. The only care taken of the prisoners is, that they shall not escape. This last observation tells the whole story of Hungarian prisons. Accused persons are treated with less consideration than condemned criminals are. The Magyar is old-fashioned in every thing, — his prisoners were treated precisely so five hundred years ago; in what are they better than their fathers?

Miss Pardoe says, that when Pesth was nearly destroyed, in 1838, by an inundation of the Danube, scarcely a theft was committed. Paget (p. 293), speaking of the shepherds of Hungary, says that robbery is a part of the shepherd's duty, and according to his dexterity in preventing others from robbing him, or in robbing others in return when robbed, is he valued by his master and respected by his companions.

It is scarcely necessary to say, that, among this primitive people, trade, internal improvements, science, art, and edu-

cation are in a primitive state. A few men like Count Szechenyi, however, have already introduced important changes in each of these particulars. Gold, silver, iron, copper, sulphur, salt, soda, alum, potash, saltpetre, coal, wood, hemp, tobacco, hides, tallow, horse-hair, bristles, gall-nuts, rags, spirits of wine, wool, corn, and exquisite wines, are found, manufactured, or produced in great abundance, and yet Hungary has scarcely any commerce. This is partly owing to Austrian restrictive laws, but chiefly to the peculiar non-commercial character of the Magyars, and to the stationary nature of their customs, laws, and institutions. No merchant, says Paget (p. 318), can go into the Hungarian market with the same confidence he would in other countries. He can neither enforce the fulfilment of a contract, nor recover a debt without great difficulty and expense. A modern merchant might as well go into the English market as it was in the time of King John.

The water-mills on the Danube are made each of two deck-boats, containing the mill-works, with the water-wheel between them. Until 1836, the only means of transit by the river, from Linz to Vienna, was the Kehl-hammer. This is a flat-bottomed boat, a hundred and twenty feet long, and roofed in. It is immaterial which end goes first. Six oars, four at the sides, and one at either end, propel the craft. Passengers carry their own provisions, or starve. Now there are steamboats on the Danube, thanks to the Count Szechenyi. Still, the river arrangements are primitive enough. The Hungarian never uses the sail.

The agricultural societies, established by Szechenyi and other Anglomaniacs, have effected some change in farming operations, but not much. The ground, when poor, is left fallow every other year, and crops are never changed. The plough is one-handled, the fork being the branch of a tree. The corn is trodden, precisely in the Mosaic fashion, as soon as it is cut. Green crops are neglected; barley is rarely found. Irrigation is almost unheard of.

Since the violent attack of the Emperor Joseph, the Magyar language has been cultivated with some care, and Szechenyi has established an academy for its development. There are several famous poets and novelists in Hungary. There is little good music. Painting and sculpture have

been neglected; specimens are rare in the best palaces, but the ubiquitous hand of Szechenyi has brought two or three native artists into notice. Hungary possesses few scientific works, or men of high scientific attainments. The exceptions are men who were educated abroad. There are a few good museums, created by the Szechenyi family, of course. Paget complains of the University, that it is too national. He thinks that there are questions of greater importance than whether Adam was a Magyar, or Homer a Slovak. Perhaps he is right. There were published in 1838 works to the number of 433. Of these, 221 were in the Magyar tongue, 99 in German, and 84 in Latin; 29 were Gazettes, of these one in Latin. Upwards of two hundred were religious and scientific works. Of these, more than one half were sermons and academical dissertations in medicine. About 150 were works of fancy. Paget says that almost every work of merit, published in London or Paris, is to be found in the bookstores of Presburg. This gives a good idea of the state of education in Presburg, but not in the whole country, as Paget supposes. He believes that nine tenths of the Magyars can read and write, which is also an exaggeration. The Empress Maria Theresa did much for the cause of education in Hungary. Joseph introduced mixed or godless schools, but after his death they were closed. At present, nearly every village has its school. The schools are supported by the peasants. The Catholic schools are encouraged by the government. Others are formed, if the Protestants be numerous enough. If not, their children attend the Catholic school, without the obligation, however, of learning the Catechism. The branches taught are the same as in all good common schools, with the addition of moral maxims, history, and Latin grammar. The Catholics, besides their ecclesiastical seminaries, have about eighty academies and colleges. The Protestants have several Latin schools, a few academies, and three colleges. Notwithstanding all this, education is primitive in Hungary. The reason is, the Catechism is taught, or, as Paget expresses it, the higher mental faculties are not developed. God save Hungary from the development of the higher faculties! That development brought forth the Europe of 1848. The Hungarian rebels were Protestant Magyars, Poles, and Jews. The magnates and the Slaves of Hungary proper are Catho-

lics, generally. Some of the latter are schismatic Greeks, and a few are Lutherans. The untitled Magyar nobles are Calvinists. Paget (p. 106) observes that the Protestant clergy are liberal, because oppressed.

These untitled nobles are a sturdy race of men, and when they become Catholics once more they will form an important element in the future greatness of Hungary. Paget mentions (p. 106) that they are chiefly Protestants, zealous, but not too enlightened, and capable of selling their votes. That is because their higher faculties are developed. We have described, in former articles, the privileges of these nobles. They can hold land, they can vote, and they were exempted from taxation. There are grades among them, of course, but they are chiefly "one house nobles," men possessing the hereditary rights of nobility, but in every other respect little above the peasant. (Paget, p. 244.) They are supposed, by law, to be the descendants of the common soldiers who followed Arpad. They are sometimes called half-spurs. They are, says Paget (p. 247), generally a proud, unruly, hard-drinking set of fellows, with higher notions of privilege and power than of right and justice, but they are brave, patriotic, and hospitable in the highest degree. Miss Pardoe, when at Pesth, witnessing a county election, expressed her surprise that the troops of coarsely clad, red-handed, and rude-looking agriculturists were among the nobles of the land. A Magyar friend described the half-spurs to her as a congeries of small landholders, herdsmen, vine-growers, wagoners, and pig-drivers. It is true that the term *untitled nobleman* means, in Hungary, only a freeman, but the half-spur considers himself quite equal to the proudest magnate of the land. The poorest would scorn an alliance with the richest Slave, and, if a coachman, no sum of money would tempt him to drive a Wallach into a Magyar town. His (Paget, p. 302) is the only language understood in heaven, and therefore the only one to be used in prayer. "Ah! my lady," said a Magyar nurse who heard her mistress pray in German, "how can you expect God to listen to you, if you speak a language he does not understand?"

The theory of the constitution is, that every Hungarian is born a soldier. His nobility and all his cherished privileges derive from this fact. He always appears at his assemblies armed. He enlists with the understanding that

he is to be a hussar, that he shall have a horse, wear spurs, and blue pantaloons. All, except the clergy, cherish with great affection a hairy upper lip. The moon, it is said, is compelled to rise in the theatres with a fierce Magyar mustachio. Paget saw men whose mustachios were a foot long, from tip to tip. He also mentions that he saw the very cattle formed like regiments, three or four deep, and in this order they fed. So one morning, near Debreczin, he saw a troop of several hundred horses, headed by the parish bull as drum major, gallop by, and file off each to his quarters as regularly as soldiers to their billets. When the Magyar officer enters a ball-room, he marches to the centre, draws up to attention, strikes his spurs together, bobs his head forward, faces to the left and bobs again, then to the right and bobs again. When the untitled noble serves as master at the table of a magnate, he is, says Paget, bewhiskered and bespurred as fiercely as if he were handling a sabre instead of presenting a knife and fork. The Magyar uniform is the finest in Europe. We need not say that in Europe there is not a better soldier. Some portions of Hungary have not enjoyed ten years of peace since the times of Arpad.

Paget says that there are more than two hundred English officers in the Austro-Hungarian army. It would be worth while to know how many of these, during the last war, remained faithful to their military oath.

Now what is to become of this noble Magyar nation? It descended, a thousand years ago, upon the plains of Hungary; it conquered the country; it was the terror of Europe for a space; it defended Southeastern Europe once from the Turkish scourge of God; it has passed under the dominion of three foreign houses, and it has not lost its liberties; it has successfully resisted the elsewhere omnipotent arm of Austrian centralization; numbering only four millions, it has for a thousand years defied, beaten, or enslaved the nations around or within its borders, and there it is, with its nationality as intense as it was in the days of Arpad. Does this glorious past seem likely to be lost in an inglorious future? Is the sun of the great Magyar nation to set in blood? Is the crown of St. Stephen to be laid, as a mere relic, upon the altar of a ruined Hungarian cathedral?

The Magyars are not republicans, in the modern accep-

tation of that term. We have accumulated evidence enough, on this point, in previous articles, and almost every peculiarity of the nation which we have noted in this paper brings new proof of the fact. The Magyars are a nation, an encamped army, of soldiers, and a well-ordered army cannot form a republic. There are among the Magyars many reformers, or liberals. But liberalism, as Paget (p. 20) well observes, is one thing in Hungary, and quite another thing in England. The greater number of the young nobles are liberals. Their liberalism is mainly a creed of one article, which is, that Austria is the root of all Hungarian evils. "I am sure," says Paget, "that they are anxious for the freedom and education of the peasantry, and yet it often appeared to us that they spoke of them, and to them, as though they belonged to a different class of creation with themselves: in short, all of them are reformers, but many of them seem eminently impractical in their ideas of reform."

Republicanism is well in its place; it is well in America; — God save it from American demagogues! But it is not well in a country where the manners, ideas, institutions, and the whole genius of the people are conceived in aristocracy and born in monarchy. Even in 1849, when the quarrel with Austria was at its height, when republicanism was in the ascendant at Paris, Vienna, Milan, and Rome, the revolutionary Diet, yea, even the Kossuth Diet, spurned, hissed the name of republicanism out of the sight and hearing of Magyardom. Only a few Gallomanists were found to speak in its favor. The deputies wanted an independent Magyar kingdom. Magyar republicans would cease to be Magyars. Republicanism has no more place in Hungary than monarchy in America.

So when we demonstrate that they are not republicans, we bring no accusation against them; we prove only that our countrymen are sadly ignorant of the true nature of the Hungarian struggle for independence.

In one sense — not in the modern sense, however — Magyardom is a republic. Every member of the nation is noble. The half-spur and the magnate are equal before the constitution, in the presence of the king. English writers contend that England is a republic in the same sense, and they love to compare the late Magyar struggle with the English revolution of 1688.

Our case against the Magyars, as well as against our own demagogues, was, that the cause of 1849 was a bad cause. It had some elements of justice, — the object may have been good, — but the end and the circumstances were bad, and this vitiated the whole cause. We have not space to repeat the heads of our argument, neither is it necessary. It is quite possible to yield a hearty admiration of the Magyar character, taken as a whole, without undertaking to defend it in each of its peculiarities. There is no question that the Magyar wins the love of those who meet him off the battle-field, and the respect of those who encounter him thereon; but that does not prove him a faultless being. With very great national virtues, the Magyar exhibits great national vices, and all of them were fully exhibited in 1849, as they always have been when a great question is before the nation. They had allowed their jealousy of Austria to place them in a highly impolitic position with reference to the Slaves around and beneath them. Nearly all the plans for the amelioration of the peasant condition originated, as we have seen, from the court of Vienna. That court had as little desire to emancipate the peasants, to make them equal with the Magyars, as the Magyars themselves had. Yet the suspicious sons of Arpad thought differently; they looked upon every act in behalf of the Slaves, emanating from Austria, as a covert attack upon Magyar liberties. This suspicion led them to oppose all such acts, where opposition was practicable, and so they committed the great error of exhibiting themselves as enemies, and the Austrians as friends, of the unfortunate Slaves. Independently of this circumstance, they were as willing as the court of Vienna to legislate for the benefit of the peasants. They cared as much for them as Austria did. But their intense nationality threw another difficulty in the way. They did not wish to be unjust to the peasants, but, regarding them as things of another creation, they did not precisely know how to be just to them. This led to another fatal error. The reforms proposed by Austria were practicable and safe. The reforms proposed by them were impracticable. Whenever they really did any thing, it was done after the plan emanating from Vienna, as was seen in the Diet of 1836–48, when the practicable reforms proposed, and partly carried, were based on the *Urbarium*, the peasant *Magna Charta* forced upon Hungary by Maria Theresa, nearly a

hundred years before. This led to another misconception. They appeared to the peasants as men who were compelled, by the force of circumstances, to adopt Austrian schemes of reform, after having resisted them for a hundred years. And so 1849 came and found the Slaves as evilly as ever disposed towards their Magyar superiors.

The same year found the Magyars in quite as impolitic a situation with reference to their dependencies. The Wallachs of Transylvania were, in the eyes of a Magyar, less than dogs. It was possible to conciliate them or at least to keep them quiet during the war, but the policy of Kossuth in their regard was stern and cruel. Three evil consequences followed this capital error. The insurrection of the Wallachs was quelled at the cost of seas of blood. General Bem, a man who might have checkmated Görgey, was detached from the main army, and sent, with a separate command, to Transylvania. The Russian invasion ensued.

The Magyar policy with reference to the Slaves of Croatia was equally blind. There is no doubt that Jellichich was an ambitious soldier; perhaps he was also an unfaithful subject. It is very possible, moreover, that some of the pretensions advanced by the Croats were wild and extravagant. It is certain that the Magyars were a superior people, and that the Magyars knew it. But, just at that time, when Slavic nationality was as furiously asserted as ever Magyarism was, when even Panslavism was openly talked of, and, what was worse for that imaginative people, sung about and prayed for, when the northern congress of Prague and the southern congress of Agram had been held, the Magyars held the torch to the magazine of Slavic gunpowder. Besides giving them worse than no representation in the Diet, besides asserting their undoubted superiority in every offensive way, they seriously tried to force their Magyar language and customs upon the Croats. The result was inevitable. Croatia flew to arms. The Magyars, in truth, did not know what a storm they were raising. They do not hate the Slaves, they do not despise them as one despises a *man*, — they regarded the Croat schemes as matter for contemptuous laughter, as pranks played by inferior beings; they looked upon them with feelings very like those with which a devout slaveholder regards the antics enacted by the black imperial court of Solouque.

To these fatal errors others were added. There was

never a great question before the nation, but the Magyars seemed to be struck with judicial blindness. In the face of Radetzky's victories, they demanded and obtained from an imbecile and frightened emperor things which he could not in honor grant, nor they demand. The Hungarian nation was always free. Magyardom may be exterminated, but it cannot be enslaved. Yet freedom and independence are two very different things. Massachusetts is free; independent of the Union it is not, ought not to be. Now if the Magyars, besides their singularly free institutions, also held the purse and sword of the nation, it would be independent, its connection with the empire would be a farce. It would do them little or no good, perhaps some harm, and it would certainly be almost fatal to the empire. The monarch, therefore, both as emperor of Austria and as king of Hungary, could not in honor grant the required privileges. If the Magyars were determined to be entirely *sui juris*, they could in honor, as honor now goes, have asked for what they did ask, and what they obtained. But then, in common honesty, they should have issued their declaration of independence in 1848, and not in 1849. As it was, they asked for things which would make the nation absolutely independent, and at the same time they swore that they did not want independence. This was not honest. It was as discreditable to the nation as the treacherous march of Kossuth to Vienna, and his infamous league with the democrats of that city, while he acknowledged Ferdinand as his emperor and king. Such dishonesty deserved the punishment which it received. The Magyars, honest, impulsive, and confiding as they commonly are, *never* failed, in their great national struggles, to submit their fate to the conduct of dishonest men, or of impracticable visionaries. It was always so, from Zapolya to Kossuth. And the consequence always was, that the nation divided, the magnates following one banner, the half-spurs rallying beneath the other. The *pars sanior et potior* never failed to win the day.

In our previous articles, we dwelt at some length upon the relations which subsisted between the Magyars and the Slaves. We demonstrated that the war was a war of races; that the Hungarian nation means the Magyar nation; that the Magyars as a body were free, and that the Slaves as a whole were serfs. We wish not, however, to be misunderstood. We did not, and do not, censure the Magyars

for this state of things, any further than to point out that the Magyar policy with reference to the Slaves was frequently unreasonable and oppressive. Our main object was to meet our own radicals, and to furnish well-meaning persons, who had been misled by the newspapers, with a full demonstration that such a state of things did exist in Hungary, even so late as 1848. We certainly did not say, and do not now, that the distinction of races and the peasant system should be entirely abolished in Hungary. These may, in honesty and in policy, be allowed to remain, with such amendments as Austria has always desired to introduce, and such as the Magyars perhaps would have adopted long since, were it not for their almost insane jealousy of Vienna. To them nothing good comes out of Nazareth.

The Slaves, in purely Slavonic provinces, have among themselves the peasant system, as well as the Magyars. The difference is, that, with them, master and peasant are of the same race. This difference is of no great practical benefit to the peasant for the moment; it induces changes beneficial to him only after the lapse of centuries. We are not sure that the Slavonic noble treats his dependents better than the Magyar does. There is less chance for a peasant to become a noble in Slavonic countries, than there is in England for a common laborer to become a peer of the realm. Hence the transfer of the Slavonic peasantry from Magyar to Slave masters, would be of little if any benefit to them. Their treatment would be little better; they would be little nearer to the enjoyment of the rights of freemen. The patriarchal system is as indigenous to Slavdom as it is to Magyardom. We are not sure, even, that a Russian serf may not, with reason, envy the Hungarian peasant.

By Austrian laws the Hungarian peasant is now free, but it is very possible that the court of Vienna will find the difficulties attending the execution of the law in Magyar territory so serious, that a partial return to the old system may turn out to be inevitable. The Hungarian peasants, after centuries of bondage, are less fitted for freedom than our Southern negroes are. This difficulty has perplexed Magyardom as well as Austria.

The peasants of Hungary are serfs, but not slaves. We speak of their condition previous to 1848, as we have done

throughout this article, using the present tense for reasons elsewhere given. They are not bound to the soil, hence they cannot be transferred with it. Their serfage is, therefore, of a mitigated form. They can and do acquire tenant right, precisely what tenants in Ireland are struggling for. Many of them are very wealthy. The account we have given, on another page, of the revenues of some magnates, proves that the lord realizes little from his peasants in the form of rent. The burdens to which they were subject have been elsewhere described. The Magyars were always sensible of the duty of treating them well, even when their own pride, jealousy, their Magyarism, in a word, stood in the way of relief to the poor serf, as it too frequently did. If the Magyars had resolutely enforced even their own laws, not their local customs, in behalf of the Slaves, the Hungarian peasantry would compare favorably with that of any Continental nation. Probably one reason why the court of Vienna so often and so resolutely interfered was, that so many laws in favor of the serf lay idle on the statute-book, so inveterate were local customs. The preamble of an old act declares that it was passed for the lord's interest, *ne omnis rusticitas, sine qua nobilitas parum valet, deleatur*. And another act declares that *nulla res magis florenti quondam Hungariæ statui nocuisse videtur oppressione colonorum, quorum clamor ascendit jugiter ante conspectum Dei*. The Ruler of nations answered their cry in 1849. If Magyars interpret that answer correctly, it will be well for the Hungarian nation.

Now Austria, Europe, cannot sustain the loss of this Magyar nation. As mere soldiers, the Hungarians are invaluable to the Old World. They were always brave, but their bravery in 1849 became almost sublime. Pulszky, Schlesinger, Pragay, Madame Beck, and other Magyar authorities, tell wondrous stories of the martial deeds done in that eventful war, and their stories are scarcely exaggerated, since they are confirmed, in all essential particulars, by Pimodan, the Austrian witness cited at the head of this article. He cannot understand *why* the Austrian troops were beaten, but, somehow, beaten they were, in defiance of all rule. Or, as an Austrian non-commissioned officer expressed it, they were not beaten, they only retreated. Pimodan tells the truth with great reluctance, but he tells it, because he is an honest, high-minded soldier.

Austria, Europe, cannot suffer the Magyar nation to die, because it is almost the only conservative nation left to the Old World. No two things can be more opposed to one another than Magyardom is to European radicalism. This latest product of the fires of hell curses almost every square inch of Continental ground outside of Hungary. There it was known by name, and known only to be ignominiously thrust out. Even Kossuth could not, or pretended that he could not, abide its presence. The conservatism of Hungary, as we have seen, is carried, in some things, to an unreasonable extent. But its existence, in the present state of Europe, challenges admiration and respect. It is the olive-branch found by the dove in the deluge of many waters. It is the symbol of the state to which Europe must and will return. Magyardom, then, may be made, if not the right arm, at least the sword wielded by the right arm of Europe, in the coming struggle between civilization and barbarism.

There is no probability that Austria will enslave the Magyar nation. It cannot if it would, and there are no signs of its desire to do it; there never were, unless in the days of the Emperor Joseph. The singular freedom of Magyar institutions renders such a thing almost impossible. The little democracies of our towns are supposed to be our best security that a central despotism will never be established in America. But the towns of Hungary are freer than even our little free democracies, as they are called. Every Hungarian has the right to be present, in person, at the Diet. But, as numbers prevent, deputies are chosen at the county meetings. These deputies are bound to vote as their constituents instruct them, or to resign, and this right is carefully guarded. Deputies have been known to deliver speeches, setting forth their own sentiments, and then to vote on the other side, in accordance with instructions received. The towns and counties elect their own officers, with the exception of the highest, who, as lord lieutenant, represents the crown, but who is powerless in local questions, while the elected county officers are omnipotent. Decrees, even of the king, approved by the Diet, can be, and have been, set aside by the county meetings, when they appear to clash with the county privileges or rights. *Cum honore seponuntur*, is the law term for the sturdy operation. It would be curious to see the constituents of Webster in-

structing him to vote for a certain measure, or resign, as it would to see a town in Massachusetts set aside a law passed by Congress, and approved by the President. Yet such things were done in Hungary.

There is no probability, either, that Magyardom will ever be absorbed in any other nationality. It has successfully battled for existence a thousand years, it has withstood rude shocks, it has overcome difficulties which proved too great for other nationalities to surmount, and there it is, as living as ever. Indeed, Magyardom has a peculiarity which is thought to be the prerogative of Anglo-Norman-dom. It absorbs all other national elements. The Hungarians may rest assured, says Paget (p. 68), that it will not be the fault of a newly made nobleman, — be he of what origin he may, — if he does not very soon persuade himself that his ancestors were of the purest Magyar blood, and if he himself does not become the warmest supporter of Magyarism in all its forms.

The last war affords examples in support of this remark of Paget, if support be needed. Kossuth, a Slovak, became a Magyar of the Magyars. Damianics, one of Kossuth's best generals, was a Serb. He had punished his own countrymen severely for rising against the Magyars. When he left them he said: "If you rise again, I shall return, and burn down your houses, and put to death yourselves and your parents and children; and on the grave of my nation I shall shoot myself, that not one of the cursed race shall survive that breaks its allegiance!"

Yet there is not the remotest probability that this singularly free nation will soon be an independent kingdom. We have assigned reasons in a previous paper, and we will not dwell upon them now. They may be summed up in one, — a deplorable want of unity. Hungary, in this respect, is wonderfully like two of the finest nations of Europe, Ireland and Italy. This notable disunion arises partly from the fact, that the local freedom enjoyed by the counties is so great, that no central power which is Magyar can be established. It would be the mockery of a power, — more so than that of the last Polish kings. The counties are independent, one of the other, and almost independent of the king, while the diet of counties only presents a concentrated image of the discordant interests of the kingdom. Moreover, the power of the king, while it was weak in the counties taken separately, was generally direct and efficient

in the diet of the nation. He governed the whole, but only as a whole, not, as in his hereditary dominions, in each constituent part of the whole. The power of a county to reject, *cum honore seponere*, a royal decree, is a whimsical illustration of this strange state of things.

In fact, only a woman, or a very good soldier, could keep the nation quiet. Nearly all the kings of the house of Arpad wore a crown of thorns. Men like Louis I., Matthias Corvin, and Leopold I. were equal to the task of governing Hungary, because the Magyars were afraid of them. Whenever the government was not remarkably strong, anarchy ensued in the land. The peculiar structure of Hungarian society, involving, as it does, the political equality and the civil and social inequality of the magnates and the untitled nobility, always rendered it impossible for Hungary to enjoy quiet, unless there were a strong central power to preserve peace, a power for which Magyar institutions do not provide. Their constitution secures the freedom of the subject, and the insignificance of the king. Their quarrels with Austria hence receive an explanation. Austria could not exercise the most common prerogatives of royalty without finding that, with every intention to do good, she had trampled upon some historical right or other.

Hungary, as we have seen in a preceding article, is a country won from the Turks by Austrian arms. While her counties govern themselves almost as independent establishments, she cannot govern herself as an independent kingdom, for the want of provision in her constitution for a sufficiently strong central power. Moreover, her geographical position, in the midst of so many Slave nations, would put the valor of her children to continual proof, in the struggle for national existence. Hungary belongs to Austria, to Europe. Her nationality will be preserved by the court of Vienna, for, considering the conservatism of the Magyars, their bravery, and their many noble qualities, that nationality will be a powerful barrier to Russian pretensions. Hungary, left to herself, would spill, in the contest with domestic and foreign enemies, blood which might be poured out to better purpose in the defence of Western Europe. Already the Slaves in Hungary and its dependencies, who are of the Greek schism, offer daily prayers for their Emperor Nicholas. The Magyar nation is one great security to Europe that such prayers will not be heard.

ART. IV. — *The Edinburgh Review*, No. CXC. Art. IX. *Ultramontane Doubts.* New York: Scott & Co. April, 1851.

THE reputation of *The Edinburgh Review* for ability, learning, and criticism was established before we had learned our letters, and has been respectably sustained in spite of its formidable rival, *The London Quarterly*. It has suffered in late years, but it is still the especial favorite with our countrymen, and it probably is more influential on this side the Atlantic than on the other. It is in accordance with the prevailing tone of the great body of educated Americans, nominally Christian, moderately liberal, and really deistical. It places the state before the Church, and loyalty above religion, but disowns the name of unbeliever, and condescends to patronize Christianity so long as it is content to serve in a subordinate sphere, and exhibits no symptoms of aspiring to independence. It respects the clergy as useful parish constables, and offers no opposition to them so long as they keep entirely aloof from all secular affairs, and interpose no obstacle to the intrigues or ambition of Whig politicians. It is wise, but its wisdom is not that which is from above, and therefore may be regarded as an admirable representative of English Whiggism, personified in Mr. Augustus Tomlinson, who with great prudence and success devotes himself to robbery and housebreaking, and to lectures on ethics and metaphysics.

The article in the number before us entitled *Ultramontane Doubts* is written with cleverness and tact, and with more intellectual power than we are accustomed to look for among Protestants. Protestantism is essentially an unintellectual religion, and in their best days Protestants made but a sorry figure at reasoning; but latterly they appear to have lost the little share of intelligence they originally carried with them from the Church, and to have become utterly unable to do any thing in the way of argument, except to vituperate, and invent, and circulate foolish and absurd stories about priests and religious. Anti-Popery lecturers and editors, in our times, and especially in our country, seldom seem able to rise above the poor old fishwoman falling into her dotage, and the fact that they

are popular, and can attract crowds and rapturous applauses, is a sad commentary on the moral and intellectual culture of the Protestant community. It is, therefore, refreshing to meet even one Protestant who shows some signs of intellectual life, who has the courage to make some show of argument, and who, perhaps, has understanding enough of the matters on which he writes to be capable of being refuted. We had wellnigh despaired of ever meeting such a one, and now that he presents himself, we greet him cordially, and cherish him as a friend. We hope his courage will not fail him at his first onset, and that he will not, as soon as he receives the first blow, like our ordinary adversaries, disappear, to be seen or heard of no more for ever. Seriously, it gives us pleasure to meet a Protestant who has a beard on his face, and who has the strength to give and to take sturdy blows. We are tired of combating mere boys, or mere *simulacra*, or shadows as unsubstantial as the ghosts of superstition.

Let it not, however, be imagined that we have really encountered one of the giants. The Reviewer is no giant, that is certain; he is not above the medium size of the species, and is Titanic only in his disposition. He is great only in comparison with the ordinary herd of Protestant controversialists, as was Gulliver among the Liliputians. He brings forward no new argument, suggests no difficulty that has not been met and answered at least a thousand times; but he has contrived with much art to obscure certain matters very plain in themselves, and to confuse certain questions so successfully, as to embarrass the uninformed Protestant mind, and to satisfy those already satisfied, that we Catholics are sad reasoners, and in the last analysis no better than Protestants themselves.

The purpose of the Reviewer is to check the speed of Catholicity in Great Britain, by a skilful appeal to the national and political prejudices of Englishmen. He begins by referring to the hope expressed by many Catholics, that England is on the eve of her return to the Church. He does not believe this hope has any solid foundation; but conceding it for the sake of the argument, he wishes Roman Catholics charitably to assist him "to ascertain fairly and logically what will be our duty in reference to this realm and constitution of England, when that inevitable hour arrives in which our consciences shall compel us to

return to their communion ; and to what extent our state and laws must be reformed and remodelled in the event of our national conversion." This he contends is very important, for "not a few of his countrymen feel it impossible to conjecture how to comport themselves, on the adoption of any *known* theory of the infallibility and supremacy of the Roman Church, towards the institutions and laws of their own country, and in relation to those doctrines of intellectual and religious freedom which at present are most 'surely believed amongst us.'" He concedes that the Catholic subjects of the queen, as a body, are truly loyal, but he thinks their loyalty is an inconsequence, not authorized by their religion, but preserved and manifested in spite of it. The theory of Catholicity adopted by such Catholics as the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Camoys, Lord Beaumont, Mr. Anstey, and, perhaps we should add, the Earl of Shrewsbury, men whose loyalty to their queen is not to be questioned, is, he thinks, only a modified Protestantism, and not the genuine Catholic article at all. Englishmen, if converted, "would conscientiously feel compelled to adopt a much more Ultramontane position." But here comes up the difficulty. If we adopt the Ultramontane doctrine, then we must accept "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." But if we do not adopt the Ultramontane doctrine, we render the seat of infallibility doubtful, which renders the infallibility itself, if not doubtful, at least of no value as a rule ; or if we remove the doubt as to the seat of infallibility, and agree as to its organ, we must say the organ, whether Pope or Council, is sometimes infallible and sometimes not, for it is certain the organ, take which you will, has uttered "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." But if the organ is sometimes infallible and sometimes fallible in its utterances, it is necessary to have some rule by which to determine when its utterances are infallible and when not, and no rule but that of private judgment is possible. That is, the Reviewer attempts to show that the Catholic cannot be consistently a Gallican, because Gallicism pushed to its last consequences is simply Protestantism ; that to be a consistent Catholic he must be an Ultramontane ; but, if an Ultramontane, must hold "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." This is the argument of the article.

The Reviewer's inquiry is, as it strikes us, quite superfluous; for it relates solely to what may or may not be the duty of Englishmen towards civil government when they are compelled by their consciences to return to the Catholic communion, that is, after they have ceased to be Protestants and become Catholics. Whatever may be their duty, it is and can be of no interest to a Protestant, because, by the very terms of the supposition, there are to be no Protestants to be affected by it. Moreover, it does not indicate a very high religious or even moral sense, after one has become conscientiously convinced that he ought to return to the Catholic Church, to stop and inquire how obedience to his conscience will affect his political or civil relations. If a man is convinced that he ought to become a Catholic, he is convinced that the Catholic Church is God's Church, and therefore infallible, and consequently that whatever she teaches him to believe must be true, and whatever she commands him to do must be just.

We must tell the Reviewer, in the very outset, that we deny the jurisdiction of the court in which he proposes to try us. He makes politics the standard of religion, and summons the Church to plead at the bar of the state. But he forgets that religion, if any thing, is the *lex suprema*, and that politics, loyalty, and patriotism are to be judged by her, not she by them. Loyalty is a virtue commanded, and therefore defined, by religion. Whatever does not come within her definition, or whatever would conflict with her commands, is by that fact alone proved to be not the virtue of loyalty, not a virtue at all, but a crime against society, and a sin against God. So also of patriotism. It is a virtue as prescribed, and within the limits prescribed, by religion; outside of these limits, and not subject to religion, it is a vice, a crime, or a sin. Politics are simply a branch of ethics, and ethics are nothing but moral theology, the application of religious principles and dogmas to practical life. Politics are, therefore, by their own nature, below religion, and subject to her authority. To attempt to judge her by them is worse than simply ridiculous. She herself is the standard, and if you mean to be religious at all, you must conform your politics to your religion, not your religion to your politics. This is simply a dictate of common sense.

In whatever light we consider the Reviewer's inquiry, it

is simply absurd. He must either deny religion, or accept religion. He cannot do both at once. There is no possible way of reconciling two contradictories. Do our best, and we cannot reconcile religion with the feelings, wishes, and notions of those who hold all religion to be false and mischievous ; for every religion, in that it claims to be religion, claims to be the supreme law, and to possess the right to demand unqualified obedience. Religion is infallible truth and justice, or what God, who is truth itself, teaches men to believe, and what God, who is justice itself, commands them to do. There can be no compromise between truth and falsehood, or between justice and injustice, any more than between Christ and Belial, God and the Devil. The Free Kirk of Scotland, in asserting its independence of the civil authority, should have taught the Reviewer that religion is above the state, and he can hardly be unaware that a Parliamentary church, like the Anglican, is no religion at all, but a part of the general police establishment of the kingdom. If he accepts religion he must accept it as religion, not as politics. He can deny all religion if he chooses, and is willing to take the responsibility of doing so, but he cannot accept it, and then object to it that it is religion. He can allege that Catholicity is false, and, if he proves his allegation, reject her on that ground, which is of itself a sufficient ground for rejecting her ; but he cannot allege that she is false, because, if accepted, she would modify his politics, disturb his political convictions, or restrict his loyalty or his patriotism ; for, if true religion, she has the Divine right to determine his politics, and to define his patriotism and his loyalty or his duty to the state. Religion, therefore the Church, if true religion, has by its own essence authority over kings, emperors, princes, and states, and they are as much bound to obey her as are the meanest of their subjects. The man who denies this has not as yet the most elementary religious conception.

The Reviewer thinks that Englishmen, were they to become Catholics, would feel bound in conscience to be Ultramontanes, for he thinks the Ultramontane doctrine that which is the most consistent with the general theory of the Church. On this point we have no dispute with him. We are ourselves ultra-Ultramontane, and have not the least sympathy in the world with what is called Gallicanism, though we have deep love and veneration for *Catholic*

France. But if you adopt the Ultramontane doctrine, contends the Reviewer, you must concede that your Church has erred. Why so? Because "English Protestants are apt to feel suspicious that" she has asserted "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." This is a serious difficulty indeed, and one which proves that it is a mistake to suppose that the Protestant has nothing to say for himself. We cannot deny that English Protestants are apt to feel such suspicions, but, happily, in the present discussion, we have nothing to do with the suspicion of English *Protestants*, for the inquiry the Reviewer sets out with he himself restricts to Englishmen after their consciences compel them to return to the Catholic communion. We cannot deny, again, that the Church has asserted principles to which "loyal and patriotic Englishmen," even though professing to be Catholics, refuse or will refuse to subscribe, but this, perhaps, is not a conclusive argument against her infallibility. Englishmen are, no doubt, very respectable, at least as their own little insular world goes, but we do not recollect that they in their capacity of Englishmen, whether nominally Catholics or not, ever received a Divine commission to teach, or a promise of immunity from error. As we have read history, the Church of God existed some centuries before there were any Englishmen in existence, and we are pretty sure that not to them, as Englishmen, was it said, "Going, teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, for behold I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." With all deference to our cousins across the water, we must tell them frankly that we do not recognize them, however "loyal and patriotic," as the infallible Church of God, from whose decision there lies no appeal. The Church of God, whatever else she is, is Catholic, not national, and her prerogatives are those of no particular nation as such, not even of the Italians, as Gioberti, in his false and exaggerated patriotism, would persuade us. Here, again, we must deny the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot consent to plead at its bar. Who says "the Church of God" pronounces a higher word than he who says "patriotic and loyal Englishmen." That patriotic and loyal Englishmen cannot subscribe to the decisions of the Church may be a grievous misfortune for them, or an excellent reason for condemning

them as heretics; but it is just no reason at all for saying the Church has erred. The Reviewer forgets that the Catholic Church is neither the Kirk of Scotland, nor the Anglican Establishment. It is only a church created by Englishmen, deriving its institution and its mission from their Queen and Parliament, and which they have made and can unmake, that can be tried by the national feelings, convictions, or prejudices of Englishmen. Englishmen, when compelled by their consciences to return to our communion, will most likely cease to be Anglicans.

But what are these principles, said to have been asserted by the Church, to which English Protestants are apt to feel suspicions that loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe. According to the Reviewer, they are the claim by the Church of the power by Divine right to depose temporal sovereigns, to absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and to persecute heretics. Here our readers will perceive that the Reviewer holds that loyal and patriotic Englishmen must place loyalty before religion, the state before the Church, and heresy before orthodoxy. If they can only provide for the state, for the temporal order, and secure immunity for heretics, they must be prepared to let the Church or orthodoxy shift for itself. A true Christian would reverse this, and contend that in securing the Church he had secured the state, and that, if he secured orthodoxy, he need not be solicitous to secure to heretics the freedom to deny it, and thus destroy themselves. But let this pass, as it is a consideration not likely to weigh with the Reviewer.

Suppose the Church has claimed the power alleged, what then? If she is what she professes to be, she is infallible, and then, if she has claimed it, she infallibly has it, and you in objecting only condemn yourself. You must be able to prove infallibly that she does not possess it, before, from her having claimed it, you can conclude that she has erred. Are you able to do this? The Church claims to be infallible, to teach and govern all nations by Divine authority, and the claim of infallible authority can never be set aside by an authority confessedly fallible. What infallible authority have you for denying that the Church possesses, by Divine right, any power she has ever claimed or claims? Do you say Englishmen cannot subscribe to it? But Englishmen are not infallible, and may themselves be the party in the wrong. Do you allege popular opinion?

Since when has popular opinion become an infallible criterion of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong? Do you say the temporal authority denies it? Is the temporal authority infallible? Do you say yes? Then you must prove it. No? Then it may be mistaken, and its assertion counts for nothing. Then, again, who made the temporal authority the judge of the spiritual? Who made its voice authoritative against the religious or spiritual authority?

Do you, finally, say the power is intrinsically evil, and such as can never, by any one, be lawfully claimed and exercised? It is, then, *malum in se*, always and everywhere wrong to depose temporal sovereigns, to absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and to punish heretics, by whomsoever it may be done. Are you prepared to take this ground? Then sing your palinode without delay. Call up your Scotch ancestors and sentence them for having made war on their king and having sold him to the English Parliament; let your righteous indignation break forth against the Long Parliament and Cromwell, for having not only deposed, but tried, condemned, and actually beheaded, Charles the First; draw up an indictment against your Whig progenitors for having called in Dutch William to expel James the Second, disown your "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, and declare Victoria the First an usurper. Why, the very essence of English and Scotch Whiggism is that kings may be deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance, and the massacre of Glencoe, the penal laws of England and Ireland, and the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which has received the royal assent almost at the moment we are writing, prove that "loyal and patriotic Englishmen," especially if Whigs, hold it lawful to persecute, if not heretics, at least true believers. Universal European Liberalism, the able organ of which the Edinburgh Review has been for nearly half a century, holds nothing to be more certain than that it is right to depose temporal sovereigns, and that subjects may not only be absolved from their allegiance, but rise up in arms and depose them whenever they take it into their heads to do so. Ask Lord Palmerston, ask Lord Minto, ask the present Sir Robert Peel, ask Lord John Russell, the first minister of the crown, ask your friends, Mazzini, Canino, Ledru-Rollin, Herr Hecker, Herr Struvé, and the whole band of Red Republicans, who, in 1848, overturned or shook every throne

in Europe, if it be not so. If you happen to be an admirer of Washington, and the republic of the United States, read in the Declaration of Independence by the American Congress of 1776, "that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are *absolved from all allegiance* to the British crown; and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." You cannot as Liberals, as Whigs, as Englishmen, nor even as Americans, living under governments founded either on the right of revolution, as is that of Great Britain, or on the principle that the tyranny of the prince forfeits his rights and absolves his subjects, as is ours, maintain that in no case and under no circumstances can temporal sovereigns be deposed and subjects absolved from their allegiance. Nay, no one can do it without asserting, with the Anglican ministers under the Stuarts, the Divine right of kings, the inamissibility of power, and passive obedience, a doctrine ably combated at the time by Cardinals Bellarmine and Du Perron, and the Spanish Jesuit Suarez, and which would deprive the people of all hope of freedom, and make God himself the accomplice of the civil tyrant. You cannot deny that civil power is amissible, that it may be forfeited, and then that temporal sovereigns may, under some circumstances, be justly deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance. Then you cannot conclude that the Church is fallible from the simple fact that she has claimed and exercised the power over temporal sovereigns and their subjects to which you object.

The difference, on the supposition that the Church has claimed and exercised the power in question, between the Reviewer and us is, that, while we claim it for the Church as commissioned by God to teach and govern all nations, he claims it for demagogues, conspirators, rebels, revolutionists, and the vague something called the people; that is, the mob, for the people acting without government and against government are a mob, and nothing else, whether in larger or smaller numbers. And what does he gain for loyalty and patriotism by denying the power to the Church, and claiming it for the mob? If you deny it to the Church, you must claim it for the mob, since there is nothing else for which you can claim it; for being a right against the temporal sovereign, it of course cannot be claimed for him.

You must, then, either deny all right to resist the tyrant, and assert absolute civil despotism, or else concede the deposing and absolving power either to the mob or to the Church, that is, the spiritual authority; and can you ask us to spend time in proving, that, even on the score of human prudence, the Church is altogether the safer depository of the power? The English rebellion under the first Charles, the French revolutions of 1789, 1793, 1830, and 1848, and the Red Republican insurrections in Switzerland, in the Italian states, in the smaller German principalities, in Berlin, and in Vienna in the last-mentioned year, as well as the revolutions now fomented throughout Europe by the secret societies, and which are kept down only by immense standing armies and the most stringent police regulations, are a proof, that to concede this power to the mob is only to render freedom impracticable, and undermine all authority, and subvert all society. Great Britain herself, who opens her arms so lovingly to the political refugees from all the Continental states, and permits them to organize on her own territory a conspiracy against all legal order and all social existence, has in her bosom a large and increasing body of Chartists, Socialists, and malecontents, who will at no distant day bring home even to her obtuse understanding the danger of asserting the sovereignty of the mob. If we wish to maintain legal order, or even society at all, we must assert authority, and maintain that, in face of the subject, it is always and everywhere sacred and inviolable. In face of the mob, authority must be presumed to be always right. Then, since constitutional monarchies, republics, and democracies, as we know from experience, can tyrannize as well as the most absolute monarchies, — since it is impossible so to organize power that it may not be abused, and most grievously abused, — nothing remains but hopeless tyranny and oppression, or the recognition in the religious or spiritual authority of an umpirage between sovereigns, and especially between sovereigns and their subjects. For this umpirage the Catholic Church is peculiarly fitted. She is in all nations, and therefore has an interest in and tenderness for each; she is confined to no one, and is above all, with an equal regard for all, and for both sovereign and subject, and therefore is independent of the peculiar prejudices or policy of either, and prepared to be impartial and just in her decisions. Some such

umpirage is felt even by our age to be necessary, as proved by your congresses of sovereigns, and by the congress of nations contended for by your peace fanatics, Cobden and Elihu Burritt, and human wisdom can devise none to be compared with that which Providence has provided in the Catholic Church. The history of the modern world since her umpirage, formerly recognized, has been generally rejected by European nations, the long and bloody wars that have since raged, the large standing armies that are kept up, the immense national debts that have been contracted, the tremendous influence on politics and national movements exercised by Jewish bankers, the present unsettled state of society, the high-handed measures of government, and the general poverty and suffering of the agricultural laboring class throughout Europe, prove the absolute madness of these nations in attempting to proceed without the umpirage of the Church, and the absolute necessity of its restoration. Nations without that umpirage are in the condition of a population without government. They are as nations in a state of anarchy, and an anarchy as to their external relations necessarily superinduces anarchy or despotism as to their internal relations. Right yields to might, and justice deserts the habitations of men. Even humanly speaking, then, since the power must exist somewhere, and its exercise is necessary, the Church is its proper depositary.

The Reviewer cannot conclude against the Church from the supposed intrinsic wrong of the power in question. He can conclude against her only on the ground that, though the power is good and just enough in itself considered, she has it not by divine right, but has usurped it. But in order to take this ground he must unchurch her; for if she be the Church of God, the true spiritual authority, she must necessarily have this power by divine right, since it is inherent in the spiritual authority as such. The Reviewer forgets this. He quietly takes it for granted that the temporal authority, if not absolutely supreme, is at least absolutely independent, and in no respect whatever subject to the control or supervision of the spiritual authority. He proceeds as a politician, looks solely to the state, and is indifferent to religion so long as it touches no matters of interest to the secular power, but holds that the secular power has the right to repel it, if it does any thing of the sort. He understands by religious liberty freedom from religious

obligation, the right of the state to have no religion, and to brush religion out of its way if it presumes to interfere between it and the realization of its plans, or the execution of its purposes. He in reality makes the state his religion, his church, and claims for it the rights and prerogatives which the Christian claims for the spiritual authority. This is the tendency of politicians in all ages, and in no age more than in our own. It is at bottom only the same general tendency of the flesh to rule the spirit which every Christian has to struggle against, and which causes all the confusion experienced in the bosom of the individual and of society. But religion is the *lex suprema*, and its perfect freedom, independence, is necessarily its supremacy. It is the supreme law or it is nothing; and if the supreme law, it is for states no less than for subjects, for princes are as much bound to obey the law of God as their subjects, and in their public as in their private relations. Religion is supreme over all men, of whatever rank or dignity, and in every department of life, individual or social, private or public, for no one in any rank or relation has any right to be irreligious; and to deny this is simply to deny religion itself. If then we suppose a church at all, that is, a divinely instituted authority, commissioned to teach, to interpret, and declare the law of God, we must suppose it supreme, and in all cases paramount to the temporal power; that it is the church that prescribes the sphere of the temporal, within which it is free, and not the state that prescribes the sphere of the church. The spiritual by its own essential nature defines the temporal, and therefore the powers of the state, and at the same time its own powers. Consequently, in every case of a collision of the two authorities, the temporal, not the spiritual, must yield. We must obey God rather than men, and therefore in every case the spiritual authority rather than the temporal, for the temporal loses its divine right to command, and becomes a purely human authority, which is no authority at all, the moment it commands any thing contrary to the spiritual authority, commissioned to interpret and declare the law of God.

That this conclusion will not be subscribed to by "loyal and patriotic Englishmen" is very possible, but we cannot stultify ourselves in order to gain even their subscription. The fact is as we state it, in the very nature of things; and do not let us so besot ourselves as to suppose that we can hold

religion as religion, and yet subject it to the state, or withdraw the state from its control. Do let us be one thing or another. Either pronounce all religion a cheat, an imposition, mere priestcraft, or else accept it as divine, and authorized by God himself to speak in his name, and therefore with the majesty of supreme authority. It is either one or the other, and there is no medium. Read M. Proudhon. He will tell you, and prove to you too, with an invincible logic, with a terrible consistency, that we only betray our folly and cowardice when we seek to find some middle ground, a *via media*, and that you must deny all religion, the very sovereignty of God, or else concede the supremacy of religion, and recognize in the chair of St. Peter the plenitude of power asserted by St. Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth. How the iron logic of this bold blasphemer puts to shame the timid and hesitating dialectics of the bravest Protestant!

The Reviewer, doubtless, is far better qualified to speak for loyal and patriotic Englishmen than we are; but, if he does not misrepresent them, they are extremely deficient in religious knowledge, and have not yet learned the first question and answer of the Catechism. The spiritual is not for the temporal; the temporal is for the spiritual, as the body is for the soul, not the soul for the body. What absurdity to contend that the body should govern the soul, or to allege that the soul transcends its sphere whenever it prescribes the law to the body and attempts to restrain its appetites and propensities! Man's only destiny is eternal life, to see and enjoy God in the beatific vision. For this and this alone the law of God commands him to live, and the temporal can be legitimate only as rendered subordinate and subservient to this end. Man has no temporal destiny, properly speaking, and his only destiny is spiritual, eternal. The temporal order, therefore, has and can have no temporal destiny, no destiny in the temporal, and consequently has its destiny or its end only in the spiritual order. Society, the whole secular order itself, has no secular end, and exists only in reference to the spiritual destiny of man, and is to be regarded only in so far as made subservient to the salvation of the soul. The state is instituted for the management of secular affairs, it is true, and it has no right to meddle with any others; but it is bound to manage these affairs under the spiritual law for the spiritual end, and

therefore under the law of which the spiritual authority is the interpreter, and for an end which God through that authority prescribes. Evidently, then, the spiritual authority, however constituted, to whose hands soever confided by Almighty God, is by its own nature supreme in regard to the whole secular order, because confessedly supreme in all that regards man's spiritual destiny, and therefore under God the sovereign of all temporal sovereigns, of all emperors, kings, princes, states, no less than of individuals employed in the immediate service of the sanctuary. The Church, then, if the true Church, if the divinely instituted spiritual authority, has, we do not say temporal authority, for that we do not claim for her, but plenary spiritual power over the whole temporal order, and necessarily possesses by divine right all the power over princes and their subjects she is alleged to have claimed and exercised. These powers are hers, not merely by an express grant of temporal authority, but because they are inherent in her as the spiritual authority. It is then supremely ridiculous to attempt to unchurch her by proving that she has claimed and exercised them. If what she claims to be, she cannot but possess them, and cannot but have the divine right to exercise them. You must, then, prove that she is not the Church of God, that she is not the divinely instituted spiritual authority, before you can object either to her having exercised or to her having claimed them.

We claim power of any sort for the Church only on the ground that she is what she professes to be, the true Church of God, representing the authority of God in its plenitude on earth. We hold her divinely commissioned to teach, interpret, and apply the law of God to all cases that can arise in any department of human life. If she is not thus commissioned, she is a false church, an impostor, and we recognize in her no authority at all. You need not, then, be frightened at our Ultramontaniam. If she is what she claims to be, she is infallible, and then all her decisions must be infallibly just and true. Are you among those who fear justice and hate the truth? Yes? Then you condemn yourself. No? Then what more do you want? You have yourself begun by saying, that "none can be more convinced than ourselves of the truth of the declaration which we often find on the lips of Roman Catholics, that 'there is no better rule than that of an infallible church.' This

we think certain." Do understand, then, that infallibility means infallibility, and that the decisions of an infallible church are infallible. An infallible church can err in nothing she commands the faithful either to believe or to do. What, then, do your loyal and patriotic Englishmen fear? What can they fear, when they are conscientiously convinced that she is God's Church? If she has deposed temporal sovereigns, can you not see that it is infallible proof that they deserved to be deposed, and that she was right in deposing them? if she absolves subjects from their allegiance, that they are absolved by the law of God, and she has the power to absolve them? and if she punishes heretics, that heretics deserve to be punished, and she has the right to punish them? Do understand that the infallibility of the actor necessarily carries along with it the infallibility of the act. If the Church is infallible, what more do you want? Do you want an independent guaranty that she will not abuse her infallibility? Is not the infallibility itself the best guaranty that you can have or desire? Do you deny her infallibility? Then you are not concerned in the inquiry you raise, for you are inquiring only after the duty of those whose consciences compel them to return to her communion, and no man's conscience can compel him to do that unless he is convinced that she is what she professes to be, therefore infallible. But deny her infallibility, if you choose, and prove that she is not what she professes to be; we will then concede you all you ask, and abandon her to your tender mercies, to be treated as you treat any one of your own sects. But we deny that, from the simple fact of her having claimed and exercised the powers you object to, you can conclude that she has erred; for if infallible, it is infallibly certain that she possesses them and has the right to claim and exercise them, and you in denying it are only blaspheming the Immaculate Spouse of God. Supposing, then, as you allege, that the Church has asserted the principles to which you say "loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe," you must unchurch her, set aside her claim to infallibility, before you can be permitted to allege this fact against her. The Reviewer will therefore perceive that we can easily escape from the dilemma which he has labored so hard and so skilfully to construct, and in which he supposes he has concluded us.

Nevertheless, the Reviewer does not establish the fact

that the Church has asserted the principles to which he contends Englishmen cannot subscribe. We are well aware of the passages he cites from St. Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth; but we must tell him that these passages do not sustain his allegation,—not, as he supposes, because we hold the utterances of the organ of infallibility are sometimes fallible, and sometimes not, for we hold no such thing; but because it does not appear that they are utterances of that organ at all. We do not, in saying this, abandon the Ultramontane ground. We accept the Papal infallibility; but that infallibility is not, even on Ultramontane principles, a personal prerogative of the Pope. It attaches to his office, not to himself personally, and therefore he is the organ of infallibility only when speaking in his official character, and officially deciding a point of faith or morals for the Church. We say *faith or morals*, because it is only in questions of faith or morals that any Catholic asserts the infallibility of the Church, whether speaking through the Sovereign Pontiff or a general council, or, in fine, through the body of her bishops teaching in communion with their chief, the successor of St. Peter, each in his own diocese. We concede to the Reviewer that the Pope is infallible in interpreting the Scriptures, and that the great Popes cited do support their claim of the deposing and absolving power by the sacred text; but as we assert the infallibility of the Pope only when deciding officially, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, we are obliged to hold the Pope infallible only in reference to the precise point before him to be decided. When the question before him is the interpretation of the sacred text, we concede his infallibility; but nothing obliges us to hold him infallible in interpreting it, when its interpretation is not, so to speak, the question before the court. The interpretation is then an *obiter dictum*, and, though deserving of great respect, is not a declaration of the law. The rule that obtains in the civil courts, and with which every lawyer is presumed to be familiar, is the rule that obtains here. Now, in the instances the Reviewer cites, the Popes were not defining the faith, nor judicially interpreting the sacred text, but simply arguing from it and theological reason in justification of their acts; that is, they were reasoning, and not defining, and therefore their utterances cited were not the utterances of the organ

of infallibility. This is evident from the fact that these utterances are not articles of faith, and are not insisted on as such by Ultramontanes, since, if they were, the Gallicans, who do not accept them, would in the view of Ultramontanes be held to be heretics, which is not the fact; for the Gallican is admitted to be a Catholic, and the dispute with him turns on a question confessedly not of faith. Whatever principles the Church has asserted or asserts are confessedly, in the view of all Catholics, of faith; but as these principles are conceded even by those who hold them not to be of faith, it follows that the Church has never asserted them.

We in this are far from saying that the principles set forth by the Popes referred to are not true, very far from admitting that these great Popes erred in what they said. All we say is, that they did not define the matters involved, and therefore that what they said is not formally of faith, and if not formally of faith no Catholic can be held under pain of heresy to accept it, or obliged by his faith to assert the principles involved. All that the Catholic is obliged on Ultramontane principles to maintain is the divine right of the Popes to do what in the cases alleged they did do, and to exercise the same power in all analogous cases. 'This much of course he must maintain. But in taking the ground that the views presented by the Popes of their own powers are not to be regarded as definitions of faith, we do not by any means, as the Reviewer imagines, render it doubtful to whose hands the infallible authority is confided, within what limits the utterances of the organ of infallibility are infallible, and what are the utterances themselves. He says we render these three things doubtful, and thus destroy the infallible church as a rule, because we must settle them before we can use it, and we have and can have only private judgment with which to settle them. We dispute hopelessly, he says, as to the seat of infallibility. We are obliged, in order not to accuse infallibility of erring, to contend that the utterances of the organ of infallibility are sometimes infallible and sometimes not, and can never decide which of its utterances are to be received as infallible, and which are to be counted fallible. These preliminary difficulties are conclusive against the Church as an available rule, and render it more perplexing for a Catholic with his infallible Church to know what he

ought to believe and do, than it is for a Protestant who makes no pretensions to an infallible church. The Reviewer is a man of a fertile fancy. Yet Protestants insist so often and so strenuously on this objection, here put in its strongest form, that we are sometimes inclined to believe that they do really persuade themselves that there is some force in it.

The Reviewer says we dispute hopelessly among ourselves as to the seat or organ of infallibility. We have, he alleges, four theories amongst us on this point, one that the Pope alone, a second that the council alone, a third that the Pope and council conjointly, and a fourth that the Universal Church diffusely, is the organ of infallibility. He evidently supposes, or wishes to insinuate, that these are four exclusive and mutually hostile theories, and that he who accepts any one of them must necessarily deny the others. He perhaps is not so well informed as he thinks. From these four theories we must strike the second, for nobody contends that the council alone is infallible, and for the excellent reason that there is no such thing as an œcumenical council without the Pope, and only œcumenical councils are ever held to be infallible. Then, of the remaining three, we must remind the Reviewer that they are not three *theories* as to the seat of infallibility, but three modes or respects in which the Church is held to be infallible, and the assertion of one involves no denial of the other two. The Pope and council conjointly is simply the council, neither more nor less, and all Catholics without a single exception hold the council infallible in all matters of faith and morals. "The Universal Church diffusely" means, we suppose, what our theologians term the *Ecclesia dispersa*, or Church dispersed, in distinction from the *Ecclesia congregata*, or Church assembled in general council. The Church in this sense, again, is held by all Catholics to be infallible, and what in this sense she teaches, to be of faith. The infallibility of the Church in these two respects, assembled and dispersed, is of faith, and no man can deny it and be a Catholic. In addition, all, except a few individuals, — now chiefly laymen, devoted to politics, ambitious of state or court favor, or desirous of introducing political changes which are repugnant either in themselves or in the manner of introducing them to Christian morals, and who are called Gallicans, although the Gallican

hierarchy disowns them, — hold that the Sovereign Pontiff alone, when defining officially, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, is also infallible. Those who hold and those who deny the Pope's infallibility hold, be it remembered, the Church to be infallible in the other two respects mentioned. All the dispute there is amongst us is then confined to the first-named mode, that is, whether the Pope, *loquens ex cathedra*, be or be not infallible. But even here the dispute has little practical importance, for the Gallican holds that he is bound to receive the Papal definitions and constitutions as infallible, unless there is a reclamation against them, and a reclamation cannot be made, for the first bishop who should reclaim would be *ipso facto* excommunicated. The Gallican is not permitted to dispute any definition of the Pope when it is actually made, and he never does it. Bossuet, we believe, concedes that there is no instance of an erroneous Papal definition recorded, and there is never a question whether the Papal definitions actually made are or are not of faith. The Gallican bishops accepted at once, as the infallible voice of the Church, the Papal condemnation of the five propositions extracted from the book of Jansenius, and the Jansenists themselves acknowledged the authority of the Pope and the infallibility of his definition of the doctrine, and only objected that the Pope is not infallible in deciding a question of fact, such as whether the five propositions were contained or not in the book of Jansenius. The propositions they agreed were to be condemned as heretical, but as to the fact whether they were contained in Jansenius or not, they wished to maintain a respectful silence. But the Gallican bishops rejected this distinction as a vain subterfuge, insisted that the Papal constitution was infallible, and as to the question of fact no less than as to the question of doctrine.

The Reviewer says that the theory which ascribes infallibility to "the Universal Church diffusely" is unintelligible. "The Universal Church resembles some gas, enormously voluminous and elastic; it has no visible dimensions, no tangible solidity. It is a nebulous matter, of which the orb of truth may be *a making*, for aught we know, but of which it has never yet been made." No man appears to advantage who writes on what he does not un-

derstand. The Universal Church, as the Reviewer understands it, may, if he will pardon the bull, be unintelligible; but as a Catholic understands it, it is very intelligible. It consists of the whole body of pastors or bishops in communion with the Pope, their visible head and visible centre of unity. A body with a visible centre and a visible head cannot, except in Scotch metaphysics, be destitute of visible dimensions or tangible solidity. The Church dispersed, of which we predicate infallibility, is composed of these bishops or pastors teaching in communion with the successor of St. Peter, each in his own diocese. This is the ordinary way in which the Church teaches, and it is only when errors arise, and there are heresies to be anathematized, that she ever teaches in any other way. To know what she teaches in this way is always an easy matter. By virtue of the Papacy, the episcopacy is held by the bishops *in solido*, each standing for all and all for each. All must respectively agree with the Pope, and if all respectively agree with him, all, by a well-known mathematical axiom, must respectively agree with one another. To know, then, what the Universal Church teaches, you have only to consult the first bishop you meet, we care not if a Gallican bishop, in communion with the Pope, or your parish priest approved by his bishop. All the talk, then, about the doubtfulness of the seat of infallibility amounts to nothing. The Gallican is, no doubt, more or less inconsequent, that is, not a good reasoner, but he can always learn without difficulty what the Church commands him either to believe or to do; and the Ultramontane, though asserting the Papal infallibility, asserts nothing to be of faith which the Gallican does not also assert; for he does not assert the Papal infallibility as an article of faith, or hold it to be of faith in such a sense that speculative denial of it must subject one to canonical censure for heresy.

The second difficulty we have already resolved. The utterances of the organ of infallibility, whether the Pope, the Council, or the Church dispersed, are infallible without any limitation; but the Pope, although infallible when that organ, is not always it, or does not always speak as it, and what he says in any other character is not necessarily the voice of the Church. Doubtless, we must use reason to determine when he is defining a question of faith or morals, or is only arguing or acting in regard to matters on which no

Catholic claims infallibility for the Church ; but this does not concede that we are forced to rely on private judgment to say when the utterances of the organ are infallible and when not. Not every exercise of reason is a private judgment. The proper exercise of reason on those matters to which reason is competent is in no respect a private judgment, because it is not a judgment of reason as peculiar to this or that individual, but as common to all men. Private judgment is only when the matters judged lie out of the range of reason, and its principle is not the common reason of mankind, nor a catholic or public authority, but the fancy, the caprice, the prejudice, or the idiosyncrasy of the individual forming it. Catholicity does not supersede, it presupposes, reason; and no Catholic so understands the rule of an infallible church as to suppose it can be adopted and made available, or applied, without any use of reason. The Church addresses herself to men as creatures endowed with reason, and as using their reason and using it reasonably. The point in the case before us for reason to decide is, not whether this or that utterance of the organ of infallibility is infallible, but is this or that an utterance of the recognized organ of infallibility. The former is out of the province of reason, and, if we were obliged to decide it by natural reason alone, we should be obliged to rely on private judgment; but the latter is within the competency of reason, and its decision by reason is not an act of private judgment. The case, moreover, presents no difficulty, for the definitions of the Church or of the Pope are always rendered in clear and precise language, and bear on their very face the unmistakable marks of their real character. The documents which we must consult are official documents, which speak for themselves, and are as easily distinguished as the enactments of a legislature, the edicts of a king, or the judicial decisions of civil courts. It is only those that come in an official form that we are obliged to receive as authoritative, and therefore as infallible. Consequently, there is no inquiry as to within what limits the utterances are infallible, and no difficulty in determining what are the utterances of the infallible organ.

It follows from what we have said, that we can take either horn of the Reviewer's dilemma without any grave inconvenience. If we say the Church has asserted "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot

subscribe," nothing obliges us to concede that she has erred, because the inability of Englishmen to subscribe may be their own fault, and can weigh nothing against the Church, and because the principles in question are evidently inherent in the spiritual power. If we choose to deny that those principles are of faith, we can do so without denying the Papal infallibility, because the Pope has never defined them to be of faith. If, again, we choose to go farther, and deny, with the Gallican, that the Pope possesses by divine right the deposing and absolving power, we can do so without being forced to rely on private judgment, with the Protestant, or losing the infallible Church as the rule of faith.

We have said we are bound to hold that the Pope had the right to depose temporal sovereigns, and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance. Thus far all Catholics are agreed. We hold with Ultramontanes that he possessed the power he claimed and exercised by divine right; Gallicans, as well as we, hold that he had the power, but contend that he held it, *jure humano*, by the will of the people, or the concession of Catholic sovereigns. The Catholic people and sovereigns, of course, consented to the exercise of the power, or else the Pope could not have exercised it, at least with any effect; but we do not believe that the right to exercise it was conferred by them, for it appears to us plainly inherent in the spiritual authority as such, and Saint Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth manifestly claim it, not as a temporal, but as a spiritual power. The Gallican view, though not contrary to the faith, seems to us to be a questionable expedient for relieving the apprehensions of the temporal authority, conciliating civil tyrants, and retaining court favor, and fitted to pave the way for withdrawing the state from its subjection to the law of God, or, what is the same thing, permitting it to interpret and declare that law for itself. But it may be well to examine the cases in which the deposing and absolving power has been exercised.

That the Popes have, in certain cases, deposed temporal sovereigns, and absolved their subjects from their allegiance, is undoubtedly true; and that they have a right to do so, in all analogous cases, we suppose must be conceded, whether we adopt Ultramontane or Gallican doctrines. But they have done so in no case that need alarm the

delicate loyalty and patriotism of either a Catholic or a Protestant Englishman. The power has never been exercised over an infidel prince, or one who was not a spiritual subject of the Pope, and bound by his profession, the tenure of his crown, and the constitution and laws of his realm, to protect and defend the Catholic religion. Such was the case with Henry the Fourth of Germany, and such was the case with the Albigensian Counts of Thoulouse. Such, too, was the case with Elizabeth of England, a case, perhaps, as favorable to the Reviewer as can be selected. She was excommunicated by Saint Pius the Fifth, deposed, and her subjects absolved from their allegiance. But she had personally professed the Catholic religion, had succeeded to the crown as a Catholic, when the Catholic constitution of England was still in force, and the Catholic religion was part and parcel of the law of the land. She was bound by her profession, her coronation oath, the tenure of her crown, and the laws of her realm, to be a Catholic, and to protect and defend the Catholic religion. When she turned heretic, violated the constitution of her kingdom, oppressed her subjects, abolished Catholicity, expelled the Catholic bishops from their sees, set up a new hierarchy of her own creation, and persecuted, exiled, imprisoned, hung, and beheaded Catholics for adhering to their religion, she deserved excommunication for her heresy and wickedness, and deposition for her intolerable tyranny. The Protestants of England themselves would instantly depose their present amiable and popular queen were she to become a Catholic, and they would contend that they have the right to do so, because she holds her crown only inasmuch as she is a Protestant, and is bound by her coronation oath to protect and defend the Protestant religion as by law established. What they hold it compatible with their loyalty and patriotism to do to their queen for embracing the true faith and seeking a heavenly crown, the Pope could well do to Elizabeth for abolishing the true faith, establishing heresy, and persecuting true believers; and if the Pope permitted the king of Spain to attempt to drive her from her throne, they have nothing to say, for they count it gloriously loyal and patriotic to have called in Dutch William to expel his father-in-law, the Catholic James the Second. Loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot complain of the Church for having done, in favor of the constitution,

the laws, and the religion of England, what Protestants glory in having done against them.

It is evident from an analysis of all the cases of deposition that can be cited, that the Popes have always respect to the constitution of the civil power, and that, when they interpose against the sovereign, it is always to vindicate the rights of the nation invaded by the prince. Where a sovereign has made no war on the constitution and laws of his realm, where he has been faithful to his obligations, and has preserved the tenure of his crown, and ruled justly, according to the constitution and laws, the Pope has never claimed the power to depose him, or to absolve his subjects. It is clear, then, that the present queen of Great Britain, in case she does not persecute Catholics, and deny them the freedom of their religion, does not come within the category of any of those cases in which the Popes have asserted the deposing and absolving power. She is a Protestant, it is true; but she has violated no law of her kingdom in being one, and breaks no obligation which as queen she has taken by remaining one. There is no principle ever asserted by the Church on which, were her subjects to become Catholics, she could be deposed. Her Catholic subjects now owe her allegiance, and are bound by the Church to obey her in all things not repugnant to the law of God, and the fact of the rest of her subjects becoming Catholics could work no change in her rights, or in their obligations to her as temporal sovereign. To say that Catholics cannot be bound to obey an heretical prince is not true. Belgium is a Catholic nation, and yet the prince is Protestant. The Pope has not absolved them from their allegiance. The Catholic subjects of Prussia are held to owe allegiance to their sovereign, as much as are the subjects of Austria to their pious young emperor. The Apostle, speaking by the Holy Ghost, commands believers to obey even the heathen emperors of Rome, and heresy, when there is nothing in the constitution of the state against it, obviously can no more work a forfeiture of the rights of sovereigns than paganism or infidelity. Doubtless, the Church would claim to decide for Catholics what things are contrary to the law of God, and what are not: but this she does now for those subjects of Queen Victoria who have the happiness to be Catholics. Obviously, the rights of the queen to her throne, and the duties of her subjects, in case they should become Catholics, would remain unaffected.

There is nothing in the Catholic religion at war with loyalty and patriotism, so long as loyalty and patriotism are confined within the bounds of virtue, and are not made pretexts for encroaching on the freedom of the spiritual authority in all things spiritual. Doubtless, such loyalty and patriotism as that of the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Beaumont are not compatible with our duty as Catholics, nor even as enlightened and upright statesmen. Every good Catholic must, of course, place God before the king, the Church before the state; but this only makes him the more loyal as a subject, and the more worthy as a citizen. Loyal and patriotic Englishmen may object to this, and insist that the state shall be independent of the law of God; but we cannot assert religion at all without asserting it, and not to assert it would be only to leave open the door to absolute civil despotism. We know no way of reconciling Catholicity with atheistical politics, no way of rendering religion acceptable to infidel politicians, and we shall not attempt to do it.

In direct reply, then, to the Reviewer's question, as to what will be the duty of Englishmen to the constitution and realm of England when their consciences compel them to return to our communion, we answer that it will be,— 1. To expunge from the constitution and laws all those provisions which are directed against the Catholic religion, to free the queen from the obligation imposed by Parliament to remain a Protestant, and to give her liberty, if she chooses, to become a Catholic and aspire to a heavenly crown, without forfeiting her earthly crown; and 2. To preserve inviolate, in all other respects, the constitution and laws of the realm, and loyally to obey the sovereign in all things not repugnant to the law of God, as interpreted, declared, and administered by the Church through her proper organs. This reply is clear and distinct, and in strict logical and historical harmony with the principles which the Church has asserted and acted on for eighteen hundred years, and is repugnant by no principle the Church or the Popes have ever asserted. Nothing is more certain, than that the Church recognizes the civil power as distinct from herself, and autonomous in its own sphere. The supremacy she claims is not a temporal, but a spiritual supremacy; and consists not in the claim to exercise civil power, but in the right to prescribe under God the morality of the state, to

prescribe the end for which civil society exists, and as to their morality the means by which that end is to be gained. She denies to the state all competency in spirituals, and asserts that it is bound to observe in all its acts the law of God, of which she is the divinely commissioned guardian and judge. So long as the state respects her authority as this guardian and judge, and faithfully seeks by lawful means the true end of civil government, she leaves it free to pursue its own course, and commands her children to be loyal and obedient to it.

The Church, in fact, treats the civil government, as far as the nature of the case admits, precisely as she does the individual. If the individual is simply a Catholic layman, with no other obligations to her than those contracted in his baptismal vows, she demands of him only the fulfilment of those vows; but if he has contracted special obligations towards her, or has received from her special trusts, she demands the fulfilment of them; and if he refuses, she revokes the trusts, and punishes him for his breach of faith. So, if a sovereign contracts special obligations to her, and holds his authority on condition of fulfilling them, she demands their fulfilment; and, if she judges it meet, she deposes him, if he obstinately persists in violating them. This is all just and reasonable, if we admit any church or spiritual authority at all. Queen Victoria has contracted no special obligations to the Church, and is not bound to perform any special duties towards her. The England of former times was Catholic, had a Catholic constitution, and its special duties to the Catholic religion; but the England of our times is Protestant, and its conversion to the Catholic religion will not revive the England that was, and the old relations between its government and the Holy See. It will be the conversion to the faith of a new kingdom, and the special relations between it and the Holy See will depend on the arrangements that may be mutually determined upon. In the mean time, the relations of Catholic Englishmen to the civil power come under the general rule, and in that there is nothing to absolve them from their allegiance to their queen, so long as she does not persecute the Catholic religion, and so long as she rules justly, according to the constitution and laws of her realm.

As to the question of persecution raised by the Review, and the alleged duty of temporal princes to extirpate heresy

from their dominions, we have only a word to say; for it will be time enough to discuss it at length when Protestants cease to persecute the Church. It is not in reply to an English or Scotch Reviewer in 1850 or 1851, that we shall attempt to prove that ours is not a persecuting Church. The old penal laws against Catholics are not yet all wiped out from the English statute-books, and the recent Ecclesiastical 'Titles Act, which renders the exercise of the Catholic religion in Great Britain contrary to the civil law, shows what sort of friends of religious freedom English Protestants are. No matter what the pretences are, the recent law is an act of pure persecution, and as such it would make even Protestants ashamed, if shame they had, of calling themselves the friends of religious liberty. The Reviewer's impudence in pretending to be the advocate of religious liberty while approving that law, is a little too great to permit us to treat him with that courtesy which we always wish to observe towards an opponent. As for the Church, she asserts the freedom of religion, but she does not, that we are aware, assert the freedom either of heresy or of infidelity. She does not profess liberality, nor boast toleration as one of her glories; but she has never authorized the punishment of heretics with other than ecclesiastical censures, save when and where they have attacked the legally established order of things. The Church is a kingdom, a spiritual society, and it is ridiculous to say that she has not as much right to defend and protect herself as any civil society has to protect itself. When a class of heretics, like the Albigenses, arise and attack both her and civil society, not with spiritual weapons alone, but with fire and sword, burning her churches and convents, violating her religious, massacring her priests, and assassinating her cardinals and legates, she has the right, if she has the right to be at all, to call in the civil arm to protect her; nay, to call upon the princes whose subjects these enemies of religion and pests of society are, and who are bound by their oaths and the constitutions of their states to defend her, to extirpate them from their dominions; and to depose them, if, instead of doing it, they favor them. This is the only sort of persecution the Church has authorized, and we shall not so insult good sense or outrage common justice as to apologize for it. We should as soon think of apologizing for shutting up a thief in prison, or hanging a cold-blooded murderer.

